Daf A Week · Expert – Beit Midrash Analysis · On-Ramp

Nedarim 71

On-RampExpert – Beit Midrash AnalysisMarch 1, 2026

Sugya Map

  • Issue: The Mishna (Nedarim 71a) posits that if a young woman makes a vow while betrothed, is divorced, and then re-betrothed bo bayom (on the same day), her father and her ba'al acharon (final betrothed) nullify her vows. The Gemara delves into the locus classicus of this ruling: can the ba'al acharon nullify vows that were disclosed to the ba'al rishon (first betrothed)?
  • Nafka Mina(s):
    • Scope of Hafarah: Does the ba'al acharon inherit the ability to nullify all vows "upon her," even those known to and potentially subject to kiyum (ratification) by a prior betrothed? This hinges on Shmuel's reading of "ונדריה עליה" (Numbers 30:7).
    • Nature of Hafarah: Does hafarah by a father or husband "sever" a vow, or merely "weaken" its force? This lies at the heart of the Beit Shammai vs. Beit Hillel dispute concerning hafarah after a husband's death (Nedarim 71a).
    • Divorce's Impact: Is a husband's act of divorce after hearing a vow considered k'shtikah (like silence, merely losing the opportunity to nullify) or k'kiyum (like ratification, actively upholding the vow)? This determines if he can nullify if he remarries her bo bayom (Nedarim 71a).
  • Primary Sources: Mishna and Gemara Nedarim 71a, Bamidbar 30:7-9.

Text Snapshot

The Mishna lays out the bedrock principle:

מִשְׁנָה: נָדְרָה וְהִיא אֲרוּסָה, וְנִתְגָּרְשָׁה בּוֹ בַּיּוֹם, וְנִתְאָרְסָה בּוֹ בַּיּוֹם לְאַחֵר, אֲפִילּוּ לְמֵאָה — אָבִיהָ וּבַעֲלָהּ הָאַחֲרוֹן מְפִירִין נְדָרֶיהָ. זֶה הַכְּלָל: כׇּל שֶׁלֹּא יָצְאָה לִרְשׁוּת עַצְמָהּ שָׁעָה אַחַת — אָבִיהָ וּבַעֲלָהּ הָאַחֲרוֹן מְפִירִין נְדָרֶיהָ. MISHNA: If she took a vow as a betrothed woman and then was divorced on the same day, and she was again betrothed on the same day to another man, or even to one hundred men, one after the other, on a single day, her father and her last husband nullify her vows. This is the principle: With regard to any young woman who has not left her father’s jurisdiction and entered into her own jurisdiction for at least one moment, her father and her final husband nullify her vows. (Nedarim 71a)

Dikduk/Leshon Nuance

The phrase "אביה ובעלה האחרון מפירין נדריה" (her father and her final husband nullify her vows) is striking. The Gemara's subsequent discussion pivots on the implication of "האחרון" (the final one), particularly concerning vows made under previous betrothals. The Ran notes that "בו ביום" is critical, implying that the hafarah window has not yet closed, preventing kiyum (Ran, Nedarim 71a s.v. מתני' נדרה והיא ארוסה). The Mishna's "זה הכלל: כל שלא יצאה לרשות עצמה שעה אחת" (This is the principle: any [woman] who has not left her own domain for a moment) serves as a meta-rule, establishing the boundaries of paternal and spousal hafarah jurisdiction, linking it to the marital status and age of the woman. Rashi clarifies "לרשות עצמה" as not having been fully married (nis'et) or having reached majority (bogeret) (Rashi, Nedarim 71a s.v. לרשות עצמה).

The Gemara then quotes Shmuel:

מְנָא הָא מִילְּתָא דְּבַעַל אַחֲרוֹן מֵפֵר נְדָרִים שֶׁנִּגְלוּ לְבַעַל רִאשׁוֹן? אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: דְּאָמַר קְרָא "וְאִם הָיוֹ תִהְיֶה לְאִישׁ וּנְדָרֶיהָ עָלֶיהָ... וְהֵפֵר אִישָׁהּ אֶת נִדְרָהּ" — נְדָרִים שֶׁהָיוּ עָלֶיהָ כְּבָר. From where do we derive that her final betrothed can nullify her vows that were disclosed to the first betrothed? Shmuel said that the verse states: “And if she be to a husband and her vows are upon her…and he nullifies her vow” (Numbers 30:7–9), indicating that he can nullify vows that were upon her already. (Nedarim 71a)

The Gemara's kushya "ונדריה עליה — מותר" (and her vows are upon her — is superfluous) is a classic midrash halacha move, seeking extra meaning from seemingly redundant words. This superfluous "עליה" (upon her) is interpreted by Shmuel to extend the hafarah power to vows already in existence, even if known to a previous betrothed.

Readings

Ran (Nedarim 71a s.v. מתני' נדרה והיא ארוסה)

The Ran elucidates the Mishna's case, particularly the significance of the "בו ביום" clause. He states: "דארוס מפר בקודמין בשותפות והאי דנקיט נתגרשה בו ביום ונתארסה בו ביום משום דבשמע עסקינן דשמע ארוס או שמע אב ומש"ה דוקא בו ביום אבל ביום של אחיו לא דכיון דשמע חד מינייהו ולא הפר קיימיה לנדרה".

  • Chiddush: The Ran highlights that the arus (betrothed husband) nullifies previous vows in partnership with the father. The critical element of "on the same day" (divorced and re-betrothed) is specifically to preempt the kiyum (ratification) that would occur if a full night passed after one of the nullifiers (father or arus) heard the vow and failed to nullify it. This implies that the hafarah power is not a simple inheritance, but a renewed opportunity, provided the initial hafarah window hasn't closed on all parties.

Rashi (Nedarim 71a s.v. אביה ובעלה האחרון)

Rashi offers a concise yet crucial clarification regarding the scope of the ba'al acharon's hafarah power: "אפילו מה שנדרה באירוסי ראשון".

  • Chiddush: He explicitly states that "her father and her final husband nullify her vows" means even those vows she made during the first betrothal. This directly addresses the Gemara's initial question and confirms Shmuel's interpretation of the verse, laying the groundwork for understanding how the ba'al acharon can nullify vows known to the ba'al rishon.

Shita Mekubetzet (Nedarim 71a s.v. מתניתין אביה ובעלה האחרון)

The Shita Mekubetzet, citing the RITZ, points out a crucial nuance: "ובהפר לה האב או הארוס מיירי דאלו לא הפר לה אחד מהן הא קיימא לן דנתרוקנה רשות לבעל בנדרין שלא נראו לארוס."

  • Chiddush: The RITZ suggests the Mishna implicitly assumes that either the father or the arus did nullify. This seems counter-intuitive given the Gemara's question about nullification of vows disclosed to the first betrothed. Perhaps the RITZ means the Mishna refers to a situation where some hafarah occurred, rather than a total void, or perhaps he's speaking of a different scenario within the Mishna's broader context. However, the more common understanding, as per Rashi and Ran, is that the Mishna is indeed grappling with the ability of the ba'al acharon to nullify even when the ba'al rishon failed to act. The Ranv"i (Nedarim 71a s.v. נדרה והיא ארוסה), also cited in the Shita Mekubetzet, further clarifies the "בו ביום" to mean that bedi'eved (post-facto), the re-betrothal is valid, even though lechatchila (ideally) one should wait three months due to davar she'yeish bo mishum mar'it ayin (something that has the appearance of impropriety, cf. Yevamot 43b).

Tosafot Rid (Nedarim 71a s.v. פיסקא נדרה והיא ארוסה)

The Tosafot Rid directly connects Shmuel's teaching to the Mishna's case: "פי' והאי קרא בארוס שני קמיירי מדכתיב ואם הי' תהי'."

  • Chiddush: He explicitly states that Shmuel's derivation from "ונדריה עליה" (and her vows are upon her) applies to the second betrothed, as indicated by the future tense "תהיה" (she will be). This reinforces the idea that the ba'al acharon's power is not limited by the prior ba'al rishon's inaction, provided the jurisdictional conditions are met.

Friction

The Knotty Question of Kiyum by Divorce

The Gemara's dilemma, "גירושין כשתיקה או כקיום?" (Nedarim 71a), presents a formidable kushya regarding the nature of hafarah and its cessation. If a husband hears a vow and then divorces his wife, what is the legal status of that vow?

  • Kushya: If divorce is considered k'kiyum (like ratification), it implies an active upholding of the vow by the husband's final act within the marriage. This would mean the vow is permanently established, and even if he remarries her bo bayom, he could no longer nullify it. This has profound implications for the Mishna's premise. If the ba'al rishon's divorce counts as kiyum, how could the ba'al acharon (or even the same husband remarried) possibly nullify a vow that has already been ratified? This would seem to override Shmuel's derasha and the Mishna's very foundation. The very concept of kiyum is meant to cement the vow, making it unassailable.

The Unraveling: K'shtikah and the Nature of Nullification

The Gemara's terutz is that "גירושין כשתיקה" (Nedarim 71a), meaning divorce is merely like silence.

  • Terutz: This resolution is pivotal. If divorce is k'shtikah, it means the husband simply lost his window of opportunity to nullify; he did not actively ratify the vow. Therefore, the vow remains in a state of potential nullification rather than becoming irrevocably affirmed. When he remarries her bo bayom, a new hafarah window opens for him, allowing him to nullify the vow. This implies that kiyum requires a more explicit act or the passage of a full night, rather than a mere change in marital status.
    • This aligns with Beit Hillel's view, "אינו מפסיק" (Nedarim 71a), that hafarah does not "sever" the vow into parts. Rather, the nullifiers' power is a dynamic, shared jurisdiction. If the ba'al rishon fails to nullify, the vow isn't necessarily "severed" as partially valid. Instead, the opportunity for nullification passes, but the fundamental issur (prohibition) of the vow is not fully solidified unless a full night passes without hafarah. The Ran (Nedarim 71a s.v. מתני' נדרה והיא ארוסה) underscores the "בו ביום" as critical for preventing the vow from becoming a kiyum. This allows the ba'al acharon to enter the picture and, in conjunction with the father, exercise their shared nullification power, as if the vow was "upon her already" (Shmuel, Nedarim 71a). The key is that the vow was never fully ratified by the ba'al rishon through an active kiyum or the passage of a night.

Intertext

Bamidbar 30:7-9 – The Lexical Locus

The primary source for the husband's power of hafarah is Bamidbar 30. The Gemara's focus on the seemingly superfluous word "עליה" (upon her) in "ונדריה עליה" (Numbers 30:7) is a classic example of ribbui (expansion) through drasha. Shmuel uses this to teach that a husband can nullify vows that were already "upon her" before their marriage, or, as our sugya applies it, before his specific betrothal to her (Nedarim 71a). This hermeneutic method expands the plain meaning of the text to encompass broader halachic principles, illustrating the dynamic interplay between peshat and drash.

Nedarim 72a / Sotah 23b – Nitrokna Reshut

The concept of "נתרוקנה רשות לאב" (authority reverted to the father) is a significant parallel. This occurs when a married woman's husband dies, and he had not heard her vow. In such a case, his hafarah power, which he never exercised, reverts to the father, allowing the father to nullify the vow alone (Nedarim 72a). This demonstrates that hafarah authority is not static; it shifts based on a woman's marital status and the knowledge of her nullifiers. In our sugya, however, we have an arus acharon who steps into the role, preventing a full reversion to the father alone. Instead, the father and the new betrothed share the responsibility, underscoring the specific and ongoing shared jurisdiction over an arusah's vows, as long as she has not left "רשות עצמה" (her own domain) (Mishna Nedarim 71a).

Psak/Practice

The halacha largely follows the opinion of Beit Hillel and the teaching of Shmuel.

  • Rambam (Hilchot Nedarim 12:12-13) rules that an arusah's father and husband nullify her vows together. If the husband dies, and he had not heard the vow, the father nullifies alone. However, if she is then betrothed to another, the father and the second husband nullify together. This directly affirms the Mishna's principle. The Rambam further clarifies that if the first husband did hear the vow but died without nullifying it, his ability to nullify is lost, but the second husband, if betrothed bo bayom, can still nullify with the father.
  • The ruling that "גירושין כשתיקה" (divorce is like silence) (Nedarim 71a) is critical for practical halacha. It means that a husband who divorces his wife after hearing a vow has not actively ratified it. Therefore, if he remarries her bo bayom, he can still nullify that vow, as his hafarah window reopens. This highlights that kiyum requires either an explicit statement or the passage of a night, not merely a change in marital status.
  • The meta-psak heuristic gleaned here is that the jurisdiction over hafarat nedarim is highly sensitive to time and marital status. The "בו ביום" condition is a lifeline, preventing the automatic ratification of vows and preserving opportunities for nullification even through multiple marital transitions.

Takeaway

The intricate rules of hafarat nedarim reveal a dynamic, rather than static, jurisdictional framework over vows. The ability of a ba'al acharon to nullify prior vows, coupled with the "divorce is like silence" principle, underscores a halachic preference for preserving the option of nullification, rather than allowing vows to become irrevocably ratified through inaction or marital flux.


Footnotes:

  • Mishna Nedarim 71a
  • Gemara Nedarim 71a
  • Numbers 30:7
  • Ran, Nedarim 71a s.v. מתני' נדרה והיא ארוסה
  • Rashi, Nedarim 71a s.v. לרשות עצמה
  • Ran, Nedarim 71a s.v. מתני' נדרה והיא ארוסה
  • Rashi, Nedarim 71a s.v. אביה ובעלה האחרון
  • Shita Mekubetzet, Nedarim 71a s.v. מתניתין אביה ובעלה האחרון (citing RITZ)
  • Shita Mekubetzet, Nedarim 71a s.v. נדרה והיא ארוסה (citing Ranv"i)
  • Yevamot 43b
  • Tosafot Rid, Nedarim 71a s.v. פיסקא נדרה והיא ארוסה
  • Numbers 30:7
  • Nedarim 72a
  • Sotah 23b
  • Mishna Nedarim 71a
  • Rambam, Hilchot Nedarim 12:12-13
  • Gemara Nedarim 71a
  • Ran, Nedarim 71a s.v. מתני' נדרה והיא ארוסה
  • Mishna Nedarim 71a