Nedarim 65

Sugya Map

• Issue: The baraita states that a vow prohibiting benefit from another (Modar Hana'a meChaveiro) may only be dissolved (matirin) in the presence of the subject of the vow (bifanav)¹.
• Nafka Mina(s):
  • Moshe Rabeinu and Yitro: Rav Nachman derives the halacha from Moshe's vow to Yitro not to return to Egypt, and God's instruction to Moshe: "In Midian you vowed, go and dissolve your vow in Midian" (Exodus 4:19), implying hatara bifanav².
  • King Zedekiah and Nebuchadnezzar: Zedekiah swore to Nebuchadnezzar not to reveal his embarrassing act (eating a live rabbit). Later, suffering greatly, he sought hatara from the Sanhedrin. The Sanhedrin initially dissolved the vow shelo bifanav, leading to Nebuchadnezzar's outrage and the elders' silent shame, signifying an error in halacha³.
• Primary Sources:
  • Baraita (Tosefta 2:12)⁴
  • Exodus 4:19 ("ויאמר ה' אל משה במדין לך שב מצרים...")⁵
  • Exodus 2:21 ("ויואל משה לשבת את האיש")⁶
  • Ezekiel 17:13 ("ויבא אתו באלה")⁷
  • II Chronicles 36:13 ("וגם במלך נבוכדנצר מרד אשר השביעו באלהים")⁸
  • Lamentations 2:10 ("ישבו לארץ ידמו זקני בת ציון")⁹

Text Snapshot

The sugya opens with a foundational baraita:

**"תניא: המודר הנאה מחבירו, אין מתירין לו אלא בפניו."**¹⁰

Translation: It is taught in a baraita: With regard to one prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from another, they dissolve the vow for him only in the presence of the one who is the subject of the vow.

The Gemara immediately questions the source: **"מנא הני מילי?"**¹¹ Rav Nachman's derivation from Moshe's vow to Yitro is pivotal. The dikduk of the word "ויואל" (Exodus 2:21) is critical. Rav Nachman explains that **"אין אלה אלא שבועה"**¹² – the term vayo'el is linguistically linked to ala (oath), citing Ezekiel 17:13. This establishes the equivalence of oaths and vows for this halacha. The Divine instruction to Moshe, **"במדין נדרת, לך והתר נדרך במדין,"**¹³ explicitly mandates the hatara in Midian, i.e., in Yitro's presence. Rashi clarifies that Yitro had made Moshe swear not to return to Egypt because of those seeking to kill him, thus making it a vow le'hana'ato (for his benefit)¹⁴.

Readings

Ran on Nedarim 65a: The Twofold Rationale for Bifanav

The Ran¹⁵ delves into the Yerushalmi's¹⁶ debate concerning the underlying reason for requiring the hatara to be done bifanav. This distinction yields significant nafka minot:

1. "מפני הבושה" (Due to Shame): One opinion holds that the requirement is to ensure the noder (vower) feels shame before the mudav (subject of the vow). This rationale implies that the vow was for the mudav's benefit (hana'ato), and the noder should feel awkward requesting its dissolution. If the vow was not for the mudav's benefit, this reason would not apply, and hatara could occur shelo bifanav. Furthermore, if the mudav is notified (hodi'uhu), but not physically present, the shame component is missing.
2. "מפני החשד" (Due to Suspicion): The second view posits that the requirement is to prevent the mudav from suspecting the noder of transgressing the vow. If the mudav is unaware of the dissolution, they might see the noder benefiting from them and assume a transgression. This reason applies even if the vow was not for the mudav's benefit, as the potential for chashad exists whenever the mudav is unaware. Crucially, according to this view, if the mudav is merely notified (hodi'uhu) of the hatara, even shelo bifanav, the chashad is removed, and the hatara should be valid.

The Ran notes that the Yerushalmi presents these as two distinct rationales, each with its implications. The sugya regarding Zedekiah seems to align better with the chashad rationale, as Nebuchadnezzar's concern was that Zedekiah revealed the secret, implying he broke his oath, rather than concern for Zedekiah's shame.

Tosafot on Nedarim 65a: Reconciling Bifanav with Ba'al Korcho

Tosafot¹⁷, like the Ran, acknowledges the Yerushalmi's two reasons. Their primary focus, however, is to clarify whether "בפניו" (in his presence) necessarily implies "מדעתו" (with his consent). They argue that the plain reading of the baraita and the derasha from Moshe and Yitro suggests that bifanav can even be ba'al korcho (against his will).

Tosafot explains that if the reason is mifnei hachashad (to prevent suspicion), then the mudav's consent is not necessary. As long as the mudav is physically present and aware of the hatara, the suspicion of transgression is removed. The case of Moshe and Yitro supports this, as it's unlikely Yitro would have willingly consented to Moshe's departure, yet God instructed Moshe to dissolve the vow "in Midian." This interpretation stands in contrast to R' Tam's view (mentioned by Rashba and Ran) that bifanav implies a benefit received by the mudav, requiring their consent. Tosafot rejects R' Tam's understanding of the baraita as too restrictive, noting the general phrasing "המודר הנאה מחבירו" rather than "המדיר חבירו" (one who makes his friend vow).

Both Rishonim highlight the foundational interpretive tension: Is bifanav about the internal state of the vower (shame) or the external perception of the subject (suspicion)? Their differing emphasis shapes the conditions and validity of hatara.

Friction

The Strongest Kushya: B'dieved Validity of Hatara Shelo Bifanav

The most acute tension in the sugya surrounds the b'dieved (post-factum) validity of Zedekiah's hatara. The Sanhedrin initially dissolved Zedekiah's oath shelo bifanav, and he proceeded to reveal Nebuchadnezzar's secret. Nebuchadnezzar's subsequent outrage leads to the Sanhedrin's shame ("ישבו לארץ ידמו זקני בת ציון"¹⁸), strongly implying they erred. This suggests that the hatara shelo bifanav was invalid l'chatchila (ab initio). However, the Gemara doesn't explicitly state that Zedekiah remained bound by his oath b'dieved. If the hatara was null and void, then Zedekiah would have been an over al shvuah (transgressor of an oath), a severe sin. Yet, the Sanhedrin permitted him to speak. This creates a kushya: Was the hatara shelo bifanav b'dieved valid or not?

The Ran¹⁹ articulates this friction clearly. On one hand, the Sanhedrin allowing Zedekiah to reveal the secret suggests b'dieved validity. He cites Gittin 35b²⁰ regarding an almana vowing to yetomim, where the concern is that she might get her vow dissolved, implying such a hatara (even if shelo bifanav or shelo mida'ato) would be effective b'dieved. On the other hand, the pasuk in Divrei Hayamim ("וגם במלך נבוכדנצר מרד אשר השביעו באלהים"²¹) explicitly condemns Zedekiah for rebelling against Nebuchadnezzar, "who had made him swear by God." This pasuk implies that Zedekiah's revelation was a transgression, suggesting the hatara was indeed invalid. The Ra'avad²² explicitly sides with this interpretation, stating that the pasuk proves the hatara was ineffective, even b'dieved.

The Best Terutz: Davar Mitzvah or B'dieved Efficacy

There are two primary terutzim (resolutions) to this kushya:

1. Tosafot's Terutz (Davar Mitzvah): Tosafot²³ (cited by Ran and Rashba²⁴) addresses the Sanhedrin's actions by suggesting that l'chatchila, hatara shelo bifanav is forbidden, but l'davar mitzvah it may be permitted. They argue that Zedekiah was "מצטער ביותר כשלא היה יכול לגלות ומתבטל ע"י כך ממלאכת שמים" (suffering greatly by not being able to reveal, thereby being nullified from Divine service). Additionally, it was a mitzvah for the Sanhedrin to heed the king's (Nebuchadnezzar's) command to free Zedekiah from his distress. This terutz allows for the hatara to be valid l'chatchila due to extreme circumstances, mitigating the Sanhedrin's error to one of judgment rather than outright halachic violation. The shame of the elders was because they did not fully follow the proper procedure of bifanav, or because they acted in a way that led to such a disastrous outcome, even if technically permissible l'davar mitzvah. This still maintains that b'dieved the hatara was effective.

2. Ran's View (B'dieved Efficacy, but with Ra'avad's Dissent): The Ran himself leans towards the b'dieved efficacy of the hatara, even if done improperly l'chatchila. He uses the Gittin proof from the almana to support this. If b'dieved hatara were entirely null, there would be no concern for her seeking dissolution. However, he carefully presents the Ra'avad's strong dissenting view, which insists that the pasuk in Divrei Hayamim unequivocally proves the hatara was invalid even b'dieved, and Zedekiah indeed transgressed. The Ran's final stance seems to be that b'dieved the hatara is effective, but the kushya from Divrei Hayamim remains potent, and the Tosafot's terutz provides a way for the Sanhedrin's actions to be understood within halacha while still acknowledging their error in judgment.

Intertext

Yerushalmi Nedarim 5:4 - The Root of the Boshet vs. Chashad Debate

The Gemara Bavli alludes to the differing rationales for bifanav without explicitly stating them. The Yerushalmi in Nedarim 5:4 is the primary source that explicitly articulates the two reasons for requiring the presence of the mudav: "מפני הבושה" (due to shame) and "מפני החשד" (due to suspicion)²⁵. As discussed in the Ran and Tosafot, these two reasons have significant nafka minot regarding whether mere notification suffices, whether the mudav's consent is needed, or if the hatara can be ba'al korcho. The Bavli implicitly relies on this foundational Yerushalmi debate to understand the nuances of the baraita.

Rambam Hilchot Nedarim 6:11-12 - Codification of Bifanav and B'dieved

The Rambam codifies this halacha in Hilchot Nedarim. He states:

"המודר הנאה מחבירו, אין מתירין לו אלא בפניו. מנא לן? דכתיב: 'ויאמר ה' אל משה במדין לך שב מצרים כי מתו כל האנשים', אמר לו: במדין נדרת ליצרו, לך והתר נדרך במדין."²⁶ Translation: One who is prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from his friend, they may only dissolve it for him in his presence. From where do we derive this? As it is written: "And the Lord said to Moses in Midian: Go, return to Egypt; for all the men are dead," He said to him: In Midian you vowed to Yitro, go and dissolve your vow in Midian.

The Rambam continues by describing the Zedekiah incident, underscoring the Sanhedrin's error²⁷. Crucially, the Rambam does not explicitly state whether the hatara is valid b'dieved if done shelo bifanav. However, his inclusion of the Zedekiah story and the Sanhedrin's shame implies that the proper procedure is essential. The lack of an explicit ruling on b'dieved validity suggests either that it is utterly invalid (like the Ra'avad) or that it is a machloket which he does not wish to decide definitively, or that it is valid b'dieved but constitutes a grave error l'chatchila. Most poskim understand the Rambam to imply that b'dieved it is pasul, aligning with the emphasis on the Sanhedrin's error.

Psak/Practice

The practical halacha largely follows the stringency that hatarat nedarim for a vow affecting another must be done bifanav. The Shulchan Aruch rules in Yoreh De'ah 228:2: "המודר הנאה מחבירו, אין מתירין לו אלא בפניו" (One who is prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from his friend, they may only dissolve it for him in his presence)²⁸. This clearly adopts the baraita's rule.

Regarding the nafka mina between boshet and chashad: many poskim lean towards chashad as the primary concern, meaning that if the mudav is notified and aware, even if not physically present, the hatara might be valid b'dieved according to some. However, l'chatchila, physical presence is required. The Rama (Yoreh De'ah 228:2) adds that some say that if the mudav is a wicked person (rasha) or a minor, their presence is not required²⁹. This might stem from the boshet aspect (no shame before a rasha) or chashad (no significant concern for suspicion from a rasha or minor).

As for the b'dieved validity of a hatara shelo bifanav, the prevailing psak is generally stringent. While Tosafot's davar mitzvah terutz for Zedekiah offers a path, it's reserved for extreme necessity. In typical cases, if a hatara is performed shelo bifanav, it is considered a significant error, and many poskim would rule it invalid b'dieved, requiring a re-dissolution bifanav if possible. The severity of Zedekiah's punishment, as highlighted by the Ra'avad, reinforces the view that the hatara was fundamentally flawed and ineffective.

Takeaway

The sugya highlights the profound ethical and social dimensions embedded within halachic procedures for vows, emphasizing not just the technical annulment but also the interpersonal dynamics of trust, shame, and public perception. The debate over b'dieved validity underscores the tension between procedural correctness (l'chatchila) and ultimate efficacy.

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¹ Nedarim 65a. ² Nedarim 65a. ³ Nedarim 65a. ⁴ Nedarim 65a. ⁵ Exodus 4:19. ⁶ Exodus 2:21. ⁷ Ezekiel 17:13. ⁸ II Chronicles 36:13. ⁹ Lamentations 2:10. ¹⁰ Nedarim 65a. ¹¹ Nedarim 65a. ¹² Nedarim 65a. ¹³ Nedarim 65a. ¹⁴ Rashi Nedarim 65a s.v. במדין לך. ¹⁵ Ran Nedarim 65a s.v. תניא המודר הנאה מחבירו אין מתיריו לו אלא בפניו. ¹⁶ Yerushalmi Nedarim 5:4. ¹⁷ Tosafot Nedarim 65a s.v. דתנן המודר הנאה מחבירו. ¹⁸ Lamentations 2:10, cited Nedarim 65a. ¹⁹ Ran Nedarim 65a s.v. והיכא דהוי בפניו. ²⁰ Gittin 35b. ²¹ II Chronicles 36:13, cited Ran Nedarim 65a s.v. ואחרים אמרו. ²² Ra'avad, cited Ran Nedarim 65a s.v. ואחרים אמרו. ²³ Tosafot Nedarim 65a s.v. אמרו לו. ²⁴ Rashba Nedarim 65a s.v. ואמרו מקצת המפרשים. ²⁵ Yerushalmi Nedarim 5:4. ²⁶ Rambam Hilchot Nedarim 6:11. ²⁷ Rambam Hilchot Nedarim 6:12. ²⁸ Shulchan Aruch Yoreh De'ah 228:2. ²⁹ Rama Yoreh De'ah 228:2.