Nedarim 62

Sugya Map: The "Ownerless" Fig and the "Crown of Torah"

• Issue: The halachic status of figs left in a field after the majority of harvesting tools ("knives" or "scythes") have been put away. Specifically, whether they are considered ownerless (hefker) and thus permissible to eat without fear of theft and exempt from tithes.
• Nafka Mina(s):
  • Gezel (Theft): If the figs are ownerless, taking them is not theft.
  • Ma'aser (Tithes): If the figs are ownerless, they are exempt from ma'aser.
  • Personal Conduct of Sages: The varied reactions of great Sages (Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda, Rabbi Ḥama bar Rabbi Ḥanina, Rabbi Tarfon) to this situation highlight differing interpretations and levels of stringency.
  • The "Crown of Torah": The story of Rabbi Tarfon leads to a broader discussion about the proper use and reverence of Torah scholarship, with severe consequences for leveraging it for personal gain.
• Primary Sources:
  • Nedarim 62a-b
  • Ezekiel 7:22
  • Daniel 5:30
  • Deuteronomy 30:20, 4:24
  • Proverbs 7:3, 3:17
  • Leviticus 19:14, 21:8
  • I Kings 18:12
  • II Samuel 8:18
  • Ezra 7:24
  • Mishnah Nedarim 62a (regarding vows until harvest/rains)
  • Baraita (cited in Gemara Nedarim 62a) regarding love of Torah.

Text Snapshot

The Gemara opens with a foundational statement:

הוקפלו רוב המקצעות, מותרות משום גזל ופטורות מן המעשר.

"If most of the scythes/knives [literally: cutting instruments] have been put away, they [the figs] are permitted with regard to stealing and are exempt from tithes."

Dikduk/Leshon Nuance:

• מקצעות (Miktsa'ot): While translated as "knives," the root katsa (קצע) relates to cutting or shaving. The commentaries clarify this refers to the tools used for harvesting. The plural form suggests a collection of such instruments.
• הוקפלו (Hukpelo): Passive form of kafal (כפל) meaning to fold or put away. This signifies the act of storing the tools, implying the primary harvest is complete.
• מותרות משום גזל (Mutarot mishum gezel): Literally, "permitted because of theft." This phrasing is slightly counter-intuitive. The meaning, as clarified by the commentaries, is that they are not considered theft, hence they are mutarot (permitted).
• פטורות מן המעשר (Ptorot min ha'ma'aser): Exempt from tithes. This follows logically from being ownerless.

The Gemara then presents a key incident:

רבי יהודה הנשיא ורבי יוסי ברבי יהודה הוו אזלי באורחא, ואשכחי הני מילי, אכל רבי יהודה הנשיא, ולא אכל רבי יוסי ברבי יהודה. אתא בעל דעתא וא"ל: מ"ט לא אכלי רבנן? הא הוקפלו רוב המקצעות. והא אמר רבי יוסי ברבי יהודה: משום בושת פנים לא אכל.

*"Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda were traveling on a road, and they found these [figs]. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi ate, but Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda did not eat. The owner of the field came and said to them: Why are the Sages not eating? Indeed, most of the scythes have been put away. But Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda did not eat, because [he thought] out of bashfulness he [the owner] said [they were permitted]." *

Dikduk/Leshon Nuance:

• אשכחי הני מילי (Ashkḥi ha-ni mili): "Found these things." This implies encountering the figs.
• בעל דעתא (Ba'al de'ata): "Owner of the matter/thing," meaning the owner of the field.
• מ"ט (Ma'at): Abbreviation for mih ta'ama (מאי טעמא), "what is the reason?"
• והא אמר רבי יוסי ברבי יהודה: משום בושת פנים לא אכל (Ve'ha amar Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda: Mishum boshet panim lo achal): This clause is critical. Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda's refusal wasn't based on the halacha itself, but on his interpretation of the owner's motivation. He suspected the owner was merely being polite and not truly relinquishing ownership.

Readings

The fundamental principle that ripe fruit left in the field after the main harvest tools are put away is considered ownerless, thus permitting its consumption and exempting it from tithes, is explained by the early commentators.

• Ran (Rabbeinu Nissim Girondi) on Nedarim 62a s.v. מותרות משום גזל: The Ran explains the core logic: "שמתיאשים הן ממה שנשאר בשדה אחר שקפלו והכניסו רוב המקצועות" ("for they [the owners] despair of what remains in the field after they have folded and brought in most of the cutting instruments"). This means the owners, having gathered the bulk of their harvest and stored their tools, are presumed to have given up on the remaining fruit. The act of putting away the tools is the tangible sign of this abandonment. He further clarifies the exemption from tithes: "ודפטורות מן המעשר - דכתיב (דברים י״ד:כ״ט) ובא הלוי כי אין לו חלק ונחלה עמך יצא הפקר שיש לו חלק ונחלה עמך" ("and they are exempt from tithes - for it is written (Deuteronomy 14:29): 'And the Levite, because he has no portion or inheritance with you, [shall come and eat within your gates]' - [this applies to] ownerless property that has a portion or inheritance with you"). The Ran connects the concept of hefker (ownerless property) to the exemption from ma'aser. The verse implies that only property belonging to someone with a portion in the land is subject to tithes. Ownerless property, by definition, lacks such an owner and thus falls outside the scope of ma'aser.

• Tosafot on Nedarim 62a s.v. הוקפלו: Tosafot echoes the Ran's sentiment regarding theft: "שהבעלים מפקירין אותם" ("that the owners declare them ownerless"). They emphasize the owners' active (though implied) act of relinquishing ownership. Regarding tithes, they succinctly state: "כהפקר" ("like ownerless property"). This implies that once something is hefker, its halachic status regarding tithes changes, mirroring the status of property that was never owned or was explicitly abandoned. Tosafot Rid adds a crucial detail by linking this to Mishnah Ma'aserot: "ולבסוף תני מצא כילאי דכול החייב שידוע דמדבר הגמור אלא אין גמר מלאכתן למעשר עד שיכתשם ויעשה מהן עיגולין כדתנן בפ"ג דמעשרות שאם מצא קציעות מותרות משום גזל ופטורות מן המעשרות" ("And later it teaches [in Ma'aserot] about finding kilayim [mixed seeds] where it is known that it is fully obligated, but its final processing for ma'aser is not until it is crushed and made into cakes, as we learned in the third chapter of Ma'aserot. Thus, if one finds dried figs [ketsiot], they are permitted regarding theft and exempt from tithes"). This comparison is significant: just as unprocessed figs (ketsiot) found after a certain point are exempt, implying a stage of completion for tithe obligation, so too are these figs. The Tosafot Rid further clarifies the timing: "ואמתי מועיל ההפקר להיות פטור מן המעשרות עד לעולם כשהופקר קודם שנגמרה מלאכתו שאפילו אם יגמור לאחר מיכן פטור אבל אם היפקר לאחר שנגמרה מלאכתו שוב אינו פוטרו" ("And when does abandonment help to be exempt from tithes forever? When it is abandoned before its processing is completed, for even if he completes it afterward, it is exempt. But if it is abandoned after its processing is completed, it no longer exempts him"). This establishes that abandonment before the final stage of processing is what grants the exemption.

Friction

The most striking tension in this sugya arises from the starkly contrasting actions and subsequent self-recrimination of Rabbi Tarfon, juxtaposed with the broader principle that hefker exempts items from theft and tithes.

• The Kushya: Rabbi Tarfon, a towering figure, is found eating figs in a field when "most of the knives have been set aside." The owner, mistaking him for a thief, sacks him and intends to throw him into the river. Rabbi Tarfon is saved only when the owner realizes he is carrying the great Rabbi Tarfon. Afterward, Rabbi Tarfon laments: "Woe to Tarfon, for I made use of the crown of Torah." This regret is later amplified by Rabba bar bar Ḥana quoting Rabbi Yoḥanan: "Whoever makes use of the crown of Torah is uprooted from the world," derived via a fortiori from Belshazzar’s punishment for using desecrated Temple vessels. The question is: If the figs were indeed hefker due to the time of year ("most of the knives set aside"), then Rabbi Tarfon was merely taking ownerless property. Why would this be considered "making use of the crown of Torah"? It seems he was acting within the bounds of the established halacha. Furthermore, the owner's action of sacking him was based on a mistaken identity, not on the halachic permissibility of the figs. So, what was the transgression that warranted such severe self-chastisement and the severe pronouncement of being "uprooted from the world"?

• The Terutz: The Gemara itself provides a nuanced answer, differentiating Rabbi Tarfon’s case: "Since Rabbi Tarfon was very wealthy, he should have sought to appease him with money in order to save himself, rather than relying on his status as a Torah scholar." The underlying issue is not the permissibility of the figs themselves, but the method by which Rabbi Tarfon, a wealthy Torah scholar, extricated himself. Instead of simply eating the figs as ownerless property (which would have been permissible), or attempting to negotiate with the owner (which his wealth would have facilitated), his predicament arose because the owner assumed he was stealing. When saved, Rabbi Tarfon's regret stems from the fact that his release was predicated on his identity as a Torah scholar, implicitly suggesting that he leveraged his status to avoid a physical confrontation or legal entanglement, rather than handling it through financial means appropriate to his wealth or by simply claiming the hefker status of the fruit. The "crown of Torah" was, in essence, used as a shield or a means of avoidance, which is seen as an inappropriate and potentially dangerous reliance on one's scholarly stature, especially when other avenues (like wealth) were available. The severe pronouncement about being "uprooted" is thus an extreme warning against any action that could be construed as exploiting Torah status for personal advantage, even in a situation that appears initially benign. It underscores the principle that the "crown of Torah" is not a tool for self-preservation in the mundane sense, particularly when wealth provides an alternative.

Intertext

The profound ethical and halachic implications of leveraging one's Torah status are echoed in various texts, offering a broader perspective on the sugya's concerns.

• Tanakh (Deuteronomy 30:20): The baraita explicitly invokes the verse "To love the Lord your God, to listen to His voice, and to cleave to Him" to caution against studying Torah for external validation: "a person should not say: I will read the written Torah so that they will call me a Sage; I will study Mishna so that they will call me Rabbi; I will review my studies so that I will be an Elder and will sit in the academy." This directly addresses the "crown of Torah" problem, framing it as a perversion of the divine commandment to love and cleave to God. The goal of Torah study must be intrinsic, rooted in love for God, not in the acquisition of honor or status. The verse's emphasis on "cleaving to Him" suggests a deep, personal connection, not a tool for social climbing.

• Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 246:4 - Meta-Halachic Heuristic): While not a direct halachic ruling derived from this specific Gemara passage, the Shulchan Aruch's extensive discussion on the laws of gedolei ha'dor (great leaders of the generation) and the respect due to them, implicitly touches upon the dangers of misusing such stature. The very existence of detailed laws regarding how one must conduct oneself in the presence of, or when interacting with, great scholars highlights the sensitivity surrounding their position. The principle that one should not derive personal benefit from the Torah, as articulated in the Gemara’s baraita and the Rabbi Tarfon incident, informs the meta-halachic heuristic that respect for Torah scholars must be genuine and based on their piety and wisdom, not on any expectation of personal material gain or privilege derived from their title. This is further reinforced by the laws concerning the honor due to a Kohen or Levi, which are based on their service, not on personal exploitation.

Psak/Practice

The sugya's discussion on the "crown of Torah" primarily functions as a powerful ethical directive and a cautionary tale rather than a source for direct psak in everyday halachic practice.

• Meta-Halachic Heuristic: The core takeaway is the absolute imperative to study Torah for its own sake ("לימוד לשמה"). This is not merely advisable but foundational to a proper relationship with God and Torah. The severe consequences for exploiting the "crown of Torah," as exemplified by Rabbi Tarfon's regret and the pronouncement of being "uprooted," serve as a potent deterrent. The principle is that honor and reward are byproducts of sincere study, not its objective. This guides how one should approach learning and how one should perceive the honor due to scholars – it should be a recognition of their dedication and wisdom, not a license for personal advantage.
• Distinguishing Situations: The Gemara's clarification in Rabbi Tarfon's case – that his wealth should have dictated a different approach – suggests a nuanced application. While the general principle against exploiting Torah status is absolute, the specific recourse taken might depend on one's circumstances. However, the underlying message remains: avoid relying on your Torah status for personal gain or to escape mundane difficulties, especially when other means are available. The exemption from theft and tithes is a halachic reality based on the state of the produce, not a privilege to be claimed by a scholar.

Takeaway

True reverence for Torah demands intrinsic study, not its exploitation for honor or gain, lest one risk spiritual uprooting. The "crown of Torah" commands profound respect, but it is a mantle of service, not a tool for personal advantage.