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Daf A Week · Expert – Beit Midrash Analysis · Deep-Dive

Nedarim 55

Deep-DiveExpert – Beit Midrash AnalysisNovember 13, 2025

Sugya Map

This sugya on Nedarim 55a delves into the intricate definitions of various agricultural terms when used in the context of nedarim (vows), particularly focusing on dagan (grain) and tevua (produce/crop). The core tension lies between interpreting these terms according to their narrow, scriptural definitions versus their broader, everyday colloquial usage (lashon bnei adam).

Core Issue

The central question is the scope of a neder when one forbids oneself from "dagan" or "tevua."

  • What constitutes dagan? Rabbi Meir posits a broad definition: anything that is "piled" (midgan), including dry cowpea. The Rabbis limit it to the ḥameshet minim (five species of grain).
  • What constitutes tevua? Rabbi Meir initially distinguishes dagan from tevua, stating that tevua is only the five species. The Gemara later brings a consensus that tevua is indeed limited to the five species.
  • What constitutes alalta (crop/profit)? This term is introduced in a practical she'elah from Rava, leading to a debate about its scope, extending even to non-agricultural profits.
  • How does the noder's intent affect the vow? Rabbi Yehuda introduces the principle of Kol Al Pi Ha'Noder, emphasizing the specific context and intent of the vower.

Nafka Minas (Practical Implications)

  1. Scope of Prohibition: Determines precisely which foodstuffs are forbidden when a person makes a vow using terms like dagan, tevua, yevul ha'shanah (produce of the year), tzimchei karka (growths of the ground), or giddulim. For instance, if one vows "from dagan," does it include rice or dry legumes?
  2. Linguistic Interpretation in Halakha: The sugya serves as a paradigm for how Chazal navigate the interpretation of terms used in legal contexts, balancing lashon Torah with lashon bnei adam.
  3. Blessings on Food: The discussion on truffles and mushrooms (kimhin u'fitriyot) directly impacts the bracha rishona recited over them, distinguishing between "growth from the ground" (gidulo min ha'aretz) and "drawing sustenance from the ground" (yonek min ha'aretz).
  4. Shabbat Laws: The later Mishnah and Baraita on the definition of beged (garment) for nedarim parallels halachot of hotza'ah (carrying) on Shabbat, where an item's status as a "garment" vs. a "burden" is critical.
  5. Ethical Conduct: The aggadic interlude between Rava and Rav Yosef regarding "Matana, Nahaliel, Bamot" highlights the importance of humility in Torah scholarship and the consequences of arrogance.

Primary Sources

  • Mishnah Nedarim 55a: The primary text initiating the debate on dagan and tevua, and later introducing R. Yehuda's principle regarding the noder's intent and the definition of beged.
  • Gemara Nedarim 55a-b: Expands on the Mishnah's definitions, introduces the term alalta, brings proofs and refutations from Tanakh, and includes the aggadic narrative.
  • Divrei HaYamim II 31:5: "וְכִפְרֹץ הַדָּבָר הִרְבּוּ בְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל דָּגָן תִּירוֹשׁ וְיִצְהָר וּדְבַשׁ וְכֹל תְּבוּאַת הַשָּׂדֶה" (II Chronicles 31:5). Cited by Rav Yosef to challenge R. Meir's definition of dagan.
  • Bamidbar 21:18-20: "וּמִמַּתָּנָה נַחֲלִיאֵל וּמִנַּחֲלִיאֵל בָּמוֹת וּמִבָּמוֹת הַגַּיְא וְרֹאשׁ הַפִּסְגָּה וְנִשְׁקָפָה עַל פְּנֵי הַיְשִׁימֹן" (Numbers 21:18-20). The biblical verses interpreted by Rava in his teshuva to Rav Yosef.
  • Yeshayahu 40:4: "כָּל גֶּיא יִנָּשֵׂא וְכָל הַר וְגִבְעָה יִשְׁפָּלוּ וְהָיָה הֶעָקֹב לְמִישׁוֹר וְהָרְכָסִים לְבִקְעָה" (Isaiah 40:4). Cited by Rava as a counter-point.
  • Mishnah Berakhot 40b: "על דבר שאין גידולו מן הארץ אומר שהכל נהיה בדברו." (Mishnah Berakhot 40b). Cited to resolve a contradiction regarding the bracha on truffles and mushrooms.

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Text Snapshot

The sugya opens by immediately presenting a fundamental machloket concerning the scope of a vow.

Mishnah Nedarim 55a

הנודר מן הדגן אסור בפול המצרי יבש, דברי רבי מאיר. וחכמים אומרים: אינו אסור אלא מחמשת המינין. רבי מאיר אומר: הנודר מן התבואה אינו אסור אלא מחמשת המינין. אבל הנודר מן הדגן, אסור בכל מידגן, ומותר בפירות האילן וירקות.

For one who vows that grain [dagan] is forbidden to him, it is prohibited to eat the dry cowpea, because, like grain, its final stage of production involves being placed in a pile; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: It is prohibited for him to partake of only the five species of grain: Wheat, barley, oats, spelt, and rye, as that is the connotation of the term dagan in the Torah. Rabbi Meir says: For one who vows that grain is forbidden to him, and therefore he will refrain from eating grain [tevua], it is prohibited for him to eat from only the five species of grain. However, for one who vows that grain is forbidden to him, and therefore he will refrain from eating grain [dagan], it is prohibited to eat all produce whose final stage of production involves being placed in a pile, e.g., dry cowpea, and it is permitted for him to eat fruits of the tree and vegetables.

  • Dikduk/Leshon Nuance: The Mishnah presents Rabbi Meir's view in two parts. First, it states his view that dagan includes dry cowpea, contrasting with the Rabbis. Then, it returns to Rabbi Meir's opinion, explicitly distinguishing tevua (narrowly defined as five species) from dagan (broadly defined as "כל מידגן" – anything that is piled). This double articulation of R. Meir's view underscores his specific and consistent distinction between dagan and tevua. The term "מידגן" is key to R. Meir's interpretation, implying a process of piling or forming a goren (threshing floor heap).

Gemara Nedarim 55a

אי ה"ס דגן כל מידגן? מיתיבי רב יוסף: "וכיפרוץ הדבר הירבו בני ישראל דגן תירוש ויצהר ודבש וכל תבואת השדה" (דברי הימים ב' לא:ה). וכי תימא דגן כל מידגן, מאי "וכל תבואת השדה"? אביי אמר: לרבות פירות האילן וירקות.

The Gemara asks: Is this to say that according to Rabbi Meir, the term dagan means any produce that is harvested at one time and placed in a pile [midgan]? Rav Yosef raised an objection: After King Hezekiah called upon the people to give teruma and tithes properly, the verse states: “And as soon as the matter was publicized, the children of Israel gave in abundance the first fruits of dagan, wine, and oil, and honey, and of all the tevua of the field; and the tithe of all that they brought in abundance” (II Chronicles 31:5). And if you say that dagan means any produce that is placed in a pile, what is the meaning of the words “As soon as the matter was publicized, the children of Israel gave in abundance the first fruits of dagan…and of all the tevua of the field”? There is no need to list both dagan and all tevua of the field. Abaye said: Tevua comes to include fruits of the tree and vegetables, which they tithed although they are not included in dagan, as they are not harvested at one time and placed in a pile.

  • Dikduk/Leshon Nuance: Rav Yosef's challenge hinges on the perceived redundancy. If dagan is "כל מידגן" (all piled produce), then "כל תבואת השדה" (all produce of the field) seems superfluous. Abaye's terutz (resolution) distinguishes between what is midgan (piled, e.g., grains, legumes) and what is not (fruits, vegetables), thus preserving the distinct meaning of each term in the verse.

Later in the Gemara, the discussion shifts to alalta and then to an extensive baraita concerning dagan, yevul ha'shanah, tzimchei karka, and beged.

Baraita Nedarim 55a

הנודר מן הדגן אסור בפול המצרי יבש ומותר בלח. ומותר באורז, ובחילקא, ובתירגיז, ובטיסני. הנודר מן יבול השנה אסור בכל יבול השנה, ומותר בעזים ובטלאים ובחלב ובביצים ובאפרוחים. ואם אמר: גידולי השנה אסורין לי, אסור בכולם.

For one who vows that grain [dagan] is forbidden to him, it is prohibited to partake of the dry cowpea, and it is permitted for him to partake of fresh cowpea. And it is permitted for him to partake of rice, as well as of wheat kernels split into two parts [ḥilka], of wheat kernels crushed into three parts [targeis], and wheat kernels crushed into four parts [tisnei]. For one who vows that produce of the year is forbidden to him, it is prohibited to partake of all produce of the year that grew from the ground or on trees, and it is permitted for him to partake of goats, and of lambs, and of milk, and of eggs, and of chicks born that year, as they are not included in the category of produce. And if he said: Growths of the year are forbidden to me, it is prohibited for him to eat all of them.

  • Dikduk/Leshon Nuance: The baraita introduces further nuances for dagan (dry vs. fresh cowpea, processed grains, rice). Critically, it introduces the distinction between "יבול השנה" (produce of the year, which excludes animals and animal products) and "גידולי השנה" (growths of the year, which includes everything that "grows" in a broader sense, including animals). This highlights how subtle linguistic shifts in a vow can dramatically alter its scope.

Mishnah Berakhot 40b (as cited in Nedarim 55a)

על דבר שאין גידולו מן הארץ, אומר שהכל נהיה בדברו... ותניא: על המלח ועל הזמית ועל הכמהין ועל הפטריות, אומר שהכל נהיה בדברו.

And over a food item whose growth is not from the ground, one recites: By Whose word all things came to be. And it is taught in a baraita: Over salt and over brine [zamit], and over truffles and mushrooms, one recites: By Whose word all things came to be.

  • Dikduk/Leshon Nuance: This excerpt is crucial for the sugya's later resolution regarding truffles and mushrooms. The Gemara in Nedarim ultimately emends the Mishnah's phrase "אין גידולו מן הארץ" to "אינו יונק מן הארץ" (does not draw sustenance from the ground), demonstrating a critical distinction between origin and mode of sustenance. This grammatical and conceptual refinement is essential for reconciling the halachot.

Readings

The sugya on Nedarim 55a presents a rich tapestry of interpretation, particularly around the definitions of dagan and tevua. Rishonim and Acharonim meticulously dissect the nuances of the Mishnah and Gemara, often revealing underlying principles of halachic linguistics.

Rashi: The Nexus of "Piling" and Common Usage

Rashi's central contribution on Nedarim 55a is his crystal-clear articulation of Rabbi Meir's position regarding dagan and his explanation of the Rabbis' counter-argument. Rashi consistently anchors his understanding in the concept of lashon bnei adam (common parlance) versus lashon Torah (Torah's specific terminology).

  1. Rashi on Nedarim 55a s.v. אלא מחמשת מינין (But only from the five species): Rashi begins by unequivocally listing the "five species" of grain: wheat, barley, spelt, rye, and oats. This immediate definition sets the baseline for the narrow interpretation of dagan and tevua according to the Rabbis and the eventual halakha. For the Rabbis, when one vows "from dagan," the scope is precisely limited to these five. This is crucial because it indicates that, for the Rabbis, the term dagan in nedarim should be interpreted restrictively, likely adhering to its most specific, scriptural meaning. This contrasts sharply with Rabbi Meir's approach, which Rashi elaborates on next.
    Rashi on Nedarim 55a:1:1

  2. Rashi on Nedarim 55a s.v. רבי מאיר אומר בו' (Rabbi Meir says regarding it): Here, Rashi clarifies Rabbi Meir's nuanced distinction. He explains that when one vows "from tevua," even Rabbi Meir concedes that it refers only to the five species of grain. This agreement is significant because it implies a universal understanding of tevua as a narrower term. However, the crux of Rabbi Meir's chiddush (novel interpretation) lies in dagan. Rashi states: "אבל הנודר מן הדגן אסור בכל מין דמידגן משמע דבר שעושין ממנו כר ופול המצרי יבש עושין ממנו כרי ולהכי אסור" (But one who vows from dagan is forbidden from any species that is "piled," meaning something that is made into a heap, and dry cowpea is made into a heap, and therefore it is forbidden). Rashi highlights the root דג"ן as implying "מידגן," which means "to be piled up" or "to be made into a heap" (כר). This etymological connection forms the basis of Rabbi Meir's broad interpretation. For R. Meir, dagan is not merely a botanical classification but a descriptor of agricultural processing – anything that undergoes the process of being harvested and piled like grain on a threshing floor. This includes dry cowpea (פול המצרי יבש) because it shares this characteristic. The emphasis on "יבש" (dry) is critical, as fresh cowpea would be treated like a vegetable and not piled. Rashi thus paints Rabbi Meir as a proponent of interpreting vows according to a functional, common understanding of the term's root meaning, rather than a strictly botanical or scriptural one. This distinction between dagan (broad, functional) and tevua (narrow, conventional) is central to Rashi's understanding of the Mishnah.
    Rashi on Nedarim 55a:1:2

Tosafot: Reinforcing the "Piling" Criterion

Tosafot generally align with Rashi's interpretation of Rabbi Meir's view but often add layers of precision or address implicit questions. Their brief comment here solidifies the understanding of dagan as a process-oriented term.

  1. Tosafot on Nedarim 55a s.v. מתניתין אסור בפול המצרי (Mishnah: Is forbidden from dry cowpea): Tosafot reiterate Rashi's explanation, stating: "דכל מידי דאידגן שמעמידין אותו בכרי נקרא דגן" (for anything that is "piled," which is set up in a heap, is called dagan). This phrase, "כל מידי דאידגן," directly echoes R. Meir's "כל מידגן" from the Mishnah and reinforces the idea that the criterion for dagan is its processing method. By explicitly saying "שמעמידין אותו בכרי" (which they set up in a heap), Tosafot confirm that the physical act of piling is the defining characteristic for R. Meir's broader definition. While seemingly simple, this reinforcement is important. It confirms that the sugya's initial understanding of R. Meir is indeed rooted in this functional definition. It also serves as a foundational understanding against which later kushyot (objections) and terutzim (resolutions) regarding other items (like rice or processed wheat) will be measured. The implication is that if an item is treated like grain in terms of its post-harvest handling, R. Meir would include it in a neder on dagan.
    Tosafot on Nedarim 55a:1:1

Ran: Synthesizing the Linguistic Debate

The Ran (Rabbeinu Nissim ben Reuven Gerondi), a highly influential Rishon, often provides a more comprehensive and conceptually driven explanation, synthesizing earlier views and highlighting the underlying principles.

  1. Ran on Nedarim 55a s.v. מתני' הנודר מן הדגן אסור בפול המצרי יבש (Mishnah: One who vows from dagan is forbidden from dry cowpea): The Ran explicitly states that Rabbi Meir believes that "כיון דמידגן שעושין ממנו דגן סבירא ליה לר' מאיר דדגן מיקרי" (since it is midgan, from which they make dagan, R. Meir holds that it is called dagan). This phrase is significant because it draws a clear causal link: the act of midgan (piling/processing like grain) is what causes it to be classified as dagan. This is not merely a descriptive characteristic but a constitutive one for the term. The Ran then immediately identifies the core machloket (dispute) between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis: "וחכמים אומרים אינו אסור אלא מחמשת המינין והאי נודר ללשון תורה נתכוון ורבי מאיר סבר ללשון בני אדם נתכוון." (And the Rabbis say: it is forbidden only from the five species, and this vower intended [to use the term] according to the language of the Torah. And Rabbi Meir holds he intended [to use it] according to the language of people.) This is the critical conceptual distinction provided by the Ran. Rabbi Meir interprets dagan according to lashon bnei adam – how ordinary people would understand the term, which includes anything that functions like grain in terms of processing (i.e., being piled). The Rabbis, conversely, interpret dagan according to lashon Torah – how the term is used in the Torah, which is specifically for the five species of grain. This fundamental difference in interpretive methodology forms the backbone of the entire sugya regarding definitions in nedarim. The Ran’s clear articulation here provides the meta-halakhic framework for understanding not just this specific debate, but many others in nedarim where linguistic interpretation is paramount.
    Ran on Nedarim 55a:1:1

Rashba: Delving into Specific Inclusions and Exclusions

The Rashba (Rabbeinu Shlomo ben Avraham Aderet) often delves into the specifics of the baraita and the implications for various foodstuffs, challenging and refining the definitions. His analysis frequently grapples with apparent contradictions and offers sophisticated resolutions.

  1. Rashba on Nedarim 55a s.v. הנודר מן הדגן אסור בפול המצרי יבש (One who vows from dagan is forbidden from dry cowpea): The Rashba picks up on a crucial detail from the later baraita (Nedarim 55a) that states: "ומותר באורז בחילקא בטירגיז ובטיסני." (And it is permitted for rice, ḥilka, targeis, and tisnei). This presents a significant kushya for Rabbi Meir's "כל מידגן" principle. If dagan includes "anything piled," why would rice (which is piled like grain) and processed wheat products (ḥilka, targeis, tisnei, which are unequivocally derived from dagan and are also piled/stored) be permitted? The Rashba attempts to resolve this tension. He first suggests that the baraita's hetter (permission) for these items might be specific "לכוס, אבל לאפות לא" (for drinking/eating as whole grains, but not for baking into bread). This implies that a neder on dagan might target the substance in its form suitable for bread-making, not its more rudimentary or processed forms. This is a subtle yet powerful distinction, suggesting that the noder's intent could be refined by the typical use of the dagan. However, the Rashba then offers a more direct terutz: "הכא לא אתא לאשמועינן אלא מה שהוא בכלל המין ולא ענין איסורו" (The Mishnah here only comes to teach us what is included in the general category of the species, and not the specific matter of its prohibition). This is a meta-halakhic point about the scope of the Mishnah's teaching. The Mishnah might be defining the general linguistic scope of dagan (e.g., cowpea is like a grain because it's piled), while the baraita is detailing the specific halakhic exclusions for a vow. Even if something is generally "midgan," common usage for nedarim might still exclude certain items. He notes a textual variant in the baraita where orrez and the wheat products are described as "דגן מוחלק" (separated grain) or "מוחלט" (absolute grain). If "מוחלק," it means processed, which could be a reason for exclusion from "dagan" in its raw, piled state. This demonstrates the Rashba's rigorous approach to reconciling texts and his willingness to posit different levels of interpretation for a term depending on the context (general categorization vs. specific halakhic application in a vow).
    Rashba on Nedarim 55a:1

  2. Rashba on Nedarim 55a s.v. הא ד תניא הנודר מן התבואה (That which is taught: one who vows from tevua): The Rashba also addresses the Gemara's question regarding the baraita that states: "והכל מודים הנודר מן התבואה אינו אסור אלא מחמשת המינין" (And everyone agrees that one who vows from tevua is only forbidden from the five species). The Gemara asks: "Isn't that obvious?" The Rashba's discussion here would typically elaborate on the terutz given in the Gemara ("lest you say tevua means all items that grow from the ground, therefore the Tanna teaches us...") The Rashba would likely emphasize that despite the intuitive understanding, the Tanna finds it necessary to explicitly state this consensus to preempt a broader interpretation. This reinforces the principle that in nedarim, even seemingly obvious linguistic boundaries sometimes require explicit clarification, especially given the various interpretations possible for terms like dagan and tevua. It suggests a constant vigilance against over-extension of terms in vows, preferring a narrower interpretation unless explicitly stated or commonly understood otherwise.
    Rashba on Nedarim 55a:4

These Rishonim collectively illuminate the meticulous textual analysis and conceptual distinctions required to grapple with nedarim. They highlight the tension between strict linguistic adherence and common usage, a theme central to much of halakha.

Friction

The sugya presents several points of contention and nuanced interpretation. We will focus on two major areas of friction: the scope of "dagan" as defined by Rabbi Meir versus the baraita's exclusions, and the linguistic redundancy challenged by Rav Yosef from Divrei HaYamim.

Kushya 1: The Baraita's Hettera for Processed Grains and Rice Contradicting R. Meir's "כל מידגן"

  • The Kushya: The Mishnah records Rabbi Meir's position that one who vows "from dagan" is forbidden from "כל מידגן" (anything that is piled), citing dry cowpea as an example. This principle suggests a broad inclusion based on a functional characteristic (being piled for storage/processing). However, a baraita later in the sugya states: "הנודר מן הדגן אסור בפול המצרי יבש ומותר בלח. ומותר באורז, ובחילקא, ובתירגיז, ובטיסני." (One who vows from dagan is forbidden from dry cowpea but permitted from fresh. And permitted from rice, and from ḥilka, targeis, and tisnei [various processed wheat kernels]). The contradiction is glaring:

    1. Rice (orrez): Rice is a grain that is unequivocally harvested and piled. If "כל מידגן" is the criterion, rice should be forbidden according to Rabbi Meir. Yet the baraita permits it.
    2. Processed Wheat (ḥilka, targeis, tisnei): These are, by definition, forms of wheat – one of the ḥameshet minim (five species) of dagan. They are merely processed (split or crushed). Even if one argues that the neder is on the raw form, these processed forms are still derived from dagan and would typically be stored in piles or containers like grain. Permitting them seems to directly contradict both the specific and general interpretations of dagan. This appears to undermine the very foundation of Rabbi Meir's expansive definition of dagan as "כל מידגן."

  • Terutz 1: Rashba's Distinction: General Category vs. Specific Prohibition The Rashba (Nedarim 55a s.v. הנודר מן הדגן אסור בפול המצרי יבש) addresses this head-on. He suggests that the Mishnah, when presenting Rabbi Meir's view, is defining the general linguistic category of dagan – i.e., what types of produce share the characteristic of being "piled" like grain. In this general sense, dry cowpea is included because its handling resembles that of dagan. However, the baraita, according to the Rashba, is discussing the specific halakhic application of a neder on dagan. Even if an item generally falls under the category of "מידגן," the actual prohibition in a vow might be narrower, reflecting a more refined common understanding of "dagan" as a foodstuff. Thus, rice, while piled, might not be considered "dagan" in the common understanding of a vow (perhaps because it's not one of the five species, or has a distinct culinary identity). Similarly, processed wheat forms, while derived from dagan, might be excluded because a vow on "dagan" might implicitly refer to the whole grain, not its fragmented or altered states. The Rashba introduces the idea that "הכא לא אתא לאשמועינן אלא מה שהוא בכלל המין ולא ענין איסורו" (the Mishnah here only comes to teach us what is included in the general category of the species, and not the specific matter of its prohibition). This creates a critical hermeneutic distinction: a word's general semantic range might be broader than its specific halakhic scope in a particular context like nedarim.

  • Terutz 2: The Noder's Implicit Intent and the Nature of "Processing" This terutz focuses on the noder's implied intent, even within Rabbi Meir's framework of lashon bnei adam. While Rabbi Meir takes dagan broadly as "anything piled," this broadness might still be limited by the typical use or state of the item.

    1. Rice: Though piled, rice (אורז) is not one of the ḥameshet minim. It has a distinct identity in halakha (e.g., it doesn't become ḥametz). Perhaps lashon bnei adam for dagan implicitly excludes items that, while sharing a processing characteristic, are fundamentally distinct in their botanical and halakhic classification from the primary grains. The noder, even if speaking broadly, might not intend to include such items in a vow specifically on "dagan."
    2. Processed Wheat: Ḥilka, targeis, and tisnei are wheat kernels that have been split or crushed. A neder on "dagan" might refer to the whole grain in its usual form, or the raw product from the threshing floor. Once processed, it arguably changes its identity to "processed wheat product" rather than simply "dagan." Compare this to a vow "from fruit" – it might not include fruit preserves or juice, even though they are derived from fruit. The "piling" aspect might apply to the raw material, but once its form is altered, it falls outside the neder's scope, reflecting a common understanding that a vow on a general category might not extend to its derivatives.

  • Terutz 3: A Baraita Reflecting the Rabbis' View (or a nuanced R. Meir) A simpler terutz might suggest that the baraita does not necessarily reflect Rabbi Meir's view in its entirety. The baraita might be presenting the Rabbis' position, or a more widely accepted halakha, even if the initial Mishnah highlighted Rabbi Meir's unique interpretation. If the baraita aligns with the Rabbis' view that dagan is only the five species, then permitting rice and processed wheat makes perfect sense, as they are not the ḥameshet minim in their direct form or are not considered dagan by the Rabbis at all (in the case of rice). Alternatively, even within Rabbi Meir's camp, the baraita could represent a highly nuanced understanding. While "כל מידגן" is the general rule, there might be specific, commonly understood exclusions or limitations. The baraita might be clarifying these specific halachot that are accepted even by Rabbi Meir, perhaps because rice and processed wheat, despite their "piled" nature, are not considered "dagan" in the most direct and common sense, which is the ultimate arbiter for nedarim for Rabbi Meir. This terutz leans on the idea that lashon bnei adam is not perfectly logical or consistently applied in all edge cases.

Kushya 2: Rav Yosef's Redundancy Challenge from Divrei HaYamim

  • The Kushya: Rav Yosef raises an objection to Rabbi Meir's definition of dagan from the verse in Divrei HaYamim II 31:5: "וְכִפְרֹץ הַדָּבָר הִרְבּוּ בְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל דָּגָן תִּירוֹשׁ וְיִצְהָר וּדְבַשׁ וְכֹל תְּבוּאַת הַשָּׂדֶה" ("And as soon as the matter was publicized, the children of Israel gave in abundance the first fruits of dagan, wine, and oil, and honey, and of all the tevua of the field"). Rav Yosef argues: "וכי תימא דגן כל מידגן, מאי 'וכל תבואת השדה'?" (And if you say dagan means any produce that is placed in a pile, what is the meaning of "and of all the tevua of the field"?). If dagan is understood broadly as "all piled produce" (as per Rabbi Meir), then "all tevua of the field" would seem redundant, as most field produce that is tithed would already be covered by the expansive dagan. The Torah is not redundant in its language, especially in listing categories for terumot and ma'aserot. This challenges the very premise of Rabbi Meir's broad definition.

  • Terutz 1: Abaye's Resolution – Tevua Includes Fruits and Vegetables Abaye provides the most direct and explicit terutz in the Gemara: "לרבות פירות האילן וירקות" (To include fruits of the tree and vegetables). This resolution works by setting boundaries for dagan and tevua ha'sadeh. According to Abaye, dagan (even if interpreted broadly by R. Meir as "כל מידגן") only includes field crops that are harvested and piled, such as grains and legumes. It would not include tree fruits or vegetables, as these are typically not "piled" in the same manner on a threshing floor (goren). Therefore, the phrase "כל תבואת השדה" is not redundant; it serves to encompass those categories of produce – tree fruits and vegetables – that are tithed but fall outside the scope of dagan. This interpretation preserves a distinct and necessary role for both terms in the biblical verse, thus resolving Rav Yosef's kushya.

  • Terutz 2: Rava's Distinction – Tevua vs. Tevua HaSadeh Later in the sugya, Rava offers a distinct interpretation: "תבואה לחוד, ותבואת השדה לחוד" (Tevua is discrete, and tevua of the field is discrete). According to Rava, the simple term tevua (as discussed in the Mishnah, where everyone agrees it's the five species) is indeed narrow. However, tevua ha'sadeh ("produce of the field") is a broader, all-encompassing term that refers to all crops that grow in the field, including dagan (in any interpretation) and other field crops that might not fall under dagan (e.g., various legumes or vegetables that are not "piled" in the way dagan is, or simply not considered dagan). This terutz implies a hierarchy: dagan is a specific, prominent category of field produce (listed first due to its importance), and "כל תבואת השדה" is a catch-all phrase to ensure that every type of field produce subject to tithing is included, regardless of whether it was explicitly mentioned or falls under a specific definition of dagan. This is a common biblical rhetorical device where specific examples are given before a general, comprehensive category. Thus, the phrase is not redundant but expansive.

  • Terutz 3: Enumeration of Important Categories and a General Catch-All This terutz builds on Rava's idea but frames it as a stylistic feature of biblical enumeration. The verse lists several key agricultural products for tithing: dagan (grain), tirosh (wine, from grapes), yitzhar (oil, from olives), and dvash (honey, often referring to date honey, a fruit product). These are the most significant and common items for tithing. After listing these prominent categories, the verse adds "וְכֹל תְּבוּאַת הַשָּׂדֶה" (and all produce of the field) as a comprehensive, general clause. This clause serves to ensure that any other produce from the field, whether or not it neatly fits into the categories of dagan, wine, oil, or honey, is also included for tithes. This avoids any ambiguity or omission. Under this interpretation, "dagan" would refer to its primary, narrow meaning (the five species), and "all tevua of the field" would encompass everything else that grows in the field, including the remaining field crops (legumes, vegetables) and potentially even the five species themselves if not already covered, ensuring the mitzvah of tithing is comprehensive. This terutz is consistent with the Rabbis' initial narrow definition of dagan and allows for "tevua ha'sadeh" to function as a broad, inclusive term without redundancy.

These kushyot and terutzim demonstrate the rigorous analysis applied to biblical and Mishnaic texts, where every word choice and perceived redundancy is meticulously examined to extract precise halakhic meaning.

Intertext

The sugya on Nedarim 55a, while focused on the definitions of agricultural terms in vows, reverberates through various other areas of halakha and Jewish thought, illustrating how foundational linguistic and conceptual distinctions are applied across the breadth of Jewish literature.

1. Berakhot 40b: The Distinction of Growth and Sustenance for Brachot

The sugya in Nedarim 55a directly references Mishnah Berakhot 40b regarding the bracha over truffles and mushrooms (kimhin u'fitriyot). This cross-reference is critical for understanding how Chazal distinguish between physical origin and mode of sustenance, a distinction with profound halakhic implications.

Nedarim 55a: The baraita states that one who vows on "produce of the land" (yevul ha'aretz) is permitted truffles and mushrooms, but if he vows on "growths of the ground" (giddulim shel karka), they are forbidden. The Gemara then brings a contradiction from M. Berakhot 40b, which states that for "an item whose growth is not from the ground" (davar she'ein gidulo min ha'aretz), one recites Shehakol. A baraita there lists truffles and mushrooms as examples for Shehakol. The Gemara resolves this by emending the Mishnah's text to "an item that does not draw sustenance from the ground" (eino yonek min ha'aretz). Connection: This emendation highlights a crucial meta-halakhic principle: the same term ("growth from the ground") can have different meanings depending on the halakhic context. For nedarim, "growths of the ground" might focus on the item's physical origin (they visibly emerge from the ground), leading to their prohibition. However, for brachot, the focus shifts to the source of sustenance. Since truffles and mushrooms are believed to draw sustenance from the air or other non-earthly sources (or at least not in the same way as plants), they are classified differently for brachot. Rambam's Codification: The Rambam codifies this distinction in Hilchot Berachot 8:3, stating that on truffles and mushrooms, one recites Shehakol "מפני שאין יונקים מן הארץ" (because they do not draw sustenance from the ground). This demonstrates the enduring impact of this subtle linguistic and scientific distinction on practical halakha.
Mishneh Torah, Blessings 8:3
Nedarim 55a
Berakhot 40b

2. Mishnah Rosh Hashanah 1:1: The Calendar for Vows

While not explicitly cited on Nedarim 55a itself, the Rosh's commentary on a later Mishnah (Nedarim 8:2) about vows over time references the Mishnah in Rosh Hashanah 1:1. This connection elucidates how time-bound vows are interpreted, paralleling the sugya's discussion of material terms.

Mishnah Rosh Hashanah 1:1: "באחד בתשרי ראש השנה לירקות ולמעשרות ולנדרים" (On the first of Tishrei is the New Year for vegetables, for tithes, and for vows). Gemara Rosh Hashanah 12a: The Gemara asks, "ולנדרים למאי הלכתא?" (For vows, for what halakha is this?). It answers: "לכדתניא המודר הנאה מחבירו לשנה מונה שנים עשר חדש מיום ליום ואם אמר שנה זו אפילו לא עמד אלא עשרים ותשעה באלול עלתה לו שנה" (One who vows benefit from his fellow for "a year" counts twelve months from day to day. But if he said "this year," even if only the 29th of Elul remained, it counts as a full year). Connection: This directly relates to the baraita in Nedarim 55a which discusses "יבול השנה" (produce of the year) and "גידולי השנה" (growths of the year). Just as the sugya meticulously defines what "dagan" or "growths" include, the sugya in Rosh Hashanah (and the Rosh's commentary on Nedarim) defines what "year" means in the context of a vow. The distinction between "לשנה" (for a year – 12 months from the vow) and "שנה זו" (this year – until the end of the current calendar year, Tishrei) is a classic example of lashon bnei adam vs. strict temporal calculation. It underscores the principle that the noder's precise language is paramount, whether for material objects or periods of time.
Rosh Hashanah 12a
Rosh on Nedarim 8:2:1

3. Shemot 22:28: Dagan in the Context of Terumot and Ma'aserot

The verse from Divrei HaYamim (II Chron. 31:5) cited by Rav Yosef is part of a broader scriptural tradition linking dagan, wine, and oil to agricultural offerings. A foundational verse for terumot and ma'aserot is found in Parshat Mishpatim.

Shemot 22:28: "מְלֵאָתְךָ וְדִמְעֲךָ לֹא תְאַחֵר" (Your first fruit and your juice you shall not delay). Gemara Pesachim 6a (Rashi): Rashi on Pesachim 6a explains "מְלֵאָתְךָ" (your first fruit) as referring to dagan (grain), and "וְדִמְעֲךָ" (your juice) as referring to tirosh (wine) and yitzhar (oil). Connection: This verse, and its traditional interpretation, demonstrates that dagan is consistently grouped with wine and oil as the primary agricultural products designated for terumot and ma'aserot in the Torah. This provides a strong basis for the Rabbis' view in Nedarim 55a that dagan refers to the ḥameshet minim. The Torah's consistent usage of dagan in the context of specific agricultural offerings suggests a precise, narrow definition in lashon Torah, which stands in contrast to Rabbi Meir's broader lashon bnei adam interpretation of "כל מידגן." The Divrei HaYamim verse (dagan, wine, oil... and all tevua of the field) fits perfectly into this established scriptural pattern, where dagan represents the staple grains.
Shemot 22:28
Rashi on Pesachim 6a:1:1

4. Mishnah Eruvin 10:4: "Garment" in Shabbat Law

The latter part of Nedarim 55a discusses the definition of "garment" (beged) for vows, which finds a striking parallel in the halachot of hotza'ah (carrying) on Shabbat.

Mishnah Nedarim 55a: "הנודר מן הבגד מותר בשק ובסדין ובחמילה... ר' יהודה אומר: הכל לפי המדיר." (One who vows from a garment is permitted sackcloth, a sheet, and a coarse curtain... Rabbi Yehuda says: Everything is according to the one who vows). The Gemara brings a baraita further listing specific items permitted/forbidden. Mishnah Eruvin 10:4: "היו עליו עשר חלוקות בין עשר מדינות הרי זה אינו מוציא. אבל אם יש עליו עשרה כלילונות אינו מוציא. אלא אם כן מוציא כדרך שהוא לובש בשבת." (If one had ten shirts, whether from ten lands, he does not carry out. But if he has ten special cloaks, he does not carry out unless he wears them in the manner he wears them on Shabbat). Gemara Nedarim 55b (Baraita): "אדם יוצא בשק עב ובסגוס ובסדין ובחמילה מפני הגשמים... אבל לא בקופא ולא בסלא ולא במחצלת מפני הגשמים." (One may go out with a thick sackcloth, a coarse woolen blanket, a sheet, or a coarse curtain from the rain... but not with a box, basket, or mat from the rain). This baraita explicitly states that "shepherds may go out in sackcloth," and clarifies that "all people" may do so, as "the Sages spoke in the present," referring to prevalent situations. Connection: Both sugyot grapple with the definition of "garment" but for different halakhic purposes. In nedarim, it's about the noder's intent and the common understanding of beged in the context of a vow. In hotza'ah on Shabbat, it's about whether an item is considered a "burden" (masa) or a "garment" (malbush), which depends on derech levisha (the normal manner of wearing). The baraita in Nedarim 55b directly bridges these two areas by stating that sackcloth, etc., are considered garments for protection from rain, even though they might not be typical attire. The emphasis on "דרך לבישה" (manner of wearing) and lashon bnei adam (common usage, like shepherds wearing sackcloth) is a unifying principle across these seemingly disparate halachot. It demonstrates that practical common usage and context are crucial factors in defining terms in halakha.
Eruvin 10:4
Nedarim 55b

5. Bamidbar 21:18-20 & Yeshayahu 40:4: Humility and Torah Scholarship

This section, while aggadic, is integral to the sugya's flow, occurring in the midst of the halakhic discourse. It serves as a moral interlude, highlighting the personal attributes necessary for true Torah scholarship.

Bamidbar 21:18-20: "וּמִמַּתָּנָה נַחֲלִיאֵל וּמִנַּחֲלִיאֵל בָּמוֹת וּמִבָּמוֹת הַגַּיְא וְרֹאשׁ הַפִּסְגָּה וְנִשְׁקָפָה עַל פְּנֵי הַיְשִׁימֹן" (And from Mattana Nahaliel, and from Nahaliel Bamot, and from Bamot the valley, and the top of Pisgah, which looks over the face of the wasteland). Yeshayahu 40:4: "כָּל גֶּיא יִנָּשֵׂא וְכָל הַר וְגִבְעָה יִשְׁפָּלוּ" (Every valley shall be lifted, and every mountain and hill shall be made low). Connection: This aggadic discussion between Rava and Rav Yosef, prompted by Rav Yosef's anger at Rava's perceived arrogance, underscores the ethical dimension of Torah learning. Rava's interpretation of the verses – that one must make oneself "like a wilderness" to receive Torah as a "gift" (mattana), which then becomes an "inheritance" (nahaliel) leading to "greatness" (bamot), but arrogance leads to degradation ("the valley") – is a powerful moral lesson. The verse from Isaiah serves as the teshuva (repentance) for arrogance, that humility leads back to elevation. Intertextual Significance: This aggada is often cited in discussions of middot (character traits) for Torah scholars. It teaches that intellectual prowess alone is insufficient; it must be tempered with humility and respect for teachers and colleagues. The placement of this aggada within a complex halakhic sugya suggests that even the most rigorous legal analysis is ultimately subservient to the moral and spiritual development of the talmid ḥacham. It subtly reminds the reader that the interpretation of halakha is not merely an academic exercise but a spiritual endeavor demanding appropriate conduct.
Nedarim 55b

These intertextual connections demonstrate the holistic nature of Talmudic discourse, where seemingly disparate topics are interwoven by shared principles, linguistic nuances, and overarching ethical considerations.

Psak/Practice

The sugya on Nedarim 55a, with its detailed linguistic analyses and debates, forms a cornerstone for the halachot of nedarim and influences other areas of Jewish law. The practical psak (ruling) largely follows the consensus of the Rabbis and later authorities, emphasizing the primacy of common usage balanced with specific textual traditions.

1. Defining "Dagan" and "Tevua" in Nedarim

The core machloket between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis regarding dagan is resolved in favor of the Rabbis.

  • Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 217:1: "הנודר מן הדגן, אינו אסור אלא מחמשת המינין." (One who vows from dagan is only forbidden from the five species.) This explicitly rejects Rabbi Meir's broader definition of "כל מידגן" (anything piled) and limits dagan to wheat, barley, oats, spelt, and rye.
  • Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 217:1: "הנודר מן התבואה, אינו אסור אלא מחמשת המינין." (One who vows from tevua is only forbidden from the five species.) This reflects the consensus stated in the Gemara by Rabbi Yochanan and the baraita. Practical Impact: For a person making a vow today, if they say "I vow from dagan" or "I vow from tevua," the scope of the prohibition is narrow, covering only the five species of grain. This means rice, dry cowpea, and other "piled" produce would be permitted, unless specifically included in the vow.

2. Defining "Alalta" (Crop/Profit)

The sugya's discussion on alalta (profits or yield) also has direct halachic implications.

  • Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 217:1: "הנודר מן העללתא, אסור מכל מילי דגדלי בארעא." (One who vows from alalta is forbidden from everything that grows from the ground.) This follows Abaye's broader interpretation, which includes all crops.
  • Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 217:2: The Shulchan Aruch further states that if one vows from alalta and intended to include profits from houses and boats, then these are also forbidden. This incorporates Rava's later safek and the broader understanding of alalta as encompassing all forms of yield or profit, particularly if the noder's intent is explicit or implied by context. Practical Impact: The term alalta is interpreted broadly, encompassing not just agricultural produce but potentially any form of financial gain, depending heavily on the noder's intent. This highlights the expansive power of a vow when using a general term for "profit."

3. The Principle of Kol Al Pi Ha'Noder (Everything According to the Vower's Intent)

Rabbi Yehuda's principle is a foundational heuristic for all nedarim.

  • Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 217:1: "כל הנדרים הולכים אחר לשון בני אדם וכוונת הנודר." (All vows follow the language of people and the intent of the noder.) This is a universal rule. While the default is lashon bnei adam (common usage), if the noder explicitly clarifies their intent, that intent is paramount.
    • For example, if one says, "I vow from dagan, and by dagan I mean all piled produce, including rice and cowpea," then even though halakha generally restricts dagan to the five species, their specific intent would broaden the vow. The examples of wool/linen in the Mishnah clearly illustrate this: if one vows from wool because it caused discomfort while wearing it, only wearing is forbidden; if because it was a burden while carrying it, only carrying is forbidden. Practical Impact: This principle places significant emphasis on the subjective element of a vow. When in doubt, a hakham would first inquire about the noder's specific intention and the context of the vow.

4. Bracha on Truffles and Mushrooms

The sugya's resolution regarding truffles and mushrooms has a direct impact on Hilchot Brachot.

  • Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 203:3: "על כמהין ופטריות, מברך שהכל נהיה בדברו, מפני שאינן יונקין מן הארץ." (Over truffles and mushrooms, one recites Shehakol Nihya Bidvaro, because they do not draw sustenance from the ground.) This precisely codifies the Gemara's emendation from Berakhot 40b. Practical Impact: The bracha on truffles and mushrooms is Shehakol, distinguishing them from other produce that grows from the ground and receives Borei Pri Ha'adamah. This is a clear instance where a nuanced biological/botanical distinction, refined by Chazal, directly translates into a practical halakha.

Meta-Psak Heuristics

  1. Linguistic Precision: The sugya is a masterclass in how slight variations in terminology (dagan vs. tevua, yevul ha'shanah vs. giddulim shel shanah, gidulo min ha'aretz vs. yonek min ha'aretz) can lead to dramatically different halakhic outcomes. This teaches us to be incredibly precise in our language, especially in legal contexts.
  2. Contextual Interpretation: The meaning of a term is not static but fluid, depending on the halakhic context (e.g., nedarim vs. brachot vs. terumot). A word can have a general meaning, a lashon Torah meaning, and a lashon bnei adam meaning, and the halakha must discern which applies.
  3. Default Narrowness in Vows: Generally, in nedarim, when there is a dispute or ambiguity, the tendency is to interpret the vow narrowly, to minimize the scope of the prohibition (le'hakel), unless the noder's intent or common usage clearly indicates a broader scope. This aligns with the principle of lav davka (not necessarily), meaning a person's general statement might not be intended literally in every detail.

The sugya on Nedarim 55a is a profound exploration of legal interpretation, demonstrating the meticulous care Chazal employed to define terms, balance tradition with contemporary usage, and ultimately guide practical halakha.

Takeaway

The sugya on Nedarim 55a masterfully navigates the intricate relationship between linguistic precision, common usage (lashon bnei adam), scriptural terminology (lashon Torah), and the noder's intent, demonstrating how these factors shape the halakhic scope of vows and other areas like brachot and Shabbat. It is a testament to the Talmud's rigorous approach to defining terms, ultimately prioritizing clarity and the vower's true meaning.

Citations

Nedarim 56
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