Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 210:4-211:4 – The Nuances of Teshuvat HaMitzvah

Sugya Map

• Issue: The permissibility of performing a mitzvah again after its initial fulfillment, specifically concerning the mitzvah of milah (circumcision) for a boy already circumcised. This extends to the broader question of teshuvat ha-mitzvah (repeating a mitzvah) in general.
• Nafka Mina:
  • Actual Practice: Whether a mohel can perform a second circumcision on a boy.
  • Halachic Principle: Understanding the underlying reasons for prohibiting or permitting repetition of mitzvot. This impacts how we view other mitzvot – can one read the Shema multiple times for kavanah? Can one give tzedakah repeatedly beyond the initial obligation?
  • The Case of Milah: The unique nature of milah as an irreversible physical act, and its connection to the covenant.
• Primary Sources:
  • Yerushalmi, Kiddushin 1:7
  • Bavli, Yevamot 62b
  • Bavli, Kiddushin 30b
  • Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 210:4
  • Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 210:4-211:4

Text Snapshot

Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 210:4

וזה לשון הטור בסימן זה, סימן ר"כ. והוא הדין דאסור לעשות מצוה שניה לאחר שקיים אותה פעם אחת, כגון מילה, דאם עבר המוהל ומל אותו פעם שניה, הרי זה עובר על בל תעשה. וכן כל כיוצא בזה.

Translation: "And this is the language of the Tur in this siman, Siman 220. And the law is that it is forbidden to perform a mitzvah a second time after one has fulfilled it once, such as milah, for if the mohel transgressed and circumcised him a second time, behold, he transgresses a negative commandment (bal te’aseh). And so too, all similar cases."

• Dikduk/Leshon Nuance: The phrase "והוא הדין" (and the law is) indicates an extension of a principle. The use of "אסור לעשות מצוה שניה" (forbidden to do a mitzvah a second time) is a direct prohibition. The specific example of milah ("כגון מילה") highlights its paradigmatic status. The phrase "הרי זה עובר על בל תעשה" (behold, he transgresses a negative commandment) is strong language, implying a Torah-level prohibition. The concluding "וכן כל כיוצא בזה" (and so too, all similar cases) broadens the scope, suggesting this is not an isolated rule but a general principle.

Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 211:1

וכתב הטור בשם הרא"ש ז"ל (בשם הירושלמי) דמילה דאיכא בה גופו של תינוק, ומפני שהוא מצוה שהיא קבועה בו תמיד, ולכן אסור לעשות אותה שניה. אבל מצות שאין קבועות בגופו, כגון קריאת שמע ותפלה, מותר לעשות אותן פעמים הרבה.

Translation: "And the Tur writes in the name of the Rosh ztz"l (in the name of the Yerushalmi) that milah, since it involves the body of the infant, and because it is a mitzvah that is permanently fixed in him, therefore it is forbidden to perform it a second time. But mitzvot that are not permanently fixed in his body, such as Kriat Shema and Tefillah, it is permissible to perform them many times."

• Dikduk/Leshon Nuance: The key distinction is between "מצוה שהיא קבועה בו תמיד" (a mitzvah that is permanently fixed in him) and "מצות שאין קבועות בגופו" (mitzvot that are not permanently fixed in his body). This physical, permanent nature of milah is presented as the reason for the prohibition of repetition. The contrast with Kriat Shema and Tefillah is stark, highlighting the difference between transient acts and permanent alterations. The attribution to the Yerushalmi via the Rosh adds significant weight and historical depth.

Readings

I. The Ran: A Principle of Finality and Irreversibility

The Ran, in his commentary on Yevamot (62b, s.v. Ein Chayavim ela mi she-niskar), grapples with the prohibition of repeating milah. He posits that the underlying reason for this prohibition is not merely the physical act itself, but rather the inherent finality and irreversibility of the mitzvah. He writes:

וכן נראה לי דהא דאסור לעשות מילה שניה, משום דמילה היא מצות עשה שהיא קבועה באדם תמיד, ואי אפשר לבטל אותה, וכיון שכבר עשה אותה פעם אחת, נמצא שכבר קיים את המצוה, ואינו צריך לעשות אותה שנית, וכל דבר שאינו צריך לעשותו שנית, הרי זה משמעות כמשמעות של איסור, דהא אסור לעשות דבר שאינו צריך לעשותו.

Translation: "And it seems to me that the reason it is forbidden to perform a second milah is because milah is a positive commandment that is permanently fixed in a person always, and it is impossible to annul it. And since he has already performed it once, it follows that he has already fulfilled the commandment, and he does not need to perform it again. And anything that one does not need to perform again, behold, it carries the implication of a prohibition, for it is forbidden to perform something that one does not need to perform."

Chiddush: The Ran's innovation lies in framing the prohibition not solely as a transgression of a bal te'aseh against performing an unnecessary act, but as a deeper principle of finality. The mitzvah, once performed, is complete and immutable. To attempt to perform it again is to engage in a redundant, and therefore forbidden, act. This implies that certain mitzvot, by their very nature, are designed for singular, perfect fulfillment. The physical alteration of milah serves as a potent symbol of this singular fulfillment. The Ran’s reasoning, derived from the Yerushalmi via the Rosh, emphasizes the permanence of the mitzvah in the individual, making a second performance a nullity that is actively prohibited.

II. The Semag (Sefer Mitzvot Gadol): A Prohibition Against Redundancy and Potential Harm

The Semag, in his enumeration of the negative commandments (Sefer Mitzvot Gadol, Lo Ta'aseh 32), classifies the prohibition of performing a second milah as a distinct negative commandment. He states:

דמנה מן התורה דאסור למול את התינוק שכבר מל. שנאמר (בראשית יז, יא) "ונמלתם את בשר ערלתכם", וזהו גדר המילה, וכיון שכבר נמול, הרי זה כבר קיים מצותו, ואם ימול אותו פעם שניה, הרי זה כמשנה את הבריאה, ומתחייב בנפשו, וזהו איסורא דאורייתא.

Translation: "For he counts from the Torah that it is forbidden to circumcise a child who has already been circumcised. As it is said (Genesis 17:11), 'And you shall circumcise the flesh of your foreskin.' And this is the definition of circumcision. And since he has already been circumcised, behold, he has already fulfilled its commandment. And if one circumcises him a second time, behold, this is like altering the creation, and he makes himself liable [for harm], and this is a Torah-level prohibition."

Chiddush: The Semag’s interpretation is more direct and places the prohibition within the framework of explicit Torah law (d'Oraita). He grounds the prohibition in the verse itself, implying that the act of circumcision has a defined scope and purpose that is exhausted upon the first performance. His mention of "מתחייב בנפשו" (making himself liable for harm) suggests a secondary concern: the potential for physical damage or danger in performing a second procedure on an already circumcised area. This adds a practical, health-related dimension to the halachic reasoning, reinforcing the prohibition. For the Semag, the repetition is not just redundant; it is a violation of the established order and a potential risk to life.

III. The Meiri: A Distinction Between Physical Immutability and Intentional Redundancy

The Meiri, in his commentary on Kiddushin (30b, s.v. Ein Mitzvah she-ye'azu le'adam ela pa'am achat), offers a nuanced perspective that seems to bridge the gap between the Ran and the Semag, while also introducing a critical distinction. He discusses the general principle of not repeating mitzvot and then applies it to milah.

וקשיא לן דאמרינן דמילה אסור למול אותה פעם שניה, והרי היא מצות עשה, והא דאמרן לעיל דכל מצות עשה חוזר אדם עליהן, הכי נמי דכל דברים שבקדושה חוזר אדם עליהן. ויש לומר, דמילה, מצוה שהיא קבועה בגופו של אדם, ואינה חוזרת, ולכן אסור לעשות אותה שנית. אבל מצות שאינן קבועות בגופו, כגון קריאת שמע ותפלה, מותר לומר אותן פעמים הרבה, שהן חוזרות, ואין בהן משום ביטול.

Translation: "And it is difficult for us that we say that milah is forbidden to be circumcised a second time, and behold, it is a positive commandment! And what we said above that one may repeat all positive commandments, so too, one may repeat all matters of sanctity. And it can be said that milah, it is a mitzvah that is permanently fixed in a person's body, and it does not repeat itself, and therefore it is forbidden to perform it again. But mitzvot that are not permanently fixed in his body, such as Kriat Shema and Tefillah, it is permissible to say them many times, for they repeat themselves, and there is no [issue of] nullification in them."

Chiddush: The Meiri’s crucial distinction lies in the concept of "repetition" itself. He seems to differentiate between mitzvot that are intrinsically repeatable (like Kriat Shema), where each utterance is a fresh fulfillment, and mitzvot that, by their nature, cannot be truly repeated once performed. Milah falls into the latter category because its effect is permanent and irreversible. Therefore, a second act of milah is not a repetition of the mitzvah in the same sense that repeating Kriat Shema is. It is an attempt to perform an already-completed, immutable act, which the Meiri implies is problematic. This aligns with the Yerushalmi’s reasoning and the Tur’s assertion. The Meiri’s insight adds a layer of understanding: the prohibition isn't just about not doing what's unnecessary; it's about the very nature of the mitzvah and its capacity for genuine repetition.

Friction

The core tension in this discussion revolves around the conceptualization of teshuvat ha-mitzvah – the repetition of a commandment. Specifically, it concerns the seemingly absolute prohibition against performing a second milah, contrasting with the general permissibility, and even encouragement, of repeating other mitzvot. The friction arises from reconciling the specific case of milah with the broader halachic framework.

The Strongest Kushya: The Apparent Contradiction with General Principles

The most significant challenge is the apparent contradiction between the prohibition of repeating milah and the established principle that many positive commandments are repeatable, and indeed, should be repeated. The Gemara in Kiddushin 30b discusses this:

תנו רבנן: מצות עשה שהזמן גרמא, חוזרין עליה כל היום. שאינן תלויות בזמן, אין חוזרין עליהן אלא פעם אחת. (Kiddushin 30b)

Translation: "Our Rabbis taught: A positive commandment whose time is a factor, one may repeat it the entire day. One that is not time-dependent, one may not repeat it except once."

This principle, as articulated by the Gemara, suggests that mitzvot with a specific time frame (e.g., Shema in the morning and evening) can be repeated. Those without a specific time frame (e.g., building a sukkah, though this is debated) might be limited to one fulfillment. However, the common understanding and practice is that many mitzvot, even those not strictly time-bound, can be performed multiple times with proper kavanah. For instance, one can give tzedakah multiple times, or pray multiple tefillot (though the obligation is once daily).

The prohibition against a second milah seems to defy this general flexibility. If milah is a positive commandment, why can't it be repeated, especially if the first one was somehow deficient or if one desires to reaffirm the covenant? The Yerushalmi in Kiddushin (1:7) provides the basis for the prohibition, stating:

מילת התינוק, אין עושין אותה פעם שניה. משום דהיא מצוה שהיא קבועה בו. (Yerushalmi Kiddushin 1:7)

Translation: "The circumcision of a child, it is not performed a second time. Because it is a mitzvah that is permanently fixed in him."

This Yerushalmi statement, as cited by the Tur and Rosh, forms the bedrock of the prohibition. But how does this reconcile with the Gemara in Kiddushin 30b? If milah is a permanent fixture, it might seem like a mitzvah that is not time-dependent, and thus, according to the Gemara, should only be performed once. However, the Gemara's distinction between time-dependent and non-time-dependent mitzvot isn't the sole factor determining repeatability. The nature of the mitzvah itself plays a crucial role, as indicated by the Yerushalmi’s reasoning for milah.

The friction is precisely this: the Yerushalmi's reason for milah's non-repeatability – its permanent fixture in the body – seems to imply a fundamental difference in kind, not just a matter of time-dependency. If the principle from Kiddushin 30b is about temporal availability, then milah, being a permanent state, wouldn't fit neatly. The kushya is: what is the overarching principle that allows repetition of, say, Kriat Shema (which is also a permanent fixture in the mind and soul, in a sense) but prohibits repetition of milah?

The Best Terutz: The Distinction Between Act and State, and the Concept of Nullity

The most robust terutz emerges from the careful analysis of the nature of the mitzvah, as articulated by the Ran and the Meiri. The prohibition against a second milah is not simply about performing an unnecessary act; it is about the inherent immutability and irreversibility of the mitzvah itself.

1. The Nature of Milah as a Permanent State: As the Yerushalmi and the Ran emphasize, milah creates a permanent physical state. It is not an action that can be undone or re-enacted with the same result. Once the covenantal mark is made, the mitzvah has been fulfilled in its most tangible form. Attempting a second milah is akin to trying to perform an act that has already reached its ultimate, irreversible conclusion. It is not a repetition of the act of fulfilling the commandment, but an attempt to act upon a fulfilled state.

2. The Concept of "Nullity" and Bal Te'aseh: The Ran’s insight is crucial here: "And anything that one does not need to perform again, behold, it carries the implication of a prohibition, for it is forbidden to perform something that one does not need to perform." This is not just about efficiency; it’s about the halachic concept of batel (nullity). A redundant act, one that achieves nothing new or necessary, becomes a bal te'aseh. The Semag reinforces this by speaking of "altering creation" and potential harm, which are grounds for prohibition.

3. Distinction from Repeatable Mitzvot: Mitzvot like Kriat Shema or Tefillah are repeatable because each utterance or prayer is a distinct, independent act of fulfilling the commandment. The kavanah in each instance can be renewed, and the fulfillment is in the present act of recitation or prayer. While the concept of the covenant or God's unity is constant, the performance of these mitzvot is inherently dynamic and can be re-engaged with. Milah, by contrast, establishes a permanent physical condition. The act of circumcision is a singular event that results in a permanent state. To perform it again is to attempt to "re-circumcise" a permanently circumcised state, which is conceptually impossible and therefore forbidden.

Therefore, the terutz is that milah is unique because its fulfillment results in a permanent, immutable state. The prohibition against a second milah stems from the inherent impossibility of truly repeating such a mitzvah, and any attempt to do so constitutes a forbidden redundancy that could also carry practical dangers. This is not a contradiction with the principle of repeating Kriat Shema, but rather a testament to the diverse natures of mitzvot and their unique modes of fulfillment. The Yerushalmi's reasoning (“מצוה שהיא קבועה בו”) is the key, defining milah as a mitzvah whose fulfillment is a lasting condition, not a repeatable action.

Intertext

I. Tanakh: The Uniqueness of the Covenantal Mark

The covenant of circumcision is foundational in Jewish tradition, established in Genesis 17. The verse regarding milah is:

וּבֶן־שְׁמֹנַ֤ת יָמִים֙ יִמּוֹל֙ לָכֶ֔ם כָּל־זָכָ֖ר לְדֹרֹתֵיכֶ֑ם יְלִ֣יד בַּ֔יִת וּמִקְנַת־כֶּ֖סֶף מִכֹּ֣ל בֶּן־נֵכָ֑ר אֲשֶׁ֥ר לֹֽא־מִֽזַּרְעֲךָ֖ הֽוּא׃ (Bereishit 17:12)

Translation: "And on the eighth day, you shall circumcise the flesh of your foreskin, every male throughout your generations, he who is born in the house, and he who is bought with money from any foreigner who is not of your seed."

The emphasis on "כל זכר לדורותיכם" (every male throughout your generations) underscores its ongoing, yet singular, nature for each individual. The commandment is to perform the circumcision, not to maintain a state of being uncircumcised and then circumcise. Once the act is done, the condition is met. The permanence of the milah as a sign of the covenant (ot brit) means it's a mark of a completed, perpetual commitment. Re-doing it would be to question or re-establish a covenant already sealed. This inherent permanence and covenantal significance lends weight to the idea that it's a unique, non-repeatable act.

II. Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 210:4: The Explicit Halachic Codification

The Arukh HaShulchan's citation of the Tur directly codifies the principle. The Shulchan Aruch itself, in Orach Chaim 210:4, states:

אסור לעשות מצוה שנית לאחר שקיים אותה פעם אחת, כגון מילה, דאם עבר המוהל ומל אותו פעם שניה, הרי זה עובר על בל תעשה. וכן כל כיוצא בזה.

Translation: "It is forbidden to perform a mitzvah a second time after one has fulfilled it once, such as milah. For if the mohel transgressed and circumcised him a second time, behold, he transgresses a negative commandment. And so too, all similar cases."

This is the direct source the Arukh HaShulchan is expounding upon. The language is identical to the Tur, solidifying the prohibition as a clear halachic ruling. The inclusion of "milah" as the prime example and the statement "עובר על בל תעשה" (transgresses a negative commandment) leaves no room for doubt within the codified law. The Arukh HaShulchan’s role here is to elaborate on the reasons behind this seemingly strict rule, drawing from the Rishonim.

III. Responsa: The Practical Application and Refinements

While not directly cited by the Arukh HaShulchan in this specific passage, the concept of teshuvat ha-mitzvah has been explored extensively in responsa literature, particularly concerning situations where the initial fulfillment might be questioned. For instance, in cases of questionable milah or kashrut of food. The general approach in such cases is to avoid repeating a mitzvah if the first was likely valid, due to the prohibition of redundancy. However, if there is significant doubt about the validity of the first performance, and the mitzvah is of utmost importance, some leniency might be found, though this is heavily dependent on the specific circumstances and the degree of doubt. The prohibition against repeating milah acts as a strong barrier, requiring exceptional circumstances and clear evidence of a flawed initial circumcision for any reconsideration. This demonstrates how the principle, even when seemingly absolute, is managed in practice through careful consideration of doubt and validity.

Psak/Practice

The psak stemming from this discussion is clear and consistently applied:

1. Absolute Prohibition of Second Milah: A second circumcision on a child already circumcised is strictly forbidden. This is not a matter of preference or enhanced fulfillment, but a transgression of a negative commandment. The mohel who performs such an act is in violation of halacha.
2. Irreversibility of Fulfillment: The concept of teshuvat ha-mitzvah being prohibited for milah underscores the idea that certain mitzvot, once validly performed, are irrevocably fulfilled. There is no halachic mechanism for "improving" or "re-doing" a valid milah.
3. Doubt and Safek: In cases of extreme doubt regarding the validity of an initial milah (e.g., if the first mohel was demonstrably incompetent or the procedure was clearly incomplete), there might be grounds for a chesed shel emet (chesed of truth, i.e., a burial), which could involve a symbolic completion. However, this is a complex area, and a second actual milah is almost universally avoided. The default is to assume the first milah was valid unless proven otherwise with absolute certainty.
4. Meta-Heuristic: The Nature of the Mitzvah: The underlying heuristic is that the nature of the mitzvah dictates its repeatability. Mitzvot that establish a permanent, irreversible state are generally non-repeatable, while those that are acts of service or recitation in time are repeatable. This serves as a guiding principle for understanding other similar cases.

Takeaway

The prohibition of a second milah is not merely about avoiding redundancy, but about respecting the singular, irreversible nature of a covenantal act. This principle illuminates the diverse ways mitzvot are fulfilled, distinguishing between repeatable actions and immutable states.