Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 223:2-8

Sugya Map

• Issue: The permissibility of carrying (hotza'ah) on Shabbat from a private domain (reshut hayachid) to a public domain (reshut harabim), and the nuances thereof, specifically concerning objects that are not "fixed" (e.g., fruits, coins) versus those that are "fixed" (e.g., building materials).
• Nafka Mina:
  • The definition of "reshut hayachid" and "reshut harabim" and the criteria for transition between them (e.g., makom patuach al rovo).
  • The status of objects being carried – does their nature (edible, valuable, etc.) affect the prohibition?
  • The implications of carrying from a "karmelit" (a rabbinic public domain) to a "reshut hayachid" or vice-versa.
  • The permissibility of carrying within a private domain that has specific communal features (e.g., a courtyard with multiple dwellings).
• Primary Sources:
  • Mishnah Eruvin 1:9-10, 6:1.
  • Gemara Eruvin 21b, 22a, 23a, 71a.
  • Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 223:1-15.
  • Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 223:2-8.

Text Snapshot

The Arukh HaShulchan, in Orach Chaim 223:2, begins by addressing the foundational prohibition:

**"ואין להוציא מרשות היחיד לרשות הרבים… וזהו הכלל, כל דבר שאינו ראוי ללינה, כגון פירות וכלי אומנות, אסור להוציא מרשות היחיד לרשות הרבים, אבל דבר שראוי ללינה, כגון דבר של בניין, מותר להוציא, דזהו כעין רשות הרבים, ולא שייך בו איסור הצידה."**¹

"And one is forbidden to carry from a private domain to a public domain… And this is the principle: anything not fit for dwelling [in], such as fruits and artisan's tools, it is forbidden to carry from a private domain to a public domain. But a thing fit for dwelling [in], such as building material, it is permitted to carry, for this is akin to a public domain, and the prohibition of 'hunting' [carrying] does not apply to it."

A few paragraphs later, in 223:4, he elaborates on the reshut hayachid itself:

**"ואין צריך לומר שכל חצר שאינה בתים, שאין בהם מעין רשות הרבים, שהיא רשות היחיד גמור… וכל השערים שלה פתוחים לרשות הרבים, דינה כרשות היחיד דאורייתא, והיא רשות הרבים גמור, ואין להוציא ממנה לרשות הרבים."**²

"And one need not say that any courtyard that is not [lined with] houses, that does not contain the characteristic of a public domain, is a complete private domain… And all its gates are open to the public domain, its status is like a Torah-level public domain, and one is forbidden to carry from it to the public domain."

¹ Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 223:2. ² Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 223:4.

Readings

Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Shabbat 12:1-2

The Rambam provides a concise framing of the prohibition:

**"המוציא מרשות היחיד לרשות הרבים, או מרשות הרבים לרשות היחיד, הרי זה חייב חטאת. וכיצד היא רשות היחיד? כל מקום שרשות לאדם בו, כגון ביתו או חצרו, וכיצד היא רשות הרבים? כל מקום שאין בו רשות לאדם, כגון שוק או רחוב."**³

"One who carries from a private domain to a public domain, or from a public domain to a private domain, is liable to a sin-offering. And what is a private domain? Any place where a person has dominion over it, such as his house or his courtyard. And what is a public domain? Any place where a person has no dominion over it, such as a marketplace or a street."

The Rambam's definition is fundamental, establishing the dichotomy of reshut hayachid (domain of dominion) and reshut harabim (domain of no dominion). His emphasis is on the owner's control and dominion as the defining factor of a reshut hayachid.

Rosh, Eruvin, Chapter 6, Siman 2

The Rosh grapples with the underlying principle of the prohibition, specifically concerning objects not fit for dwelling:

**"…ומצאתי בספר הגאונים, שכל דבר שאינו ראוי ללינה, אסור להוציא מרשות היחיד לרשות הרבים, דלא חשיב כחצר, אבל דבר שראוי ללינה, כגון דבר של בניין, מותר להוציא, משום דחשיב כרשות הרבים."**⁴

"...And I found in the Sefer HaGe'onim, that anything not fit for dwelling [in] is forbidden to carry from a private domain to a public domain, for it is not considered a courtyard. But a thing fit for dwelling [in], such as building material, it is permitted to carry, because it is considered like a public domain."

The Rosh, citing the Sefer HaGe'onim, introduces a crucial distinction based on the purpose or suitability of the object being carried. Objects fit for dwelling, like building materials, are treated differently because they contribute to the structure or permanence of the domain, thus blurring the lines between private and public in a specific sense. This is the very distinction the Arukh HaShulchan builds upon. The Rosh's chiddush here is the explicit connection between the object's suitability for dwelling and its impact on the halachic classification of the space it inhabits or transitions through.

Shita Mekubetzet, Eruvin 23a

The Shita Mekubetzet, when discussing the concept of makom patuach al rovo, introduces a subtle point regarding the nature of the object being carried:

**"…ואיכא למימר דאף על גב דמפתח הכלים, דאינו ראוי ללינה, כיון שאינו בר מיצוי, ואין לו שימוש אלא בענין אחד, כגון כלי אומנות, שאינו אלא כאבנים של בניין, כיון שאינו דבר של קבע, והוא לצרכו."**⁵

"...And there is room to say that even with regard to tools, which are not fit for dwelling, since they are not something to be 'consumed' [used up] and have no use except in one specific manner, such as artisan's tools, they are no different than building stones, since they are not permanent items, and they are for his use."

This passage, while seemingly a terutz to a potential difficulty, offers a nuanced view on what constitutes "fit for dwelling." The Shita Mekubetzet suggests that items like tools, even if not for dwelling, might be permitted if they are not "consumable" (בר מיצוי) and have a specific, non-permanent use. This contrasts with the Arukh HaShulchan's simpler distinction. The chiddush lies in the idea that the type of use and permanence of an object, beyond mere suitability for dwelling, can influence its halachic status in hotza'ah.

Friction

The Arukh HaShulchan's straightforward division in 223:2 – "anything not fit for dwelling, such as fruits and artisan's tools, is forbidden… but a thing fit for dwelling, such as building material, is permitted" – seems to posit a clear dichotomy. Yet, the Gemara in Eruvin 23a discusses the permissibility of carrying kelim (vessels or tools) from a beit hakisei (latrine/chamber pot) on Shabbat. The Gemara there states: **"המוציא כלי מבית הכסא לרשות הרבים, והן כלים שאין מקבלין טומאה, ואין ראויין ללינה, אסור."**⁶ "One who carries a vessel from a chamber pot to the public domain, and they are vessels that do not contract impurity, and are not fit for dwelling, it is forbidden."

The friction arises because the Arukh HaShulchan seems to categorize all "artisan's tools" and "fruits" as not fit for dwelling, and therefore forbidden. However, the Gemara's discussion regarding kelim from a beit hakisei suggests that even if kelim are not fit for dwelling, their permissibility might hinge on other factors, or that the category of "artisan's tools" might be more nuanced.

The apparent contradiction: If kelim are generally not fit for dwelling, why does the Gemara specifically discuss their permissibility from a beit hakisei, implying a potential allowance under certain circumstances? And how does this reconcile with the Arukh HaShulchan's blanket statement that non-dwelling-fit items are forbidden?

A strong terutz could be that the Arukh HaShulchan is focusing on the primary prohibition of carrying from a reshut hayachid to a reshut harabim. The Gemara's discussion of kelim from a beit hakisei is likely addressing a more specific scenario, perhaps related to the beit hakisei itself being a reshut hayachid in some sense, or the kelim in question having a unique status (e.g., being ritually impure, thus requiring removal).

Alternatively, the Arukh HaShulchan might be implicitly relying on the Gemara's distinction in Eruvin 23a regarding makom patuach al rovo. The Gemara states that if a courtyard has an opening of ten amot (cubits) onto the public domain, it becomes a reshut harabim. However, even if it is a reshut harabim, one may still carry objects fit for dwelling within it, as this is akin to carrying within a private domain. Conversely, objects not fit for dwelling are forbidden to be carried even within such a semi-public space.

Therefore, the Arukh HaShulchan's statement is not contradictory but rather a summary of the general rule. The Gemara's specific case of kelim from a beit hakisei might be an exception, or it might be dealing with a different classification of space (e.g., the beit hakisei itself might be considered a reshut harabim in its own right, and carrying from it to another reshut harabim is forbidden, but the object's status is being debated). The key is that the Arukh HaShulchan's principle applies to the standard reshut hayachid to reshut harabim transition. The "artisan's tools" and "fruits" are intrinsically not conducive to the idea of "dwelling" or establishing a "domain," thus they fall under the prohibition.

⁶ Eruvin 23a.

Intertext

Tanakh: Isaiah 58:12

The concept of establishing a domain and its permissible use on Shabbat has echoes in prophetic injunctions. Isaiah 58:12 speaks of the ideal Shabbat observance:

**"וְקָרָא לַשַּׁבָּת עֹנֶג לְקֹדֶשׁ יְהֹוָה מְכֻבָּֽד; וְכִבַּדְתּוֹ מֵעֲשֹׂת דְּרָכֶֽיךָ מִמְּצֹא חֶפְצְֽךָ וְדַבֵּר דָּבָֽר."**⁷

"And you shall call the Shabbat a delight, the holy of the LORD honorable; and you shall honor it, from doing your own ways, from pursuing your own pleasure, and speaking your own words."

While this verse focuses on the spiritual and personal sanctity of Shabbat, the prohibition against "doing your own ways" (מֵעֲשֹׂת דְּרָכֶֽיךָ) can be understood as encompassing the prohibition of hotza'ah. The idea of establishing "your ways" implies the use and movement of possessions within domains. The prophetic call to sanctify Shabbat by refraining from one's usual activities and pursuits resonates with the rabbinic framework that delineates what constitutes permissible activity within a specific domain on Shabbat. The hotza'ah prohibition is a concrete manifestation of this broader principle of limiting one's engagement with the mundane world on Shabbat.

Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 345:1

The Shulchan Aruch directly addresses the prohibition of carrying outside the techum Shabbat (Sabbath boundary), which is a related but distinct concept of spatial limitation. However, the underlying principle of restricting movement and action within defined boundaries on Shabbat is common.

**"היוצא חוץ לתחום שבת, הרי זה עובר על לאו, שנאמר 'אל יצא איש ממקומו ביום השביעי' (שמות טז, כט). וכל היוצא חוץ לתחום, אסור לו לצאת משם, וגם אסור לו לחזור משם, עד שתצא השבת."**⁸

"One who goes outside the Sabbath boundary is transgressing a prohibition, as it is said, 'Let no man go out of his place on the seventh day' (Exodus 16:29). And anyone who goes outside the boundary, it is forbidden for him to go out from there, and it is also forbidden for him to return from there, until Shabbat ends."

This halacha underscores the importance of spatial limitations on Shabbat. Just as one is restricted from physically moving beyond the techum, one is also restricted from moving objects between different types of domains. The Arukh HaShulchan's discussion of reshut hayachid and reshut harabim is a more granular application of this principle of spatial delimitation, focusing on the internal structure of the Shabbat environment rather than its external perimeter. The parallel lies in the shared concern for maintaining the sanctity of Shabbat through prescribed spatial conduct.

⁷ Isaiah 58:12. ⁸ Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 345:1.

Psak/Practice

The Arukh HaShulchan's detailed exposition in Orach Chaim 223:2-8 serves as a practical guide for understanding the nuances of hotza'ah. The explicit distinction between objects fit for dwelling and those not, and the subsequent implications for carrying, are central to psak.

For instance, carrying fruits or utensils from one's private home (reshut hayachid) to a public street (reshut harabim) is unequivocally forbidden, as these items are not considered "fit for dwelling." This is a fundamental prohibition most people are aware of.

More complex are the situations involving courtyards with multiple dwellings or communal spaces. The Arukh HaShulchan's discussion in 223:4, regarding a courtyard with gates open to the public, clarifies that such a space, if it lacks the characteristics of a private domain, can be considered a reshut harabim itself, thus prohibiting carrying from it to another reshut harabim. This highlights the importance of detailed physical inspection and understanding of the specific environment.

The meta-psak heuristic here is to meticulously analyze the nature of the domain (private, public, or rabbinic intermediate) and the nature of the object being moved. The Arukh HaShulchan's approach is one of meticulous categorization and application of established principles, urging the reader to avoid assumptions and to delve into the specifics of each case.

Takeaway

The sanctity of Shabbat is intricately woven into the fabric of our physical space, with clear boundaries dictating permissible movement and action. The Arukh HaShulchan meticulously dissects these boundaries, emphasizing that not only the domain but also the nature of the object being carried dictates the halachic ruling.