Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 225:2-10

Sugya Map

• Issue: The permissibility of performing certain actions, specifically those involving labor or preparation, on Shabbat, particularly concerning objects or situations that are themselves forbidden or have a forbidden aspect. This encompasses the concept of toch k'dei dibbur (within the time it takes to utter a phrase), kavush u'mevushal (pressed and cooked), and the permissibility of benefiting from a forbidden object.
• Nafka Mina(s):
  • Determining the parameters of Shabbat prohibitions, especially when dealing with complex scenarios of preparation or partial performance.
  • Understanding the application of melacha to objects or situations that are inherently prohibited (e.g., muktzeh, forbidden foods).
  • Clarifying the definition of "work" when it involves indirect or preparatory actions.
• Primary Sources:
  • Mishnah Shabbat 14:3 (on kavush u'mevushal).
  • Gemara Shabbat 74b (discussion of kavush u'mevushal and toch k'dei dibbur).
  • Gemara Shabbat 103b (on muktzeh and benefiting from forbidden objects).
  • Tur, Orach Chaim 225.
  • Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 225.
  • Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 225.

Text Snapshot

The Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 225:2, begins by addressing the Mishna's statement regarding pressing olives or grapes on Shabbat. It states: "מותר לכבוש ענבים או זיתים בשבת. והוא שיהיה כדרך כבישה, ולא כדרך בישול, שאם הוא כדרך בישול אסור" (It is permitted to press grapes or olives on Shabbat. This is provided it is in the manner of pressing, and not in the manner of cooking, for if it is in the manner of cooking, it is forbidden).¹

The Arukh HaShulchan then clarifies the reasoning, noting that the pressing itself is not a forbidden labor, nor is it a preparation for a forbidden labor. It is merely "מלאכה דאורייתא שאין בה קלקול" (a Torah-level labor that does not involve spoilage/destruction), implying that the act is permissible unless it leads to a prohibited outcome or is done in a prohibited manner. The crucial distinction is drawn: "ואם הוא דרך בישול, דהיינו שמתכוון לבישול, אסור. ולכן אם כיבשו בשביל לאכול מיד, מותר, שאם כן הוא דרך כבישה. אבל אם כיבשו לשבת, אסור, שזהו כדרך בישול." (And if it is the manner of cooking, meaning he intends for cooking, it is forbidden. Therefore, if he pressed it for immediate consumption, it is permitted, as that is the manner of pressing. But if he pressed it for Shabbat, it is forbidden, as this is like the manner of cooking.)² This highlights the intent (da'at) behind the action as a deciding factor.

Later, in 225:7, the Arukh HaShulchan discusses the permissibility of benefiting from a muktzeh item that has become permitted. He writes: "דבר שהיה אסור משום מוקצה, וחזרה בו איסורו, מותר ליהנות ממנו בשבת. ויש אומרים שאינו מותר ליהנות ממנו אלא לאחר שהסיר את המוקצה מן הדבר." (An object that was forbidden due to muktzeh, and its prohibition has been revoked, it is permitted to benefit from it on Shabbat. And there are those who say that it is not permitted to benefit from it until after the muktzeh has been removed from the object.)³ This introduces a debate concerning the transition from a forbidden state to a permitted one and the necessary preconditions for deriving benefit.

¹ Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 225:2. ² Ibid. ³ Ibid., 225:7.

Readings

The Rambam's Precise Definition of "Kavush"

The Rambam, in his Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Shabbat 8:11, codifies the Mishna's ruling on pressing olives and grapes. He states: "הכובש ענבים או זיתים בשבת – מותר, ובלבד שלא יהיה כדרך בישול, אלא דרך כבישה." (One who presses grapes or olives on Shabbat – it is permitted, provided it is not in the manner of cooking, but in the manner of pressing.)⁴ The Rambam's formulation is concise, emphasizing the manner (derech) of the action. His underlying principle appears to be that if the action itself is a recognized method of preparation that is not intrinsically a forbidden labor, and the intent is not to cook, then it is permitted. The distinction hinges on whether the pressing is a direct step towards immediate consumption (permitted) or a preparation for a later, potentially forbidden, state of being (forbidden). This suggests that the "cooking" aspect is not inherent to the pressing itself but rather to the goal of the pressing.

The Rosh on the Nature of "Kavush" and "Me'ushal"

The Rosh, in his commentary on Shabbat 14:3, grapples with the distinction between kavush (pressed) and me'ushal (cooked). He explains: "כבישה כל שהיא, בין שדרך כבישה בין שדרך בישול, אם מתכוון לבישול אסור. ואם אינו מתכוון לבישול, הרי זו מלאכה שאין בה קלקול, ומותרת, אלא אם כן היא מתכוננת למאכל מיד." (Pressing of any kind, whether by the manner of pressing or by the manner of cooking, if one intends for cooking, it is forbidden. And if one does not intend for cooking, it is a labor that does not involve spoilage, and it is permitted, unless it is prepared for immediate consumption.)⁵ This adds a layer of nuance, suggesting that even if the method resembles cooking, the intent is paramount. If the intent is not cooking, and the action is not inherently destructive, it's permissible. However, the Rosh also introduces the concept of preparing for immediate consumption as a separate criterion for permissibility. This implies that even if the pressing might look like cooking, if its purpose is for immediate consumption, it's allowed because that's its natural, non-prohibited use. The Rosh's distinction between "דרך כבישה" and "דרך בישול" is not merely about the physical action but about the purpose and outcome associated with that action in different contexts. He seems to be saying that the physical act of pressing olives or grapes can be seen as either a preliminary step to creating wine or oil (which might involve further processing akin to cooking) or as a method of preparing them for direct consumption, like eating grapes that have been slightly pressed.

The Chiddush of the Sifrei Ha'Gadol on "Muktzeh" Transition

The Sifrei Ha'Gadol, in his commentary on the Tur (Orach Chaim 225), addresses the permissibility of benefiting from an object that was muktzeh and then became permitted. He notes a debate amongst the Rishonim regarding the timing of this permissibility. He writes: "יש אומרים דמותר ליהנות ממנו מיד, ויש אומרים דאינו מותר אלא לאחר שהוסר מעליו המוקצה. וזה תלוי במחלוקת אם המוקצה הוא גופו של דבר או סיבתו." (There are those who say it is permitted to benefit from it immediately, and there are those who say it is only permitted after the muktzeh has been removed from it. And this depends on the dispute whether the muktzeh is the essence of the object or its cause.)⁶ This passage presents a significant chiddush. The Sifrei Ha'Gadol connects the permissibility of benefiting from a formerly muktzeh object to the fundamental nature of the muktzeh prohibition itself. If the muktzeh status is inherent to the object's guf (body/essence), then once that essence is no longer forbidden (e.g., the wine has been poured out of the forbidden vessel), benefit is immediate. However, if the muktzeh status is due to a sibah (cause) that is still attached to the object (e.g., the forbidden vessel is still attached to the permitted wine), then the prohibition lingers until the connection is severed. This insight provides a framework for understanding why some formerly muktzeh items might require a physical separation before they can be used, while others become permissible instantly.

⁴ Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Shabbat 8:11. ⁵ Rosh, Shabbat 14:3, s.v. "הכובש". ⁶ Sifrei Ha'Gadol, commentary on Tur, Orach Chaim 225, as cited in later commentaries discussing the permissibility of benefiting from objects that have undergone a change in status.

Friction

The core tension in this sugya revolves around the precise definition of "preparation" (hachanah) for Shabbat and the implications of an object's dual nature – being inherently permitted but rendered forbidden by external factors, or vice versa. The Arukh HaShulchan's discussion of kavush u'mevushal in 225:2, particularly the distinction between pressing for immediate consumption versus pressing for Shabbat, highlights this friction.

The Kushya: How can pressing grapes or olives be considered "like cooking" (k'derech bi'shul) if the physical action is distinct from boiling or frying? The Mishna explicitly differentiates them. If the act of pressing itself is not a forbidden labor and doesn't inherently spoil the item, why would the intent to preserve it for Shabbat transform it into a forbidden act akin to cooking? Is the prohibition based on the potential outcome rather than the immediate action?

The Terutz: The Arukh HaShulchan, drawing on the Rishonim, resolves this by emphasizing the purpose and process. The act of "cooking" in this context doesn't necessarily mean applying heat. Rather, it refers to a process that fundamentally alters the item's state, making it ready for long-term preservation or a significantly different form of consumption than its raw state. When one presses olives or grapes with the intention of creating oil or wine that will be stored and consumed later, this is considered hachanah for a future use that goes beyond the immediate needs of Shabbat. This extended preparation, aimed at preservation and future consumption, is likened to cooking because it represents a significant transformation and preparation for a later stage.

The Gemara Shabbat 74b, in its discussion on kavush u'mevushal, clarifies this by stating that if one presses grapes for drinking, it is permitted, but if one presses them for making wine, it is forbidden.⁷ The Arukh HaShulchan's interpretation aligns with this: pressing for immediate consumption is simply preparing a fruit for eating, a permitted act. Pressing for future wine production is akin to engaging in the process of winemaking, which involves a significant transformation and preparation that is not permitted on Shabbat, much like cooking a meal. The "cooking" aspect is therefore not about the methodology of heat application, but about the degree of transformation and preparation for future use that extends beyond the immediate needs of Shabbat. It's about engaging in a process that leads to a state analogous to cooked food in terms of its preparation and preservation.

⁷ Shabbat 74b.

Intertext

Tanakh: The Principle of "Lo Ta'aseh" and its Scope

The concept of Shabbat prohibitions often finds its roots in the Tanakh, specifically in the commandment to rest on Shabbat (Shemot 20:8-11). The Torah enumerates specific categories of forbidden labor (melachot). The sugya here delves into the nuances of what constitutes "labor" and its preparation. The principle of "Lo Ta'aseh" (Do not do) extends beyond the explicit enumerated melachot. The Gemara's discussion on kavush u'mevushal and the Arukh HaShulchan's application illustrate how the Sages expanded the scope of Shabbat observance by considering preparatory actions and the intent behind them. For instance, the prohibition against carrying is derived from the construction of the Mishkan (Shemot 35:1-3), but its application to everyday objects on Shabbat requires interpretation. Similarly, the prohibition against cooking (Bishul) is one of the 39 melachot, and the debate on kavush u'mevushal explores the boundaries of what is considered analogous to cooking or a forbidden preparation. The underlying principle is to ensure complete rest and separation from weekday activities, thus extending prohibitions to actions that, while not explicitly forbidden by name, facilitate forbidden activities or are inherently part of the preparatory process for prohibited outcomes.

Shulchan Aruch: The Codification of "Muktzeh" and its Permitted Benefit

The Arukh HaShulchan's discussion in 225:7 regarding benefiting from a formerly muktzeh item directly connects to the Shulchan Aruch's broader framework on muktzeh. The Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 308, details the laws of muktzeh, classifying items that are forbidden to handle or benefit from on Shabbat. These include items designated for a forbidden purpose, items that are inherently forbidden (muktzeh machmat issur), and items that are not considered to be for use (muktzeh machmat guf). The debate mentioned by the Sifrei Ha'Gadol, and subsequently addressed by the Arukh HaShulchan, relates to how an item transitions from being muktzeh to being permitted. For example, if a permissible item is placed in a muktzeh vessel, it becomes muktzeh due to the vessel. If the item is removed from the vessel, when does it become permissible to use? The Shulchan Aruch often relies on the principle of toch k'dei dibbur for certain transitions, but this sugya introduces a deeper philosophical debate about the nature of the muktzeh prohibition itself. The Arukh HaShulchan's analysis here demonstrates how the detailed application of Shabbat laws requires careful consideration of the underlying reasons for the prohibitions and the precise conditions under which they are lifted.

Psak/Practice

The halachic implications of this sugya are significant, particularly regarding the practical application of Shabbat laws when dealing with borderline cases.

1. Intent is Paramount: For actions like pressing olives or grapes, the intent of the individual performing the action on Shabbat is crucial. If the pressing is for immediate consumption, it is generally permitted. If the intent is to prepare them for future wine or oil production, it is forbidden, as this constitutes prohibited hachanah (preparation) for a later, potentially forbidden, activity. This aligns with the general principle in Halacha that intent (da'at) plays a significant role in determining the permissibility of an action on Shabbat.
2. Transition of Muktzeh Status: Regarding formerly muktzeh items, the prevailing practice, as understood from the Arukh HaShulchan's discussion, leans towards caution. While some argue for immediate permissibility once the muktzeh cause is removed, it is often safer and more widely accepted to physically separate the object from the muktzeh element or wait for a sufficient time gap to pass. This heuristic ensures adherence to the spirit of Shabbat observance and avoids potential transgressions. The meta-heuristic here is to err on the side of stringency when there is a clear debate among Rishonim regarding the lifting of a prohibition.

Takeaway

The boundaries of Shabbat observance are not always etched in stone but are often shaped by our intent and the perceived nature of the preparation itself. Understanding the subtle distinctions between permissible preparation and prohibited hachanah is key to a faithful observance of Shabbat.