Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 268:9-16

Sugya Map

The Arukh HaShulchan in Orach Chaim 268:9-16 delves into the intricate question of who is qualified to perform milah (circumcision), with particular emphasis on the distinction between the physical act (maaseh milah) and the associated blessings (birkat milah). The discussion primarily revolves around individuals typically excluded from performing mitzvot for others or reciting brachot.

Issue

The core issue is the kesherut (fitness) of various individuals – kutan (minor), eved (slave), isha (woman), akum (non-Jew), mumar (apostate), cheresh (deaf-mute), and shoteh (mentally incapacitated person) – to act as a mohel. This bifurcates into two distinct questions:

1. Can such an individual perform the maaseh milah itself, thereby fulfilling the mitzvah of removing the orlah?
2. Can such an individual recite the birkat milah?

Nafka Mina(s)

• L'chatchila vs. B'dieved: Whether certain individuals are permitted to perform milah initially (l'chatchila), or if the milah they perform is only valid post-facto (b'dieved).
• Selection of a Mohel: Guidance for the avi habben (father of the son) in choosing a qualified mohel.
• The Nature of Mitzvah Performance: Deeper insight into whether a mitzvah is fulfilled purely by the physical act, or if it requires the kavannah (intention) and chiyuv (obligation) of a bar mitzvah individual.
• Bracha Recitation: Determining who recites the bracha when the mohel is unqualified to do so.

Primary Sources

• Mishna, Nedarim 3:11
• Talmud Bavli, Avoda Zara 27a
• Talmud Bavli, Kiddushin 29a
• Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Milah 2:1, 3:9
• Tosafot, Avoda Zara 27a s.v. "Rabbi Yehuda"
• Tur, Orach Chaim 265, 268
• Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 265:1, 268:9-16
• Rama, Orach Chaim 265:1, 268:9-16
• Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 268:9-16

Text Snapshot

The Arukh HaShulchan navigates these complexities with characteristic precision. Let's examine a few pivotal lines:

Differentiating Maaseh and Bracha

"אפילו קטן שאין בו דעת כלל, כשר למול. אך לא לברך" – Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 268:9 [^1]

This line encapsulates a central theme: even a kutan lacking full da'at (understanding/maturity) can perform the physical act of milah, but is disqualified from reciting the bracha. The dikduk of "אפילו קטן שאין בו דעת כלל" emphasizes the minimal requirement for the maaseh itself, pushing the boundaries of kesherut for the physical act far beyond that for the bracha. The leshon "אך לא לברך" highlights the sharp distinction; the maaseh is valid, but the bracha is exclusively reserved for one who is bar mitzvah.

L'chatchila vs. B'dieved for a Kutan

"וכן קטן שאין בו דעת אינו כשר לכתחילה אבל בדיעבד כשר" – Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 268:10 [^2]

Here, the Arukh HaShulchan clarifies the l'chatchila (ideally) vs. b'dieved (post-facto) distinction specifically for a kutan. While the previous line stated a kutan is "כשר למול", this line refines it to "אינו כשר לכתחילה". This nuance is crucial. It means that while the milah performed by a kutan is valid and the child is considered circumcised, one should not choose a kutan as a mohel if an adult is available. The term "שאין בו דעת" further ties the l'chatchila disqualification to the lack of full intellectual maturity, linking da'at to optimal mitzvah performance even if not strictly necessary for the act's kashrut.

The Status of a Woman Mohel

"והאשה אף שהיא מצווה על כל מצוות התלויות בנשים אינה כשרה למול לכתחילה" – Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 268:11 [^3]

This statement addresses the isha. The Arukh HaShulchan acknowledges that a woman is obligated in many mitzvot ("מצווה על כל מצוות התלויות בנשים"), yet immediately states she is "אינה כשרה למול לכתחילה". This suggests that her chiyuv in mitzvot in general does not automatically qualify her for performing milah l'chatchila. The leshon "אף שהיא מצווה" implies a potential hiddush or counter-intuitive ruling, requiring a specific reason for her l'chatchila disqualification in milah, which is not explicitly tied to her general exemption from mitzvat asseh she'hazman grama.

Readings

The Arukh HaShulchan in this section acts as a faithful interpreter and synthesiser of generations of halachic discourse. The underlying tension often lies between the Rambam's more stringent view on the mohel's qualifications and the more lenient approach adopted by Tosafot and subsequently codified by the Rama.

Rambam: The Prerogative of the Ben De'ah

The Rambam posits a rigorous standard for the mohel. In Hilchot Milah 2:1, he unequivocally states: "אין מלין אלא גדול ישראל ובן דעת" [^4]. This declaration sets a high bar, effectively disqualifying a kutan, isha, eved, akum, or shoteh l'chatchila. For Rambam, the act of milah is not merely a physical procedure but a profound mitzvat asseh requiring the kavannah and chiyuv of an adult Jew of sound mind.

Chiddush of Rambam

The chiddush of the Rambam lies in his insistence that the mohel must be a "גדול ישראל ובן דעת" even for the maaseh itself. This suggests that the mitzvah of milah, for Rambam, incorporates an element of da'at and chiyuv on the part of the performer, beyond simply achieving the physical removal of the orlah. The Maggid Mishneh on Hilchot Milah 2:1 explains Rambam's position, noting that the Yerushalmi (Kiddushin 4:1) implies that milah requires da'at [^5]. For Rambam, milah is a mitzvat asseh that necessitates a shaliach (agent) who is capable of kavannah and is himself bar mitzvah. If one were to argue that the maaseh of milah is merely a technical removal, Rambam would counter that the mitzvah is not just to remove the orlah, but to "למול את בנך" (circumcise your son), an act imbued with holiness that should ideally be performed by one obligated in mitzvot. The b'dieved validity for Rambam would likely stem from the gzeirat hakatuv that the orlah is removed, but the mitzvat asseh itself might not be considered fulfilled k'darka (in its ideal manner).

Tosafot: Prioritizing the Maaseh

In stark contrast to the Rambam, Tosafot (Avoda Zara 27a s.v. "Rabbi Yehuda") explicitly states: "דכיון דאשה קטנה ועבד כשרים למול" [^6]. This pronouncement is foundational for the more lenient approach embraced by later poskim. Tosafot derive this from the Gemara's discussion of milah on Shabbat, where Rabbi Yehuda allows a kutan to perform milah on Shabbat because "כל הכשרין לשחיטה כשרים למילה" (all who are fit for shechita are fit for milah) [^7]. Since a kutan is fit for shechita (as long as they know the halachot), they are also fit for milah. The implication is that milah is primarily a technical act of removing the orlah, similar to shechita, which focuses on the proper performance of the maaseh rather than the chiyuv or kavannah of the perpetrator.

Chiddush of Tosafot

The chiddush of Tosafot is their emphasis on the technical competence for the maaseh milah over the mohel's status as a bar mitzvah obligated individual. They view the mitzvah of milah as fulfilled once the orlah is properly removed, regardless of whether the mohel is fully chayav in mitzvot. The chiyuv to circumcise rests on the father, and he can appoint virtually anyone to perform the physical act. The kashrut of milah is therefore divorced from the mohel's personal obligation or ability to make brachot. This distinction allows for a broader range of individuals to perform the maaseh, with the bracha then being the responsibility of a bar mitzvah male, typically the avi habben or another qualified adult. This perspective effectively splits the mitzvah into its ritual act and its associated birkat ha'mitzvah.

Rama: Synthesizing Leniency and Idealism

The Rama generally adopts the position of Tosafot, allowing kutan and isha to perform the maaseh milah b'dieved, and even l'chatchila if no adult male mohel is available [^8]. However, he maintains the stricture that only a bar mitzvah male can recite the birkat milah [^9]. The Rama thus provides the normative halacha for Ashkenazim, balancing the practical need to ensure milah is performed with the ideal preference for a fully qualified mohel and ba'al bracha.

Chiddush of Rama

The Rama's chiddush is his clear codification of Tosafot's view into halacha l'maaseh. He establishes the l'chatchila preference for an adult male mohel who can also make the bracha, but crucially validates the milah performed by a kutan or isha b'dieved. He also explicitly permits them l'chatchila if no qualified adult male is available, demonstrating a practical approach to ensure the mitzvah is not delayed. This pragmatic stance ensures that the mitzvah of milah is fulfilled on time even in challenging circumstances, while still upholding the dignity and spiritual elements associated with the bracha by restricting its recitation to a bar mitzvah male.

Arukh HaShulchan: Elucidating and Consolidating

The Arukh HaShulchan meticulously unpacks the differing opinions and consolidates the halacha for later generations. He affirms the Rama's position, emphasizing the l'chatchila preference for an adult male mohel and the b'dieved validity of milah by a kutan, isha, or eved. He dedicates significant space to clarifying the bracha protocol when the mohel cannot recite it, stressing the avi habben's primary role in the birkat lehachniso [^10].

Chiddush of Arukh HaShulchan

The Arukh HaShulchan's chiddush is primarily in his detailed and systematic exposition of these complex halachot. He doesn't just state the psak, but often delves into the reasoning and underlying sugyot. He clarifies the specific nuances of da'at for a kutan in 268:10, and meticulously details the bracha responsibilities in 268:13-15. His unique contribution lies in his comprehensive synthesis of the Rishonim and Acharonim, providing a clear and accessible guide for practice while still revealing the depth of the halachic discourse. For example, his careful wording in 268:10 ("וכן קטן שאין בו דעת אינו כשר לכתחילה אבל בדיעבד כשר") not only distinguishes l'chatchila from b'dieved but also implicitly acknowledges the Rambam's emphasis on da'at as an ideal, even while ultimately siding with the Tosafot's b'dieved validation. He also tackles edge cases like the cheresh and shoteh in 268:16, demonstrating his commitment to a complete halachic picture.

Friction

The most profound kushya (difficulty) arising from this sugya is the fundamental disagreement between the Rambam and Tosafot (which largely informs the Shulchan Aruch and Rama) regarding the l'chatchila qualification of a mohel. This isn't a mere procedural debate; it reflects a deep conceptual divergence on the nature of milah as a mitzvah.

The Core Kushya: Who is a "Qualified" Mohel L'chatchila?

The Rambam states with absolute clarity: "אין מלין אלא גדול ישראל ובן דעת" [^11]. This implies that a kutan, isha, or eved cannot perform milah l'chatchila at all. The Rambam's language suggests that only an adult Jewish male of sound mind possesses the requisite qualities to properly perform this mitzvat asseh. For Rambam, the mohel is not just a technician; he is an agent of the mitzvah who must embody the chiyuv and kavannah appropriate for such a sacred act. The mitzvat asseh of milah is not merely the physical removal of the orlah, but the act of kiddush Hashem through a proper agent.

In stark contrast, Tosafot (Avoda Zara 27a s.v. "Rabbi Yehuda") unequivocally states: "דכיון דאשה קטנה ועבד כשרים למול" [^12]. This statement, derived from Rabbi Yehuda's opinion that "כל הכשרין לשחיטה כשרים למילה" [^13], implies that as long as the individual possesses the technical skill, they are qualified to perform the maaseh milah. The Tosafot's position is that the chiyuv primarily rests on the father, and he can appoint anyone capable of the physical act to be his shaliach. This Tosafot is quoted by the Rama as the basis for allowing a kutan or isha to perform milah b'dieved, and even l'chatchila in the absence of a gadol [^14].

The friction is evident: Rambam demands a bar de'ah male for the act itself l'chatchila, while Tosafot sees the act as permissible by anyone technically capable, even l'chatchila in certain scenarios. How can these two fundamental approaches to milah be reconciled, or at least understood as stemming from different conceptual frameworks?

Best Terutz: Divergent Understandings of Mitzvah Agency and the Essence of Milah

The core of the terutz lies in dissecting the nature of the mitzvah of milah itself and the concept of shlichut (agency) in performing it.

Terutz 1: The Nature of Milah – Mitzvat Asseh vs. Gzeirat Hakatuv

One primary explanation for this divergence is found in how Rishonim conceive of the mitzvah of milah.

• Rambam's View: Milah as a Mitzvat Asseh Requiring Kavannah and Chiyuv. For the Rambam, milah is a profound mitzvat asseh that requires the kavannah (intention) and chiyuv (obligation) of the performer. The mohel is not merely performing a medical procedure; he is acting as a shaliach to fulfill a divine commandment. As such, the shaliach must be fit to perform mitzvot in their ideal form. A kutan, isha, or eved (who are either not bar mitzvah or not fully free Jews) are considered deficient in their capacity to fully embody this shlichut for a mitzvat asseh l'chatchila. The Maggid Mishneh on Rambam, Hilchot Milah 2:1, cites the Yerushalmi (Kiddushin 4:1) which links milah to da'at [^15], further solidifying the Rambam's stance that the performer's mental and spiritual state is integral to the mitzvah's optimal fulfillment. While b'dieved the physical removal of the orlah might satisfy the divine decree to remove the orlah, it does not, in Rambam's view, constitute the ideal fulfillment of the mitzvat asseh k'darka. The Avi Habben is the mechuyav, but his shaliach must be an appropriate vessel for the mitzvah.

• Tosafot's View: Milah as a Gzeirat Hakatuv Primarily Focused on the Maaseh. Tosafot and those who follow them (including the Rama) approach milah more as a gzeirat hakatuv (divine decree) that primarily requires the physical removal of the orlah. The emphasis is on the maaseh itself. The chiyuv for the mitzvah rests squarely on the avi habben. He is the one obligated to "מול את בנו" (circumcise his son) [^16]. As long as the orlah is effectively removed by a technically competent individual, the mitzvah is fulfilled, even if that individual is a kutan or isha. The mohel in this view is more akin to an instrument or a contractor hired to perform a specific physical task. The Gemara's comparison to shechita ("כל הכשרין לשחיטה כשרים למילה") [^17] supports this, as shechita is a highly technical act where the kashrut depends on the precision of the cut, not necessarily the chiyuv of the shohet (e.g., a kutan can shecht if knowledgeable) [^18]. In this framework, the bracha then becomes the distinct component requiring a bar mitzvah individual, as brachot are expressions of praise and thanks reserved for those obligated in mitzvot.

Terutz 2: The Scope of Shlichut for Mitzvot

A second terutz focuses on the specific nature of shlichut for mitzvot.

• Rambam's Shlichut: For Rambam, when one appoints a shaliach to perform a mitzvah for them, the shaliach must be capable of mitzvat performance in their own right, or at least be a bar mitzvah Jew. This is because the shaliach effectively steps into the shoes of the meshale'ach (the one sending) to fulfill the mitzvah. A kutan or isha cannot fully embody this agency for a mitzvah because they are not chayav in milah themselves (a kutan is not bar mitzvah, an isha is exempt from milah). Therefore, l'chatchila, they cannot serve as a proper shaliach to fulfill the avi habben's chiyuv.

• Tosafot's Shlichut: Tosafot (and Rama) likely view the shlichut for milah as more limited. The shaliach is merely an executor of the physical act. The mitzvah of milah is unique in that it is performed on a third party (the baby), not by the shaliach for their own benefit. Thus, the shaliach does not need to be personally chayav in milah or even generally bar mitzvah to perform the physical act. Their role is to facilitate the avi habben's chiyuv by performing the necessary physical procedure. This is analogous to a shaliach for korbanot, where even a non-Jew can perform the shechita (though the minui and kavannah for korbanot are more complex) [^19], demonstrating that the physical act can be separated from the personal chiyuv of the performer in certain mitzvot.

In conclusion, the Arukh HaShulchan's presentation, by largely following the Rama, adopts the more inclusive view of Tosafot for the maaseh milah, while rigorously maintaining the requirement of a bar mitzvah male for the brachot. This demonstrates a psak that values the timely performance of the essential maaseh milah above an ideal mohel, while still acknowledging the spiritual weight of the bracha.

Intertext

The discussions surrounding who can perform milah and recite its brachot intersect with broader halachic principles concerning mitzvah performance by those not fully obligated.

1. Mitzvot Performed by Ketanim and the Principle of Chinuch

The sugya frequently touches upon the kutan's ability to perform milah, raising questions about a kutan's role in fulfilling mitzvot for adults. The general principle is katan she'higgia l'chinuch (a minor who has reached the age of education), where ketanim are educated to perform mitzvot mid'rabanan even before their bar mitzvah [^20]. However, this is primarily for their own chinuch, not to fulfill the obligation of a gadol.

• Paradox of Milah: Milah presents a paradox. While a kutan cannot fulfill a gadol's obligation for most mitzvot (e.g., kiddush or havdalah) [^21], Tosafot and the Rama permit a kutan to perform milah even l'chatchila if a gadol is unavailable. This suggests that milah is unique. The Gemara in Kiddushin 29a states that the father is chayav to circumcise his son ("האב חייב למול את בנו") [^22]. The kutan is merely an instrument through whom the father's obligation is fulfilled. This is distinct from a kutan performing a mitzvah for a gadol who is obligated in that mitzvah for himself (e.g., sukkah or lulav). In milah, the kutan acts on behalf of the avi habben to perform an act on the baby, not to fulfill an obligation for the avi habben directly.

• Comparison to Shechita: The Gemara (Avoda Zara 27a) links milah to shechita with the dictum "כל הכשרין לשחיטה כשרים למילה" [^23]. A kutan who understands the halachot of shechita can perform it, and the meat is kosher [^24]. This analogy reinforces the idea that milah, in its maaseh aspect, is a technical skill where da'at is required for the act's proper execution, not for the performer's chiyuv status. The Arukh HaShulchan (OC 268:16) reflects this by stating that a kutan who is pakkuach (intelligent) is simply like any kutan regarding milah, implying that da'at to perform the act correctly is assumed for any kutan permitted to do it.

2. Women and Mitzvot Asseh She'Hazman Grama vs. Lo Hazman Grama

The halachic status of women in performing milah for a male child is another point of intertextual resonance. The general rule is nashim peturot mi'mitzvot asseh she'hazman grama (women are exempt from time-bound positive commandments) [^25]. Milah is a mitzvat asseh, and while it ideally occurs on the eighth day, it is not strictly time-bound, as it can be performed later if there are delays. Thus, it is generally considered mitzvat asseh she'lo hazman grama (a positive commandment not time-bound).

• Direct Obligation vs. Performance for Others: Since milah is lo hazman grama, one might assume women are obligated in it. However, women are not personally obligated in milah (as they are not circumcised). The question then becomes whether they can perform it on behalf of others. The Gemara (Avoda Zara 27a) permits a woman to perform milah ("אשה כשרה למול"), and the Shulchan Aruch (OC 268:10) states this explicitly [^26], though the Rama adds that l'chatchila one should not use a woman, but b'dieved it is valid [^27].

• Why L'chatchila Disqualification? The Arukh HaShulchan (OC 268:11) states: "והאשה אף שהיא מצווה על כל מצוות התלויות בנשים אינה כשרה למול לכתחילה" [^28]. This is intriguing. If milah is lo hazman grama and she is generally chayav in such mitzvot, why the l'chatchila disqualification?

  • Kavod HaBriyot/Public Role: One explanation, often cited for women's exclusion from certain public mitzvot like tefillin or talit (even though lo hazman grama), is kavod habriyot (human dignity) or pritzut (immodesty) [^29]. A woman performing milah might be seen as inappropriate or undignified in a public religious ceremony, even if technically capable.
  • Leniency in Rambam's View: Even Rambam, who requires a gadol ישראל ובן דעת [^30], might have a nuanced view. While he generally excludes women from being mohalim, a b'dieved validation of the act itself might still be consistent with his view that the essential maaseh of removing the orlah is achieved, even if the mitzvat asseh is not fulfilled k'darka.
  • Rashba's Insight: The Rashba (Responsa 1:47) discusses a woman's ability to act as a shaliach for milah, concluding that she is fit. He distinguishes milah from other mitzvot where a woman might be disqualified as a shaliach due to her lack of chiyuv. For milah, the focus is on the maaseh, not the chiyuv of the shaliach [^31]. This aligns well with the Tosafot and Rama positions that the Arukh HaShulchan follows.

These intertextual connections highlight that the halachot of milah are not isolated, but deeply embedded in broader discussions about who can perform mitzvot, the nature of shlichut, and the specific roles of ketanim and women in halachic practice.

Psak/Practice

The Arukh HaShulchan's discussion in OC 268:9-16, synthesizing centuries of halachic discourse, establishes clear guidelines for the selection and conduct of a mohel. The practical psak largely aligns with the Rama, reflecting the normative Ashkenazic practice.

L'chatchila (Ideally)

• Qualified Mohel: L'chatchila, the milah should be performed by an adult Jewish male who is bar mitzvah (i.e., gadol and ben de'ah) and ritually observant. This individual should also be proficient in the medical aspects of milah [^32]. This mohel will then perform the maaseh milah and recite the birkat al hamilah.
• Avi HaBben's Role: The father of the son (avi habben) is the primary mechuyav (obligated party) in the mitzvah of milah [^33]. He recites the birkat lehachniso b'vrito shel Avraham Avinu and shehecheyanu (if applicable) [^34]. If the mohel is the father himself, he recites all the blessings [^35].

B'dieved (Post-Facto or In Case of Necessity)

• Kutan, Isha, Eved: If an adult Jewish male mohel is unavailable, a kutan (minor who understands the procedure), an isha (woman), or an eved (Jewish slave) may perform the maaseh milah [^36]. The milah performed by them is considered kosher (b'dieved), and the child is deemed circumcised. In such a scenario, where no gadol is available, some poskim (following Rama) would even permit them l'chatchila [^37].
• Akum or Mumar: An akum (non-Jew) or a mumar (apostate) cannot perform milah l'chatchila [^38]. If they do, the milah is b'dieved valid, but only if they did it for the sake of the mitzvah (and not, for example, for medical reasons alone). However, one should always seek a Jewish mohel to perform hatafat dam brit (drawing a drop of blood) from a child circumcised by an akum or mumar [^39].
• Cheresh, Shoteh: A cheresh (deaf-mute) who communicates via sign language and is otherwise intelligent is considered like a normal person and can perform milah [^40]. A shoteh (mentally incapacitated person) cannot perform milah at all, and even b'dieved it is questionable, as they lack da'at [^41].

Bracha Recitation

• If the mohel is a kutan, isha, eved, akum, or mumar, they cannot recite the birkat al hamilah. In this case, another bar mitzvah adult male, typically the avi habben or another Jew present, recites the bracha on behalf of the mohel [^42]. The avi habben always recites his specific bracha (and shehecheyanu) [^43].

Meta-Psak Heuristics

The Arukh HaShulchan's detailed analysis exemplifies a crucial halachic heuristic: the distinction between the ideal performance of a mitzvah (l'chatchila) and its minimal requirements for validity (b'dieved). It demonstrates that while hiddur mitzvah (beautification of the mitzvah) is desired, the fundamental maaseh of the mitzvah (removing the orlah) takes precedence, ensuring that the child fulfills the mitzvah of milah even if performed under less than ideal conditions. This pragmatic approach safeguards the timely performance of a mitzvah which carries severe consequences if neglected.

Takeaway

The Arukh HaShulchan meticulously delineates the qualifications for a mohel, separating the maaseh milah's validity from the birkat milah's strict requirements. This nuanced halachic framework prioritizes the essential physical act of milah even by non-ideal agents, while reserving the spiritual dimension of bracha for a bar mitzvah male.

[^1]: Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 268:9 [^2]: Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 268:10 [^3]: Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 268:11 [^4]: Rambam, Hilchot Milah 2:1 [^5]: Maggid Mishneh, Hilchot Milah 2:1 s.v. "אין מלין אלא גדול" [^6]: Tosafot, Avoda Zara 27a s.v. "Rabbi Yehuda" [^7]: Talmud Bavli, Avoda Zara 27a [^8]: Rama, Orach Chaim 268:9-11 [^9]: Rama, Orach Chaim 265:1 [^10]: Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 268:13-15 [^11]: Rambam, Hilchot Milah 2:1 [^12]: Tosafot, Avoda Zara 27a s.v. "Rabbi Yehuda" [^13]: Talmud Bavli, Avoda Zara 27a [^14]: Rama, Orach Chaim 268:10-11 [^15]: Maggid Mishneh, Hilchot Milah 2:1 s.v. "אין מלין אלא גדול" [^16]: Talmud Bavli, Kiddushin 29a [^17]: Talmud Bavli, Avoda Zara 27a [^18]: Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 1:1 [^19]: Mishna, Zevachim 2:1; Rambam, Hilchot Maaseh HaKorbanot 1:19 [^20]: Talmud Bavli, Sukkah 42a; Brachot 20a [^21]: Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 234:4 (Kiddush); Orach Chaim 296:5 (Havdalah) [^22]: Talmud Bavli, Kiddushin 29a [^23]: Talmud Bavli, Avoda Zara 27a [^24]: Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 1:1 [^25]: Talmud Bavli, Kiddushin 29a [^26]: Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 268:10 [^27]: Rama, Orach Chaim 268:10 [^28]: Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 268:11 [^29]: Magen Avraham, Orach Chaim 17:2 (regarding Tzitzit for women) [^30]: Rambam, Hilchot Milah 2:1 [^31]: Rashba, Responsa 1:47 [^32]: Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 268:9-10 [^33]: Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 268:13; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 265:1 [^34]: Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 268:13; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 265:1 [^35]: Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 268:13 [^36]: Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 268:9-11 [^37]: Rama, Orach Chaim 268:10-11 [^38]: Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 268:15 [^39]: Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 264:1 [^40]: Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 268:16 [^41]: Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 268:16 [^42]: Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 268:14-15 [^43]: Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 268:13