Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 266:8-15

Sugya Map

• Issue: The Arukh HaShulchan, in Orach Chaim 266:8-15, meticulously unpacks the halachic intricacies surrounding hadlakat ner Shabbat when performed before shkiat hachamah, particularly focusing on the interplay of tosefet Shabbat, individual kabalat Shabbat, the timing of the bracha, and the permissibility of amira l'akum for lighting once Shabbat has been accepted. The core tension lies in reconciling the individual's early acceptance of Shabbat with the communal halachic clock and the nature of issur melacha during the bein hashmashot period extended by tosefet Shabbat.

• Nafka Minas:

  • Timing of the Bracha: When should the bracha on ner Shabbat be recited if one lights significantly before shkiat hachamah, specifically before pelag hamincha or between pelag hamincha and shkiat hachamah? This hinges on whether hadlaka itself constitutes kabalat Shabbat for the individual.
  • Scope of Kabalat Shabbat: Does an individual's kabalat Shabbat bind them to all issurei Shabbat immediately, including the prohibition of amira l'akum, even if the community has not yet accepted Shabbat?
  • Nature of Tosefet Shabbat: Is tosefet Shabbat a Rabbinic enactment or min haTorah? How does its dina impact melachot performed by a goy on one's behalf during this extended period?
  • Amira L'Akum: Under what circumstances, if any, is it permissible to instruct a goy to light Shabbat candles after one has personally accepted Shabbat but before shkiat hachamah?

• Primary Sources:

  • Talmud Bavli: Shabbat 23b, 34b, 35a, 118b; Eruvin 36b; Beitza 36b.
  • Rambam: Hilchot Shabbat 5:1, 29:1-3; Hilchot Brachot 11:16.
  • Tur: Orach Chaim 261, 263, 266.
  • Shulchan Arukh: Orach Chaim 261:2, 263:4-5, 266:8-9.
  • Rema: Orach Chaim 261:2, 263:4-5, 266:8.
  • Magen Avraham: Orach Chaim 263:16, 266:10.
  • Taz: Orach Chaim 263:10.
  • Gra: Orach Chaim 263:8.
  • Chayei Adam: Klal 5:17-18.
  • Arukh HaShulchan: Orach Chaim 266:8-15.

Text Snapshot

The Arukh HaShulchan masterfully synthesizes various shittot regarding early hadlakat ner Shabbat. Let's zero in on a few crucial lines to appreciate his precision and nuance:

"ולכן נשים שרגילות לקבל שבת בהדלקה, הרי הן מקבלות שבת בהדלקה בברכה. ואם הדליקו קודם פלג המנחה, יברכו אחר פלג המנחה וידליקו קודם פלג המנחה." [Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 266:8] Here, the Arukh HaShulchan addresses the common practice of women accepting Shabbat with hadlaka. He affirms this practice, noting that the bracha is recited b'zman hadlaka. However, a critical distinction is made for hadlaka before pelag hamincha. In such a scenario, one lights before pelag hamincha but recites the bracha after pelag hamincha. This indicates a separation between the ma'aseh hadlaka and the kabalat Shabbat component facilitated by the bracha, or at least a delaying of the full halachic consequence of the bracha until a more appropriate time. The dikduk of "יברכו אחר פלג המנחה וידליקו קודם פלג המנחה" is crucial; it's not "ידליקו ויברכו" at two different times, but rather the bracha itself is deferred. This implies that the bracha is what actualizes the kabalat Shabbat for the madlik, and that kabalat Shabbat cannot truly take effect before pelag hamincha even if the act of lighting occurs then.

"אבל אם כבר קיבל שבת, אסור לצוות לגוי להדליק, דהוי כצווי על מלאכה דאורייתא, דהדלקה ביום חשיכה היא." [Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 266:14] This is a particularly potent statement. The Arukh HaShulchan draws a hard line: once an individual has accepted Shabbat, instructing a goy to light (even before shkiat hachamah) is forbidden. The leshon "אסור לצוות לגוי" and the justification "דהוי כצווי על מלאכה דאורייתא, דהדלקה ביום חשיכה היא" are striking. He equates this amira l'akum to commanding a melacha d'Oraita on Shabbat itself. This implies that for the individual who has accepted Shabbat, the bein hashmashot period extended by tosefet Shabbat is so thoroughly transformed into Shabbat that any melacha performed by a goy at their behest is a direct violation of issurei Shabbat d'Oraita. This is a much stricter stance than typically found for amira l'akum in other contexts, highlighting the profound impact of kabalat Shabbat on the individual's halachic status. The phrase "ביום חשיכה היא" refers to the halachic status of lighting a fire on Shabbat as a melacha related to mav'ir or biyur (Shabbat 70a).

Readings

The Arukh HaShulchan's discussion on hadlakat ner Shabbat and its relationship to kabalat Shabbat and tosefet Shabbat stands on the shoulders of giants. We will examine two pivotal figures whose shittot are foundational to understanding the Arukh HaShulchan's nuanced presentation: the Rambam and the Magen Avraham.

### Rambam: Tosefet Shabbat and the Weight of Individual Acceptance

The Rambam's shittah on tosefet Shabbat is arguably the most stringent and far-reaching, positing it as a mitzvah d'Oraita from the verse "שבתון שבת קודש לה'" [Shemot 16:23]. He states explicitly: "מצות עשה מן התורה להוסיף מחול על הקודש, בין בכניסתו בין ביציאתו." [Rambam, Hilchot Shabbat 29:1]. This foundational principle reverberates throughout his rulings concerning the boundaries of Shabbat.

For the Rambam, tosefet Shabbat is not merely an asiyasei d'Rabanan to create a seyag around Shabbat, but a direct chiyuv d'Oraita. This means that the period of tosefet Shabbat, once initiated, carries the full weight of issurei Shabbat d'Oraita. This has profound implications for melachot performed during this time. While the Rambam does not explicitly discuss hadlakat ner Shabbat in the context of women's kabalat Shabbat with a bracha and its timing, his general principles inform the subsequent discussions.

The Rambam is clear that one "אסור לו לעשות שום מלאכה" [Rambam, Hilchot Shabbat 5:1] once Shabbat has entered, and by extension, during tosefet Shabbat. His view of amira l'akum is also quite strict. While he permits it in limited circumstances for a shevut d'Rabanan for a tzorech mitzvah or tzorech rabim (e.g., "מותר לומר לגוי לעשות מלאכה ביום שבת לצורך מצוה" [Rambam, Hilchot Shabbat 6:9]), he would certainly prohibit it for a melacha d'Oraita. Given his shittah that tosefet Shabbat makes melacha d'Oraita, instructing a goy to perform a melacha (like lighting) within the accepted tosefet Shabbat period would be tantamount to commanding a melacha d'Oraita. This provides the bedrock for the Arukh HaShulchan's strong statement in 266:14.

The Rambam's shittah implies that kabalat Shabbat is a transformative act. Once an individual accepts Shabbat, the time becomes kodesh for them, and the issurim apply fully. This absolute nature of tosefet Shabbat as d'Oraita is a minority opinion among Rishonim, with many holding it to be d'Rabanan (e.g., Rashi, Tosafot). However, the Arukh HaShulchan, particularly in his psak regarding amira l'akum, appears to lean towards the Rambam's stringent approach, at least regarding the individual's chiyuv. The Arukh HaShulchan's statement "דהוי כצווי על מלאכה דאורייתא, דהדלקה ביום חשיכה היא" [Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 266:14] seems to directly channel the Rambam's understanding of tosefet Shabbat as converting the chol into kodesh with respect to melachot. The hadlaka becomes "ביום חשיכה" for the one who accepted Shabbat, irrespective of the sun's position. This rigorous application of tosefet Shabbat explains the Arukh HaShulchan's strictness regarding amira l'akum in this context. It's not merely a shevut, but an issur derivative of a melacha d'Oraita for the one who has taken on Shabbat.

### Magen Avraham: The Nuance of Bracha and Kabalat Shabbat

The Magen Avraham's contribution to this sugya is pivotal, particularly concerning the timing of the bracha on ner Shabbat and its immediate effect of kabalat Shabbat. His analysis in Orach Chaim 263:16 (s.v. v'yesh noshnim) addresses the common practice of women lighting candles and immediately reciting the bracha. The kushya he raises is significant: if reciting the bracha constitutes kabalat Shabbat for the woman, then the act of lighting (a melacha) would itself be forbidden, as it occurred after she accepted Shabbat. This is a classic dilemma: how can one perform a melacha to fulfill a mitzvah if the mitzvah itself brings on Shabbat, making the melacha forbidden?

The Magen Avraham offers two main solutions to this problem, both of which have shaped halachic practice:

1. Delaying Kabalat Shabbat: He suggests that the kabalat Shabbat is not instantaneous with the bracha but rather occurs after the completion of the mitzvah of lighting. This allows the melacha to be performed while still chol, and only once the mitzvah is done does the bracha (and its accompanying kabalat Shabbat) fully take effect. This shittah posits a slight delay in the kabalat Shabbat effect of the bracha.
2. Covering the Eyes: Alternatively, he suggests the now-widespread practice of covering one's eyes after lighting but before reciting the bracha. This allows the physical act of lighting to occur while it is still chol. The bracha is then recited while the eyes are covered, effectively postponing the enjoyment of the mitzvah (and thus the kabalat Shabbat) until after the bracha is completed and the eyes are uncovered, whereupon one immediately benefits from the light. This ensures that the bracha is recited on a mitzvah that is already performed and enjoyed, but the kabalat Shabbat effect is only triggered after the prohibited act of lighting is finished.

The Arukh HaShulchan (266:8) directly engages with this problem, offering his own nuanced psak. While he acknowledges that "נשים שרגילות לקבל שבת בהדלקה, הרי הן מקבלות שבת בהדלקה בברכה," he then introduces a critical caveat: "ואם הדליקו קודם פלג המנחה, יברכו אחר פלג המנחה וידליקו קודם פלג המנחה." This psak is a distinct approach from the Magen Avraham's solutions. The Arukh HaShulchan does not suggest covering the eyes to circumvent the kabalat Shabbat issue. Instead, he explicitly separates the ma'aseh hadlaka from the bracha (and thus from the kabalat Shabbat it effects) when lighting before pelag hamincha. For him, lighting before pelag hamincha is not problematic per se, but the bracha (which signifies kabalat Shabbat) must await the halachically appropriate window of bein hashmashot (i.e., after pelag hamincha). This implies that kabalat Shabbat by hadlaka is potent, but there are certain zmanim before which its full halachic force (via the bracha) cannot be activated.

The Arukh HaShulchan's solution here can be understood as harmonizing the idea that hadlaka brings kabalat Shabbat (a concept he accepts) with the notion that there's a minimum zman for the kedusha of Shabbat to begin (at least pelag hamincha). Therefore, the physical melacha of lighting can be done early, but the spiritual act of kabalat Shabbat through the bracha is deferred until pelag hamincha or later. This is a departure from the Magen Avraham's focus on the immediate effect of the bracha on the melacha, and instead emphasizes the temporal boundaries of kabalat Shabbat itself.

In essence, the Arukh HaShulchan respects the Rambam's rigorous understanding of tosefet Shabbat as carrying significant issurim once accepted, which informs his strictness on amira l'akum. Concurrently, he grapples with the practical implications of kabalat Shabbat through hadlaka, much like the Magen Avraham, but offers a different psak concerning the timing of the bracha for early lighting, suggesting a deferred bracha rather than a physical separation of ma'aseh and kabalat Shabbat through eye-covering. This synthesis reflects his characteristic attempt to provide a clear and practical halacha while remaining true to the underlying lomdus.

Friction

The Arukh HaShulchan's statement in 266:14 creates a significant point of friction: "אבל אם כבר קיבל שבת, אסור לצוות לגוי להדליק, דהוי כצווי על מלאכה דאורייתא, דהדלקה ביום חשיכה היא." [Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 266:14]. This declaration is remarkably stringent. The kushya emerges from the apparent contradiction with common halachic principles regarding amira l'akum, particularly for tzorech mitzvah or tzorech gadol, where poskim often permit instructing a goy to perform melacha d'Rabanan or even a shevut d'Rabanan on Shabbat itself. Here, the Arukh HaShulchan asserts that after one has accepted Shabbat (even before shkiat hachamah), instructing a goy to light candles is "כצווי על מלאכה דאורייתא," effectively equating it to commanding a non-Jew to perform a melacha d'Oraita on Shabbat proper.

### The Strongest Kushya: Amira L'Akum – Why the Extreme Strictness?

The conventional understanding of amira l'akum is that it is mideRabanan [Shabbat 153a; Beitza 36b; Rambam, Hilchot Shabbat 6:1]. Furthermore, there are well-established leniencies, such as permitting amira l'akum for a tzorech mitzvah or tzorech gadol when the melacha is d'Rabanan or even a shevut d'Rabanan [Rema, Orach Chaim 307:5; Magen Avraham 307:11]. Even when the melacha is d'Oraita, some poskim permit amira l'akum in cases of safek pikuach nefesh or choleh she'ein bo sakanah if no Jew can perform a shinui [Shulchan Arukh, Orach Chaim 328:17, 330:2].

The kushya is therefore multi-faceted:

1. D'Oraita vs. D'Rabanan: Why does the Arukh HaShulchan classify this amira l'akum as akin to commanding a melacha d'Oraita? Even if tosefet Shabbat is d'Oraita (following the Rambam), the issur of amira l'akum itself is generally d'Rabanan. How does a d'Rabanan prohibition on amira l'akum become "כצווי על מלאכה דאורייתא"? It's unusual to find such a strong equivalency.
2. Tzorech Mitzvah: Hadlakat ner Shabbat is a significant mitzvah. If amira l'akum is permitted for tzorech mitzvah in other contexts (e.g., lighting a candle for a sick person who needs light, where the act of lighting itself is a melacha d'Rabanan for the Jew), why is it so strictly forbidden here, especially when the community has not yet accepted Shabbat? The mitzvah of ner Shabbat for the home is paramount for shalom bayit and oneg Shabbat.
3. The Nature of Kabalat Shabbat: Does kabalat Shabbat by an individual transform the time for everyone in their domain, or only for themselves? If only for themselves, then the goy is performing the melacha while it is still chol for the goy and for the broader community. The Arukh HaShulchan's statement implies that the individual's acceptance of Shabbat somehow projects its kedusha onto the activity, making any melacha performed at their behest during that time fundamentally problematic.

The Arukh HaShulchan's formulation is exceptionally strong, suggesting a deeper understanding of tosefet Shabbat and amira l'akum than typically applied. It forces us to confront the true scope of individual kabalat Shabbat.

### Best Terutz: The Dina of Tosefet Shabbat and the Severity of Amira L'Akum

The most compelling terutz to resolve this kushya lies in a rigorous understanding of the Arukh HaShulchan's underlying shittah regarding tosefet Shabbat and the nature of amira l'akum when a melacha d'Oraita is involved.

The Arukh HaShulchan, throughout his work, often leans towards the stringent opinions of the Rambam, especially regarding dina d'Oraita. As we noted, the Rambam holds tosefet Shabbat to be d'Oraita. If one accepts Shabbat, then for that individual, the period of tosefet Shabbat becomes kodesh d'Oraita. Consequently, any melacha performed by that individual during this period would be a melacha d'Oraita.

Now, let's address the issur of amira l'akum. While amira l'akum is generally d'Rabanan, the poskim distinguish between amira l'akum for a melacha d'Rabanan and amira l'akum for a melacha d'Oraita. The leniencies for tzorech mitzvah or tzorech gadol primarily apply when the melacha itself is d'Rabanan or a shevut. However, when the underlying melacha is d'Oraita, amira l'akum is considered a much more severe prohibition, often equated to d'Oraita in its gravity, if not in its technical source. The Gemara in Gittin 8b, regarding "שלוחו של אדם כמותו," suggests that an agent is like the sender. While this principle has limitations regarding issurim, the sevara that one who commands a melacha d'Oraita is deeply implicated in it is strong.

The Arukh HaShulchan's phrase "דהוי כצווי על מלאכה דאורייתא" (266:14) is key. He is not necessarily saying that amira l'akum itself becomes d'Oraita in this case. Rather, he is asserting that the effect of such a command is as if one commanded a melacha d'Oraita. The issur for the individual who has accepted Shabbat is to perform any melacha. By instructing a goy to light, the madlik is directly facilitating a melacha that, from their perspective, is already d'Oraita due to tosefet Shabbat.

Consider the comparison: If one were to tell a goy to light a candle on Shabbat itself, even for a mitzvah, it would be generally forbidden, as the lighting is a melacha d'Oraita. The Arukh HaShulchan is arguing that tosefet Shabbat for the individual acts exactly like Shabbat itself in this regard. Therefore, the amira l'akum for hadlaka during one's accepted tosefet Shabbat is treated with the same stringency as amira l'akum for a melacha d'Oraita on Shabbat proper. The leniencies for tzorech mitzvah and amira l'akum are generally reserved for shevut or melachot d'Rabanan, not for a direct melacha d'Oraita which the individual has personally undertaken to observe.

This terutz emphasizes the profound, transformative power of kabalat Shabbat for the individual in the Arukh HaShulchan's view. Once one has accepted Shabbat, the kedusha of Shabbat is fully present for them, making all melachot (including hadlaka) assur d'Oraita. Consequently, commanding a goy to perform such a melacha during this period is viewed with the utmost severity, akin to commanding a melacha d'Oraita on Shabbat itself, and thus falls outside the scope of typical amira l'akum leniencies. The mitzvah of ner Shabbat itself does not override the fundamental issur of violating one's self-accepted Shabbat.

Intertext

The Arukh HaShulchan's rigorous analysis of kabalat Shabbat and amira l'akum for ner Shabbat resonates with broader halachic themes concerning the individual's relationship with time and mitzvot.

### 1. The Power of Personal Kabalat Shabbat in other contexts

The concept of an individual accepting Shabbat early and thereby becoming bound by its issurim is not unique to ner Shabbat. The Gemara in Shabbat 118b discusses a ba'al habayit who accepts Shabbat early, noting that he becomes assur in melacha from that point. "רבינא איקלע לבי רב אשי, אמר ליה: מאי קא עביד מר? אמר ליה: קא מקיים תוספת שבת." [Shabbat 118b]. This Gemara illustrates that an individual can indeed initiate tosefet Shabbat for themselves. The Arukh HaShulchan's strictness in 266:14 regarding amira l'akum for hadlaka flows directly from this foundational principle: once you have accepted Shabbat, your time has changed, and your issurim are in effect.

This idea is further elaborated in Shulchan Arukh, Orach Chaim 261:2, which states that one who accepts Shabbat early for themselves (even without the community doing so) is bound by issurei Shabbat. The Rema there adds that even if one thinks they accepted Shabbat, it is binding. This underscores the subjective and personal nature of kabalat Shabbat. The Arukh HaShulchan (266:14) takes this a step further by showing that this personal kabalat Shabbat not only binds the individual from performing melacha but also from instructing a goy to do so, precisely because of the dina of tosefet Shabbat making the melacha d'Oraita for the one who accepted. The amira l'akum is not merely a technical d'Rabanan shevut; it becomes a direct affront to the kedusha of Shabbat that the individual has willingly taken upon themselves. This strictness distinguishes between merely stopping work early and formally accepting Shabbat with all its ramifications. If one merely stops work, they haven't necessarily accepted Shabbat for all issurim, but a formal kabalat Shabbat through hadlaka (especially with a bracha) is a full embrace of the Shabbat kedusha.

### 2. The Scope of Amira L'Akum for Tzorech Mitzvah

The Arukh HaShulchan's firm stance on amira l'akum for hadlaka after kabalat Shabbat also engages with the broader sugya of amira l'akum for tzorech mitzvah on Shabbat. As mentioned, the general halacha allows for certain leniencies. For instance, the Gemara in Beitza 36b discusses scenarios where amira l'akum might be permissible for a tzorech mitzvah, but primarily when the melacha is d'Rabanan. "דתנן: אין אומרים לגוי לעשות מלאכה בשבת, אבל אומר לו לעשות צרכי מת, וצרכי חולה שאין בו סכנה, וצרכי מצוה." [Beitza 36b, as interpreted by some Rishonim]. The Rishonim debate the scope of this leniency. The Rambam (Hilchot Shabbat 6:9) restricts it significantly, allowing amira l'akum for tzorech mitzvah only for shevut (i.e., melacha d'Rabanan). The Rema (Orach Chaim 307:5) is more lenient, permitting amira l'akum for a melacha d'Rabanan even for a tzorech mitzvah.

The Arukh HaShulchan (266:14) clearly places hadlakat ner Shabbat after kabalat Shabbat in the category of melacha d'Oraita for the individual. By stating "דהוי כצווי על מלאכה דאורייתא," he explicitly rules out any leniency that might apply to tzorech mitzvah for melachot d'Rabanan. This means that the mitzvah of ner Shabbat, while important, does not override the fundamental issur d'Oraita of performing melacha during one's self-accepted tosefet Shabbat. This is consistent with the understanding that pikuach nefesh is virtually the only mitzvah that can override issurei Shabbat d'Oraita. The Arukh HaShulchan's position highlights that once the individual has transformed their time into Shabbat, the issurim are absolute, and even tzorech mitzvah cannot serve as a blanket permit for commanding a melacha d'Oraita. It underscores the Arukh HaShulchan's consistent approach that the kedusha of Shabbat, once accepted, demands an uncompromising adherence to its issurim.

Psak/Practice

The Arukh HaShulchan's analysis in Orach Chaim 266:8-15 has significant implications for contemporary halachic practice, particularly for individuals who light Shabbat candles and accept Shabbat early.

### 1. Timing the Bracha for Early Lighting

The Arukh HaShulchan's psak in 266:8, regarding lighting before pelag hamincha and delaying the bracha until after pelag hamincha, offers a distinct approach from the more prevalent custom of covering one's eyes after lighting, as suggested by the Magen Avraham. While the Arukh HaShulchan's psak is a valid derech to ensure the bracha is recited at a halachically appropriate time, it is not the universally adopted custom. Most communities, particularly those following Ashkenazic tradition, adhere to the Magen Avraham's solution of covering the eyes [Mishnah Berurah 263:27]. This allows the bracha to be recited immediately after lighting, maintaining the sequence of ma'aseh then bracha, while ensuring that kabalat Shabbat (which is linked to the bracha and its enjoyment) does not precede the melacha of lighting. The Arukh HaShulchan's psak highlights the importance he places on pelag hamincha as a significant threshold for kabalat Shabbat. Nevertheless, the widespread custom reflects a different balance, prioritizing the immediate bracha through a clever takanah.

### 2. The Absolute Nature of Individual Kabalat Shabbat

The Arukh HaShulchan's unequivocal ruling in 266:14—that one who has accepted Shabbat cannot instruct a goy to light, as it is "כצווי על מלאכה דאורייתא"—is a crucial practical halacha. This means that for anyone who formally accepts Shabbat early (whether through hadlaka, bracha, or verbal declaration), the clock for issurei Shabbat begins for them immediately. This is not a mere chumra; it's a fundamental redefinition of time for that individual. Therefore, one must be exceedingly careful about asking a goy to perform any melacha (including tasks like turning on lights, adjusting thermostats, or even answering the door if it involves melacha) during this tosefet Shabbat period, even before shkiat hachamah. This psak serves as a strong reminder that kabalat Shabbat is a deeply personal and transformative act, binding the individual to the full rigor of Shabbat halacha, regardless of the community's status. It also underscores a meta-psak heuristic of the Arukh HaShulchan: where the Rambam’s stringent position on tosefet Shabbat (as d’Oraita) intersects with a direct issur melacha, the Arukh HaShulchan leans towards the highest degree of stringency, especially when amira l'akum for a melacha d'Oraita is involved.

Takeaway

The Arukh HaShulchan underscores that an individual's kabalat Shabbat is a potent, transformative act, redefining time for them such that even instructing a goy to perform a melacha (like lighting) before shkiat hachamah becomes akin to a severe issur d'Oraita. This strictness shapes the proper timing of the bracha on ner Shabbat and demands utmost caution in amira l'akum once Shabbat has been personally accepted.