Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 268:2-8

Sugya Map & Text Snapshot

Sugya Map

This sugya grapples with the intricate definitions of choleh (illness) that necessitate the postponement of milah (circumcision), particularly when the milah would otherwise override Shabbat. The core tension lies in reconciling the general, highly stringent rule for milah postponement with specific conditions like yerek (jaundice/yellowing) and tzaraas (a type of skin affliction, often translated as leprosy).

• Issue: What constitutes an "illness" that delays milah, especially when milah would typically be docheh Shabbat (overriding Shabbat)? Specifically, how do yerek and tzaraas fit into this definition, given conflicting traditional interpretations and minhagim?
• Nafka Mina(s):
  • Whether a milah is performed on Shabbat or delayed to a weekday.
  • The halachic permissibility of a mohel performing milah on Shabbat for a child with yerek or tzaraas.
  • The precise scope and threshold of pikuach nefesh (saving a life) in the context of milah, which appears uniquely stringent compared to other mitzvot.
• Primary Sources:
  • Talmud Bavli, Shabbat 134a-b
  • Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Milah 1:17
  • Shulchan Arukh, Orach Chaim 268:2-8
  • Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 268:2-8
  • Rishonim: Rashba, Ritva (to Shabbat 134a), Rosh (Shabbat 19:1)
  • Acharonim: Magen Avraham (OC 268:5)

Text Snapshot

The Arukh HaShulchan (AHS) presents a multi-faceted analysis, beginning with the general rule and then addressing specific cases.

Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 268:2:

"כל שהוא חולה קצת, או שיש לו חום כל שהוא, או שהיה לו חום ביום שלפני כן, דוחה את המילה עד שיבריא לגמרי" (Anyone who is slightly ill, or has any amount of fever, or had a fever on the day before, delays the milah until he fully recovers.)

• Dikduk/Leshon Nuance: The emphatic repetition of "כל שהוא" (any amount/slight) underscores the extreme stringency for milah. Even a minimal indication of illness or prior fever is sufficient to delay, suggesting a very low threshold for chashash sakana (concern for danger).

Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 268:4:

"אבל אם יש לו ירק או צהוב או שיש לו נגע צרעת אין דוחה את המילה" (But if he has yerek or yellowness, or if he has nega tzaraas, it does not delay the milah.)

• Dikduk/Leshon Nuance: This line initially groups yerek, yellowness, and tzaraas together as conditions that do not delay milah, seemingly implying they are not considered choleh in this context. The phrasing "אין דוחה" (does not delay) is declarative.

Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 268:5-6:

"וכתב הרשב"א בתשובה וכן הר"ן בחידושיו דבנגע צרעת מנהג פשוט לדחות המילה... וכן כתבו הריטב"א והרב המגיד... אכן המגן אברהם כתב דלדעת הרמב"ם והשו"ע גם נגע צרעת אין דוחה את המילה. ומכל מקום המנהג פשוט שדוחים" (And the Rashba wrote in a responsum, and similarly the Ran in his novellae, that regarding nega tzaraas it is a simple custom to delay the milah... And similarly the Ritva and Rav Hamaggid wrote... However, the Magen Avraham wrote that in the opinion of the Rambam and the Shulchan Arukh, even nega tzaraas does not delay the milah. Nevertheless, the custom is simple to delay.)

• Dikduk/Leshon Nuance: This section immediately introduces a challenge to the previous statement regarding tzaraas. The AHS cites Rishonim and Acharonim, highlighting a minhag that contradicts the apparent psak of Rambam/Shulchan Arukh. The concluding phrase "מכל מקום המנהג פשוט שדוחים" (Nevertheless, the custom is simple to delay) indicates a practical leaning towards the minhag despite the theoretical din. This marks a significant internal friction within the AHS's presentation.

Readings

The Arukh HaShulchan's discussion in Orach Chaim 268:2-8 navigates a complex interplay of Gemara, Rishonim, and minhag, particularly concerning the definition of choleh for milah on Shabbat. The core tension revolves around whether conditions like yerek (jaundice/yellowing) and tzaraas (skin lesions) are severe enough to postpone the brit.

Reading 1: Rambam & Ritva – Yerek and Tzaraas as Non-Delays for Milah

Chiddush Briefly:

Rambam and Ritva, interpreting the Gemara, assert that yerek and tzaraas, in their fundamental definitions, are not considered choleh that warrant delaying milah, even when it would otherwise be performed on Shabbat.

Explanation:

The Arukh HaShulchan (AHS) 268:4 begins by stating definitively, "אבל אם יש לו ירק או צהוב או שיש לו נגע צרעת אין דוחה את המילה" (But if he has yerek or yellowness, or if he has nega tzaraas, it does not delay the milah)1. This initial stance aligns squarely with the psak of the Rambam and the interpretative framework offered by the Ritva.

Rambam, Hilchot Milah 1:17: The Rambam states unequivocally: "תינוק שיש בו ירק או צרעת או שהוא בעל מום במקום המילה, מלין אותו בשבת, ואין חוששין לו" (A child who has yerek or tzaraas, or who has a blemish in the place of the milah, we circumcise him on Shabbat, and we are not concerned for him)2. This is a direct and forceful ruling. For the Rambam, these conditions do not rise to the level of choleh that would necessitate delaying the milah and thereby losing its zrizut (promptness) and the ability to perform it on Shabbat. His view stems from a literal reading of the Gemara in Shabbat 134a, which asks, "מנין שמלין את הירק ואת הצרעת בשבת?" (From where do we know that we circumcise yerek and tzaraas on Shabbat?) and answers: "כי היכי דכתיב 'ביום השמיני ימול בשר ערלתו' – לכל מי שראוי למול" (Just as it is written 'on the eighth day he shall circumcise the flesh of his foreskin' – for anyone fit to be circumcised)3. The Gemara's very question and answer imply that yerek and tzaraas do not render a child unfit for milah on Shabbat.

Ritva, Shabbat 134a, s.v. "תינוק שיש בו ירק": The Ritva provides the hermeneutical underpinning for this position. He explains that yerek is not considered a choli (illness) that poses a danger to life, but rather a shinui gavna (a change of color) or a makkah (a wound/blemish) that is not inherently life-threatening. He explicitly states: "ירק שאינו מוליך לידי חולי אלא ששינה גונו, מלין אותו בשבת" (Yerek, which does not lead to illness but only changes its color, we circumcise him on Shabbat)4. The Ritva distinguishes this from a true choleh where the milah itself could exacerbate the illness or endanger the child. He implicitly extends this logic to tzaraas when grouped with yerek in the Gemara. The chumra (stringency) of milah to delay for "any slight illness" (as AHS 268:2 states) applies only to genuine choli, not to mere superficial conditions.

The AHS in 268:4 initially presents this straightforward view, but significantly, in 268:7, he revisits the yerek case with a crucial nuance: "ומכל מקום אם יש לו ירק או צהוב כהלכה שאינו חולי, אין דוחה את המילה" (Nevertheless, if he has yerek or yellowness kehalacha which is not an illness, it does not delay the milah)5. The phrase "כהלכה שאינו חולי" (according to Halacha, which is not an illness) directly echoes the Ritva's reasoning, distinguishing a benign change from a symptomatic illness. This implies that if yerek were an illness, it would delay the milah, but in its common manifestation, it is not.

Reading 2: Rashba & Rosh – The Minhag to Delay for Tzaraas

Chiddush Briefly:

Rashba and Rosh, while acknowledging the Gemara's general thrust, emphasize that tzaraas (and by implication, any choleh that could be serious) does delay milah, citing a prevalent minhag and the inherent danger associated with such a condition, especially when considering the unique stringency for milah postponement.

Explanation:

Immediately following the declarative statement in 268:4, the AHS pivots in 268:5-6 to discuss a contradictory minhag regarding tzaraas: "וכתב הרשב"א בתשובה וכן הר"ן בחידושיו דבנגע צרעת מנהג פשוט לדחות המילה... ומכל מקום המנהג פשוט שדוחים" (And the Rashba wrote in a responsum, and similarly the Ran in his novellae, that regarding nega tzaraas it is a simple custom to delay the milah... Nevertheless, the custom is simple to delay)6. This reflects the position championed by Rishonim like Rashba and Rosh, who give significant weight to the minhag and a more expansive definition of choleh for milah.

Rashba, Responsa (cited by AHS and others) & Shabbat 134a, s.v. "ואם יש בו ירק": The Rashba grapples with the Gemara's statement. While he might concede that simple yerek doesn't delay, he distinguishes tzaraas as a more severe condition. In his chidushim to Shabbat 134a, he states: "ואם יש בו ירק, מלין אותו בשבת, ואין חוששין לו... אבל אם יש לו נגע צרעת, מנהגא הוא דלא מלין, משום דהוי חולי" (If he has yerek, we circumcise him on Shabbat, and we are not concerned for him... But if he has nega tzaraas, the custom is not to circumcise, because it is an illness)7. The Rashba's crucial point is that tzaraas is considered a choleh, a genuine illness or makkah (wound) that carries inherent danger. This classification brings tzaraas under the umbrella of the general rule that "any slight illness" delays milah. The minhag to delay, for the Rashba, is not an arbitrary custom but one rooted in a legitimate chashash sakana (concern for danger). He thus implicitly reinterprets the Gemara's grouping of yerek and tzaraas as not necessarily equating their severity or halachic status as choleh.

Rosh, Shabbat 19:1: The Rosh reinforces the Rashba's position. He states: "וכן נגע צרעת, מנהג לדחות המילה, משום דהוי חולי" (And similarly for nega tzaraas, the custom is to delay the milah, because it is an illness)8. The Rosh's concise statement highlights that the minhag is not merely a custom but is because tzaraas is an illness. This firmly places tzaraas within the category of choleh that delays milah, overriding the milah b'zmanah (milah on its proper time, which usually overrides Shabbat). The emphasis on "מנהג לדחות" (custom to delay) suggests that even if the Gemara's phrasing could be read otherwise, the accepted practice, informed by a sensitivity to pikuach nefesh, is to be stringent.

Arukh HaShulchan's Synthesis: The AHS's struggle in 268:5-6 is evident. He explicitly notes the Magen Avraham's view, which aligns with Rambam that tzaraas should not delay milah9. Yet, he concludes, "ומכל מקום המנהג פשוט שדוחים" (Nevertheless, the custom is simple to delay)10. This signals that while the theoretical din might lean towards the Rambam, the practical psak (Halachic ruling) for tzaraas is dictated by the deeply entrenched minhag. This reflects a broader halachic principle where a widespread minhag, especially one connected to pikuach nefesh, can become normative halacha l'maaseh, even if it seems to diverge from a strict textual reading or a prominent Rishon's opinion. The AHS effectively gives greater weight to the minhag of chumra in matters of life and health.

Friction

The Strongest Kushya: Arukh HaShulchan's Internal Inconsistency on Tzaraas

The Arukh HaShulchan (AHS) presents a striking internal inconsistency concerning the halachic status of nega tzaraas (skin affliction akin to leprosy) in relation to milah. In OC 268:4, he states, "אבל אם יש לו ירק או צהוב או שיש לו נגע צרעת אין דוחה את המילה" (But if he has yerek or yellowness, or if he has nega tzaraas, it does not delay the milah)11. This appears to be a clear psak, grouping tzaraas with yerek as a condition that does not warrant delaying milah, even on Shabbat. This aligns with the Rambam's view that tzaraas does not prevent milah b'zmanah.

However, immediately following this, AHS 268:5-6 introduces a stark contradiction: "וכתב הרשב"א בתשובה וכן הר"ן בחידושיו דבנגע צרעת מנהג פשוט לדחות המילה... אכן המגן אברהם כתב דלדעת הרמב"ם והשו"ע גם נגע צרעת אין דוחה את המילה. ומכל מקום המנהג פשוט שדוחים" (And the Rashba wrote in a responsum, and similarly the Ran in his novellae, that regarding nega tzaraas it is a simple custom to delay the milah... However, the Magen Avraham wrote that in the opinion of the Rambam and the Shulchan Arukh, even nega tzaraas does not delay the milah. Nevertheless, the custom is simple to delay)12.

The kushya is profound: How can the Arukh HaShulchan, a work renowned for its systematic and clear presentation of halacha l'maaseh, first issue a definitive ruling that tzaraas does not delay milah (268:4), and then, within two short paragraphs, completely reverse course, asserting that the minhag dictates delaying milah for tzaraas, and effectively concluding that this minhag is the normative practice (268:6)? This is not merely presenting a machloket (dispute) between Rishonim; it's presenting two opposing psakim as if both are valid or, more accurately, presenting one psak and then seemingly replacing it with its opposite, without a clear explanation for the initial statement or its subsequent nullification. Why would AHS even bother stating the Rambam's view (echoed by Magen Avraham) if he ultimately concludes that the minhag overrides it for practical halacha?

The Best Terutz (or Two)

Terutz 1: The Evolution of Psak – From Theoretical Din to Practical Minhag

This terutz suggests that AHS 268:4 presents the din of milah for tzaraas as understood from a literal reading of the Gemara (Shabbat 134a) and as codified by the Rambam, which views tzaraas as not constituting a choleh that delays milah b'zmanah. The Gemara's query, "מנין שמלין את הירק ואת הצרעת בשבת?" (From where do we know that we circumcise yerek and tzaraas on Shabbat?) and its affirmative answer, "כי היכי דכתיב 'ביום השמיני ימול בשר ערלתו' – לכל מי שראוי למול"13, indeed imply that these conditions do not render one "unfit" for milah on Shabbat. AHS 268:4 reflects this direct, unadorned din.

However, as AHS proceeds to 268:5-6, he introduces the minhag (custom) championed by Rishonim like Rashba and Rosh, which does delay milah for tzaraas. This minhag is not seen as a deviation from halacha, but rather as an expression of chumra (stringency) rooted in chashash sakana (concern for danger). The Rashba explicitly states that tzaraas "הוי חולי" (is an illness)14. The Rosh concurs, linking the minhag directly to the illness status of tzaraas15. The AHS, known for his focus on halacha l'maaseh (practical law) as it evolved through generations, recognizes that this minhag has become the de facto psak.

Therefore, the initial statement in 268:4 is a presentation of the theoretical din as derived directly from Gemara and codified by the Rambam. The subsequent discussion in 268:5-6, culminating in "המנהג פשוט שדוחים"16, is the psak l'maaseh, reflecting the practical application of halacha where a widespread minhag (especially one involving pikuach nefesh) takes precedence. The AHS's structure here is not self-contradiction, but rather a didactic journey: first, present the bedrock din, then show how later authorities and minhag have refined or expanded its application due to a heightened sensitivity to sakanah. He is effectively saying: "While the Gemara might imply otherwise, and Rambam rules that way, the accepted practice for tzaraas is to delay due to chashash sakana." This showcases the dynamic nature of psak, where minhag can become a binding force, especially in areas of pikuach nefesh.

Terutz 2: Distinguishing Tzaraas from Yerek – A Subtler Reading of AHS

This terutz posits that AHS, even in 268:4, might have implicitly recognized a distinction between yerek and tzaraas, even though he grouped them. His subsequent discussion then clarifies this latent distinction.

AHS 268:4 states: "אבל אם יש לו ירק או צהוב או שיש לו נגע צרעת אין דוחה את המילה"17. AHS 268:7, which clarifies the yerek case, states: "ומכל מקום אם יש לו ירק או צהוב כהלכה שאינו חולי, אין דוחה את המילה" (Nevertheless, if he has yerek or yellowness kehalacha which is not an illness, it does not delay the milah)18. The phrase "כהלכה שאינו חולי" (which is not an illness according to Halacha) is crucial. It implies that yerek can be an illness, and if it is, then it would delay milah. The AHS is careful to specify that only yerek that is not a choli does not delay.

Applying this logic to tzaraas: While AHS 268:4 initially groups tzaraas with yerek, his subsequent discussion in 268:5-6, citing Rashba and Rosh, effectively re-categorizes tzaraas (or at least the minhag treats it) as inherently a "choleh" for the purpose of milah postponement. The minhag to delay for tzaraas is rooted in the understanding that tzaraas, by its very nature as a visible skin affliction (a makkah), carries a greater inherent chashash sakana than simple yerek (which might just be a color change). Thus, tzaraas is effectively treated as a choleh that does delay, whereas yerek only delays if it's symptomatic of an underlying choli.

The apparent contradiction is resolved by understanding that for AHS, tzaraas is always considered a choleh for milah purposes due to the minhag and the inherent seriousness of the condition, making it fall into the "any slight illness" category of 268:2. Yerek, on the other hand, is only a choleh if it presents as an actual illness. AHS 268:4, then, could be read as presenting the Rambam's view where neither delays if they are not illnesses, but AHS immediately qualifies tzaraas in 268:5-6 by saying the minhag has classified it as an illness requiring delay. This allows AHS to present the different facets of the sugya without truly contradicting himself, but rather by demonstrating the nuanced application of the choleh definition.

Both terutzim highlight the Arukh HaShulchan's commitment to presenting both the foundational din and its practical, evolved application, especially where pikuach nefesh is involved.

Intertext

The sugya surrounding milah on Shabbat and the definition of choleh for its postponement provides rich ground for intertextual connections, illuminating broader halachic principles.

Intertext 1: The Unique Status of Milah as Docheh Shabbat and its Chumra Regarding Choleh

The discussion in AHS 268 directly builds upon the unique halachic status of milah as one of the few mitzvot that min haTorah (from the Torah) overrides Shabbat. However, this very privilege comes with a peculiar stringency: while milah is docheh Shabbat, it is not docheh choleh (it does not override illness).

Source: Talmud Bavli, Shabbat 132a-b, 134a. The Gemara in Shabbat 132a famously establishes, "כל צרכי מילה – עושין בשבת" (All needs of milah are done on Shabbat)19. This is derived from the verse "ביום השמיני ימול" (on the eighth day he shall be circumcised) (Vayikra 12:3), which is understood to mean "even if the eighth day falls on Shabbat." This makes milah b'zmanah (circumcision on its proper time) a unique category of mitzvah that permits numerous melachot (forbidden labors) on Shabbat.

However, a critical caveat is introduced: this applies only if the child is perfectly healthy. If the child is a choleh, even a slight illness, the milah is postponed. The AHS 268:2 emphasizes this: "כל שהוא חולה קצת, או שיש לו חום כל שהוא... דוחה את המילה עד שיבריא לגמרי" (Anyone who is slightly ill, or has any amount of fever... delays the milah until he fully recovers)20. This is an extraordinary stringency. For most other mitzvot, a choleh would be exempt, but the mitzvah itself wouldn't be delayed, nor would it override Shabbat. Here, the choleh actively prevents the mitzvah from being performed on its optimal day, thereby pushing it off Shabbat entirely.

This demonstrates a unique hierarchy: Milah b'zmanah > Shabbat (for a healthy child), but Choleh (even slight) > Milah b'zmanah (and therefore > Shabbat for that milah). This reflects the profound emphasis on pikuach nefesh and chashash sakana in Jewish law, especially concerning infants. The Torah itself, in granting milah the power to override Shabbat, implicitly assumes a healthy subject. Any deviation from perfect health immediately triggers the pikuach nefesh principle, which then takes precedence over the mitzvah itself. This chumra for milah highlights that even a mitzvah of such great import must yield to the most minimal doubt regarding life. The Gemara in Yevamot 71b states that "כל ספק נפשות להקל" (any doubt concerning lives is to be lenient)21, meaning to prioritize life, and here, prioritizing life means delaying the milah.

Intertext 2: The Authority of Minhag in Halachic Psak, Especially for Pikuach Nefesh

The AHS's struggle with tzaraas (268:5-6), where he acknowledges a theoretical din but ultimately defers to a widespread minhag to delay milah, serves as a powerful illustration of the role of minhag in shaping halacha l'maaseh. This tension between strict textual interpretation and accepted practice is a recurring theme in halachic literature.

Source: Rambam, Hilchot Mamrim 1:2; Tosafot, Avodah Zarah 36a s.v. "מאי טעמא". The authority of minhag has been debated by various halachic schools. The Rambam generally emphasizes the preeminence of established halacha derived from the Talmud and earlier codifiers. For the Rambam, a minhag usually requires a basis in halacha or a legitimate svara (reasoning) to be binding; it cannot simply contradict a clear din22.

However, the Ba'alei HaTosafot and many later authorities often grant greater weight to minhag, especially minhagim that are ancient and widespread. They operate on the principle of "מנהג מבטל הלכה" (custom nullifies halacha) in certain contexts, or more commonly, "יש לו על מי לסמוך" (it has a basis to rely upon), assuming that a strong minhag must have an unstated halachic foundation, even if not immediately apparent from the Gemara23. This is particularly true when the minhag leans towards chumra, especially in areas of pikuach nefesh.

The AHS in 268:5-6 clearly sides with the latter approach for tzaraas. Despite acknowledging that the Rambam (and by extension the Shulchan Arukh, according to Magen Avraham) would permit milah for tzaraas on Shabbat, he concludes, "ומכל מקום המנהג פשוט שדוחים" (Nevertheless, the custom is simple to delay)24. This signifies that the minhag, rooted in a chashash sakana (as Rashba and Rosh articulate that tzaraas "הוי חולי"25), has effectively become the binding halacha l'maaseh. The AHS, as a posek who sought to present living halacha, gives definitive weight to the established practice where concerns of life and health are paramount. This demonstrates how minhag, especially when informed by cautious medical intuition or an abundance of caution, can concretize and even reshape halachic practice over time.

Psak/Practice

The Arukh HaShulchan's nuanced discussion in Orach Chaim 268:2-8 provides critical guidance for practical psak concerning milah postponement.

Halacha L'Maaseh:

1. General Rule for Illness: Any slight illness ("חולה קצת") or fever ("חום כל שהוא"), even a fever from the day before, is sufficient to delay the milah until the child is completely healthy ("עד שיבריא לגמרי")26. This establishes an exceptionally low threshold for choleh in the context of milah, reflecting a supreme concern for the infant's life. The milah, if postponed, is then performed on a weekday.
2. Tzaraas: Despite a theoretical position that tzaraas might not delay milah (as per Rambam and initially presented in AHS 268:4), the Arukh HaShulchan unequivocally concludes that "המנהג פשוט שדוחים" (the custom is simple to delay) for nega tzaraas27. This means that in practice, a child with such a skin lesion would have their milah postponed until the condition resolves, regardless of whether it falls on Shabbat or a weekday. This reflects the minhag viewing tzaraas as a choleh or at least a condition that carries sufficient chashash sakana.
3. Yerek (Jaundice): The AHS distinguishes between types of yerek. If the yerek or yellowness is "כהלכה שאינו חולי" (according to Halacha, which is not an illness), it does not delay the milah28. This refers to benign, physiological jaundice common in newborns that is not indicative of an underlying, dangerous medical condition. However, if the yerek is symptomatic of an actual illness (e.g., pathological jaundice, liver disease), then it would be considered a choleh and the milah would be delayed, falling under the general rule of AHS 268:2.

Meta-Psak Heuristics:

1. Extreme Chumra for Infant Pikuach Nefesh: The sugya underscores that for milah, the threshold for choleh that delays the mitzvah is exceptionally stringent. This highlights the Halacha's acute sensitivity to potential danger for an infant, setting a lower bar for pikuach nefesh than in many other halachic contexts. This suggests that in any doubt regarding an infant's health, leniency (in this case, delaying the milah) is the default.
2. Authority of Minhag in Sakanah: The Arukh HaShulchan's ultimate reliance on the minhag for tzaraas demonstrates the significant authority of a widespread custom, particularly when it is rooted in chashash sakana. Even if a minhag appears to diverge from a strict textual reading or an opinion of a major posek (like Rambam), if it is established for the sake of preserving life, it becomes normative halacha l'maaseh. This teaches us to respect and investigate minhagim that prioritize safety.
3. The Role of Medical Judgment: The distinction regarding yerek ("שאינו חולי" vs. "שהוא חולי") necessitates contemporary medical expertise. A posek cannot make this determination without consulting qualified medical professionals. This highlights the constant interplay between Halacha and scientific understanding, especially in areas of pikuach nefesh. Halachic decisions in medical contexts are rarely made in a vacuum.

Takeaway

The sugya illuminates the extraordinary stringency applied to pikuach nefesh concerning infant milah, where even the slightest illness or a minhag rooted in chashash sakana takes precedence over the mitzvah b'zmanah and its ability to override Shabbat. This exemplifies the dynamic nature of psak, balancing foundational din with practical, safety-conscious minhag.

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1. Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 268:4.
2. Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Milah 1:17.
3. Shabbat 134a.
4. Ritva, Shabbat 134a s.v. "תינוק שיש בו ירק".
5. Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 268:7.
6. Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 268:5-6.
7. Rashba, Shabbat 134a s.v. "ואם יש בו ירק".
8. Rosh, Shabbat 19:1.
9. Magen Avraham, Orach Chaim 268:5.
10. Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 268:6.
11. Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 268:4.
12. Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 268:5-6.
13. Shabbat 134a.
14. Rashba, Shabbat 134a s.v. "ואם יש בו ירק".
15. Rosh, Shabbat 19:1.
16. Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 268:6.
17. Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 268:4.
18. Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 268:7.
19. Shabbat 132a.
20. Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 268:2.
21. Yevamot 71b.
22. Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Mamrim 1:2.
23. Tosafot, Avodah Zarah 36a s.v. "מאי טעמא".
24. Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 268:6.
25. Rashba, Shabbat 134a s.v. "ואם יש בו ירק"; Rosh, Shabbat 19:1.
26. Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 268:2.
27. Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 268:6.
28. Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 268:7.