Arukh HaShulchan Yomi · Expert – Beit Midrash Analysis · Standard
Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 316:19-24
Sugya Map
The sugya of Tzeidah (trapping) on Shabbat, specifically regarding insects, flies, fleas, and creeping things (sh'ratzim), pivots on the intersection of physical confinement and psychological utility. The conceptual map of this sugya addresses whether the prohibition of trapping applies to creatures that are not typically hunted, how we define the spatial parameters of confinement, and the halakhic status of unintended trapping.
[Tzeidah (Trapping) on Shabbat]
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+-----------------------+-----------------------+
| |
[Species Type] [Intent & Confinement]
| |
+-- B'mino Nitzod (Torah Prohibition) +-- Pesh Reishei d'La Nicha Lei
| e.g., Deer, Fish [Shabbat 106b] | (Taz vs. Magen Avraham)
| |
+-- Ein B'mino Nitzod (Rabbinic Prohibition) +-- Mechusar Tzeidah (Spatial Confinement)
e.g., Flies, Fleas [Arukh HaShulchan 316:19] (Rambam vs. Rashi/Ran)
Core Issues
- The Taxonomy of Trapping (B'mino Nitzod vs. Ein B'mino Nitzod): Is the av melakha of Tzeidah restricted to animals hunted for their hide, meat, or general utility, or does it encompass the physical restriction of any living creature?
- The Physics of Confinement (Mechusar Tzeidah): At what point does a space transition from "unconfined" to "confined"? Does this transition depend on the absolute volume of the space or the relative ease with which the creature can be captured?
- Incidental Confinement (Pesh Reishei d'La Nicha Lei): When one closes a chest, book, or window, thereby trapping insects, does this constitute an act of trapping? If so, does the lack of intent (la nicha lei) combined with a Rabbinic prohibition (ein b'mino nitzod) generate a double-layered leniency?
Nafka Minot (Practical Ramifications)
- Closing a window or screen door in the summer when flies or mosquitoes are in the house.
- Shutting a storage chest or book where moths or silverfish reside.
- Trapping or killing a biting flea or tick on one's body.
- Capturing dangerous pests (e.g., scorpions, wasps) for self-defense.
Primary Sources
- Mishnah/Gemara: Shabbat 106b (the definition of b'mino nitzod); Shabbat 107a (laws of trapping insects and fleas); Shabbat 121a (trapping dangerous creatures).
- Rishonim: Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Shabbat 10:15-22; Rashi, Shabbat 106b s.v. "Ein B'mino Nitzod"; Ran, Shabbat 38b (on the Rif).
- Acharonim: Taz, Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 316:2; Magen Avraham, Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 316:3; Arukh HaShulchan, Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 316:19-24.
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Text Snapshot
The following passage from Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 316:21 serves as our analytical anchor:
"...דבאמת זהו פלא גדול לומר דבסגירת תיבה או ספר שיש שם זבובים יהיה אסור משום צידה, דכל שאין כוונתו לצידה כלל, אלא לסגור התיבה והספר, וגם אין לו שום תועלת מצידתן, וגם אינם ניצודים לכלום, דהא תיכף כשפתחם יפרחו לחוץ – אין זה שם צידה כלל, ואפילו איסור דרבנן ליכא..."
Textual & Grammatical Nuances
- "אין זה שם צידה כלל" (This is not defined as trapping at all): Note the use of the term shem (legal category/definition) rather than issur (prohibition). The Arukh HaShulchan is not merely searching for a heter (permit) within the laws of pesh reishei (inevitable consequences); he is arguing that the physical act of closing a box, when divorced from any utility or permanent confinement, does not even enter the conceptual category of Tzeidah.
- "דהא תיכף כשפתחם יפרחו לחוץ" (For immediately upon opening them, they will fly away): This highlights a temporal and functional dimension of trapping. Confinement that is inherently transient and lacks any purpose of retention does not satisfy the shiur (measure) or the gdar (definition) of Tzeidah.
- "ואפילו איסור דרבנן ליכא" (And there is not even a Rabbinic prohibition): This is a bold claim against the Magen Avraham, who ruled stringently. The Arukh HaShulchan asserts that when the action is completely detached from the melakha’s objective, it bypasses both Torah and Rabbinic levels of prohibition.
Readings
The Arukh HaShulchan’s analysis of Tzeidah in Orach Chaim 316:19-24 requires a systematic unpacking of his engagement with the Rishonim and Acharonim. We will divide his conceptual moves into three primary readings.
Reading 1: The Taxonomy of Species (B'mino Nitzod) and the Status of Insects
The Gemara in Shabbat 106b distinguishes between species that are b'mino nitzod (species of a type that is hunted) and those that are ein b'mino nitzod (species of a type that is not hunted). Trapping the former constitutes a Torah violation (chayav), while trapping the latter is a Rabbinic violation (patur aval assur).
The Arukh HaShulchan begins in Se'if 19 by defining these categories. He notes that flies (zvuvim), mosquitoes (yitushim), and fleas (par'oshim) fall under the category of ein b'mino nitzod. Why? Because they have no commercial or domestic utility. No one hunts flies to sell their meat, hide, or oil.
Is the species hunted?
|
+---> Yes: B'mino Nitzod ----> Torah Prohibition (Chayav)
|
+---> No: Ein B'mino Nitzod --> Rabbinic Prohibition (Assur m'Drabanan)
However, the Rambam in Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Shabbat 10:21 introduces a nuance:
"הרודה דבש מכוורת דבורים... וחגבים וזבובים ויתושים ופרעושים וכל כיוצא בהן... הרי זה פטור, אבל אסור." (One who scrapes honey from a beehive... grasshoppers, flies, mosquitoes, fleas, and the like... is exempt from Torah liability, but it is rabbinically forbidden.)
The Arukh HaShulchan notes that while the Rambam groups all these insects together as patur aval assur (exempt but forbidden), there is an underlying tension regarding the reason for this Rabbinic status. Is it because they are ein b'mino nitzod, or is it because their trapping does not serve a constructive purpose (melakha she'eina tzricha l'gufa—a labor not needed for its own sake)?
To understand this, the Arukh HaShulchan analyzes the position of Rashi Shabbat 106b s.v. "Ein B'mino Nitzod". Rashi explains that b'mino nitzod refers to animals that people typically hunt for their skins or meat. This implies that the category is determined by societal practice. If a society began hunting a particular insect for its chemical properties, that insect would shift from ein b'mino nitzod to b'mino nitzod.
The Arukh HaShulchan's chiddush here is that the Rabbinic prohibition on trapping ein b'mino nitzod is not a weaker version of the Torah prohibition; rather, it is a safeguard designed to prevent confusion with b'mino nitzod. Consequently, when there is absolutely no interest in the animal itself, the Rabbinic decree is applied with greater flexibility, particularly when it intersects with other halakhic principles like tza'ar (pain) or mit'asek (incidental action).
Reading 2: The Battle of the Chest: Taz vs. Magen Avraham (Se'if 21)
The core halakhic battleground of this sugya is found in Se'if 21, which addresses the classic scenario of closing a chest, box, or book containing flies or other insects.
[Closing a Chest with Flies Inside]
|
+-------------------------+-------------------------+
| |
[Magen Avraham] [Taz]
- Pesh Reishei of a Rabbinic - Pesh Reishei d'La Nicha Lei
prohibition is FORBIDDEN. in a Rabbinic prohibition is PERMITTED.
- Focus: The physical consequence - Focus: The lack of intent and
of confinement. the nature of the vessel.
| |
+-------------------------+-------------------------+
|
[Arukh HaShulchan]
- Reconciles and transcends both.
- Defines the act as "Mit'asek" (incidental action).
- Confinement is temporary and lacks utility;
therefore, it is not "Tzeidah" at all.
The Taz Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 316:2 rules that it is permitted to close a chest or a book even if flies will be trapped inside. His reasoning rests on two pillars:
- Pesh Reishei d'La Nicha Lei b'Derabanan: Closing the box is an inevitable consequence (pesh reishei), but the person does not care about trapping the flies (la nicha lei). Since the trapping of flies is only a Rabbinic prohibition (ein b'mino nitzod), we have a pesh reishei d'la nicha lei on a Rabbinic level, which the Taz holds is entirely permissible.
- Lack of Intent (Mit'asek): The person’s physical action is directed entirely toward closing the chest to protect its contents, not toward the flies.
The Magen Avraham Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 316:3 strongly disagrees, arguing that a pesh reishei is forbidden even for a Rabbinic prohibition (pesh reishei d'la nicha lei b'derabanan assur). According to the Magen Avraham, one must shoo away the flies before closing the chest or book, as the physical reality of trapping remains an unavoidable result of the action.
The Arukh HaShulchan steps into this dispute with a conceptual defense of the Taz, offering a chiddush that reframes the entire debate. He argues that the Magen Avraham's stringency leads to an absurdity:
"ובאמת לפי דברי המג"א יקשה לומר כן, דא"כ אין אנו יכולים לסגור שום תיבה וספר בקיץ, דאי אפשר שלא יהיו שם זבובים, וכי נחוש לזה? והוי גזירה שאין הציבור יכולין לעמוד בה!" (And in truth, according to the words of the Magen Avraham, this is highly difficult to say, for if so, we would be unable to close any chest or book in the summer, as it is impossible for there not to be flies there! Shall we worry about this? It would be a decree that the community cannot abide by!)
To resolve this, the Arukh HaShulchan argues that the act of closing a chest or book containing flies is not defined as Tzeidah at all:
- The Temporary Nature of the Confinement: The flies are not truly "trapped" because the chest will eventually be opened again, at which point they will fly away. True Tzeidah requires a degree of permanent or significant confinement.
- The Absence of Utility (Shelo L'tzorek): The trapping provides no benefit to the person closing the chest. In fact, the person would prefer the flies not be there.
- The Definition of Mit'asek: The person is a mit'asek (one who acts without intent). Unlike a classic pesh reishei (such as cutting off a chicken's head, where the result is a direct and permanent physical transformation of the object), closing a box does not transform the flies. They remain free-flying insects within a slightly smaller space, and their confinement is entirely incidental to the primary action of closing the box.
Thus, the Arukh HaShulchan concludes that the Taz is correct, not merely because of a formal leniency in pesh reishei d'la nicha lei b'derabanan, but because the physical act itself fails to meet the conceptual definition of Tzeidah (אין זה שם צידה כלל).
Reading 3: The Physics of Space: "Mechusar Tzeidah" (Se'if 22)
In Se'if 22, the Arukh HaShulchan addresses the spatial requirements of trapping. How small must a space be for an animal to be considered "trapped"?
The Gemara and Shulchan Aruch distinguish between a "large house" and a "small house." If a deer enters a large house and one closes the door, it is not considered trapped if the deer still requires chase to be caught. However, if one closes the door of a small house where the deer can be caught in a single lunge, it is considered trapped (chayav).
The Arukh HaShulchan explains this based on the concept of mechusar tzeidah (lacking trapping):
[Spatial Confinement Check]
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Is the animal easily caught in a single lunge?
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+---------------+---------------+
| |
[Yes] [No]
| |
"Eino Mechusar Tzeidah" "Mechusar Tzeidah"
| |
Torah Prohibition No Torah Violation
(Chayav) (Paturs)
- Eino Mechusar Tzeidah (Not lacking trapping): If the animal is confined to a space where it can be captured in a single reach of the hand without further chase, it is considered fully trapped. Closing the door of such a space constitutes a Torah violation.
- Mechusar Tzeidah (Lacking trapping): If the space is large enough that catching the animal still requires effort, strategy, or chase, closing the door is not a Torah violation (though it may be rabbinically forbidden).
The Arukh HaShulchan applies this to insects in Se'if 22:
"ודבר זה תלוי לפי המקום ולפי הניצוד. דבזבובים ויתושים, אפילו כלי קטן, אם אינו יכול ליטלם בידו בבת אחת אלא שצריך עוד לצודם – לא הוי צידה גמורה..." (And this matter depends on the place and the creature being trapped. For with flies and mosquitoes, even in a small vessel, if one cannot grab them in his hand at once but must still hunt them—it is not considered complete trapping...)
Here, the Arukh HaShulchan introduces a subjective, relative definition of space. The spatial threshold for Tzeidah is not a fixed mathematical volume; rather, it is a function of the relationship between the physical capabilities of the hunter and the agility of the prey.
Because a fly is small and highly agile, confining it to a large room or even a moderately sized chest does not make it easily caught. One must still swat or chase it. Therefore, closing a chest containing flies is not eino mechusar tzeidah for the fly, which provides another conceptual layer to permit closing the chest.
Reading 4: Trapping for Protection: Dangerous Creatures and Biting Fleas (Se'ifs 20 & 23)
In Se'ifs 20 and 23, the Arukh HaShulchan deals with the practical problems of biting insects and dangerous animals.
In Se'if 20, he analyzes the case of a flea (par'osh) on one's skin. The Shulchan Aruch Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 316:9 rules that if a flea is biting a person, they may remove it and throw it off, but they may not trap it or kill it.
The Arukh HaShulchan explains the mechanics of this ruling:
- The Flea vs. the Louse: A louse (kinah) does not jump; it merely crawls. Therefore, picking up a louse is not considered Tzeidah because it was never "free" in a way that required hunting—it is already as good as caught. A flea, however, jumps rapidly. Capturing a flea requires skill and effort, making it subject to the Rabbinic prohibition of trapping ein b'mino nitzod.
- The Permit for Pain (Tza'ar): If the flea is actively biting and causing pain, the Rabbis permitted one to take it in their hand and discard it. This is based on the principle that Rabbinic prohibitions are waived or relaxed in cases of significant physical pain or discomfort (b'makom tza'ar lo gazru rabanan). However, once the flea is removed, one may not place it in a vessel or retain it, as that would constitute unnecessary trapping.
In Se'if 23, the Arukh HaShulchan expands this principle to dangerous creatures (mizikin), such as snakes, scorpions, and rabid dogs.
[Encountering a Dangerous Creature]
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Are they actively threatening life?
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+---------------+---------------+
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[Yes] [No]
| |
Permitted to kill or trap Permitted to trap to prevent
(Pikuach Nefesh) injury, but not to kill unless
they pose an active threat.
- Active Danger to Life (Pikuach Nefesh): If the creature is deadly (e.g., a venomous snake or scorpion), one is permitted to kill it or trap it immediately. This is a simple application of pikuach nefesh (saving a life), which overrides all Shabbat laws.
- Potential Harm / Pain (Tza'ar/Hezek): If the creature is not deadly but causes painful bites or stings (e.g., a non-venomous snake, a wasp, or a hornet), one may trap them to prevent injury, provided the trapping is done shelo l'tzorek (not for the purpose of utilizing the creature, but purely to neutralize the threat).
The Arukh HaShulchan emphasizes that trapping a dangerous creature to prevent harm is permitted even if done in a professional manner, because the primary intent is defensive (le-hatzil m'hezek—to save from damage). This highlights how the halakhic category of Tzeidah is deeply sensitive to the human context of the action.
Friction
The sugya of Tzeidah contains several conceptual tensions. Below, we explore two of the most significant theoretical conflicts within the Arukh HaShulchan’s analysis.
Friction 1: The Definition of Pesh Reishei—Physical Consequence vs. Halakhic Reality
The debate between the Taz and the Magen Avraham regarding closing a chest containing flies exposes a fundamental tension in the definition of pesh reishei.
The Kushya (Difficulty)
A pesh reishei is defined as an action that inevitably results in a prohibited consequence. If you drag a heavy chair across a dirt floor, you will inevitably dig a furrow (pesh reishei for Choresh—plowing). The fact that you do not want the furrow is irrelevant; the physical reality of your action creates the prohibited result.
If so, how can the Taz permit closing a chest when flies are inside? The physical consequence is absolute: the flies are now confined within the chest. They cannot escape. This is, by definition, an act of trapping. Even if it is a Rabbinic prohibition (ein b'mino nitzod) and undesired (la nicha lei), the physical reality of confinement has occurred. How can the Arukh HaShulchan claim that "this is not defined as trapping at all" (אין זה שם צידה כלל)?
The Terutz (Resolution)
The Arukh HaShulchan’s resolution relies on a conceptual distinction between physical confinement and halakhic trapping.
For an action to be halakhically defined as Tzeidah, it is not enough for an animal to end up in a confined space. The action must establish a state of subjugation or utility.
Physical Confinement (Flies in closed box)
=/=> Halakhic Trapping (Tzeidah)
*Requires:* Subjugation + Utility + Intentional Retention
When a person closes a chest containing flies:
- No Subjugation: The flies are not captured for use. They are not subdued or mastered by the human agent.
- No Retention: The confinement is temporary and incidental. The chest is closed to protect the clothes, not to keep the flies. The moment the chest is opened, the flies will escape.
- No Utility: The presence of the flies in the chest is a nuisance, not a benefit.
Therefore, the Arukh HaShulchan argues that the physical confinement of the flies is a pseudo-trapping. It lacks the essential legal characteristics (shem melakha) of Tzeidah. Just as walking into a room and closing the door behind oneself is not considered "trapping oneself," closing a chest with flies inside is not considered "trapping the flies." The physical consequence occurs, but it does not rise to the level of a halakhic category of labor.
Friction 2: The Paradox of Mit'asek in Pesh Reishei
A second conceptual tension lies in the Arukh HaShulchan’s use of the term mit'asek (incidental actor) to permit closing the chest.
The Kushya (Difficulty)
The Gemara in Sanhedrin 62b defines mit'asek as someone who performs an action without intending the physical outcome of that action (e.g., intending to cut a detached gourd but accidentally cutting a attached one). However, if the outcome is inevitable (pesh reishei), the status of mit'asek is generally nullified.
As the famous rule states: "Can you cut off a chicken's head and expect it not to die?" (Yis'tocheff rasha v'lo yamut?—Shabbat 75a). If the outcome is physically certain, you cannot claim to be "merely playing" or "acting incidentally." You are legally deemed to have intended the outcome.
If closing the chest inevitably traps the flies, how can the Arukh HaShulchan invoke the concept of mit'asek? The physical certainty of the flies being trapped should override any claim of incidental action.
The Terutz (Resolution)
To resolve this, we must distinguish between two types of pesh reishei:
- Pesh Reishei of Substance (Goufah d'Melakha): Where the inevitable result is the very essence of the forbidden labor (e.g., killing the chicken, digging the furrow). In these cases, the physical inevitability forces us to attribute intent to the actor, and the claim of mit'asek is rejected.
- Pesh Reishei of Circumstance (Nifal b'Derekh Agav): Where the inevitable result is a secondary, circumstantial effect that does not generate the primary outcome of the action.
The Arukh HaShulchan argues that closing a chest is an act of sheltering or securing clothes. The trapping of the flies is a circumstantial byproduct that does not alter the character of the chest-closing.
Furthermore, because the flies are ein b'mino nitzod (not a hunted species), the entire prohibition is Rabbinic. In the realm of Rabbinic prohibitions, when the physical action is directed entirely toward a permissible goal (protecting clothes) and the byproduct is undesired and of no utility, the legal fiction of pesh reishei (which imputes intent to the actor) is not applied. The actor remains in the status of mit'asek, and the action is permitted.
Intertext
To understand how the Arukh HaShulchan’s analysis fits into the broader halakhic conversation, we must examine its precedents in the Talmud and its applications in contemporary responsa.
Talmudic Parallel: Shabbat 121a — Trapping Dangerous Creatures
The Gemara in Shabbat 121a records a dispute regarding trapping dangerous animals on Shabbat:
"כופין קערה על גבי עקרב בשבת..." (One may invert a bowl over a scorpion on Shabbat [to prevent it from biting]...)
[Talmudic Source: Shabbat 121a]
|
v
Inverting a bowl over a scorpion to prevent a bite
|
+---> Permitted because it is for protection, not utility.
+---> This forms the basis for the Arukh HaShulchan's rulings
on trapping dangerous pests (Se'if 23).
This Talmudic precedent is the source for the Arukh HaShulchan’s ruling in Se'if 23. The Gemara permits inverting a bowl over a scorpion because the action is defensive. The goal is to prevent harm, not to acquire the scorpion.
The Rishonim ask: why is this not a violation of trapping? The Ran (on the Rif, Shabbat 45b) explains that trapping a scorpion under a bowl is a Rabbinic prohibition because it is ein b'mino nitzod. The Rabbis permitted this Rabbinic violation to protect people from physical pain or injury.
The Arukh HaShulchan extends this reasoning: if we can trap a scorpion (which is dangerous) to prevent injury, we can likewise trap or discard a biting flea (which causes pain) or close a window to keep out wasps. The defining factor is the defensive nature of the act, which removes it from the category of creative labor (melechet machshevet).
Modern Responsa: Killing Bacteria and Micro-organisms
A contemporary application of this sugya concerns the use of hand sanitizer or antibacterial soap on Shabbat. Does killing bacteria or micro-organisms constitute a violation of Tzeidah (trapping) or Netilat Neshamah (taking a life)?
[Using Hand Sanitizer on Shabbat]
|
Does it violate Trapping or Taking a Life?
|
+----------------------+----------------------+
| |
[Not Trapping] [Not Killing]
- Microbes are invisible to - Halakha does not recognize
the naked eye. microscopic organisms as "animals"
- They are "Ein B'mino Nitzod" subject to Shabbat prohibitions.
(not hunted). - No physical "trapping" occurs.
The Tzitz Eliezer (Vol. 14, Siman 27) and Minchat Shlomo (Vol. 2, Siman 33) address this question, drawing on the principles outlined by the Arukh HaShulchan:
- Visibility and Halakhic Reality: The Torah was not given to angels, and halakhic categories are based on human perception. Because bacteria are invisible to the naked eye, they do not fall under the halakhic categories of "living creatures" (chayah/sheretz) for the purposes of Shabbat.
- The Status of Ein B'mino Nitzod: Even if bacteria were considered halakhically alive, they are not a hunted species (ein b'mino nitzod).
- Lack of Confinement: Applying sanitizer does not trap the bacteria in a physical vessel or space; it destroys them. Thus, there is no physical act of trapping.
This contemporary application aligns with the Arukh HaShulchan’s conceptual approach: halakhic categories require human-scale relevance, utility, and intent. When these elements are absent, the prohibition does not apply.
Psak/Practice
How does the Arukh HaShulchan’s analysis translate into modern halakhic practice? Here are three common scenarios:
Case 1: Closing Screen Doors and Windows in the Summer
- The Problem: During the summer, flies and mosquitoes often enter a home. Is one permitted to close the screen door or window, knowing that doing so will trap the insects inside the house?
- The Ruling: Following the Arukh HaShulchan’s defense of the Taz, it is entirely permissible to close the door or window.
- The Reasoning:
- The primary intent is to secure the home and keep other insects out, not to trap the insects inside.
- The insects are ein b'mino nitzod (not a hunted species).
- The house is a large space (mechusar tzeidah); the insects are not easily caught simply by closing the door.
- The confinement is temporary and lacks utility.
Closing screen door with flies inside:
* Intent: Keep insects out (Permissible)
* Species: Ein B'mino Nitzod (Rabbinic)
* Space: Large / Mechusar Tzeidah (Permissible)
==> DECISION: PERMITTED
Case 2: Dealing with Wasps, Hornets, or Dangerous Insects
- The Problem: A wasp or hornet enters a room, causing fear of a painful sting. Is one permitted to trap it under a cup?
- The Ruling: It is permissible to invert a cup over the wasp to trap it, or to spray it with insecticide if there is a realistic fear of being stung.
- The Reasoning:
- The wasp is a dangerous insect (mizikin) that can cause significant pain or injury.
- The trapping is defensive (le-hatzil m'hezek), which is permitted for dangerous or painful pests.
- The action is shelo l'tzorek (not for the utility of the wasp).
Case 3: Closing a Refrigerator Door with an Insect Inside
- The Problem: A fly or gnat flies into the refrigerator. Is one permitted to close the door, trapping it inside where it will eventually die from the cold?
- The Ruling: It is permissible to close the refrigerator door.
- The Reasoning:
- Closing the door is necessary to preserve the food and keep the refrigerator running properly.
- The trapping of the fly is an undesired byproduct (pesh reishei d'la nicha lei).
- The fly is ein b'mino nitzod.
- The user has no interest in keeping the fly in the refrigerator; in fact, its presence there is a nuisance.
Takeaway
The essence of Tzeidah is not merely the physical confinement of a creature, but the establishment of human mastery and utility over it. When confinement is incidental, temporary, and serves no constructive purpose, the action remains outside the halakhic definition of trapping.
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