Arukh HaShulchan Yomi · Expert – Beit Midrash Analysis · On-Ramp
Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 246:11-17
Sugya Map
This sugya in Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 246:11-17, meticulously unpacks the mitzvah of Talmud Torah, focusing primarily on the father's obligation to teach his son and the perennial question of lishma (for its own sake) versus shelo lishma (not for its own sake).
Core Issues
- Paternal Obligation: The nature and scope of the father's chiyuv to teach his son Torah.
- Son's Independent Obligation: The son's responsibility to learn even if his father fails.
- The Lishma Imperative: Reconciling seemingly contradictory gemarot regarding the validity and merit of learning shelo lishma.
Nafka Mina(s)
- Financial Burden: Whether a father is obligated to hire a tutor if he is incapable of teaching, and the extent of that obligation even if he is poor.
- Motivation in Study: The halachic and hashkafic implications for students whose primary motivation is not purely spiritual (e.g., for smicha, honor, or livelihood).
- Universal Applicability: The unwavering obligation of Talmud Torah for every Jew, regardless of personal circumstances or initial aptitude.
Primary Sources
- Kiddushin 29a (father's obligation)
- Sifrei Devarim 6:7 (source of "ושיננתם לבניך")
- Mishnah Peah 1:1 ("Eilu devarim she'ein lahem shiur")
- Pesachim 50b ("לעולם ילמוד אדם תורה אפילו שלא לשמה")
- Nedarim 62a (conflicting statements on shelo lishma)
- Rambam, Hilchot Talmud Torah 1:1, 3:4-5, 3:10
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Text Snapshot
The Arukh HaShulchan navigates these themes with characteristic breadth and precision. Here are a few representative lines that anchor our discussion:
Paternal Obligation & Son's Agency
- "מצוה על האב ללמד לבנו תורה, שנאמר 'ולמדתם אותם את בניכם לדבר בם', ונאמר 'ושיננתם לבניך'."^(Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 246:11)
- Dikduk/Leshon Nuance: The juxtaposition of two verses, one general ("ולמדתם אותם") and one specific to children ("ושיננתם לבניך"), underscores the direct and unique paternal chiyuv.
- "ואם אין אביו מלמדו, ילמוד הוא לעצמו, דמצות לימוד התורה היא מוטלת על כל אחד ואחד מישראל."^(Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 246:13)
- Dikduk/Leshon Nuance: The emphatic "ילמוד הוא לעצמו" highlights the son's independent, non-contingent obligation, reinforcing that Talmud Torah is not merely a filial right but a personal imperative.
The Lishma Imperative
- "ואפילו שלומד שלא לשמה, מכל מקום סופו לבא לשמה."^(Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 246:15)
- Dikduk/Leshon Nuance: The phrase "סופו לבא לשמה" implies a teleological process, a gradual refinement of intent, rather than an immediate transformation. This justifies an initial shelo lishma as a legitimate pathway.
Readings
The Arukh HaShulchan's discussion on Talmud Torah for the father and son, and especially the nuanced approach to lishma, draws heavily from foundational Rishonim.
Rambam: The Teleology of Lishma
The Rambam stands as a towering figure in this sugya, providing a systematic framework for understanding Talmud Torah. In Hilchot Talmud Torah 1:1, he declares the mitzvah to be incumbent upon every Jew, echoing the Arukh HaShulchan's point in 246:13. More pertinently, the Rambam's view on lishma is pivotal. He acknowledges the Gemara's dictum: "לעולם ילמוד אדם תורה אפילו שלא לשמה שמתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה."^(Rambam, Hilchot Talmud Torah 3:10; Pesachim 50b; Nedarim 62a) The Rambam's chiddush is his articulation that shelo lishma is not merely tolerated, but is a necessary and even desirable initial stage. He distinguishes between learning for legitimate, albeit external, motives (e.g., honor, livelihood) which will eventually lead to lishma, and learning with malicious intent or purely for self-aggrandizement without any connection to the mitzvah itself, which is genuinely problematic. He sees lishma as the ultimate goal, a perfected state of study where the pursuit of knowledge is solely for the sake of God and His Torah, yet recognizes the human journey towards it. This understanding underpins the Arukh HaShulchan's lenient stance in 246:15.
Tosafot: Defining Paternal Scope
The Tosafot on Kiddushin 29a, specifically s.v. כשם and s.v. חייב, delve into the precise scope of the father's obligation to teach his son. While the Gemara states "כשם שמצוה על האב ללמד את בנו תורה, כך מצוה על הבן ללמוד", implying a parallel, Tosafot clarify the nature of this parallelism. They discuss whether the father's chiyuv extends to teaching the son the entire Torah or just enough to get him started. The Tosafot's chiddush often revolves around distinguishing between chiyuv gemur (full obligation) and chiyuv hatchala (initial obligation). They suggest that the father's primary chiyuv is to initiate the son into Torah study and to teach him the fundamental principles and practical halachot, such that the son can then continue independently. This aligns with the Arukh HaShulchan's emphasis in 246:13 that "אם אין אביו מלמדו, ילמוד הוא לעצמו," implying that even if the father's teaching is limited or absent, the son's personal obligation remains paramount and takes over. Tosafot's nuanced approach helps explain why the father isn't expected to be a full-time, lifelong rebbe for his son, but rather a catalyst for the son's own learning journey.
Maharsha: Reconciling Contradictions in Lishma
The Maharsha on Nedarim 62a, s.v. כל העוסק בתורה, provides a critical reconciliation for the Gemara's seemingly contradictory statements regarding shelo lishma. The Gemara first declares, "כל העוסק בתורה שלא לשמה נוח לו שלא נברא", and then, "לעולם ילמוד אדם תורה אפילו שלא לשמה שמתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה." The Maharsha's chiddush is to differentiate between two distinct types of shelo lishma. The first, more severe statement, refers to one who learns with an intention that actively denigrates Torah or uses it for malicious purposes, e.g., to gain power to oppress others. This is a profound desecration, rendering such study worse than non-existence. The second, more lenient statement, refers to learning for personal benefit (e.g., honor, a position, or even simply for intellectual stimulation) but without malicious intent. In this scenario, the learning itself, even if initially impure in motive, has the inherent power to elevate the student, eventually leading him to a purer state of lishma. This distinction, echoed in the Rambam and adopted by the Arukh HaShulchan, is crucial for promoting widespread Torah study, as it removes the paralyzing fear that imperfect motives invalidate the entire endeavor.
Friction
The most acute kushya in this sugya, explicitly addressed by the Arukh HaShulchan, revolves around the seemingly contradictory statements in Chazal concerning the study of Torah shelo lishma.
The Quandary of Shelo Lishma
The Gemara in Nedarim 62a presents a stark dichotomy. On the one hand, R' Yonatan states, "כל העוסק בתורה שלא לשמה נוח לו שלא נברא" (Whoever engages in Torah study not for its own sake, it would have been better had he not been created). This casts a profoundly negative light on any study not purely lishma. Yet, on the very same daf (and famously in Pesachim 50b), the Gemara declares, "לעולם ילמוד אדם תורה אפילו שלא לשמה, שמתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה" (A person should always study Torah, even not for its own sake, for from not for its own sake, he will come to study for its own sake). How can Chazal simultaneously assert that shelo lishma is so detrimental as to render one's existence regrettable, while also encouraging it as a valid path to lishma? This apparent tension is not merely academic; it has profound implications for the encouragement of Torah study and the internal motivations of every learner.
Terutz: Differentiating Intent
The Arukh HaShulchan, following the path of many Rishonim, implicitly resolves this contradiction by differentiating between various types of "not for its own sake."
Terutz 1: Malicious vs. Self-serving Intent (Rashi, Maharsha)
Rashi on Nedarim 62a, s.v. נוח לו שלא נברא, and the Maharsha as discussed above, offer a compelling distinction. The shelo lishma that is so condemned refers to learning with malicious intent – using Torah as a tool for personal aggrandizement, to harm others, or to justify wicked deeds. Such an individual perverts the very essence of Torah. The shelo lishma that is encouraged, however, refers to learning for personal gain, honor, or even just intellectual curiosity, but without any malevolent purpose. In this context, the inherent sanctity and wisdom of Torah act upon the learner, gradually purifying his intentions and guiding him towards lishma. The Torah's light, as it were, eventually pierces through the initial layers of self-interest. The Arukh HaShulchan's statement "ואפילו שלומד שלא לשמה, מכל מקום סופו לבא לשמה"^(Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 246:15) clearly embraces this more optimistic interpretation.
Terutz 2: The Rambam's Developmental Approach
The Rambam in Hilchot Talmud Torah 3:10 offers a slightly different, though complementary, distinction. He explains that the shelo lishma that is condemned is when one learns not for the sake of the mitzvah at all. For example, if one learns only to be called "Rabbi," or to earn a salary, and has no intention whatsoever of fulfilling the mitzvah of Talmud Torah or improving his service of God. This is an abuse of Torah. Conversely, learning shelo lishma that is permissible and encouraged is when one learns with an ulterior motive (e.g., for honor, or to gain knowledge to rule halacha), but still with the underlying belief that this learning will eventually lead him to serve God properly and to learn lishma. It is a stepping stone. The Arukh HaShulchan's formulation, focusing on "סופו לבא לשמה," perfectly encapsulates this developmental understanding. The initial impure motive is tolerable precisely because it is seen as a transitional phase, not a final destination.
Intertext
The Arukh HaShulchan's discussion on Talmud Torah is deeply rooted in broader Jewish thought, finding resonance across Tanakh and halachic codes.
Tanakh: The Genesis of Paternal Obligation
The fundamental source for the father's obligation to teach his son Torah is found in Devarim 6:7: "וְשִׁנַּנְתָּם לְבָנֶיךָ וְדִבַּרְתָּ בָּם בְּשִׁבְתְּךָ בְּבֵיתֶךָ וּבְלֶכְתְּךָ בַדֶּרֶךְ וּבְשָׁכְבְּךָ וּבְקוּמֶךָ." This verse, part of the Shema, is expounded upon by Chazal (e.g., Kiddushin 29a) as the direct mandate for the father. The Sifrei Devarim 6:7, Piska 34 interprets "וְשִׁנַּנְתָּם לְבָנֶיךָ" as referring to the father's chiyuv. The language "וְשִׁנַּנְתָּם" implies diligent, repeated instruction, not merely a one-time lesson. The Arukh HaShulchan's opening lines in 246:11, "מצוה על האב ללמד לבנו תורה, שנאמר 'ולמדתם אותם את בניכם לדבר בם', ונאמר 'ושיננתם לבניך'," directly reference this foundational biblical command. This intertextual link solidifies the divine origin of this mitzvah, establishing it not as a rabbinic enactment but as a Torah imperative.
Shulchan Aruch & Responsa: Practical Ramifications of Lishma
The Arukh HaShulchan's extensive treatment of Talmud Torah in OC 246 parallels and expands upon the concise rulings of the Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 246:6, which states: "מצוה על כל אדם ללמוד תורה, בין עני בין עשיר... ואפילו בעל אשה ובנים." This establishes the universality of the obligation. Critically, the Arukh HaShulchan's nuanced discussion of lishma has profound practical ramifications for modern halachic discourse, particularly concerning learning for vocational purposes. Iggerot Moshe, Yoreh De'ah Vol. 3, Responsum 31 by Rav Moshe Feinstein, addresses the question of learning Torah for parnassah (livelihood), specifically for teaching or acting as a Rav. Rav Moshe rules that it is permissible to take a salary for teaching Torah, and one can even learn with the intention of becoming a teacher. He grounds this in the Gemara's dictum of "מתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה" and the Rambam's interpretation. As long as the ultimate goal is to serve God and spread Torah, the initial motivation of earning a living is not disqualifying. This teshuvah directly applies the Arukh HaShulchan's (and Rishonim's) understanding of shelo lishma to a common contemporary scenario, demonstrating that the lenient approach is not merely theoretical but forms the basis for practical psak. It validates the pursuit of Torah professions, ensuring that necessary communal roles can be filled without compromising the spiritual integrity of the learners.
Psak/Practice
The Arukh HaShulchan's synthesis of the sugya regarding Talmud Torah lands in halacha with several critical implications, particularly concerning motivation and accessibility.
The Imperative of Study, Regardless of Initial Intent
The most significant practical outcome is the universal encouragement to engage in Torah study, even if one's initial motivations are not purely lishma. The Arukh HaShulchan, by emphasizing "סופו לבא לשמה"^(Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 246:15), provides a meta-psak heuristic: the default posture for any Jew considering Torah study should be to do it. The fear of imperfect intentions should not be a barrier. This approach prioritizes participation and exposure to Torah, trusting in its transformative power. It legitimizes studying for smicha, for communal leadership, for intellectual satisfaction, or even for social standing, provided there is no malicious intent. This psak ensures broad engagement with Torah, preventing a potential paralysis that might arise from an overly stringent view of lishma.
Unwavering Obligation for All
Furthermore, the Arukh HaShulchan's reiteration that the mitzvah of Talmud Torah falls upon "כל אחד ואחד מישראל" (246:13, 246:17) and that the son must learn "לעצמו" if the father fails, reinforces the non-negotiable nature of this obligation. This means that even in scenarios where familial support or structured educational opportunities are lacking, the individual's responsibility remains intact. This is not merely a moral imperative but a halachic one, implying that resources (time, money, effort) must be allocated to fulfilling this mitzvah. It sets a high bar for personal responsibility in spiritual growth, irrespective of external factors.
Takeaway
Talmud Torah is a universal, lifelong mitzvah where even imperfect initial motivations are not only tolerated but are seen as a legitimate, teleological pathway to a deeper, purer lishma. The obligation to learn transcends familial shortcomings and personal circumstances, underscoring its centrality to Jewish life.
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