Nazir 6

Sugya Map

The sugya on Nazir 6a addresses the fundamental temporal parameters of an unspecified vow of naziriteship (setam nezirut). At the heart of the talmudic dispute lies a clash between two Amoraim regarding the baseline duration of this unique halakhic state of consecration, and how we navigate the boundaries of consecutive time-periods.

• The Core Dispute:
  • Rav Mattana asserts that an unspecified naziriteship lasts thirty days.
  • Bar Padda contends that it lasts twenty-nine days (thirty days less one).
• The Nafka Minot (Practical and Conceptual Ramifications):
  • Tiglachat Taharah (The Shaving Ritual): Does the nazir shave his head and bring his offerings on the thirtieth day (yom sheloshim) or the thirty-first day (yom sheloshim ve-echad)?
  • Miktzat Hayom Ke-Kulo (The Principle of "Part of the Day is Like the Whole Day"): Can a single day serve a dual, overlapping function? Specifically, can the thirtieth day act simultaneously as the final day of a first naziriteship and the initial day of a second, consecutive naziriteship (lekhan u-lekhan)?
  • Soter et HaKol (Retroactive Negation due to Impurity): If a nazir contracts ritual impurity (tumah) on the thirtieth day, does he lose his entire previous count, or is the term already conceptually complete?
  • The Nature of Halakhic Time: Is halakhic time comprised of rigid, indivisible twenty-four-hour units, or is it a fluid continuum where the gavra (person) can transition between legal states mid-day?
• Primary Sources:
  • Numbers 6:5 – The biblical mandate of hair growth: "Until the days are complete... he shall let the locks of the hair of his head grow long."
  • Numbers 6:13 – The completion of the nazirite term: "On the day when the days of his consecration are complete."
  • Mishnah Nazir 16a – The mechanics of consecutive naziriteships, shaving early, and the impact of impurity.
  • Nazir 5b–6a – The talmudic dialectic contrasting Rav Mattana and Bar Padda.

---

Text Snapshot

מתני׳: מי שאמר הריני נזיר שתי נזירות, מגלח את הראשונה יום שלשים ואחת, ואת השניה יום ששים ואחת. ואם גילח את הראשונה יום שלשים, מגלח את השניה יום ששים. ואם גילח יום ששים חסר אחד, יצא, שיום שלשים עולה לו מן המנין:
```[^1]

```gemara
גמ׳: ...אלא לבר פדא קשיא! אמר לך בר פדא: אימא סיפא: ואם גילח את הראשונה ליום שלשים מגלח את השניה ליום ששים. אלמא דמשך הנזירות כ"ט יום. אלא, סיפא מסייעא ליה, ורישא באומר שלמים...
ולרב מתנא קשיא סיפא! אמר לך רב מתנא: כדקתני סיפא, יום שלשים עולה לכאן ולכאן. מאי קמ"ל? מקצת היום ככולו? היינו רישא! מהו דתימא ה"מ בחדא נזירות, אבל בשתי נזירות לא, קמ"ל...
```[^2]

### Philological & Textual Nuances
1. **"עולה לכאן ולכאן" (Counts for here and for there):** The Gemara introduces this bidirectional temporal accounting to rescue Rav Mattana's view. The 30th day is squeezed; its morning belongs to the conclusion of Term A, while its afternoon (post-shaving) belongs to the initiation of Term B. The term *lekhan u-lekhan* implies a non-spatial, purely conceptual division of a calendar day.
2. **"באומר שלמים" (In a case where he says "complete"):** To reconcile the Mishnah's first clause (requiring shaving on day 31 and 61) with Bar Padda's 29-day baseline, the Gemara posits that the Mishnah's *apriori* (*lechatchilah*) instruction is restricted to one who explicitly vowed "complete" days. The *dikduk* of the word *shleimim* indicates a linguistic exclusion of the *miktzat hayom* leniency.
3. **"אלמא" vs. "אלא" in Rashi:** The Rashash highlights a textual variant in Rashi's commentary regarding Bar Padda's defense.^3 Rashi's text reads: *"אלמא דסתם נזירות לא הוי אלא כ"ט"*. The Rashash suggests emending *alman* (therefore) to *ela* (rather), pointing to a structural shift in how Bar Padda reads the Mishnah's internal consistency.

---

## Readings

The debate between Rav Mattana and Bar Padda is not merely a dispute over a number (30 versus 29), but a profound inquiry into the ontology of halakhic time and the mechanics of *miktzat hayom ke-kulo*.

            ┌───────────────────────────────────────┐
            │   DURATION OF AN UNSPECIFIED VOW      │
            │           (Setam Nezirut)             │
            └───────────────────┬───────────────────┘
                                │
              ┌─────────────────┴─────────────────┐
              ▼                                   ▼
   ┌─────────────────────┐             ┌─────────────────────┐
   │     RAV MATTANA     │             │      BAR PADDA      │
   │       30 Days       │             │       29 Days       │
   └──────────┬──────────┘             └──────────┬──────────┘
              │                                   │

┌───────────────┴───────────────┐ │ ▼ ▼ ▼ ┌───────────────────┐ ┌───────────────────┐ ┌───────────────────┐ │ Letchatila │ │ B'di'avad │ │ Intrinsic Term │ │ Shave on Day 31 │ │ Shave on Day 30 │ │ Shave on Day 30 │ │ (Requires full 30)│ │ (Miktzat Hayom │ │ (29 days complete│ └───────────────────┘ │ suffices) │ │ at sunset of 29)│ └───────────────────┘ └───────────────────┘

### 1. Rashi: The Mechanics of Bar Padda's 29-Day Count
Rashi anchors Bar Padda’s position in a literal reading of the Mishnah's second clause.^4 

According to Rashi, Bar Padda does *not* utilize the principle of *miktzat hayom ke-kulo* to explain why a nazir who shaves on the 30th day has fulfilled his obligation. Rather, Bar Padda asserts that the intrinsic, biblically mandated duration of *setam nezirut* is exactly 29 days. 

When the Mishnah states that shaving on the 30th day is valid *b'di'avad* (after the fact), it is not because we treat a fraction of the 30th day as a whole day. It is because the 29-day term was *fully completed* at the sunset of the 29th day. The 30th day is merely the appropriate time for the *tiglachat* (shaving) and the bringing of the sacrifices. 

Consequently, if the nazir has consecutive terms, the 30th day is the first day of the second term. If he shaves on the 30th day, he is shaving at the very beginning of his second term, which is why he can then shave for the second term on the 60th day (which is day 31 of his second term, i.e., 29 days of term two + day 30 of term one + day 30 of term two). 

Rashi writes:
"משום דבתחילה כי גילח ביום שלשים עולה לו לכאן ולכאן ולא משום דאמרינן מקצת היום ככולו..." (Rashi, s.v. *Amar lach Bar Padda*). This means that for Bar Padda, the day does not split; rather, the first term was already over, and the new term had already begun.

### 2. Tosafot: The Dual-Directional Split of *Lekhan U-Lekhan*
Tosafot grapples with the mechanics of Rav Mattana’s defense.^5 

If Rav Mattana holds that *setam nezirut* is 30 days, and he employs *miktzat hayom ke-kulo* to validate shaving on the 30th day, how can that same 30th day *also* count as the first day of the second naziriteship? 

Tosafot notes a crucial asymmetry:
*   For the **first naziriteship**, the *miktzat hayom* occurs at the **end** of the day (the morning of the 30th day counts as the completion of the 30th day).
*   For the **second naziriteship**, the *miktzat hayom* occurs at the **beginning** of the day (the remainder of the 30th day, after shaving, counts as the entire first day of the second term).

Tosafot explains that this is only possible because of a unique halakhic reality: once the first naziriteship is terminated via shaving (*tiglachat*), the remaining part of the day is immediately vacuumed into the newly active vow. 

Tosafot compares this to a person who accepts a naziriteship in the middle of the day. Just as the partial first day counts as a full day for him, here too, the post-shaving portion of the 30th day counts as the first day of the second term. 

The novelty (*chiddush*) of the Mishnah’s latter clause, according to Tosafot, is that we do not say the overlapping of these two distinct applications of *miktzat hayom* on a single calendar day invalidates the count. We permit a single sunset-to-sunset period to bear two distinct, contradictory halakhic identities.

### 3. Shita Mekubetzet (citing Tosfot HaRosh): The Problem of Redundancy
The Shita Mekubetzet raises a powerful structural question on the Gemara's dialectic.^6 

If we accept Rav Mattana’s view that the Mishnah's latter clause teaches us that *miktzat hayom* applies even to two consecutive naziriteships, what does this clause teach according to Bar Padda? 

According to Bar Padda, there is no application of *miktzat hayom* here at all, as the first term was 29 days and was fully completed. Why, then, does the Mishnah need to state: *"And if he shaved the first on the thirtieth day, he shaves the second on the sixtieth"*? 

The Shita Mekubetzet answers that for Bar Padda, the *chiddush* of the latter clause is to teach us that the second naziriteship begins *immediately* after the shaving, even though the day has already started. 

One might have thought that a new term of naziriteship can only begin at nightfall (the start of a calendar day). The Mishnah teaches us that the second term can begin mid-day, immediately following the *tiglachat* of the first. 

Thus, even without the mechanism of *miktzat hayom ke-kulo*, Bar Padda requires a special teaching to permit the mid-day initiation of a consecutive vow.

### 4. Rambam: The Integration of Rav Mattana's View
In his Mishneh Torah, the Rambam codifies the law according to Rav Mattana:

```hebrew
"מי שנדר נזירות סתם, הרי זה אסור לגלח ולשתות יין ולהיטמא למתים שלשים יום, מיום הנדר עד שישלמו שלשים יום. ואם גילח ביום השלשים אחר הנץ החמה, יצא."
```Rambam, Hilkhot Nezirut 3:1

The Rambam explicitly rules that *setam nezirut* is 30 days, but *b'di'avad*, shaving on the 30th day is valid. 

In the subsequent halakha, the Rambam addresses consecutive naziriteships:

```hebrew
"הנודר שתי נזירות... גילח הראשונה ביום שלשים, מגלח השניה ביום ששים. ואם גילח יום ששים פחות אחד, יצא, שיום שלשים עולה לו מן המנין לראשונה ולשניה."
```Rambam, Hilkhot Nezirut 3:2

The Rambam adopts Rav Mattana's conceptual framework of *lekhan u-lekhan* (the 30th day counting for both terms). However, the Ra'avad (ad loc.) immediately objects, pointing out a potential contradiction in how the Rambam calculates the days. 

If the 30th day counts for both, then the second term actually begins on day 30. Day 30 is Day 1 of the second term. Therefore, Day 29 of the second term is calendar day 58. 

If so, the nazir should be able to shave *b'di'avad* on day 58 (which is the 29th day of his second term, just as day 30 was the 30th day of his first term). Why does the Mishnah say he shaves on day 59 (*shishim chasar achat*)? 

This critique by the Ra'avad forces us to look deeper into the structural "friction" of the sugya.

---

## Friction

### The Core Kushya: The Logical Paradox of *Lekhan U-Lekhan*
The most formidable conceptual difficulty in this sugya is the mechanics of *lekhan u-lekhan* under Rav Mattana's view. 

If *miktzat hayom ke-kulo* is a legal fiction that expands a partial day into a complete day, how can it operate in two opposite directions on the exact same day?

Let us isolate the two operations:
1.  **Operation A (The Termination):** The morning of Day 30 is treated as the completion of Day 30. This means, halakhically, the entire Day 30 has already passed. The first naziriteship is over.
2.  **Operation B (The Initiation):** The afternoon of Day 30 is treated as the entire Day 1 of the second naziriteship. This means, halakhically, the entire Day 30 is now starting.

How can the same physical day, Day 30, be legally classified as both "already entirely completed" and "only just beginning"? If the morning of Day 30 represents the *end* of a 30-day block, then Day 30 is conceptually in the past. If the afternoon of Day 30 represents the *start* of a new 30-day block, Day 30 is conceptually in the future. 

To assert both simultaneously seems to violate the law of non-contradiction. You are multiplying one calendar day into two distinct halakhic days.

              ┌───────────────────────────────────────────┐
              │          THE PARADOX OF DAY 30            │
              └─────────────────────┬─────────────────────┘
                                    │
         ┌──────────────────────────┴──────────────────────────┐
         ▼                                                     ▼

┌──────────────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────────────┐ │ MORNING OF 30 │ │ AFTERNOON OF 30 │ │ Acts as end of Term A │ │ Acts as start of Term B │ │ "Day 30 is complete" │ │ "Day 30 is Day 1" │ └────────────┬─────────────┘ └────────────┬─────────────┘ │ │ └──────────────────────────┬──────────────────────────┘ │ ▼ ┌───────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ LOGICAL CONTRADICTION │ │ How can Day 30 be both past and future? │ └───────────────────────────────────────────┘

### The Terutz: The "Gavra vs. Cheftza" Distinction (The Keren Orah)
To resolve this paradox, the *Keren Orah* (ad loc.) and other Acharonim introduce a classic Brisker distinction between the *cheftza* (the objective object/day) and the *gavra* (the subject/person).^7

The principle of *miktzat hayom ke-kulo* does not physically alter or expand calendar time. Time is objective and unyielding; a day is always 24 hours. Rather, *miktzat hayom ke-kulo* is a rule that governs the **halakhic state of the gavra**. 

When a person is bound by a status (like naziriteship or mourning) that requires a certain number of days, the Torah does not require that every single second of those days be filled with that status. Rather, the Torah requires that the status be *represented* on each of those days. 

Once the status has been represented on a given day, that day is marked as "satisfied" in the person's ledger. 

Therefore:
*   On the morning of Day 30, the nazir has experienced the status of naziriteship on the 30th day. His obligation to experience 30 days of naziriteship is now **satisfied**. The *gavra* is permitted to shave.
*   Once he shaves, he is free of the first naziriteship. He now wishes to initiate his second naziriteship.
*   The second naziriteship requires a count of 30 days. To count Day 1, he must experience the status of naziriteship on that day. By accepting the second naziriteship in the afternoon of Day 30, he has now experienced the status of the second naziriteship on Day 30.
*   Therefore, in his ledger for the second naziriteship, Day 1 (which is calendar Day 30) is marked as **satisfied**.

There is no logical contradiction here because we are not splitting the physical day. We are simply recording two different halakhic satisfactions on the same calendar day. The day itself remains a single, undivided unit of time, but because the *gavra* transitioned from one state to another mid-day, that single day successfully serves as a valid ledger entry for both counts.

This elegant solution also resolves the Ra'avad's question on the Rambam. Why can't the nazir shave on day 58? 

Because to shave on day 58 *b'di'avad*, he would need the 58th day to count for both the second naziriteship and a third (if there were one). But here, there are only two naziriteships. 

The 30th day was squeezed because it was a transition day between Term 1 and Term 2. The 60th day (or 59th) is the end of Term 2. It does not transition into a Term 3. 

Therefore, he cannot shave on day 58, because he needs 30 distinct days for the second term. Since Day 30 of the calendar was Day 1 of the second term, the 30 days of the second term are:
*   Day 1 = Calendar Day 30
*   Days 2–30 = Calendar Days 31–59.

Thus, the 30th day of his second term is Calendar Day 59. If he shaves on Calendar Day 59 (*yom shishim chasar achat*), he has shaved on the 30th day of his second term, which is valid *b'di'avad* due to *miktzat hayom ke-kulo*! The math is perfect.

CALENDAR DAYS: [Day 1 ... Day 29] [Day 30] [Day 31 ... Day 58] [Day 59] [Day 60] └──── Term 1 ───┘ │ └─────── Term 2 ──────┘ │ │ │ ▼ ▼ Transition Day Transition Day Term 1 Ends (AM) Term 2 Ends (AM) Term 2 Begins (PM) (Valid B'di'avad)

### An Alternative Friction: Bar Padda's Textual Source
Another point of friction is the Gemara's attempt to associate Rav Mattana and Bar Padda with the Tannaitic dispute between Rabbi Yoshiya and Rabbi Yonatan.

```hebrew
"רבי יונתן אומר: אינו צריך, הרי הוא אומר 'עד מלאת הימים'. אלו ימים שצריכין מילוי? הוי אומר זה שלשים יום..."
```Nazir 6a

The Gemara initially suggests that Rav Mattana (30 days) follows Rabbi Yoshiya (who derives 30 days from hair growth), while Bar Padda (29 days) follows Rabbi Yonatan (who derives it from the lunar month, which can be 29 days). 

But the Gemara rejects this, stating that even Rabbi Yonatan could agree that a naziriteship must be 30 days, and their dispute is actually about whether the word "until" (*ad*) means "until and including" (*ad ve-ad בכלל*) or "until but not including" (*ad ve-lo ad בכלל*).

Why does the Gemara go to such lengths to dissociate the Amoraim from the simple reading of the Tannaitic dispute?

The Rogatchover Gaon (*Tzofnat Paneach*) explains that if Bar Padda's 29-day limit was based on the variable lunar month, then in a leap year or a series of full months, the halakha of *setam nezirut* would change to 30 days.^8 

Bar Padda's assertion is that *setam nezirut* is **always** 29 days as a fixed halakhic measure (*shiur*). It cannot be subject to the calendar's fluctuations. Therefore, the Gemara must re-frame the Tannaitic dispute to ensure that both Rav Mattana and Bar Padda are operating within fixed, immutable halakhic definitions of time, rather than astronomical dependencies.

---

## Intertext

To fully appreciate the mechanics of *miktzat hayom ke-kulo* as deployed in our sugya, we must contrast it with its application in two other areas of halakha: **Aveilut (Mourning)** and **Zav/Zavah (Ritual Impurity)**.

### 1. The Parallel: Aveilut (Mourning)
In the laws of mourning, the principle of *miktzat hayom ke-kulo* is used extensively. 

```hebrew
"שמועה קרובה... נוהג שבעה ושלשים. שמועה רחוקה... אינו נוהג אלא יום אחד. ואמרו הלכה כדברי המיקל באבל, ואפילו מקצת היום ככולו."
```Moed Katan 19b

On the seventh day of *shiva*, the mourner sits for a short period in the morning, and we say *miktzat hayom ke-kulo*. The mourning is over, and he may bathe and launder his clothes. Similarly, on the thirtieth day of *shloshim*, the restrictions of *shloshim* terminate in the morning due to *miktzat hayom*.

Why does *miktzat hayom* work so smoothly in Aveilut, whereas in Nazir it requires complex dialectics about consecutive terms?

The difference lies in the nature of the halakhic state:
*   **Aveilut is a negative, restrictive state.** The Torah (or Chazal) imposes a period of restriction. Once a fraction of the final day has been observed under these restrictions, the requirement of "observing" that day is met. There is no requirement to *build* or *consecrate* anything.
*   **Nezirut is a positive state of consecration (*kedushah*).** The nazir is a "holy person" (*kadosh yihyeh*). A consecration requires a complete, defined vessel of time. 

The friction in Nazir 6a exists because we are trying to use a principle of leniency (*miktzat hayom*)—which normally just dissolves restrictions—to actually *consecrate* a new, consecutive period of holiness. 

The fact that Rav Mattana allows the afternoon of Day 30 to count as the entire first day of the second naziriteship shows that *miktzat hayom* in Nazir is not just a lazy waiver of the remaining hours of the day. It is a powerful legal designation that can actively generate *kedushah* for a new term.

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ COMPARATIVE MECHANICS │ ├────────────────────────────────────┬────────────────────────────────────┤ │ AVEILUT │ NAZIR │ ├────────────────────────────────────┼────────────────────────────────────┤ │ • Negative/Restrictive State │ • Positive Consecration (Kedushah) │ │ • Leniency dissolves restrictions │ • Actively generates new status │ │ • Simple termination of state │ • Complex dual-directional split │ └────────────────────────────────────┴────────────────────────────────────┘

### 2. The Contrast: Zav and Zavah
Why do we not say *miktzat hayom ke-kulo* for a *zav* or *zavah* who must count seven clean days (*shiv'ah neki'im*) before immersion? 

If a *zavah* sees no blood on the morning of the seventh day, why can't she immerse immediately, using the rule of *miktzat hayom ke-kulo*?

The Gemara in Niddah addresses this:

```hebrew
"והנושא את המקצת ככולו... ברואה לא אמרינן, דכתיב 'וספרה לה שבעת ימים' - ימים שבכללן טהרה, ולא ימים שחציין טומאה וחציין טהרה."
```Niddah 33a

The Torah explicitly requires *temimot*—absolute, unblemished completeness—for the purification process of a *zavah* ("And she shall count for herself seven days..."). 

Because the verse writes "and she shall count," the days must be counted in their entirety as clean days. A day that is half-impure (the morning before she began counting, or a day on which she experienced a discharge) cannot conceptually be part of a "clean count."

This helps us understand why Rav Mattana’s view in Nazir is so bold. 

One might have thought that Nazir, which also uses the word "completion" (*until the days are complete*), should require *temimot* like a *zavah*. 

Rav Mattana’s *chiddush* is that unlike *zavah*, where impurity physically contradicts cleanness, the transition from Naziriteship A to Naziriteship B does not contain any contradictory physical state. Both are states of holiness. 

Therefore, we do not require *temimot* in the sense of absolute separation. We allow the two terms to touch and overlap on the transition day.

---

## Psak/Practice

### 1. Codification in the Shulchan Aruch
While the Shulchan Aruch does not have a dedicated volume for the laws of Temple-era naziriteship, the meta-principles of our sugya are codified in **Yoreh Deah** regarding the laws of mourning (*Aveilut*), which directly inherit the talmudic mechanics of Nazir 6a.

```hebrew
"ביום שביעי של אבלות, אחר שבאו מנחמים אצלו, מותר בכל הדברים שאסור בהם תוך שבעה, דאמרינן מקצת היום ככולו."
```Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 395:1

The Shulchan Aruch rules that on the seventh day, immediately after the comforters leave (which represents "part of the day"), the mourner is permitted to resume normal activities. 

The Rama (ad loc.) adds that this applies to the 30th day as well:

```hebrew
"וכן ביום שלשים, אמרינן מקצת היום ככולו, וסתם אבלות שלשים יום..."

Here we see the direct linguistic and conceptual footprint of Rav Mattana’s setam nezirut sheloshim yom mapped onto setam aveilut sheloshim yom. The halakha default for both is 30 days, and both utilize miktzat hayom to terminate the state on the morning of the final day.

2. Meta-Psak Heuristic: "Miktzat Hayom" in Modern Halakha

How does this sugya influence modern halakhic decision-making? The conceptual split of lekhan u-lekhan serves as a primary precedent for resolving overlapping time-bound obligations.

• Sefirat HaOmer: Why do we not say miktzat hayom ke-kulo to permit counting Sefirat HaOmer during the day if one forgot at night?
  • The Poskim (citing the principle of temimot, "seven complete weeks") rule that like zavah, the mitzvah of counting requires the entire day to be encapsulated by the count. Thus, miktzat hayom is excluded.
• Yom Tov Sheni shel Galuyot: Can one perform work on the afternoon of the second day of Yom Tov if they are returning to Eretz Yisrael? The discussion of how a day's halakhic identity shifts mid-day often draws on the lekhan u-lekhan mechanics of Nazir 6a.

---

Takeaway

The debate between Rav Mattana and Bar Padda reveals that halakhic time is not merely a physical backdrop of rigid calendar boxes, but a dynamic canvas shaped by human vows and divine decrees. Through miktzat hayom ke-kulo, the Torah grants us the extraordinary power to compress, stretch, and overlap consecrated time, proving that in the realm of holiness, qualitative dedication always overrides quantitative duration.

---

[^1]: Mishnah Nazir 5b (which continues onto Nazir 6a). [^2]: Talmud Bavli, Nazir 6a. [^3]: Rashash on Nazir 6a:1, s.v. Rashi d.h. A"l B"P. [^4]: Rashi on Nazir 6a:2:1, s.v. Amar lach Bar Padda. [^5]: Tosafot on Nazir 6a:3:1, s.v. Ve-lirv Mattana kashya seifa. [^6]: Shita Mekubetzet on Nazir 6a:1, s.v. Ima seifa. [^7]: Keren Orah on Nazir 6a, s.v. U-leriv Mattana kashya seifa. [^8]: Tzofnat Paneach, Hilkhot Nezirut, Chapter 3.