Deuteronomy 24

Sugya Map

• Core Issue: The hermeneutics of ervat davar (Deut. 24:1)—defining the threshold for get (divorce).
• The Conflict: Is ervat davar a moral transgression (Beit Shammai) or a subjective lack of favor/character deficiency (Beit Hillel/Ibn Ezra)?
• Nafqa Mina: The status of the woman post-divorce (e.g., prohibition to the first husband if she marries another) and the validity of a get issued for non-moral, purely subjective incompatibility.
• Primary Sources: Deuteronomy 24:1–4; Gittin 90a–b; Rambam, Hilchot Gerushin 10:1–3.

Text Snapshot

The Torah introduces the parashah of the get with the phrase: כִּי־יִקַּח אִישׁ אִשָּׁה וּבְעָלָהּ וְהָיָה אִם־לֹא תִמְצָא חֵן בְּעֵינָיו כִּי־מָצָא בָהּ עֶרְוַת דָּבָר (Deut. 24:1).

• Linguistic Nuance: The phrase ervat davar is famously ambiguous. Ervah usually denotes sexual impropriety (Lev. 18). However, davar (thing/matter) serves as a syntactic buffer.
• Dikduk: Note the sequence: lo timtza chen (subjective) precedes ki matza bah ervat davar (objective). The juxtaposition implies a causal link: the lack of chen (favor) is triggered by or manifests as the ervat davar.
• Ba'al HaTurim: Ervat davar (ר"ת: בעד עד דבר) – implying that ervah necessitates edim (witnesses). This is a masterful midrashic pivot: the "matter" of the "shame" is not just the act, but the evidentiary requirement to substantiate it.

Readings

1. Ibn Ezra: The Subjectivist's Defense

Ibn Ezra (ad loc.) offers a striking departure from the Talmudic debate. He posits that ervat davar need not imply moral turpitude. He suggests that the woman is kesherah (fit/virtuous), but her "nature" is simply the reverse of her husband’s. For Ibn Ezra, the Torah acknowledges that incompatibility is a legitimate davar—a "matter"—of ervah (obscurity/shame). His reading hinges on the vav in u-matza (which he reads into the text), treating the causes for divorce as an "either/or" list: she is either morally deficient OR simply not favored. This preserves the husband’s autonomy while stripping away the stigma that Beit Shammai would impose on the divorcee.

2. Rambam: The Juridical Reality

In Hilchot Gerushin (10:1–3), Maimonides synthesizes the Halacha by framing the get as a purely legal transaction. He sidesteps the moralizing of the get process, focusing instead on the kefidah (requirement) that the bill of divorce must be written lishmah (for her sake) and bi-divur (through a declaration). While the Torah speaks of ervat davar, the Rambam treats the husband’s capacity to initiate divorce as an absolute legal prerogative. He does not mandate that the husband "prove" the ervah; the get itself creates the legal state of divorce. The "sin" warned against in the parashah is not the divorce itself (if done properly), but the cycle of remarriage described in verses 2–4.

Friction

The Kushya: The "Sin" of Incompatibility

The most acute tension arises from the closing of the parashah: "You must not bring sin upon the land" (Deut. 24:4). If, as Ibn Ezra suggests, divorce is permissible simply because she "finds no favor in his eyes," why does the Torah surround the get with such heavy moral language? If divorce is a neutral legal tool, why is it "abhorrent to God" (to'evah) for the first husband to remarry his ex-wife after she has been with another?

The Terutz

The terutz lies in the distinction between legal validity and moral integrity. The Torah treats the get as a "necessary evil" when chen is lost. However, the prohibition of returning to the first husband serves as a structural deterrent against "easy" divorce. By creating an irreversible wall (the issur of chazarah), the Torah forces the husband to weigh the finality of his decision. The "sin" is not the act of divorce itself, but the frivolous, iterative use of it—treating a human relationship like a replaceable commodity. The ervat davar is the cause for the legal process, but the remarriage restriction is the guardrail for the society.

Intertext

• Gittin 90b: The classic Machloket. Beit Shammai: Only for ervah. Beit Hillel: Even if she spoiled his food. R. Akiva: Even if he found another more beautiful. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 119) codifies the Hillelite approach, effectively decoupling the get from the requirement of "moral cause."
• Malachi 2:16: "For I hate divorce, says the Lord..." This provides the prophetic counterpoint to the Deuteronomic legal framework, illustrating the tension between the Halakhic permission of the get and the Aggadic ideal of the covenantal union.

Psak/Practice

The psak remains firm: the get is a kinyan (acquisition) in reverse. Once the get is handed over (delivery/possession), the marriage is severed. Modern practice focuses exclusively on the formalism of the get (the lishmah, the edim, the sefer). The subjective "reason" for the divorce is entirely irrelevant to the kosher status of the document. The meta-halakhic heuristic is clear: the law protects the rights of the parties to exit a failed union, even if the "failure" is subjective, while the ethical burden remains on the individuals to avoid the "abhorrence" of reckless dissolution.

Takeaway

The Torah acknowledges the tragedy of the "lost favor," providing a legal exit (the get) while simultaneously erecting a permanent barrier (the prohibition of remarriage) to ensure that the sanctity of the original bond is not treated with triviality. Legal finality is the antidote to emotional instability.