Nedarim 60

Sugya Map

• Issue: The interplay between prohibitions (like vows and terumah) and their "growths" (gidulin), specifically concerning whether these growths can nullify or transmit the prohibition, and how temporal vows are interpreted.
• Nafka Mina(s):
  • The permissibility of consuming produce derived from terumah or ma'aser sheni.
  • The duration and scope of personal vows (neder) related to food and drink, impacting daily life and observance.
  • Defining the precise temporal boundaries of vows tied to calendar units (day, week, month, year).
  • The rabbinic framework for interpreting potentially ambiguous vow language.
• Primary Sources:
  • Nedarim 60a (Mishna and Gemara).
  • Nedarim 63a (for intertextual comparison).
  • Tanakh (implied through the concept of offerings and impurity).
  • Shulchan Aruch (implied for psak).

Text Snapshot

"Wine is forbidden to me as if it were an offering [konam], and for that reason I will not taste it today, he is prohibited from drinking wine only until nightfall." (Nedarim 60a)

• Leshon Nuance: The phrase "as if it were an offering" (כאילו היה קדש) is a common formulation for neder. The key here is "today" (היום). The Gemara grapples with the precise endpoint of "today."
• Dikduk Nuance: The structure implies a direct equivalence: vow = konam = prohibition. The temporal limitation "today" is then juxtaposed with the duration of konam (which implies a more significant prohibition).

"We are speaking of the growths of growths." (Nedarim 60a)

• Leshon Nuance: גידולי גידולין (gidulei gidulin) – a doubled genitive, indicating a secondary or tertiary growth.
• Dikduk Nuance: This phrase is a technical term in agricultural halakha, distinguishing direct produce from that which grows from existing produce.

"but if he said that wine is forbidden to him for one day, he is prohibited from drinking wine from the day he took the vow to the same time on the following day." (Nedarim 60a)

• Leshon Nuance: "For one day" (יום אחד) is contrasted with "today" (היום). The implication is a full 24-hour cycle.
• Dikduk Nuance: The prepositional phrase "from... to..." (מ... עד...) explicitly defines the temporal span.

Readings

Rashi: The Nature of Growths and Prohibitions

Rashi, in his commentary on Nedarim 60a, addresses the initial seeming contradiction regarding terumah growths. He explains:

"Terumah - that permitted growths do not elevate the prohibition."¹ (תרגום: דאין גידולי היתר מעלין את האיסור)

This clarifies the core principle: if something is prohibited (terumah), its direct growths (gidulei terumah) retain that prohibition. The initial mishna’s premise is that these growths don't neutralize the prohibition. The Gemara's subsequent resolution, "We are speaking of the growths of growths," is then elucidated by Rashi:

"In growths of growths we are speaking - as if to say the growths of a [produce] onion of terumah which was planted and its growths grew beyond its root, that they become growths of growths."² (תרגום: בגידולי גידולין קאמר - דהכי קאמר גידולי בצל של תרומה שנטעה ורבו גידוליו על עיקרו דהוו להו גידולי גידולין)

This highlights a crucial distinction: direct growths are problematic, but secondary growths (gidulei gidulin) can be permissible. The specific example of an onion (batzal) is significant because its "seeds" (or rather, its propagation method) don't cease, meaning it can produce successive generations of growth from the same original bulb.

Rashi further clarifies the status of these gidulei gidulin:

"We learned this too: Growths of growths of terumah are non-sacred produce."³ (תרגום: תנינא ובו' - דגידולי גידולין של תרומה חולין)

This confirms that gidulei gidulin are generally permitted, even when originating from terumah. He then adds a critical nuance:

"Even in a matter whose seeds do not cease - like an onion, growths of growths are permitted."⁴ (תרגום: אפי' בדבר שאין זרעו כלה - כגון בצל גידולי גידולין מותר)

This reinforces that the rule of gidulei gidulin being permitted applies even to produce that can continuously propagate, where one might expect the prohibition to be more pervasive. The key is the distinction between direct and indirect growth.

Tosafot: The Condition of "Majority" and Ambiguity

Tosafot engages with the concept of "majority" (rov) as a potential factor in permitting terumah produce and offers a deeper analysis of the gidulei gidulin distinction:

"In growths of growths - like that of an onion itself, which is growths of terumah."⁵ (תרגום: בגידולי גידולין - כהך דבצל גופיה הוי גידולין של תרומה)

Tosafot begins by linking the onion example to the terumah context, suggesting that the gidulei gidulin of an onion, even if it originates from terumah, are still considered gidulei gidulin.

They then tackle a potential ambiguity in the Gemara's reasoning:

"It is written: 'The growths of growths are forbidden.' This means that when the growths of growths did not increase beyond the root. But here, when they increased, therefore the growths elevate the root, and it is permitted. And in books it is written: 'The increase of the growths of the growths are permitted if they exceeded its primary part.' This is what Rabbi Chanina taught, that the growths exceeded its root."⁶ (תרגום: ה"ג התם דלא רבו הכא דרבו - פירוש הא דאמר גידולי גידולין אסורין גבי טבל היינו כל כמה דלא רבו גידולי גידולין על העיקר אבל הכא ברבו הלכך מבטלי גידולין לעיקר ובספרים כתוב ריבויא דרבו גידולין על עיקרו מותר קמ"ל ויש לפרש כדפרישית דמלתא דרבי חנינא מיירי דרבו גידולין על עיקרו)

This passage is complex, but the core idea is that the permissibility of gidulei gidulin might depend on whether they have significantly "grown beyond" or "increased" (רבו) their original part or root. If the secondary growth is substantial, it might be seen as having a degree of independence, potentially nullifying the prohibition of the original part. This introduces a quantitative element – the majority or excess of the secondary growth. Tosafot seems to be harmonizing different statements by positing that the general prohibition on gidulei gidulin (in the context of tevel) applies when they are not a clear majority or excess, whereas in cases where they do exceed the original, they might be permitted.

Finally, Tosafot reiterates the permissibility of gidulei gidulin:

"Rabbi Chanina teaches us that even in a matter whose seeds do not cease, growths of growths are non-sacred."⁷ (תרגום: קמשמע לן רבי חנינא דאפילו דבר שאין זרעו כלה גידולי גידולין חולין)

This echoes Rashi's point, emphasizing the permissibility of secondary growths even in the most persistent types of produce.

Friction

The Core Dilemma: Temporal Interpretation of Vows

The most significant friction point arises from the Gemara's attempt to resolve the ambiguity between saying "today" (היום) versus "one day" (יום אחד) regarding a vow. The mishna states: "If one says: Wine is konam for me... and for that reason I will not taste it today, he is prohibited from drinking wine only until nightfall." (Nedarim 60a). Subsequently, it states: "but if he said that wine is forbidden to him for one day, he is prohibited from drinking wine from the day he took the vow to the same time on the following day." (Nedarim 60a).

The Gemara tries to infer from this that "one day" implies a full 24 hours, while "today" implies only until nightfall of that same day. However, this inference is immediately challenged:

The Gemara poses a question: "A dilemma was raised before the scholars: If one said: Wine is konam for me... for a day, what is the halakha in his case? Is it considered as though he said today, and he is prohibited from consuming wine until nightfall, or is it considered as though he said one day, in which case the vow takes effect for a period of twenty-four hours?" (Nedarim 60a)

This dilemma highlights the core problem: the language used for temporal vows is notoriously imprecise. The Gemara's initial attempt to resolve this by contrasting the mishna's clauses fails:

The Gemara suggests: "Come and hear a proof from the mishna: If one says: Wine is konam for me... today, he is prohibited from drinking wine only until nightfall. Therefore, if he said the vow applies for a day, it is considered comparable to a case where he said one day, and the vow is in effect for twenty-four hours."

The Gemara rejects this proof: "But say the latter clause of the mishna: If he said that wine is forbidden to him for one day, he is prohibited from drinking wine from the day he took the vow to the same time on the following day. This indicates that it is only if he said: One day, that the vow takes effect for twenty-four hours; but if he said it takes effect for a day, it is comparable to a case where he said today, and the vow takes effect only until nightfall. Rather, no inference is to be learned from this mishna." (Nedarim 60a)

The friction lies in the fact that the mishna itself presents two scenarios ("today" and "one day") with seemingly different outcomes, but the Gemara's attempt to draw a clear distinction based on the wording of the mishna proves circular and ultimately leads to the conclusion that no definitive inference can be made from the mishna alone. The problem is that the very phrasing of the mishna, when dissected, does not provide a clear rule for the intermediate case of "a day" (יום). Does "a day" align with the immediate, bounded "today," or the more extended "one day"? The Gemara wrestles with whether "a day" should be interpreted restrictively (until nightfall) or expansively (24 hours).

Terutz: Rav Ashi's Approach via Leap Year

The resolution to this friction is offered by Rav Ashi, who defers the problem to a later discussion on Nedarim 63a, concerning vows related to "this year" (hashanah hazeh) and leap years:

Rav Ashi said: "Come and hear a resolution to this question from the following mishna (63a): If one vowed: Wine is konam for me... this year, then if the year was extended, i.e., declared to be a leap year, he is prohibited from drinking wine in it and its intercalated month." (Nedarim 60a)

While Rav Ashi doesn't provide the explicit answer here, he signals that the methodology for interpreting temporal vows, even those tied to larger units like a year, involves understanding how calendar adjustments (like a leap year) impact the vow's duration. The implication is that the same principles of precise temporal definition and potential rabbinic interpretation (as seen with the chachamim's decree discussed earlier) will apply to resolving the "a day" vs. "today" debate. The terutz isn't a direct answer but a redirection to a more complex case that utilizes the same analytical tools. It suggests that the ambiguity of "a day" is part of a broader challenge in defining the precise temporal scope of vows, and that the solution likely lies in careful consideration of calendar units and their inherent ambiguities, which are then addressed by rabbinic interpretation. The core terutz is the acknowledgment that the definition of "a day" for vow purposes is not self-evident and requires further textual and logical exploration, likely involving the principles of toch keh'dei dibbur (within the time it takes to utter a phrase) and rabbinic decrees.

Intertext

1. The "Growths" Principle in Other Sacred Produce

The discussion about gidulei terumah has a clear parallel in the laws of ma'aser sheni (second tithe). Just as terumah can render produce forbidden, so too can ma'aser sheni. The Gemara in Chullin 121a discusses the status of growths of ma'aser sheni. There, the principle is generally that gidulei ma'aser sheni are also considered ma'aser sheni. However, the concept of gidulei gidulin also finds application. If one plants a seed of ma'aser sheni (which is forbidden to eat outside of Jerusalem), and that seed grows, the growth is ma'aser sheni. If that growth then produces further growth, the permissibility of the gidulei gidulin becomes a question. The underlying principle—that prohibitions can be transmitted through growth, but with distinctions between direct and indirect—is a recurring theme. The Nedarim discussion focuses on gidulei gidulin being permitted, while in ma'aser sheni, the primary concern is often the transmission of the prohibition itself.

2. Rabbinic Decrees on Vows: The Case of "One Day" and "Today"

The Gemara's discussion about Rav Yosef's decree (and Abaye's challenge) regarding vows of "today" and "one day" directly relates to the broader phenomenon of rabbinic decrees (taqqanot) designed to prevent confusion and safeguard halakha. The decree aims to prevent someone who vows for "one day" (24 hours) from mistakenly thinking their vow ends at nightfall, just because someone who vows for "today" does have their vow end at nightfall. This mirrors other decrees, such as the prohibition on writing on Shabbat, which is a decree (gezerah) designed to prevent the more severe act of writing on Yom Kippur. In the context of vows, the Sages were concerned with the practical implications of imprecise language and the potential for individuals to misinterpret the duration and scope of their commitments. The decree serves as a chomah u'migdal (a wall and a tower) around the halakha, ensuring greater adherence and clarity.

Psak/Practice

The discussion on Nedarim 60a, particularly the debate between Rav Yosef and Abaye regarding the decree for vows of "today" versus "one day," has practical implications. The Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 204:2, addresses vows pertaining to time. While the specific debate about "today" vs. "one day" is nuanced, the general principle is that vows are interpreted strictly. For a vow of "one day," it is understood as 24 hours from the time of the vow. A vow of "today" is understood to extend until nightfall of that day.

The decree mentioned by Rav Yosef, even if debated in its precise scope, underscores the rabbinic concern for clarity. When encountering ambiguous vow language in practice, a posek would need to consider the precise wording, the context, and potentially the minhag (custom). The principle of kol nidrei (all vows) at the beginning of Yom Kippur also reflects the Sages' desire to provide a mechanism for general release from vows, acknowledging the difficulty in adhering to them perfectly. The meta-heuristic here is that ambiguity in vow language often leads to stricter interpretation or a need for rabbinic intervention (hatarata noder).

Takeaway

The precise definition of temporal units in vows is a complex halakhic challenge, requiring careful interpretation of language and rabbinic decrees to prevent confusion. The distinction between direct and secondary growths (gidulin vs. gidulei gidulin) reveals a layered approach to prohibitions, where derivative entities can sometimes be treated differently from their source.