Leviticus 20

Sugya Map

• Issue: The precise dikduk and halachic implications of the unusual word order "ואל בני ישראל תאמר" (And to the Children of Israel you shall say) in Leviticus 20:1.
• Nafka Mina(s): Determining the scope of chiyuv for Bnei Noach regarding certain prohibitions (e.g., Avodah Zarah like Molech, Arayot).
• Primary Sources: Leviticus 20:1-2; Malbim, Kedoshim 88:1; Malbim, Ayelet HaShachar 111:1-4, 260:1; Sanhedrin 56a; Zevachim 108a.

Text Snapshot

וַיְדַבֵּר יְהֹוָה, אֶל-מֹשֶׁה לֵּאמֹר: א. וְאֶל-בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל תֹּאמַר: אִישׁ אִישׁ מִבְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וּמִן-הַגֵּר הַגָּר בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל, אֲשֶׁר יִתֵּן מִזַּרְעוֹ לַמֹּלֶךְ--מוֹת יוּמָת; עַם הָאָרֶץ יִרְגְּמוּהוּ בָאֶבֶן. Leviticus 20:1-2

Note the inversion: typically, the verb precedes the subject ("דבר אל בני ישראל"). Here, it's "ואל בני ישראל תאמר," placing the object ("בני ישראל") first. This leshon is the subject of Malbim's profound dikduk.

Readings

• Malbim (Kedoshim 88:1): The Malbim posits that an inverted word order, where the object precedes the verb (e.g., "ואל בני ישראל תאמר" instead of "דבר אל בני ישראל"), is not merely stylistic. Instead, it signals a gader (definition/limitation) or ribui (inclusion) regarding the subject, "בני ישראל". For R' Yosi, this specific dikduk is the source that even Bnei Noach are muchravim in certain arayot and Molech, despite the general principle of "דברה תורה כלשון בני אדם" where "איש איש" wouldn't necessarily include them.
• Rav Hirsch (Leviticus 20:1:1): Rav Hirsch contextualizes Chapter 20 as the penal code for Chapter 18's arayot, emphasizing the severe consequences (מיתת בית דין or כרת) for transgressions that undermine the nation's holiness. He highlights the placement of Chapter 19 (sanctity of life) between the prohibitions and their punishments, underscoring the deep connection between arayot and national holiness.

Friction

The strongest kushya arises from R' Yosi's stance (Sanhedrin 56a; Zevachim 108a) that "דברה תורה כלשון בני אדם" (the Torah speaks in the language of people), meaning phrases like "איש איש" (any man) are not necessarily merabeh (inclusive) of Bnei Noach but simply common parlance. If so, how are Bnei Noach included in prohibitions like Molech and arayot? The terutz, according to Malbim, is that the unusual inversion "ואל בני ישראל תאמר" itself acts as the dikduk that forces the "איש איש" within the chapter to be doik (precise) and thus merabeh Bnei Noach for these particular mitzvot. Without this specific grammatical nuance, R' Yosi would maintain that "איש איש" is merely lashon bnei adam.

Intertext

• Sanhedrin 56a: Discusses the Seven Noachide Laws, including the general chiyuv of Bnei Noach in arayot and avodah zarah.
• Zevachim 108a: The Gemara establishes the principle of "דברה תורה כלשון בני אדם" regarding various textual redundancies, which typically limits derashot from common phrasing.

Psak/Practice

The Malbim's analysis reveals a critical hermeneutic principle: even seemingly minor grammatical deviations in the Torah can carry profound halachic weight, especially when juxtaposed with broader interpretive rules like "דברה תורה כלשון בני אדם." It demonstrates that Chazal's derashot are not arbitrary but rooted in meticulous textual sensitivity. In practice, this informs our understanding of Bnei Noach obligations, showing how specific textual nuances delineate their inclusion where general phrases might not suffice.

Takeaway

The Malbim teaches us to relentlessly scrutinize every dikduk in Leshon HaKodesh, as even an inverted word order can be the lynchpin for fundamental halachic scope, defining obligations for all humanity.