Arukh HaShulchan Yomi · Expert – Beit Midrash Analysis · Standard
Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 261:7-14
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The Arukh HaShulchan (AHS) in Orach Chaim 261:7-14 meticulously unpacks the halachos surrounding Kiddush on Friday night, focusing primarily on two interconnected yet distinct requirements: the imperative of Kiddush b'Makom Seudah (Kiddush in the place of a meal) and the nuanced practice of Kiddush b'Veit HaKnesset (Kiddush in the Synagogue).
- Issue: The fundamental requirement that Kiddush must be followed immediately by a meal, as well as the historical context and contemporary validity of Kiddush recited publicly in a synagogue.
- Nafka Mina(s):
- What minimal consumption (e.g., kezayit of bread, revi'it of wine) constitutes a "meal" for Kiddush?
- Can one change locations between Kiddush and the meal?
- Does Kiddush recited in shul fulfill one's personal chiyuv (obligation)?
- The practical implications for guests, wayfarers, and congregants attending Kiddush in shul.
- The interplay between minhag (custom) and din (law) in shaping halachic practice.
- Primary Sources:
- Talmud Bavli: Pesachim 101a-b (source for Kiddush b'Makom Seudah), Eruvin 40b (source for Kiddush b'Veit HaKnesset).
- Rif: Pesachim, Ch. 10.
- Rambam: Hilchot Shabbat 29:1-5.
- Rosh: Pesachim, Ch. 10, Siman 15.
- Tur & Shulchan Arukh: Orach Chaim 261.
- Rama: Orach Chaim 261.
- Magen Avraham, Taz, Gra: On Orach Chaim 261.
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Text Snapshot
The Arukh HaShulchan navigates these complex issues with characteristic precision and an eye toward halacha l'maaseh. Let's zero in on a critical line from his discussion on Kiddush b'Makom Seudah and then another from Kiddush b'Veit HaKnesset.
On B'Makom Seudah
"וכן מי שעשה קידוש בבית אחד ואכל בבית אחר, לא יצא, אף על פי שלא הפסיק בדיבור. וכן מי שעשה קידוש בחדר אחד ואכל בחדר אחר, אם הוא בית אחד – יצא, ואם הוא שני בתים – לא יצא. והוא הדין אם עשה קידוש על היין ואכל מיד כזית פת, יצא. ואם לא אכל אלא רביעית יין, יצא אם הוא רגיל לשתות רביעית יין על הסעודה, אבל אם אינו רגיל, לא יצא." – Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 261:8-9
Dikduk/Leshon Nuance: The AHS employs the phrasing "וכן מי שעשה קידוש... לא יצא" (and similarly one who made Kiddush... did not fulfill the obligation) followed by "יצא" (fulfilled) or "לא יצא" (did not fulfill) based on the subsequent action. This categorical language underscores the ikkar hadin (primary law) derived from the Gemara's Kiddush b'Makom Seudah requirement. The nuance in "אם הוא בית אחד – יצא, ואם הוא שני בתים – לא יצא" distinguishes between rooms within a single dwelling (which maintain the "place of the meal" continuity) and separate dwellings, highlighting the spatial definition of makom seudah. The conditional clause regarding revi'it of wine – "אם הוא רגיל לשתות רביעית יין על הסעודה, אבל אם אינו רגיל, לא יצא" – introduces a subjective element of derech achila (manner of eating/drinking) as a determinant for fulfilling the obligation, a point of significant debate among Rishonim.
On Kiddush b'Veit HaKnesset
"ולכן האידנא אין קידוש שבבית הכנסת כלום, ואפילו המקדש עצמו וכל השומעים, אינם יוצאים בו ידי חובת קידוש כלל, אלא שעושים כן משום מנהג בעלמא וזכר לדבר שהיה בימיהם, ששם היו אוכלים ושותים. אבל עתה הכל הולכים לבתיהם ואוכלים ושותים, ואין להם כלום מקידוש זה." – Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 261:14
Dikduk/Leshon Nuance: The AHS's declaration "אין קידוש שבבית הכנסת כלום" (Kiddush in the synagogue is nothing) is strikingly assertive, particularly the use of "כלום" (nothing at all). This emphatic negation clarifies that, l'halacha, the Kiddush recited in shul today carries no chiyuv fulfillment for virtually anyone present, including the one reciting it. He attributes its continued practice to "מנהג בעלמא וזכר לדבר שהיה בימיהם" (merely a custom and a remembrance of what was in their days). This firmly distinguishes between the historical takkanah (enactment) for wayfarers and the modern ritual, which has been stripped of its halachic efficacy due to the absence of a subsequent meal. The phrase "ואין להם כלום מקידוש זה" (and they have nothing from this Kiddush) reiterates the lack of yotzei yedei chovah.
Readings
The Arukh HaShulchan's synthesis in OC 261:7-14 critically engages with foundational Rishonim and Acharonim, particularly concerning the stringency of Kiddush b'Makom Seudah and the evolution of Kiddush b'Veit HaKnesset. His approach often reflects a nuanced understanding of minhag versus din, and the practical application of halacha.
1. Rambam: The Uncompromising Rigor of Makom Seudah
The Rambam, in Hilchot Shabbat 29:1-5, presents a highly rigorous interpretation of Kiddush b'Makom Seudah, which forms a crucial backdrop for the AHS's discussion in 261:8. For the Rambam, the connection between Kiddush and the meal is not merely sequential, but rather inherent to the kiddush act itself, defining its validity.
Chiddush: The Rambam posits that one must immediately consume bread after Kiddush to fulfill the makom seudah requirement, or at least a revi'it of wine if one is accustomed to drinking wine as a meal component. However, his primary emphasis is on bread. Crucially, the Rambam (Hilchot Shabbat 29:3) states: "אין קידוש אלא במקום סעודה, לפיכך אם קידש בבית זה ואכל בבית אחר, לא יצא, אפילו לא הפסיק בדברים."1 This is the source for the AHS's unequivocal ruling in 261:8. For the Rambam, the "place of a meal" is a strict spatial and conceptual unit. Changing rooms within the same house is generally permitted, as it maintains the unity of the "place" (Hilchot Shabbat 29:4). However, changing houses or even fundamentally distinct areas within a larger complex breaks this unity, rendering the Kiddush invalid.
The underlying yesod for the Rambam appears to be that the se'udah is not merely an appendix to Kiddush, but rather an integral part of the kiddush haYom itself. The se'udah provides the tangible expression of the kedushah (sanctity) of Shabbat, elevating the mundane act of eating into a sacred one, thereby fulfilling the mitzvah of Kiddush. Without this immediate, localized se'udah, the Kiddush lacks its essential component. This stringent view leads him to require bread as the ideal se'udah, as bread is universally recognized as the foundation of a meal. While he allows wine in certain circumstances, it is qualified by the derech achila – one must be "רגיל לשתות רביעית יין על הסעודה" (accustomed to drinking a revi'it of wine as part of a meal)2. The AHS adopts this very language in 261:9, demonstrating his adherence to the Rambam's nuance regarding wine. The Rambam's position emphasizes the conceptual unity of Kiddush and se'udah as a single, holistic act of kiddush haYom.
2. Rosh: Broadening the Scope of Makom Seudah and Kiddush b'Veit HaKnesset
The Rosh, in Pesachim Ch. 10, Siman 15, while agreeing with the fundamental requirement of Kiddush b'Makom Seudah, often presents a more expansive or lenient interpretation than the Rambam, particularly regarding what constitutes a sufficient se'udah and the scope of Kiddush b'Veit HaKnesset.
Chiddush: The Rosh acknowledges the need for makom se'udah but is more flexible on the shiur (quantity) required. He is often cited as the source for the idea that even a kezayit of mezonot (baked goods, not bread) can suffice for the se'udah component of Kiddush. The AHS in 261:10 directly addresses this, noting the minhag to taste mezonot and discussing its halachic validity. The Rosh's view is rooted in the understanding that Kiddush is primarily fulfilled through the wine, and the subsequent meal is merely a requirement to make the Kiddush a "meal-like" event, not necessarily a full se'udah.
Regarding Kiddush b'Veit HaKnesset, the Rosh (Pesachim 10:15) affirms the Gemara's ruling in Eruvin 40b that Kiddush can be recited in shul and fulfill the obligation, specifically for wayfarers. However, he also recognizes the broader practice beyond wayfarers. His perspective is reflected in the AHS's discussion in 261:11-12, where the AHS recounts the historical basis and its eventual practical limitations. The Rosh allows for a broader interpretation of makom se'udah, often stating that if one drinks a revi'it of wine, it suffices, without the stringent "רגיל" condition the Rambam imposes3. This is a subtle but significant divergence. While the AHS quotes the Rambam's condition, the minhag of consuming mezonot (which the AHS validates as sufficient in 261:10 if one eats a kezayit) aligns more closely with the Rosh's broader scope for the se'udah. The Rosh's reasoning seems to be that as long as some form of food or drink typically associated with a meal is consumed immediately after Kiddush, the spirit of makom se'udah is upheld. This less stringent approach might stem from an understanding that the chiyuv of Kiddush is on the wine, and the se'udah is a takanah to ensure respect for the Kiddush, rather than an intrinsic part of the kiddush haYom itself.
3. Magen Avraham: The Evolution of Kiddush b'Veit HaKnesset
The Magen Avraham, in his commentary on Shulchan Arukh OC 261, provides essential insights into the practical application and historical evolution of Kiddush b'Veit HaKnesset, a topic the AHS dedicates significant space to (261:11-14).
Chiddush: The Magen Avraham (OC 261:10) is a pivotal Acharon in clarifying that Kiddush b'Veit HaKnesset today does not fulfill the chiyuv for most people. He argues that the original takkanah of the Gemara (Eruvin 40b) for Kiddush in shul was exclusively for orchim (wayfarers) who would eat and sleep there. In subsequent generations, when people had fixed homes and ate their Shabbat meals there, the takkanah became irrelevant for the general populace. He explains that while the minhag to recite Kiddush in shul persists, it is purely a zecher (remembrance) of the original takkanah and does not carry halachic weight for personal chiyuv. The Magen Avraham explicitly states that "אין לקידוש של ביהכ"נ שום שיעור" (the Kiddush of the synagogue has no measure/value) unless one is a wayfarer who actually eats there.
The AHS in 261:14 echoes this sentiment almost verbatim, declaring "אין קידוש שבבית הכנסת כלום" and attributing its continuation to "מנהג בעלמא וזכר לדבר שהיה בימיהם." The Magen Avraham's contribution is critical because he articulates the reason why the minhag diverged from the din. The original takkanah was l'tzorech (for a need) – to enable wayfarers to fulfill their obligation. Once that need ceased to exist for the majority, the takkanah effectively lapsed for them. The Magen Avraham's analysis highlights the dynamic nature of halacha, where the ta'am ha'mitzvah (reason for the mitzvah) or ta'am ha'takkanah (reason for the enactment) can dictate its ongoing applicability. His view is instrumental in distinguishing between a valid minhag that becomes binding and a minhag that is merely a ceremonial echo of a past practice without current halachic efficacy for the individual's chiyuv. The AHS's firm conclusion on Kiddush b'Veit HaKnesset is a direct reflection of the Magen Avraham's sharp distinction.
1 Rambam, Hilchot Shabbat 29:3. 2 Rambam, Hilchot Shabbat 29:2. 3 Rosh, Pesachim 10:15, s.v. "קידש בבית זה ואכל בבית אחר."
Friction
One of the most profound tensions illuminated by the Arukh HaShulchan's discussion in OC 261:7-14 is the apparent disjunction between the Talmudic allowance for Kiddush in the synagogue and its subsequent practical invalidation for the vast majority of congregants. This creates a significant kushya: How can a din explicitly stated in the Gemara, establishing that Kiddush in shul fulfills the obligation, become effectively "nullified" by later poskim and minhag?
The Kushya: The Erosion of Kiddush b'Veit HaKnesset's Efficacy
The Gemara in Eruvin 40b explicitly states: "אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל: מקדשין על היין בבית הכנסת, ומברכין עליו ברכת המזון בבית הכנסת."1 This passage seems to clearly indicate that Kiddush recited in shul is valid, even allowing for Birkat HaMazon there. Furthermore, the Gemara (Pesachim 101a) attributes the practice to R' Akiva and R' Tarfon, who recited Kiddush in shul, implying a broad application. The Rif, Rosh, and Rambam all acknowledge this Gemara, laying the groundwork for the Shulchan Arukh's initial ruling (OC 261:11) that Kiddush in shul can fulfill the obligation.
Yet, the Arukh HaShulchan (261:14), following the Rama (OC 261:11) and Magen Avraham (OC 261:10), concludes with startling finality: "ולכן האידנא אין קידוש שבבית הכנסת כלום, ואפילו המקדש עצמו וכל השומעים, אינם יוצאים בו ידי חובת קידוש כלל, אלא שעושים כן משום מנהג בעלמא וזכר לדבר שהיה בימיהם." This represents a radical shift from the plain reading of the Gemara. If the Gemara explicitly states it's valid, on what halachic basis can later authorities declare it "nothing" for most people? This is not a mere stringency (chumra) but a wholesale rejection of the din for contemporary practice. What principles allow a minhag or a change in societal conditions to override an explicit Talmudic din in such a fundamental manner?
The Terutz: Takkanah L'Tzorech and the Principle of B'Makom Seudah
The resolution to this kushya lies in a deeper understanding of the original takkanah of Kiddush b'Veit HaKnesset and its interaction with the overarching principle of Kiddush b'Makom Seudah.
Terutz 1: Takkanah L'Tzorech – A Contextual Enactment
The primary terutz, articulated by Rishonim like the Rif and Rosh, and developed by Acharonim like the Magen Avraham and the Arukh HaShulchan himself, is that the Gemara's allowance for Kiddush in shul was a takkanah l'tzorech orchim – an enactment specifically for the benefit of wayfarers. These orchim (travelers, paupers, or those without a fixed home) would often eat and sleep in the synagogue. For them, the synagogue was their "place of a meal," thereby satisfying the Kiddush b'Makom Seudah requirement. The Gemara in Eruvin 40b indeed mentions "סעודת עניים" (meal for the poor) in this context.
The Arukh HaShulchan (261:12) explains this explicitly: "וכל זה היה בזמן חז"ל שהיו האורחים והעניים אוכלים ושותים בבית הכנסת, והיו גם ישנים שם, וממילא יצאו בקידוש זה בבית הכנסת. אבל בזמן הזה שהכל הולכים לבתיהם..." The crucial point is that the takkanah did not create a new category of Kiddush devoid of the makom se'udah requirement. Rather, it recognized that for a specific demographic, the synagogue functioned as their makom se'udah.
The chiddush of the Acharonim is that when the conditions that necessitated the takkanah ceased to exist for the general public – i.e., when people no longer regularly ate and slept in shul – the takkanah reverted to its original limited scope. For those who do go home for their meal, the Kiddush in shul fails to meet the Kiddush b'Makom Seudah requirement, as they are not eating there. Thus, the minhag to continue reciting Kiddush in shul became a mere zecher, a commemoration of a past practice, rather than a halachically efficacious act for the general public. It's not that the din was "nullified," but rather that its applicability was always conditional on the makom se'udah requirement, which is no longer met in shul for most. This is similar to the principle of "בטל טעם בטל תקנה" (when the reason for the enactment ceases, the enactment ceases), a concept found in various sugyot.
Terutz 2: The Principle of Lo Plug and its Limitations
A potential challenge to the above terutz might be the principle of lo plug (do not differentiate), where Chazal might make a takkanah universally applicable even if the reason only applies to a subset, to avoid confusion. If Chazal enacted Kiddush in shul for orchim, why didn't they extend it to everyone via lo plug?
The response is that lo plug is typically applied where the core din is the same, but there's a minor differentiation. Here, the Kiddush b'Makom Seudah is a fundamental, d'Oraita (Torah-level) or d'Rabbanan (rabbinic) principle tied to the very essence of Kiddush. Creating a blanket exception that fundamentally severs Kiddush from makom se'udah for everyone would be a radical departure, not a mere application of lo plug. The takkanah for orchim was a clever way to apply the makom se'udah principle to their circumstances, not to circumvent it.
Therefore, the tension resolves by recognizing that the Gemara's statement was never an unconditional blanket permission for all, but a specific application of the Kiddush b'Makom Seudah principle to the unique situation of orchim in the synagogue. When that situation changed for the broader community, the Kiddush in shul ceased to be valid for them, not because the din changed, but because the underlying conditions for its fulfillment were no longer present. The AHS masterfully brings this historical and halachic trajectory to its decisive conclusion, affirming the Magen Avraham's position as the established psak.
1 Eruvin 40b.
Intertext
The intricate discussions in Arukh HaShulchan OC 261:7-14 regarding Kiddush b'Makom Seudah and the evolution of Kiddush b'Veit HaKnesset resonate with several parallel themes and concepts across halacha and Jewish thought. These intertexts illuminate the underlying principles and provide a broader context for the AHS's rigorous analysis.
1. The Intertwined Nature of Blessing and Meal: Kiddush and Birkat HaMazon
The requirement of Kiddush b'Makom Seudah echoes the fundamental principle that blessings over food, particularly Birkat HaMazon, are inextricably linked to the consumption of that food. The Gemara in Berachot 50a states: "כל דבר שבברכה צריך סעודה" (anything that requires a blessing requires a meal). This is not a universal rule, but it highlights a conceptual connection. More directly, the Gemara in Pesachim 101a-b, the very source for Kiddush b'Makom Seudah, discusses Kiddush alongside Birkat HaMazon after Kiddush. The AHS in 261:8 notes, "וכן מי שעשה קידוש בחדר אחד ואכל בחדר אחר... אם הוא בית אחד – יצא, ואם הוא שני בתים – לא יצא." This spatial continuity requirement finds a direct parallel in the laws of Birkat HaMazon.
The Shulchan Arukh (Orach Chaim 184:1) rules that if one leaves the house where one ate bread, one cannot recite Birkat HaMazon upon returning to the original place, but must find a new place to eat if one wants to make another blessing, or rely on another's Birkat HaMazon. The Magen Avraham (OC 184:1) clarifies that this is because changing locations severs the connection to the meal. Just as the makom se'udah for Birkat HaMazon must be a unified space, so too for Kiddush. The underlying yesod is that a blessing over food or drink that is meant to usher in or sanctify a meal requires the continuity of that meal in the same designated "place." This continuity is not merely physical but also conceptual, creating a singular event of sanctification and consumption. This parallel underscores that Kiddush b'Makom Seudah is not an isolated stringency but part of a broader halachic paradigm concerning the relationship between blessings, consumption, and locale.
2. The Dynamic of Minhag and Din: From Takkanah L'Tzorech to Zecher B'Alma
The AHS's discussion in 261:11-14 regarding Kiddush b'Veit HaKnesset – its origin as a takkanah l'tzorech orchim and its subsequent transformation into a mere minhag b'alma (just a custom) without halachic efficacy for most – offers a powerful case study in the dynamic interplay between minhag and din. This phenomenon is not unique to Kiddush.
Consider the takkanah of Hallel on Rosh Chodesh. The Gemara (Ta'anit 28b) discusses whether Hallel is recited on Rosh Chodesh. While ultimately the din is that it's minhag to say it, not a chiyuv d'Rabbanan, the practice became widespread. However, unlike Kiddush b'Veit HaKnesset, Hallel on Rosh Chodesh is still considered a minhag that retains a certain spiritual value, even if without a bracha. The Kiddush b'Veit HaKnesset situation is more akin to takkanot that have genuinely lapsed.
A more direct parallel can be found in the laws of Eruv Chatzerot. The Gemara (Eruvin 21b) discusses the takkanah to make an eruv for moving objects between courtyards on Shabbat. The poskim debate whether this takkanah applies even in situations where all residents are tovim (good, meaning they would not misuse the eruv). The Ran (Eruvin 8a in Rif's pages, s.v. "אמר רב יהודה") discusses the principle of lo plug (no differentiation) – that Chazal often make a general enactment even if the reason only applies to a subset, to avoid confusion. In our Kiddush sugya, however, the poskim (as understood by the AHS) did "differentiate." They implicitly recognized that the takkanah for Kiddush in shul was specifically tied to the orchim's need to fulfill makom se'udah. When that specific need was no longer met by the general public, the takkanah did not extend to them. The practice continued as a zecher, but its halachic force evaporated for those who went home to eat.
This distinction highlights a critical meta-halachic heuristic: a takkanah whose ta'am (reason) is purely l'tzorech (for a specific need) might be limited in its applicability, unlike a takkanah that establishes a general principle or guards against a universal concern (where lo plug is more likely to apply). The AHS's firm stance on Kiddush b'Veit HaKnesset serves as a powerful reminder that while minhagim are cherished, their halachic weight must always be scrutinized against their original ta'am and the fundamental dinim they are meant to facilitate. It underlines the halachic system's capacity for both preservation of tradition and adaptation to changing realities.
Psak/Practice
The Arukh HaShulchan's comprehensive analysis in OC 261:7-14 profoundly shapes contemporary halacha l'maaseh, providing clear directives on Kiddush that remain normative.
1. Kiddush at Home: The Imperative of Makom Seudah
The AHS firmly establishes that Kiddush must be followed by a meal in the same place. This is the cornerstone of practice. Practically, this means:
- No Interruption: One must not make a significant hesek (interruption) between Kiddush and the meal. This includes leaving the room for an extended period or engaging in lengthy conversations unrelated to the meal1.
- Minimal Consumption: For Kiddush on wine, one must drink at least a revi'it of the Kiddush wine immediately after the blessing. For the meal component, the AHS (261:9-10) states that a kezayit of bread or mezonot (like cake or crackers) suffices. This is the widespread practice, particularly for those who do not wish to drink more wine or are not immediately hungry. One who only drinks a revi'it of wine, and is not accustomed to considering it a meal, should ideally also consume mezonot.
- Spatial Continuity: While changing rooms within the same house is generally permitted, leaving the house altogether between Kiddush and the meal invalidates the Kiddush, requiring a repeat with a new bracha2.
2. Kiddush in Shul: A Ceremonial Act, Not a Fulfillment
The AHS's unequivocal declaration in 261:14 – "אין קידוש שבבית הכנסת כלום" for the general public – is the foundational psak for most communities today.
- No Personal Obligation: Kiddush recited in shul, even by the Rav or a distinguished guest, does not fulfill the personal obligation of kiddush haYom for those who will subsequently go home to eat their Shabbat meal. Everyone must recite Kiddush again at home over wine before their meal.
- Wayfarers Exception: The original takkanah remains valid for actual wayfarers or guests who will genuinely eat and sleep in the synagogue or an adjacent communal hall. For them, the Kiddush in shul, followed by a meal there, does fulfill their obligation. However, this is a rare occurrence in modern times.
- Minhag B'Alma: The continued practice of Kiddush in shul serves as a zecher (remembrance) of the historical takkanah and as a public proclamation of Shabbat's sanctity. It is a venerable minhag but lacks individual halachic efficacy for the congregants.
3. Meta-Psak Heuristics
The AHS's discussion here offers valuable insights into meta-halachic decision-making:
- Primacy of Makom Seudah: The requirement of makom se'udah for Kiddush is a non-negotiable principle, taking precedence over customs or interpretations that might dilute it.
- Contextual Applicability of Takkanot: The case of Kiddush b'Veit HaKnesset demonstrates that the halachic force of a takkanah can be contingent upon the conditions that necessitated its enactment. When those conditions change, the takkanah may cease to be universally binding, even if the practice continues as a minhag.
- Distinguishing Minhag from Din: The AHS's clarity on Kiddush b'Veit HaKnesset exemplifies the need for poskim to distinguish between cherished customs and binding dinim, especially when the underlying rationale for a minhag no longer aligns with the ikkar hadin. This prevents potential misunderstandings and ensures proper observance.
In essence, the AHS directs us towards a rigorous observance of Kiddush at home, ensuring the full integration of sanctification with consumption, while respectfully acknowledging communal synagogue practices as meaningful traditions, albeit without personal halachic fulfillment.
1 Shulchan Arukh, Orach Chaim 261:8; Magen Avraham, Orach Chaim 261:12. 2 Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 261:8.
Takeaway
The Arukh HaShulchan profoundly clarifies that Kiddush is fundamentally intertwined with the se'udah in a unified place, rendering modern Kiddush b'Veit HaKnesset a mere zecher for most, rather than a fulfillment of obligation. This underscores the enduring power of the makom se'udah principle and the dynamic nature of halacha in adapting takkanot to changing realities.
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