Arukh HaShulchan Yomi · Expert – Beit Midrash Analysis · Standard

Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 260:6-261:6

StandardExpert – Beit Midrash AnalysisFebruary 22, 2026

Sugya Map

The sugya at hand, as articulated by the Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 260:6-261:6, meticulously delineates the laws of tevilat keilim (immersion of utensils). At its core, the discussion navigates the biblical mandate to immerse vessels acquired from a non-Jew before their use, focusing on the scope, materials, and associated beracha (blessing).

Issue

The fundamental issue is the precise application and extent of the chiyuv (obligation) of tevilat keilim. This encompasses:

  1. Source of Obligation: Is the chiyuv d'Oraita (biblical) or d'Rabanan (rabbinic), and for which specific materials?
  2. Scope of "Keli": What constitutes a "vessel" requiring immersion? Are all food-contact items included, or only specific types and materials?
  3. Provenance Nuances: How does the history of ownership and manufacturing (e.g., made by a non-Jew, repaired by a non-Jew, bought from a Jew who bought from a non-Jew) impact the chiyuv?
  4. Beracha Formulation: The exact wording and conditions for reciting the beracha on tevilat keilim.

Nafka Mina(s)

The practical ramifications are numerous and significant:

  • Glass Vessels: Whether glass keilim require tevila d'Oraita with a beracha, d'Rabanan with a beracha, or d'Rabanan without a beracha. This is a major point of machloket among poskim.
  • Modern Materials: The principles derived from this sugya inform contemporary psak regarding new materials like plastic, Pyrex, or silicone.
  • Transfers of Ownership: Clarifying when a vessel has truly "entered" Jewish ownership from a non-Jew for the first time, or if subsequent transfers (e.g., Jew-to-Jew who bought from non-Jew) trigger the obligation.
  • Status of Repairs/Modifications: Understanding if a vessel made by a Jew, but repaired or hechshered (koshered) by a non-Jew, requires tevila.

Primary Sources

  • Torah: Bamidbar 31:23 (the foundational passuk for tevila).
  • Talmud Bavli: Avodah Zarah 75b (the primary locus for the halachot of tevilat keilim and materials like glass).
  • Rishonim: Rambam, Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot 17:5-6; Tosafot, Avodah Zarah 75b s.v. d'Chayyevi b'Tevila; Rosh, Avodah Zarah 5:10; Rashba, Teshuvot 1:194.
  • Shulchan Arukh: Orach Chaim 260-261 (the direct basis for Arukh HaShulchan's commentary).
  • Acharonim: Taz, Magen Avraham, Mishna Berura on Shulchan Arukh 260-261.

Text Snapshot

The Arukh HaShulchan's exposition on tevilat keilim spans several sections, each building upon the foundational halachot. We will focus on a few pivotal lines that encapsulate the central machloket and the Arukh HaShulchan's distinctive approach.

Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 260:6

"וכל כלים העשויים על ידי עכו"ם, בין של מתכות בין של זכוכית... חייבים בטבילה. ואפילו קנה מיהודי שקנאו מעכו"ם" Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 260:6

Dikduk/Leshon Nuance: The phrase "וכל כלים העשויים על ידי עכו"ם, בין של מתכות בין של זכוכית" (And all vessels made by a non-Jew, whether of metals or of glass) immediately places glass on par with metals concerning the chiyuv tevila. This preempts much of the subsequent discussion by asserting a strong position from the outset, implying a d'Oraita obligation for both. The inclusion of "ואפילו קנה מיהודי שקנאו מעכו"ם" (even if one bought it from a Jew who bought it from a non-Jew) clarifies that the chiyuv is tied to the vessel's original provenance from a non-Jew, not merely the direct transaction. This highlights the transformative nature of tevila for the keli itself.

Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 260:9

"וכלי זכוכית חייבים בטבילה מדאורייתא, וכמו שנתבאר באו"ח סימן תנ"א סעיף ד' בהג"ה... ומכל מקום כלי זכוכית שבורים שחזר וניצק אותם עכו"ם, אינם צריכין טבילה אחרת" Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 260:9

Dikduk/Leshon Nuance: Here, the Arukh HaShulchan explicitly states "וכלי זכוכית חייבים בטבילה מדאורייתא" (And glass vessels are obligated in immersion d'Oraita). The definitive "מדאורייתא" marks a crucial stance, directly challenging the Rambam's derabanan position. The reference to Orach Chaim 451:4 (regarding kashering glass keilim for Pesach) underscores a consistent sevara that glass is like metal. The subsequent phrase "ומכל מקום כלי זכוכית שבורים שחזר וניצק אותם עכו"ם, אינם צריכין טבילה אחרת" (Nevertheless, broken glass vessels that a non-Jew remelted do not require another immersion) is fascinating. It suggests that once a keli has been immersed, its "Jewish identity" persists even if remade by a non-Jew, as long as it was previously immersed. This points to the tevila being a fundamental change to the keli's status, rather than merely removing the tum'at akum from a specific owner.

Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 261:1

"מברך קודם הטבילה, אשר קדשנו במצוותיו וציוונו על טבילת כלים" Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 261:1

Dikduk/Leshon Nuance: The beracha formulation "על טבילת כלים" (on the immersion of vessels) is standard. The Arukh HaShulchan presents it as a clear instruction, indicating that for all vessels requiring tevila (including glass, as per his ruling), a beracha is recited. This is a direct consequence of his d'Oraita or d'Rabanan chazak (strong) stance on the obligation. The absence of any caveat regarding safek (doubt) underscores his confidence in the chiyuv.

Readings

The Arukh HaShulchan's rigorous analysis of tevilat keilim synthesizes centuries of Rishonim and Acharonim, often taking definitive stances on deeply contested issues. A prime example is his ruling on glass vessels. To appreciate his chiddush and its implications, we must juxtapose it with earlier foundational opinions.

1. Rambam: The Derabanan Perspective on Glass

The Rambam, in Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot 17:5-6, presents a nuanced view on the chiyuv of tevilat keilim, particularly concerning glass.

Rambam's Chiddush: The Rambam holds that the chiyuv for glass vessels is m'derabanan (rabbinic), distinguishing them from metal vessels which are m'dOraita (biblical). He states: "כל כלי מתכות שלקחן ישראל מן העכו"ם... מטבילן במקוה... וכלי זכוכית שקנאן מן העכו"ם, מטבילן מפני דרכי שלום... ואינו מברך עליהם" Rambam, Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot 17:5-6

The Rambam's reasoning, though not explicitly stated in this passage, can be inferred from the context of tum'at keilim (impurity of vessels). The passuk in Bamidbar 31:23 explicitly lists metals ("זהב וכסף נחשת ברזל בדיל ועופרת"). Glass is not mentioned. While the Gemara in Avodah Zarah 75b discusses glass, its categorization is debated. The Rambam likely views glass as akin to earthenware in its basic material (sand), which does not require tevila. Although glass is melted and reshaped like metal ("חוזר וניצוק"), the Rambam might limit the d'Oraita chiyuv solely to the materials explicitly enumerated in the Torah, or to those materials that share the inherent tum'ah susceptibility of metals. For the Rambam, the rabbinic chiyuv for glass is m’derabanan and not accompanied by a beracha, indicating a lesser degree of obligation, possibly motivated by darkei shalom or gezeira (rabbinic decree) to prevent intermingling. The Ravad, commenting on the Rambam, supports this view, emphasizing that the d'Oraita chiyuv is exclusive to the listed metals. Ravad, ad loc.

Connection to Arukh HaShulchan: The Arukh HaShulchan directly challenges the Rambam's position. As seen in the Text Snapshot, Arukh HaShulchan 260:9 unequivocally states "וכלי זכוכית חייבים בטבילה מדאורייתא." This is a stark contrast. The Arukh HaShulchan, following the view of the Tosafot, Rosh, and Shulchan Arukh (Orach Chaim 451:4 and 323:7, implicitly) believes that the Gemara's discussion of glass being "חוזר וניצוק" (remelted and reformed) places it squarely in the category of metals, thereby triggering a d'Oraita chiyuv. For the Arukh HaShulchan, the sevara of the passuk "וכל דבר אשר יבא באש" (Bamidbar 31:23) extends to any material that can be purified by fire through melting and reshaping, not just the specific metals listed. This difference is fundamental, impacting the necessity of a beracha and the severity of transgression.

2. Tosafot: The D'Oraita Stance for Glass

The Tosafot, consistent with the Arukh HaShulchan's ultimate ruling, interpret the Gemara in Avodah Zarah 75b as establishing a d'Oraita chiyuv for glass vessels.

Tosafot's Chiddush: Tosafot explicitly states that glass vessels require tevila d'Oraita, equating them to metal vessels due to their shared property of being melted and reformed. "דאמרינן בגמרא דחוזר וניצוק ככלי מתכות וכו' וכן פסק הרא"ש... מדאורייתא היא" Tosafot, Avodah Zarah 75b s.v. דחייבי בטבילה

The Gemara in Avodah Zarah 75b states: "כלי זכוכית הואיל וחוזרין ונצוקין, הרי הן ככלי מתכות" (Glass vessels, since they can be remelted and reformed, are like metal vessels). Tosafot takes this statement literally and as a definitive halachic equation. For them, the passuk in Bamidbar 31:23, "וכל דבר אשר יבא באש תעבירו באש" (and anything that comes into fire, you shall pass through fire), applies to anything that derives its form and purifiability from fire, which includes glass. The enumerated metals are examples, not an exclusive list. The sevara is not merely about the material's inherent tum'ah status, but its capacity for regeneration through fire. This regenerative property makes glass distinct from earthenware, which, once broken, cannot be repaired to its original state through fire. Therefore, glass falls under the d'Oraita category, and a beracha is recited upon its immersion. The Rosh also explicitly concurs with this position. Rosh, Avodah Zarah 5:10

Connection to Arukh HaShulchan: The Arukh HaShulchan's declaration that "וכלי זכוכית חייבים בטבילה מדאורייתא" (Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 260:9) is a direct embrace of the Tosafot's and Rosh's interpretation. He views the Gemara's equation of glass to metal as determinative for the d'Oraita chiyuv. This aligns with his general approach of ruling lechumra (stringently) in matters where a d'Oraita possibility exists, especially when supported by prominent Rishonim. This also explains why he mandates a beracha for glass, as a d'Oraita mitzvah (or a strong rabbinic one with a smachta from Torah) typically warrants one. Furthermore, the Arukh HaShulchan's comment in 260:9 about remelted glass not needing another tevila if it was previously immersed by a Jew, even if remelted by a non-Jew, reinforces the idea that tevila imparts a lasting "Jewish identity" to the keli. This sevara further supports the idea that tevila is a profound transformation, akin to gerut (conversion) for the keli, rather than a mere removal of transient tum'ah. This transformative kedusha is more fitting for a d'Oraita mandate.

3. Rashba: The Nuance of Keli Definition and Provenance

The Rashba, in his Teshuvot, contributes significantly to understanding what constitutes a "keli" for tevila and the impact of a non-Jew's involvement beyond initial manufacture.

Rashba's Chiddush: The Rashba elaborates on the precise conditions that trigger the chiyuv tevila, particularly in scenarios where the vessel's status is ambiguous due to repairs or partial manufacturing by a non-Jew. He grapples with the question of whether a keli is defined by its material, its functionality, or its complete manufacturing process. For example, he discusses a keli made by a Jew but repaired by a non-Jew: "כלי מתכות של ישראל שנתנו אצל עכו"ם לתקנם... אם דרך לתקנם בשינוי יצירה... חייב בטבילה" Rashba, Teshuvot 1:194

The Rashba's sevara here is that if the non-Jew's repair involves a significant "שינוי יצירה" (change of form/creation) that essentially reforms the keli, it might necessitate tevila again. This implies that the non-Jew's "creation" is what triggers the chiyuv, not merely their touch. The chiyuv is not just about tum'at akum (impurity of non-Jew) but about the keli entering the domain of kedusha (sanctity) for Jewish use, after having been fully "created" by a non-Jew. If the non-Jew's work is merely superficial, like polishing, it would not require tevila. This is relevant to Arukh HaShulchan 260:7, which states that if a Jew makes a keli and a non-Jew repairs it, it doesn't need tevila unless it was "הפך יצירתו" (its form was changed). This aligns perfectly with the Rashba's distinction.

Connection to Arukh HaShulchan: The Arukh HaShulchan's discussion in 260:7-8, regarding keilim made by a Jew but repaired by a goy, or keilim hechshered by a goy, directly reflects the Rashba's nuanced approach. The Arukh HaShulchan states that if a Jew made the keli, and a non-Jew merely repaired it without "הפך יצירתו," it does not need tevila. However, if the non-Jew's involvement was significant enough to be considered a new "creation" (like remelting and reforming), then it would. This demonstrates the Arukh HaShulchan's careful consideration of the keli's "identity" and the point at which goyish involvement becomes significant enough to trigger the chiyuv. This emphasis on the "creation" or "formation" of the keli by a non-Jew, rather than just its use, strengthens the argument for a d'Oraita chiyuv in cases like glass, where the non-Jew's melting and reforming is central to its identity as a vessel.

In summary, the Arukh HaShulchan adopts the more stringent d'Oraita approach for glass, aligning with Tosafot and Rosh, and applies the nuanced definitions of keli and goyish involvement from Rishonim like the Rashba to create a comprehensive and practical guide to tevilat keilim. His ruling on glass, in particular, stands as a testament to his willingness to extend d'Oraita obligations based on robust talmudic interpretation, even in the face of strong dissenting opinions like the Rambam's.

Friction

The most pronounced friction within this sugya, and indeed highlighted by the Arukh HaShulchan's definitive stance, revolves around the status of glass vessels: are they d'Oraita or d'Rabanan for tevilat keilim? This isn't merely a semantic dispute; it impacts the necessity of a beracha, the severity of transgression, and the halachic approach to new materials.

The Strongest Kushya: The Enigma of Glass's Status

The kushya can be framed thus: How can there be such a fundamental disagreement among Gedolei Yisrael regarding whether an obligation is d'Oraita or d'Rabanan, especially concerning a material (glass) explicitly discussed in the Gemara? The passuk in Bamidbar 31:23 enumerates specific metals: "זהב וכסף נחשת ברזל בדיל ועופרת" (gold, silver, copper, iron, tin, and lead). Glass is conspicuously absent from this list. If the chiyuv is d'Oraita, it must derive from this passuk. How, then, can glass be included d'Oraita?

The Gemara in Avodah Zarah 75b states: "כלי זכוכית הואיל וחוזרין ונצוקין, הרי הן ככלי מתכות" (Glass vessels, since they can be remelted and reformed, are like metal vessels). This statement seems to be the linchpin.

  • The Rambam's Challenge: If this Gemara unequivocally establishes a d'Oraita equation between glass and metal, why does the Rambam rule that the chiyuv for glass is d'Rabanan and without a beracha? The Rambam is known for his precision in discerning d'Oraita from d'Rabanan. His position implies that the Gemara's statement ("הרי הן ככלי מתכות") is not a d'Oraita equation but rather a smachta (support) or reason for a rabbinic decree, or perhaps limited to a specific aspect of din not directly related to tevilat keilim from a goy.
  • The Arukh HaShulchan's/Tosafot's Challenge: Conversely, if the Gemara's statement is not a d'Oraita equation, how can Tosafot, the Rosh, and the Arukh HaShulchan assert "וכלי זכוכית חייבים בטבילה מדאורייתא" (Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 260:9)? They must interpret "הרי הן ככלי מתכות" as a full d'Oraita equivalence. Yet, the literal reading of the passuk does not support this. The kushya is rooted in the hermeneutics of interpreting a seemingly clear Gemara in light of a sparse biblical text and the halachic implications of d'Oraita versus d'Rabanan. The absence of glass from the passuk is a strong argument for limiting the d'Oraita scope, while the Gemara's comparison is a strong argument for expanding it. This creates a genuine tzimtzum (constriction) versus harchava (expansion) tension in halachic interpretation.

The Best Terutz: Two Approaches to the Gemara's Equivalence

The terutzim (answers) to this kushya hinge on how one interprets the Gemara's phrase "הרי הן ככלי מתכות" and its relationship to the passuk in Bamidbar.

Terutz 1: Rambam's Perspective – A Derabanan Extension with a Smachta

The Rambam, followed by the Ravad and others, would likely explain that the d'Oraita chiyuv for tevilat keilim is limited to the specific metals enumerated in Bamidbar 31:23. The Torah's enumeration is precise and exhaustive for d'Oraita matters. Glass, while sharing some properties with metal (being melted and reformed), is fundamentally different in its origin (sand vs. mineral ore) and its inherent dinim regarding tum'ah (e.g., it is not susceptible to tum'at midras in the same way certain metal keilim are). Therefore, when the Gemara states "הרי הן ככלי מתכות," it should be understood as a smachta or a reason for a derabanan enactment. The Rabbis, observing the similarity between glass and metal in their manufacturing process and durability, decreed that glass vessels also require tevila. This rabbinic decree ensures consistency and prevents confusion. However, because it's a rabbinic extension and not explicitly d'Oraita, it does not warrant a beracha. The phrase "מפני דרכי שלום" in the Rambam (Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot 17:6) could also imply that the rabbinic decree was to maintain harmony or prevent societal friction, or even as a preventative measure (gezeira) against intermingling with non-Jewish practices, rather than a direct fulfillment of a d'Oraita mandate. This allows for a robust derabanan obligation without elevating it to the biblical level, thus maintaining the textual integrity of Bamidbar 31:23.

Terutz 2: Arukh HaShulchan's/Tosafot's Perspective – A D'Oraita Analogy

The Arukh HaShulchan, aligning with Tosafot and Rosh, takes the Gemara's statement "הרי הן ככלי מתכות" as a full d'Oraita equivalence. Their argument stems from a deeper reading of the passuk "וכל דבר אשר יבא באש תעבירו באש" (Bamidbar 31:23). The passuk lists specific metals as examples of "דבר אשר יבא באש" (things that come into fire and are purified by fire). The underlying sevara (reasoning) for their chiyuv is not merely their material composition, but their capacity to be melted and reformed. This process, which purifies and renews the keli, is the essence of the d'Oraita mandate. Since glass, as the Gemara explicitly states, "חוזר וניצוק" (can be remelted and reformed) just like metals, it perfectly fits the d'Oraita category of "דבר אשר יבא באש." The specific metals mentioned in the passuk are merely illustrative examples from that era, not an exhaustive limitation. This interpretation views tevilat keilim not solely as removing tum'at akum but as a process of sanctification or "conversion" for the keli as it transitions from non-Jewish to Jewish use. The capacity for a keli to be regenerated through fire makes it eligible for this profound transformation. Therefore, the Arukh HaShulchan (and Tosafot) sees no contradiction with the passuk; rather, the Gemara clarifies the passuk's underlying principle, extending it to materials like glass that share the same essential characteristic as metals. This robust d'Oraita understanding necessitates a beracha, as it is a direct fulfillment of a divinely commanded mitzvah. The Arukh HaShulchan's consistency in treating glass as d'Oraita (e.g., regarding kashering for Pesach in O.C. 451:4) further solidifies this approach.

In essence, the machloket boils down to whether the passuk's enumeration of metals is exhaustive or illustrative, and how the Gemara's analogy of glass to metal should be interpreted. The Arukh HaShulchan, through his definitive ruling, clearly sides with the latter, emphasizing the underlying sevara of the passuk over a literal enumeration, thereby expanding the scope of d'Oraita tevilat keilim.

Intertext

The sugya of tevilat keilim for vessels acquired from a non-Jew is not an isolated halacha; it resonates with broader themes in Jewish law concerning the interaction between kedusha (sanctity) and tuma'ah (impurity), as well as the unique status of Jewish ownership and practice.

1. Tumat Keilim and Material Susceptibility (Leviticus 11:33, 15:12)

The foundational laws of tum'at keilim (impurity of vessels) provide a crucial backdrop for understanding tevilat keilim. In Vayikra (Leviticus), the Torah delineates which materials are susceptible to tum'ah and how they are purified. "וכל כלי חרש אשר יפל מהם אל תוכו כל אשר בתוכו יטמא ואתו תשברו" (Leviticus 11:33) "וכלי חרש אשר יגע בו הזב ישבר וכל כלי עץ ישטף במים" (Leviticus 15:12)

Analysis: These pesukim establish a critical distinction between earthenware vessels (kli cheres) and other materials. Earthenware becomes tamei only from its interior ("אל תוכו"), and crucially, cannot be purified by immersion; it must be broken ("ואתו תשברו"). In contrast, vessels of wood, leather, or cloth can be purified by washing ("ישוטף במים"), and metal vessels can be purified. This distinction is pivotal. The reason kli cheres cannot be purified by immersion is often explained by their non-regenerative nature; once a crack or impurity enters, it cannot be "fixed" or renewed by tevila. This provides a strong sevara for why earthenware vessels are exempt from tevilat keilim when purchased from a non-Jew. If they cannot be purified from tum'ah by tevila, it logically follows that they are not subject to tevilat keilim from tum'at akum. The Arukh HaShulchan's (and Tosafot's) position that glass is d'Oraita for tevilat keilim fits this intertextual framework perfectly. Glass, like metal, is described by the Gemara as "חוזר וניצוק" (remelted and reformed). This regenerative capacity aligns it with materials that can be purified by tevila from other forms of tum'ah. Therefore, its inclusion in the d'Oraita mandate of tevilat keilim from a non-Jew is consistent with its broader halachic profile regarding purification. The sevara is that the passuk in Bamidbar 31:23 refers to materials that can be purified and transformed, which excludes earthenware but includes metal and, by extension, glass.

2. Gezeirot and Tum'at Akum (Shabbat 15a, Avodah Zarah 74b)

The halachot of tevilat keilim are inextricably linked to the broader rabbinic enactments concerning non-Jews, particularly tum'at akum (impurity attributed to non-Jews) and gezeirot (rabbinic decrees) designed to prevent assimilation and maintain Jewish distinctiveness. The Gemara discusses gezeirot such as yayin nesekh (wine handled by a non-Jew), pat akum (bread baked by a non-Jew), and bishul akum (food cooked by a non-Jew). A related gezeira is tum'at tehila le'goyim (impurity of utensils that non-Jews touch). "גזרו טומאה על כלי עכו"ם" (Shabbat 15a) "גזרו טומאה על כלי עכו"ם ועל כלי חרס שנגע בהם עכו"ם" (Avodah Zarah 74b)

Analysis: The rabbinic decree of tum'at tehila le'goyim meant that any utensil handled or used by a non-Jew was considered tamei. While tevilat keilim from Bamidbar 31:23 predates these rabbinic decrees and seems to apply even to new vessels, the existence of tum'at tehila le'goyim provides a powerful rabbinic overlay and reinforcement for the practice. For the Rambam, who holds glass is d'Rabanan, the chiyuv for glass could be seen as an extension of this tum'at tehila le'goyim. The Rabbis, wishing to treat glass similarly to metal due to its utility and durability, extended the tevila requirement to it, but as a derabanan matter, perhaps to remove a tum'at tehila specific to glass. This would explain why he doesn't mandate a beracha, as berachot are generally not recited on purely rabbinic gezeirot unless they have a smachta or are universally accepted as chiyuvim. However, for the Arukh HaShulchan, who maintains a d'Oraita chiyuv for glass, the tum'at tehila le'goyim serves as a strong rabbinic chizuk (strengthening) for an already existing biblical obligation. It underscores the profound separation required between Jewish and non-Jewish spheres, even at the level of inanimate objects. The immersion is not just a purification, but a "sanctification" of the keli for its new, elevated purpose within a Jewish home, aligning it with the general kedusha of Israel. The Arukh HaShulchan's rigorous approach to the d'Oraita status of glass suggests that tevilat keilim is more than just an anti-assimilation measure; it's a fundamental transformation of the keli's identity, echoing the transformative power of gerut for a person, bringing it into the realm of kedushat Yisrael.

These intertextual parallels demonstrate that the sugya of tevilat keilim is deeply woven into the fabric of Jewish law, drawing upon principles of tum'ah and taharah, material science as understood by the Sages, and the broader concern for maintaining a distinct and sanctified Jewish lifestyle.

Psak/Practice

The Arukh HaShulchan's comprehensive treatment of tevilat keilim in Orach Chaim 260-261, particularly his robust stance on glass, has significantly shaped contemporary halachic practice.

Halachic Landings

  1. Glass Vessels: The prevailing psak in most Ashkenazi communities, following the Arukh HaShulchan, Shulchan Arukh (implicitly), Magen Avraham, and Mishna Berura, is that glass vessels require tevila with a beracha. This is due to the strong position that their chiyuv is d'Oraita or at least a safek d'Oraita (doubtful Torah law), which mandates a beracha when performing the mitzvah. Sephardic poskim often follow the Shulchan Arukh's initial statement (O.C. 323:7 and 451:4) which doesn't explicitly state d'Oraita for glass but groups it with metals, implying a chiyuv with a beracha. Thus, for practical purposes, the machloket (Rambam vs. Aruch HaShulchan/Tosafot) largely resolves lechumra (stringently) for glass, requiring tevila with a beracha.
  2. Modern Materials: The principles laid out by the Arukh HaShulchan are applied heuristically to modern materials.
    • Plastic: Since plastic is neither metal nor glass, and does not share the "חוזר וניצוק" (remelted and reformed) property, most poskim rule that plastic keilim do not require tevila. They are often likened to wood or earthenware, which are exempt.
    • Pyrex/Corelle: These materials, while glass-like, often have different compositions. However, given the chumra for glass, many poskim recommend tevila for them, usually with a beracha if they are truly glass, or b'lo beracha (without a blessing) if there is significant doubt.
    • Silicone: Generally exempt, similar to plastic.
  3. The Beracha: The formulation "אשר קדשנו במצוותיו וציוונו על טבילת כלים" (Arukh HaShulchan 261:1) is universally accepted. The Arukh HaShulchan also addresses the shaliach (agent) performing tevila, confirming that the shaliach recites the beracha for the owner (261:4).
  4. Mixed Provenance: Arukh HaShulchan 260:6-8 clarifies that a keli bought from a Jew who bought it from a non-Jew still requires tevila. However, a keli originally made by a Jew, even if repaired by a non-Jew, does not require tevila unless its essential form ("יצירתו") was changed by the non-Jew, aligning with the Rashba's nuance.

Meta-Psak Heuristics

  • Safek d'Oraita l'Chumra: The Arukh HaShulchan's ruling on glass exemplifies the principle of "doubt in a Torah law is ruled stringently." Even with the Rambam's dissenting opinion, the possibility of a d'Oraita chiyuv for glass, strongly supported by Tosafot and Rosh, leads to the chumra of requiring tevila with a beracha.
  • Consistency Across Sugyot: The Arukh HaShulchan's consistent approach to glass across different sugyot (e.g., tevilat keilim and kashering for Pesach, O.C. 451:4) demonstrates a commitment to a unified halachic framework based on the underlying sevara of material properties.
  • Impact of "Creation": The emphasis on who "created" or "formed" the keli (e.g., non-Jew vs. Jew, or significant repair vs. minor repair) is a key heuristic. The chiyuv generally attaches when a non-Jew is the primary artisan bringing the keli into existence as a usable vessel.

The Arukh HaShulchan's detailed exposition ensures that the transformative act of tevilat keilim is properly understood and executed, reflecting both its ancient origins and its ongoing relevance in the modern Jewish home.

Takeaway

Tehila le'goyim (the immersion of vessels from non-Jews) is more than a mere act of purification; it's a profound transformation of a keli's identity, rooted in biblical text and subject to rigorous lomdus concerning material science and the essence of creation. The Arukh HaShulchan's definitive ruling for glass as d'Oraita exemplifies the poskim's commitment to extending the kedusha of Torah law to evolving material realities, underscoring the enduring significance of separating the sacred from the mundane in Jewish life.