Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 211:5-12

Hook

Ever thought the laws of tzitzit were straightforward? The Arukh HaShulchan reveals a fascinating tension between the halakha of tzitzit and the practicalities of tzeniut (modesty), showing how even seemingly simple mitzvot can require careful navigation.

Context

The Arukh HaShulchan, written by Rabbi Yechiel Michel Epstein in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, is a monumental work that aims to present halakha in a clear, systematic, and practical manner, drawing heavily on the Shulchan Aruch and its commentaries. Its goal was to be a comprehensive guide for the contemporary Jew, bridging the gap between classical sources and lived experience. In the context of tzitzit, we're delving into a commandment with deep roots in the Torah (Bamidbar 15:37-41), intended as a constant reminder of God's commandments. However, the Arukh HaShulchan here grapples with how this visible reminder intersects with the equally important value of tzeniut, particularly for women, and how societal norms can influence the application of halakha. This isn't just about thread counts; it's about the lived reality of religious observance in a changing world.

Text Snapshot

The Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 211:5-12, discusses the obligation of tzitzit and its application, particularly concerning women and the permissibility of wearing garments that might be considered immodest.

Here's a snippet from section 5:

"And it is known that the obligation of tzitzit is for men, and women are exempt from it, as it is stated 'Speak to the children of Israel and say to them, that they shall make for themselves fringes...' (Bamidbar 15:38). This implies that it is a commandment for them, meaning the males. However, some say that if a woman wants to wear a four-cornered garment, she is obligated to make tzitzit for herself, and it is praiseworthy for her to do so. This is because the verse is general, 'on the corners of their garments,' and the explanation of 'their garments' is all that is worn. And the reason for the tzitzit is a reminder, and this reminder is beneficial for women as well, and even more so, because women are more susceptible to forgetting the commandments. Therefore, it is good for them to adorn themselves with this reminder." (Sefaria URL: https://www.sefaria.org/Arukh_HaShulchan%2C_Orach_Chaim_211%3A5)

Further on, in section 11, he addresses the issue of clothing that might be immodest:

"And if a woman wears a garment that is not modest, meaning it is short or reveals the body, then she is obligated to remove the tzitzit from it, if she made them, because it is forbidden to adorn oneself with a mitzvah when it is in a garment of immodesty. For it is written, 'You shall not bring the hire of a harlot or the price of a dog into the house of the LORD your God' (Devarim 23:19), implying that forbidden things should not be mixed with holy things. And even if the garment is modest, but it is a garment typically worn by immodest women, then also she should remove the tzitzit from it, because it is a mar'it ayin (appearance of impropriety), and it is forbidden for a woman to wear such garments, and certainly to adorn them with tzitzit." (Sefaria URL: https://www.sefaria.org/Arukh_HaShulchan%2C_Orach_Chaim_211%3A11)

Close Reading

Insight 1: The Dual Nature of Tzitzit – Obligation vs. Adornment

The Arukh HaShulchan meticulously delineates the primary obligation of tzitzit for men while acknowledging a potential extension for women. This isn't a simple exemption or inclusion. Section 5 presents a nuanced view: women are exempt from the obligation, but it is praiseworthy for them to wear tzitzit if they choose to wear a four-cornered garment. This distinction is crucial. It elevates the act from a mandatory legal requirement to a voluntary act of spiritual adornment. The justification for this praiseworthiness is rooted in the very purpose of tzitzit: a reminder. The Arukh HaShulchan posits that this reminder is perhaps even more beneficial for women, citing their "susceptibility to forgetting the commandments." This is a significant interpretive leap, suggesting that the spiritual benefit of a mitzvah can transcend its strict legal boundaries, particularly when the intention is sincere. The language of "adorn themselves with this reminder" frames tzitzit for women not as a burden, but as a desirable spiritual embellishment, a visual cue to a deeper connection with the divine. This highlights a broader principle in Jewish thought: the pursuit of mitzvot is not just about fulfilling a command, but also about cultivating a spiritual life and drawing closer to God through devotional acts. The Arukh HaShulchan is carefully constructing an argument that allows for the spiritual enhancement of women's observance without imposing a direct obligation.

Insight 2: The Interplay Between Mitzvah and Tzeniut – A Conflict of Sacredness

Section 11 introduces a fascinating and challenging concept: the potential prohibition of having tzitzit on an immodest garment. The Arukh HaShulchan’s argument hinges on the principle that forbidden things should not be mixed with holy things, drawing a powerful analogy from Deuteronomy 23:19 regarding the "hire of a harlot or the price of a dog" being forbidden in the Temple. This is a profound statement about the sanctity of mitzvot. Tzitzit, as a sacred commandment, should not be associated with garments that violate the principles of tzeniut, which is itself a core value in Jewish life. The Arukh HaShulchan doesn't stop at outright immodesty; he extends this to "a garment typically worn by immodest women," invoking the concept of mar'it ayin (appearance of impropriety). This means that even if a garment isn't inherently forbidden, if its association with immodesty creates a misleading impression, it becomes problematic. This raises complex questions about societal norms and the practical application of halakha. What constitutes "typically worn by immodest women"? How do we navigate the ever-shifting landscape of fashion and social acceptability? The Arukh HaShulchan is not just laying down a rule; he's initiating a dialogue about how the outward expression of religious observance must align with inward ethical standards and a commitment to maintaining a pure and respectable image. This tension between the outward sign of a mitzvah and the ethical context in which it is displayed is a recurring theme in Jewish law and ethics.

Insight 3: The Authority of Societal Norms and Mar'it Ayin

The Arukh HaShulchan's inclusion of mar'it ayin in the context of tzitzit and immodesty demonstrates a sophisticated understanding of how halakha operates not in a vacuum, but within a community and its prevailing social mores. The prohibition against wearing garments "typically worn by immodest women" is not based on a direct biblical prohibition against the garment itself, but on the perception it creates. This principle is crucial for understanding the practical application of Jewish law, especially in areas related to personal conduct and appearance. It suggests that Jewish law is concerned not only with the act itself but also with how that act is perceived by others, and how that perception might influence the community or even oneself. The Arukh HaShulchan, in this instance, is prioritizing the avoidance of scandal and the maintenance of a positive public image for observant Jews. This means that a woman, even if she were to choose to wear tzitzit (as discussed in section 5), would be obligated to ensure that the garment itself does not create an impression of impropriety. This requires a constant awareness of societal standards and an ethical discernment in choosing one's attire. The authority of mar'it ayin highlights the communal aspect of halakha, where individual choices have ramifications beyond the self. It’s a reminder that piety is not just an internal state but also an outward presentation that should reflect the values of the community.

Two Angles

Angle 1: The Arukh HaShulchan's Pragmatic Approach to Tzeniut

The Arukh HaShulchan, in these passages, leans towards a more pragmatic interpretation of tzeniut as it intersects with tzitzit. His emphasis in section 11 on removing tzitzit from immodest garments, and even those with an appearance of impropriety (mar'it ayin), suggests a concern for maintaining the sanctity of the mitzvah by preventing its association with anything that could diminish its holiness or create a negative impression. This is akin to Rashi's general approach, which often grounds halakha in practical consequences and the need to avoid transgressions that stem from social pressures or perceived impropriety. For instance, Rashi often explains prohibitions in the Torah by highlighting how they prevent specific sins or undesirable outcomes. Here, the Arukh HaShulchan is concerned with the potential desecration of the mitzvah of tzitzit by placing it on clothing that is either inherently immodest or creates a mar'it ayin of immodesty. This practical concern for the integrity of the mitzvah and its public perception guides his ruling. He prioritizes safeguarding the spiritual value of tzitzit by ensuring it is displayed in a context that upholds Jewish ethical standards, even if it means foregoing the mitzvah on a particular garment.

Angle 2: The Ramban's Emphasis on Inner Sanctity and Personal Devotion

In contrast, one might consider how a commentator like the Ramban (Nachmanides) might approach these issues, focusing more on the internal spiritual dimension and the individual's direct relationship with God. While the Ramban certainly respects halakha, his commentary often delves into the deeper philosophical and spiritual meanings behind the commandments. In the context of tzitzit, the Ramban would likely emphasize the intrinsic value of the mitzvah as a constant reminder of God's presence and the importance of adhering to His will, regardless of external perceptions. For the Ramban, the act of wearing tzitzit is primarily about cultivating a personal connection with the Divine and internalizing the Torah's teachings. While he would not advocate for outright immodesty, his focus might be less on the strict avoidance of mar'it ayin and more on the woman's own spiritual intent and her commitment to living a life of holiness. He might argue that if a woman genuinely desires to connect with God through the mitzvah of tzitzit, even on a garment that might be perceived as less than ideal by some, her sincere intention and devotion are paramount. This perspective would prioritize the internal spiritual state over the external appearance, seeing the mitzvah as a tool for personal spiritual growth rather than solely a matter of public presentation.

Practice Implication

This passage from the Arukh HaShulchan has a direct bearing on how we approach personal observance and community engagement, particularly for women. The dual discussion on women wearing tzitzit and the prohibition of tzitzit on immodest garments highlights a delicate balancing act. For women who choose to wear tzitzit, the Arukh HaShulchan implies a responsibility to select garments that are not only modest by general standards but also align with the spirit of the mitzvah. This means being mindful of fashion trends and societal norms that might push the boundaries of tzeniut. It calls for a conscious decision-making process, where one asks: "Is this garment truly befitting the adornment of a mitzvah? Does it reflect the sanctity I aim to embrace?" Furthermore, the concept of mar'it ayin encourages introspection about how our choices might be perceived by others. It prompts us to consider whether our attire, even if not explicitly forbidden, could inadvertently create an impression that contradicts our commitment to religious values. This isn't about conforming to every fleeting trend, but about cultivating a discerning eye that prioritizes both personal spiritual integrity and responsible representation of our faith within the broader community. It encourages a proactive approach to modesty, moving beyond mere avoidance of explicit prohibitions to a positive cultivation of an appearance that honors our commitments.

Chevruta Mini

1. The Arukh HaShulchan states it's "praiseworthy" for women to wear tzitzit if they choose, but then in section 11, he obligates the removal of tzitzit from immodest garments. What's the tradeoff between encouraging voluntary spiritual adornment and preventing any perceived compromise of a mitzvah's sanctity? Does the potential for mar'it ayin outweigh the spiritual benefit of a woman choosing to wear tzitzit even on a questionable garment?

2. The Arukh HaShulchan draws an analogy to Deuteronomy 23:19, forbidding the mixing of forbidden things with holy things. How does this principle of "no mixing" apply to the modern challenge of navigating fashion and personal expression within the framework of halakha? What are the potential tradeoffs between adhering to a strict interpretation of "no mixing" to safeguard the sanctity of mitzvot and allowing for personal agency and evolving societal norms in matters of dress?

Takeaway

The Arukh HaShulchan teaches us that mitzvot are dynamic, requiring us to navigate the interplay between sacred obligation, personal devotion, and communal perception, especially in matters of outward appearance.