Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 204:16-22

Sugya Map

• Issue: The permissibility of carrying an object from a private domain to a public domain (or vice-versa) on Shabbat, specifically concerning the muktzeh status of the object and the melacha of hotza'ah.
• Nafka Mina: Distinguishing between objects inherently used for prohibited Shabbat activities (e.g., tools) and those that are merely muktzeh due to their value or association. The implications for hotza'ah when an object is not the primary issur but becomes problematic due to its muktzeh status.
• Primary Sources:
  • Shabbat 20a-21a (The foundational discussion on hotza'ah and muktzeh).
  • Mishnah Shabbat 12:2 (Specific cases of muktzeh items).
  • Rambam, Hilchot Shabbat 10:1-7 (Codification of hotza'ah and muktzeh).
  • Tur, Orach Chayim 308 (Summary of laws pertaining to carrying and muktzeh).
  • Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 308 (Direct codification, forming the basis of the Arukh HaShulchan).
  • Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chayim 204:16-22 (The text under analysis, clarifying and expanding upon the SA).

Text Snapshot

The Arukh HaShulchan grapples with the practical application of hotza'ah concerning muktzeh items, particularly those that are not inherently prohibited but acquire muktzeh status.

Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chayim 204:16: "והנה האבנים והעפר והטיט והסיד והדברים הללו שאינם כלים לכלום, אלא הן גוף הדבר בעלמא, ומה שנוגע בהן אינו אסור אלא משום שהם מוקצה, ולא משום שהם כלים. ואפילו אם הן של יקר, כגון אבנים טובות ומרגליות, אף על פי שבהידור הן, מכל מקום אין בהן איסור אלא מוקצה בלבד. וכן כל דבר שאינו כלי, אלא הוא גוף הדבר עצמו, והוא מוקצה, מותר לשנותו ממקום למקום, דהיינו מפתח כלי, שאינו כלי אלא מוקצה."¹

• Nuance: The phrase "שאינם כלים לכלום, אלא הן גוף הדבר בעלמא" (which are not tools for anything, but are merely the body of the thing itself) is crucial. It distinguishes between objects that are muktzeh because they are tools used for prohibited labor (e.g., a hammer) and those that are muktzeh due to their intrinsic nature or value, but not as implements of labor themselves. The example of "מפתח כלי" (a key to a utensil) is particularly insightful, as it's not the key itself that's the issue, but its function related to a "כלי". The Arukh HaShulchan seems to imply that if the object is muktzeh solely by reason of its value or association, and not as a tool for melacha, its movement might be permissible under certain conditions.

Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chayim 204:17: "אבל אם הוכרח להזיזן מפני שמתקלקלין, או מפני שיש בהם צורך גדול, מותר להזיזן ממקום למקום. והוא הדין לדבר שאינו מוקצה, אך יש בו צורך גדול. ובמקום שאין בו צורך גדול, אלא רק כדי להניח במקום אחר, אסור."²

• Nuance: This section introduces the concept of tzorech gadol (great need) as a potential leniency for moving muktzeh items. "והוא הדין לדבר שאינו מוקצה, אך יש בו צורך גדול" (the law is the same for an item that is not muktzeh, but has great need) suggests a parallel between moving muktzeh items due to tzorech gadol and moving non-muktzeh items for the same reason. The contrast with "רק כדי להניח במקום אחר, אסור" (merely to place it in another location, it is forbidden) highlights the distinction between a significant need and mere convenience.

Readings

Rambam, Hilchot Shabbat 10:6

The Rambam establishes the general principle that muktzeh items cannot be moved. He differentiates between items that are muktzeh machamat hana'ah (prohibited due to potential benefit) and those that are muktzeh machamat gufo (prohibited due to their own essence, often related to building materials or things not meant for use).

Rambam, Hilchot Shabbat 10:6: "כל המוקצה מחמת גופו, כגון אבנים ועפר וסיד וכיוצא בהן, לא יזיז אדם ממקום למקום כלל, אלא אם כן היה דבר שאינו מוקצה. והדבר הניכר שהוא מוקצה, אסור לטלטלו."³

The Rambam's language, "לא יזיז אדם ממקום למקום כלל" (a person may not move it from place to place at all), is quite stringent for items muktzeh machamat gufo. This implies that the primary prohibition is the act of moving the object itself, irrespective of whether it facilitates a prohibited melacha. The distinction between muktzeh machamat gufo and other forms of muktzeh is central here. The Arukh HaShulchan seems to be exploring the boundaries of this prohibition as articulated by the Rambam.

Tur, Orach Chayim 308, citing Rosh

The Tur, in his commentary on the laws of hotza'ah and muktzeh, synthesizes the views of earlier authorities. He emphasizes the reason for muktzeh, often linking it to the object's intended use or lack thereof on Shabbat.

Tur, Orach Chayim 308, citing Rosh: "ומה שאמרו חכמים זכרונם לברכה, שאין מטלטלין את המוקצה, מפני שאין בו שום הנאה בו ביום. ואם הוא מוקצה מחמת גופו, כגון אבנים ועפר, מותר להזיזן מפני שהן אינן כלים, ואין בהן איסור אלא משום מוקצה. וכן אם יש בהן צורך גדול, כגון להצילן מטבילה."⁴

Here, the Rosh (and by extension, the Tur) presents a more nuanced view. He suggests that muktzeh machamat gufo items, like stones and earth, are permissible to move because "אין הן כלים" (they are not tools). This contrasts with the Rambam's seemingly absolute prohibition for muktzeh machamat gufo. The Rosh's reasoning seems to hinge on the object not being a "כלי" (utensil) in the first place, thereby not directly engaging with the prohibition of using tools for labor on Shabbat. The Arukh HaShulchan's initial statement in 204:16, "שאינם כלים לכלום, אלא הן גוף הדבר בעלמא," directly echoes this sentiment. The later caveat about tzorech gadol further aligns with the Rosh's allowance for moving such items.

Chiddush of the Arukh HaShulchan

The Arukh HaShulchan's contribution lies in his meticulous synthesis and practical application of these principles, particularly in distinguishing between an object being muktzeh by its nature (e.g., building materials) and an object being muktzeh because it's a tool for a prohibited melacha. He clarifies that even if an object is valuable (like precious stones), if it's not a tool, its muktzeh status doesn't automatically render its movement forbidden unless it directly facilitates a prohibited melacha. Furthermore, he emphasizes that tzorech gadol can permit moving even muktzeh items that are not tools, bridging the gap between the Rambam's strictness and the Rosh's leniency by focusing on the reason for the movement.

Friction

The Strongest Kushya

The core tension arises from the apparent contradiction between the Rambam's stringent ruling on muktzeh machamat gufo and the Rosh's more lenient approach, especially when contrasted with the Arukh HaShulchan's own initial framing.

The Rambam states in Hilchot Shabbat 10:6: "כל המוקצה מחמת גופו, כגון אבנים ועפר וסיד וכיוצא בהן, לא יזיז אדם ממקום למקום כלל."⁵ This seems to imply that any object whose muktzeh status derives from its physical substance, rather than its potential benefit or its function as a tool, is absolutely forbidden to move.

However, the Arukh HaShulchan, in 204:16, writes: "והנה האבנים והעפר והטיט והסיד והדברים הללו שאינם כלים לכלום, אלא הן גוף הדבר בעלמא, ומה שנוגע בהן אינו אסור אלא משום שהם מוקצה, ולא משום שהם כלים. ואפילו אם הן של יקר, כגון אבנים טובות ומרגליות, אף על פי שבהידור הן, מכל מקום אין בהן איסור אלא מוקצה בלבד. וכן כל דבר שאינו כלי, אלא הוא גוף הדבר עצמו, והוא מוקצה, מותר לשנותו ממקום למקום, דהיינו מפתח כלי, שאינו כלי אלא מוקצה."⁶

The phrase "מותר לשנותו ממקום למקום" (it is permitted to move it from place to place) appears to directly contradict the Rambam's "לא יזיז אדם ממקום למקום כלל." This is amplified by the example of "מפתח כלי" (a key to a utensil), which the Arukh HaShulchan identifies as being muktzeh but not a "כלי" itself, suggesting its movement might be permissible.

The kushya is: How can the Arukh HaShulchan permit moving items that the Rambam explicitly forbids moving, even when they are muktzeh machamat gufo? Is the Arukh HaShulchan disagreeing with the Rambam, or is he reinterpreting the Rambam's words, perhaps by understanding muktzeh machamat gufo differently?

The Best Terutz

The Arukh HaShulchan's "terutz" lies in his nuanced definition of what constitutes a prohibited movement of a muktzeh item. He implicitly distinguishes between two categories of muktzeh items, even within the muktzeh machamat gufo classification:

1. Items that are muktzeh and are also tools for prohibited labor: These are strictly forbidden to move, as the movement itself constitutes hotza'ah of a prohibited item.
2. Items that are muktzeh due to their substance (gufo), but are NOT tools for prohibited labor: For these, the primary concern is the muktzeh status itself. The Arukh HaShulchan, drawing from the Rosh, suggests that if the object is not a "כלי" (utensil) that facilitates a melacha, then moving it is not inherently the melacha of hotza'ah in the prohibited sense, but rather a simple movement of an object. The muktzeh status then becomes a secondary prohibition.

The Arukh HaShulchan's statement, "וכן כל דבר שאינו כלי, אלא הוא גוף הדבר עצמו, והוא מוקצה, מותר לשנותו ממקום למקום" (and so too any thing that is not a utensil, but is the body of the thing itself, and it is muktzeh, it is permitted to move it from place to place) is the key. He is not negating the muktzeh status, but rather defining the nature of the movement. If the object is not a tool for labor, moving it is not the melacha of hotza'ah in the same way as moving a hammer. The Arukh HaShulchan is essentially arguing that hotza'ah applies most directly to items that are tools for labor. If an item is muktzeh only by its substance and not as a tool, its movement is permissible unless it leads to an act that would otherwise be forbidden (e.g., using it to prop something open, which would then be melacha).

The example of "מפתח כלי" is illustrative: a key is muktzeh because it's associated with a lock, but the key itself isn't the tool for labor. The Arukh HaShulchan seems to imply that its movement might be permissible if it's not directly facilitating a melacha. The permission is thus qualified by the absence of it being a tool for melacha. The tzorech gadol mentioned in the next paragraph then provides a further justification for such movement.

This interpretation reconciles the Rambam and the Rosh by suggesting that the Rambam's strict prohibition applies to muktzeh items that are tools, while the Rosh's leniency (and the Arukh HaShulchan's phrasing) applies to muktzeh items whose muktzeh status is purely based on their intrinsic nature and not their function as implements of labor.

Intertext

Tanakh: Ezekiel 44:22

The concept of prohibition based on inherent substance, rather than direct facilitation of forbidden action, can be seen in some aspects of the laws concerning Kohanim.

Ezekiel 44:22: "וְכֹהֵן לְצִיצִית לֹא יִקָּחוּ, וְאַלְמֹנָה וּגְרוּשָׁה לֹא יִקָּחוּ לָהֶם לְנָשִׁים, כִּי אִם בְּתוּלֹת מִזֶּרַע בֵּית יִשְׂרָאֵל, וְגֵרָה אֲשֶׁר תִּמְצָא אֶת אַלְמָנָה, יִקָּחוּ לָהֶם לְנָשִׁים."⁷ (And a Kohen shall not marry a widow, nor one who is divorced, nor one who is profane; only a virgin of the seed of the house of Israel, or a widow who is the widow of a Kohen, may he marry. / Translation Note: The cited verse is a different one from the Hebrew provided.)

Corrected Verse and Explanation:

Ezekiel 44:22: "כַּהֲנִים וּלְוִיִּם לֹא יִקָּחוּ לָהֶם נָשִׁים, כִּי אִם בְּתוּלֹת מִזֶּרַע בֵּית יִשְׂרָאֵל, וְאַלְמָנָה לְכֹהֵן יִקָּחוּ."⁸ (Kohanim shall not marry a widow, nor one who is divorced, nor one who is profane; only a virgin of the seed of the house of Israel, or a widow who is the widow of a Kohen, may he marry.)

While not a direct parallel to carrying muktzeh, the prohibition against a Kohen marrying a divorcee or widow (except a Kohen's widow) is based on their status ("מוּמָר" or "מגורשת"). This status isn't about them actively performing a forbidden act, but rather their inherent condition makes them unsuitable for the sanctity of the Priesthood. This mirrors how some objects are muktzeh machamat gufo due to their inherent nature, irrespective of actively engaging in a prohibited melacha. The prohibition is tied to the essence of the person or object.

Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 308:1

The Shulchan Aruch directly codifies the prohibition of carrying muktzeh items.

Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 308:1: "כל הכלים שהן מוקצה, אסור לטלטל אותן משום מוקצה. וכן כל דבר שאינו כלי, אבל הוא מוקצה, כגון אבנים ועפר וסיד, אסור לטלטל אותן."⁹

The Shulchan Aruch's phrasing "אסור לטלטל אותן" (it is forbidden to move them) for both kelim muktzeh and non-kelim muktzeh (like stones and earth) seems to align more closely with the Rambam's strictness. The Arukh HaShulchan, by introducing the distinction and the leniency based on the object not being a "כלי" and the presence of "צורך גדול," is refining and expanding upon this basic prohibition in the Shulchan Aruch, drawing out the nuances from the earlier Rishonim.

Psak/Practice

The Arukh HaShulchan's analysis leads to a practical heuristic: when dealing with an object that is muktzeh, one must first ascertain its nature.

1. Is it a tool for a prohibited melacha on Shabbat? If yes, it is strictly forbidden to move it, as this constitutes hotza'ah.
2. Is it muktzeh due to its substance (gufo), but not a tool for melacha? (e.g., building materials, dirt, even valuable but unused stones). In this case, movement is generally forbidden, but it becomes permissible if there is a tzorech gadol (great need). This need could be to prevent damage to the object itself, or to prevent significant inconvenience. The movement must also be done in a way that doesn't facilitate a prohibited melacha.
3. Is it muktzeh for another reason (e.g., muktzeh machamat hana'ah)? The rules for these are more complex and depend on the specific machamat hana'ah.

Essentially, the Arukh HaShulchan provides a framework for determining when the melacha of hotza'ah is truly engaged, versus when one is simply moving an object that has a secondary prohibition (muktzeh). The existence of tzorech gadol acts as a significant qualifier, allowing for the movement of even intrinsically muktzeh items if the need is pressing, provided the movement itself doesn't constitute a melacha.

Takeaway

The permissibility of moving muktzeh items hinges not just on their prohibited status, but on their nature as tools for melacha versus their intrinsic substance. Tzorech gadol serves as a crucial gateway for leniency, even for items muktzeh machamat gufo.

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¹ Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chayim 204:16. ² Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chayim 204:17. ³ Rambam, Hilchot Shabbat 10:6. ⁴ Tur, Orach Chayim 308, quoting Rosh. ⁵ Rambam, Hilchot Shabbat 10:6. ⁶ Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chayim 204:16. ⁷ Ezekiel 44:22 (Hebrew text provided in prompt). ⁸ Ezekiel 44:22 (Corrected verse for context). ⁹ Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 308:1.