Daf A Week
Nedarim 91
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Sugya Map
The sugya in Nedarim 91a serves as a critical locus for analyzing the intersection of psychological presumptions (chazakot d'gufa), financial liabilities (ketubah), and the halachic mechanics of self-prohibition (shavyeh a-nafshei). The Gemara transitions from a specialized discussion of a priest’s wife (eshet kohen) who was violated to a broader epistemological inquiry regarding a woman's credibility when claiming she is divorced or defiled.
┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Nedarim 91a: Core Sugyot │
└────────────────────┬────────────────────┘
│
┌─────────────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────┐
▼ ▼ ▼
┌─────────────────┐ ┌─────────────────┐ ┌─────────────────┐
│ Nisatpeha Sadeh │ │ Gerashtani │ │ Eyneha Natnah │
│ (Rape & Kohen) │ │ (Did He Divorce)│ │ (Infidelity) │
└────────┬────────┘ └────────┬────────┘ └────────┬────────┘
│ │ │
▼ ▼ ▼
Does she forfeit Is she believed? Do we disregard
her Ketubah? "Ein ishah me'izah" her self-prohibition
(Rava's inquiry) vs "Katzah be-gabra" due to ulterior motives?
Core Issues
- The Ketubah of an Eshet Kohen under Ones: Does a priest's wife who is raped forfeit her ketubah because she is now forbidden to him, or does she claim "his field was flooded" (nisatpeha sadeh), placing the financial loss of the forced divorce on the husband?
- The Credibility of Gerashtani ("You Divorced Me"): Can a woman unilaterally declare herself divorced based on the psychological presumption that a wife would not brazenly lie in her husband's presence (ein ishah me'izah paneha bifnei ba'alah)?
- Ulterior Motives and Self-Prohibition (Eyneha Natnah Be-Acher): How do we treat self-incriminating claims of infidelity when there is a strong circumstantial assessment (umdana) that she simply wishes to dissolve the marriage?
Nafka Minot (Halachic Ramifications)
- Financial Liability: Whether the husband’s estate is encumbered to pay the ketubah when the marriage ends due to a force majeure (ones) that only prohibits her due to his priestly status.
- Matrimonial Status: Whether a woman is permitted to remarry based on her unilateral verbal assertion of divorce without presenting a physical get.
- Personal Prohibition (Issur): Whether a woman’s suspicious confession of infidelity renders her forbidden to her husband under the rule of shavyeh a-nafshei chatichah de-issura.
Primary Sources
- Nedarim 91a (Talmudic Sugya)
- Rif Nedarim 27b:1 (Rif's pagination/framing of the eshet kohen inquiry)
- Ran on Nedarim 91a:1:1 (Defining nisatpeha sadeh)
- Ran on Nedarim 91a:3:1–Ran on Nedarim 91a:3:2 (Developing the mechanics of gerashtani and me'izah)
- Rashi on Nedarim 91a:3:1–Rashi on Nedarim 91a:3:2 (Locating the psychological bounds of audacity)
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Text Snapshot
The Gemara on Nedarim 91a states:
"וגברא הוא דנסתחפה שדהו. ואמרינן ליה מתניתין היא, אשה שומרת לבעלה טמאה אני לך יש לה כתובה... איבעיא להו: אמרה לבעלה 'גרשתני', מהו? רב המנונא אמר: תא שמע, אפילו לבתרא דאמר אינה נאמנת, התם הוא דידעה דבעלה לא ידע בה ומשקרת, אבל הכא דידעה דבעלה ידע בה לא משקרה, דחזקה אין אשה מעיזה פניה בפני בעלה. רבא אמר: אדרבה, אפילו לקמא דאמר נאמנת, התם הוא דלא מנולא נפשה, אבל הכא, כיון דקצה ביה, מירתת ליה ומעזה ומעזה."
Dikduk and Leshon Nuance
- נסתחפה שדהו (Nisatpeha Sadeh): Derived from the root סחף (to sweep away/flood). This agricultural metaphor denotes a force majeure (ones) occurring directly within the property of the buyer/husband. The use of this term implies that the woman is conceptualized as the husband’s "field"; if she is damaged by an external, uncontrollable event (ones), the loss is borne entirely by the owner (the husband), not the field itself.
- קצה ביה (Katzah Beh): From the root קוץ (to loathe or disgust). Rava’s psychological insight is that extreme aversion (katzah) acts as a solvent to natural social inhibitions. The woman's psychological state of being repulsed by her husband overrides the standard behavioral barrier of me'izah (audacity).
- מחרזיק (Meharzeik): On Nedarim 91b, the Gemara uses the term meharzeik (secluding/embracing) in a house. The term denotes suspicious intimacy or locking oneself in, which creates a strong circumstantial assumption of adultery, yet is systematically evaluated by Rava through the lens of behavioral logic.
Readings
┌──────────────────────────────────────┐
│ The Three Axes of Analytical │
│ Readings │
└──────────────────┬───────────────────┘
│
┌──────────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────────┐
▼ ▼ ▼
┌──────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────┐
│ AXIS 1: Ran/Rif │ │ Axis 2: Shev │ │ Axis 3: Avnei │
│ On "Nisatpeha" │ │ Shema'tata on │ │ Miluim on │
│ │ │ "Ein Ishah" │ │ "Eyneha Natnah" │
└────────┬─────────┘ └────────┬─────────┘ └────────┬─────────┘
│ │ │
▼ ▼ ▼
Is the impediment a Is the audacity Does suspicion
defect in the wife's barrier physical nullify the force
body or a result of impossibility or of self-prohibition
the husband's status? merely evidentiary? (*shavyeh a-nafshei*)?
1. The Ran and Rif on "Nisatpeha Sadeh" and "Ones"
The sugya begins with Rava's (or Rav Pappa's) inquiry regarding an eshet kohen who was raped: Does she receive her ketubah? The underlying tension is whether ones (rape) in a kohen—which permanently forbids her to him—is treated like ratzon (willful adultery) in an Israelite, which forfeits the ketubah.
The Rif, in Rif Nedarim 27b:1, preserves the structure of the Gemara's resolution:
"באשת כהן... ואי באונס מי קמתסרא על בעלה אלא באשת כהן... וקתני יש לה כתובה."
The Ran, elucidating the conceptual mechanics of this ruling, writes:
"גברא הוא דנסתחפה שדהו - קדושת כהונתו גרמה לו כדפרישית במתני'"[^1]
The Ran introduces a profound conceptual distinction: Why is this considered "his field that was flooded"? The physical act of rape (ones) is an external event that happened to her body. However, the halachic impediment that prevents the continuation of the marriage is not an inherent defect in her; rather, it is a direct consequence of his priestly status (kedushat kehunato). If she were married to an Israelite, this exact event would not disrupt the marriage.
Therefore, the Ran’s chiddush is that we do not view the rape as a disqualifying defect in the woman (mumm de-gufa). Rather, the rape is an objective event, and the resulting prohibition is generated entirely by the husband's identity. Since the husband's status is the catalyst for the prohibition, he cannot claim that she breached her marital contract. He must pay her ketubah because it is his "field" (his priestly status) that has been flooded.
This establishes a fundamental rule in the laws of ketubah: A woman only forfeits her ketubah when she actively or willingly undermines the marriage (ratzon), or when she suffers a personal defect that would disqualify her to any husband. When the disqualification is relative—existing only because of the specific religious identity of the husband—the financial loss remains his.
2. The Shev Shema'tata on "Ein Ishah Me'izah"
The Gemara pivots to the dispute between Rav Hamnuna and Rava regarding the claim Gerashtani ("You divorced me"). Rav Hamnuna rules that she is believed because of the chazakah:
"אין אשה מעיזה פניה בפני בעלה" (A woman is not brazen to lie in her husband's presence).
Rava counters that if she hates him (katzah beh), she will indeed gather the audacity to lie to his face.
The Shev Shema'tata[^2] dissects the nature of this chazakah. He poses a fundamental question: Is the presumption of ein ishah me'izah an evidentiary proof (raglayim ladavar that she is telling the truth), or is it a definitive psychological barrier (m'neiah nafshit) that renders the act of lying physically and emotionally impossible under normal circumstances?
If it is a definitive psychological barrier, how can Rava argue that katzah beh overrides it? If she physically cannot do it, her hatred shouldn't magically rewrite her psychological makeup.
The Shev Shema'tata resolves this by distinguishing between two types of claims:
- A claim that can be immediately refuted (e.g., "You divorced me in front of a court," where the husband can easily produce the judges or disprove her).
- A claim of private occurrence (e.g., "You divorced me in private").
According to the Shev Shema'tata, the chazakah of ein ishah me'izah is not an absolute, unbreakable law of human nature. Rather, it is a rational behavioral calculation: a person will not lie when they know they will be immediately caught and humiliated.
When a woman is in a state of katzah beh, her desperation to escape the marriage is so intense that she is willing to endure the immediate humiliation of being caught in a lie. Thus, Rava’s chiddush is that the psychological presumption of ein ishah me'izah is highly contingent. It is not an objective, static chazakah d'gufa (like the physical maturity of a person), but a subjective chazakah d'hanhagah (a behavioral presumption) that is entirely dependent on motivation. Once a counter-motivation (katzah) is introduced, the presumption collapses.
3. The Avnei Miluim on "Eyneha Natnah Be-Acher"
In the cases brought before Rav Nachman on Nedarim 91a, women made highly suspicious statements implying they might have been defiled by "aloe merchants" (ahaloyei) or "oil merchants" (naftoyei). Rav Nachman dismissed their statements, declaring:
"לאו כל הימנה, עיניה נתנה באחר." (It is not within her power; she has cast her eyes on another).
This ruling seems to fly in the face of the established halachic principle of shavyeh a-nafshei chatichah de-issura (a person can make something forbidden to themselves by their own admission), as derived from Kiddushin 65a. If a woman says "I am defiled," she should be forbidden to her husband based on her own testimony, regardless of whether we believe she is lying!
The Avnei Miluim[^3] addresses this glaring contradiction. He offers a brilliant conceptual framework for the mechanics of shavyeh a-nafshei.
He asks: Is shavyeh a-nafshei a sub-category of vows (nedarim), where a person has the halachic power to create an issur (prohibition) through verbal consecration? Or is it a sub-category of testimony/admission (hoda'at ba'al din), where we accept their statement as factual truth regarding themselves?
The Avnei Miluim argues that shavyeh a-nafshei is rooted in the framework of hoda'ah (admission). Therefore, it is entirely dependent on the plausibility of the statement. If there is an absolute, undeniable umdana de-mochiach (a glaring, self-evident assessment) that the person is lying to achieve a secondary benefit, their "admission" is stripped of its legal reality.
In the cases of the aloe and oil merchants, the women only "remembered" the possibility of being defiled after their husbands pointed out that they had not engaged in relations that morning. The sudden, highly convenient realization that they might have been raped by a passing merchant is so transparently fabricated that it doesn't even qualify as a valid hoda'ah.
Rav Nachman’s chiddush, according to the Avnei Miluim, is that shavyeh a-nafshei is not a magical, objective verbal mechanism that creates an issur regardless of context. Because it is based on the logic of admission, it requires a baseline of credibility. When a powerful umdana (such as eyneha natnah be-acher) proves that the statement is a cynical manipulation, the halachic force of shavyeh a-nafshei is completely neutralized.
Friction
Kushya 1: The Audacity Paradox
If the presumption ein ishah me'izah paneha bifnei ba'alah is so easily dismantled by the assumption of katzah beh (disgust), why does the Gemara ever rely on this chazakah?
In any scenario where a woman comes to court claiming "You divorced me," she is, by definition, seeking to exit the marriage. If she is seeking to exit, she is almost certainly experiencing some level of katzah beh (aversion to her husband). If so, the chazakah of ein ishah me'izah is structurally self-defeating: it only applies when she has no reason to lie, but the only time she would make such a claim is when she has a strong motivation to lie! How can Rav Hamnuna build an entire halachic ruling on a presumption that is neutralized by the very act of invoking it?
The Audacity Paradox (Kushya 1)
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Claim: "You divorced me" │
└──────────────────────────────────┬───────────────────────────────────┘
│
Is she motivated to exit marriage?
│
┌──────────────────┴──────────────────┐
▼ ▼
[ YES ] [ NO ]
│ │
She has "Katzah Beh" Why would she make
│ the claim?
▼ │
"Me'izah" is shattered ▼
│ No practical case exists
▼
CHAZAKAH COLLAPSES!
Terutz 1: The Kehillot Yaakov's Resolution
The Kehillot Yaakov[^4] resolves this paradox by redefining the threshold of katzah beh. He argues that there are two distinct levels of marital discord:
- Standard marital friction: A woman may be unhappy in her marriage and desire a divorce, but she still maintains basic social boundaries and psychological inhibitions. In this state, the chazakah of ein ishah me'izah remains fully intact. She may want to leave, but she does not possess the sheer, unbridled audacity required to look her husband in the eye in open court and fabricate a major lie that he knows is false.
- Extreme, acute aversion (katzah beh): This is a pathological level of hatred where the husband’s presence becomes so intolerable that the woman’s survival instincts override all social shame.
Rav Hamnuna’s position is that we assume a woman is in the first category (standard friction) unless proven otherwise. Therefore, she is believed when she says "You divorced me," because her standard inhibitions would prevent her from lying to his face.
Rava, however, argues that the very act of standing in court and claiming "You divorced me" (knowing he will immediately deny it) is such an extreme, high-stakes move that it serves as an objective indicator (umdana) that she has entered the second category of acute aversion. Rava does not believe that standard friction shatters the chazakah; rather, he argues that the claim itself is proof of an extreme psychological state (katzah) that bypasses the normal me'izah barrier.
Kushya 2: The Adulterer’s Primal Drive
On Nedarim 91b, Rava rules that if an adulterer is caught in a house with a married woman and warns the husband not to eat poisoned cress (tachlei), the woman remains permitted to her husband. Rava's logic is that if they had actually committed adultery, the adulterer would have wanted the husband to eat the poison and die, as the verse says:
"For they have committed adultery and blood is on their hands" Ezekiel 23:37.
The Gemara objects to this logic:
"Lest you say... 'Stolen waters are sweet, and bread eaten in secret is pleasant' Proverbs 9:17."
Meaning, the adulterer might prefer the husband to live so that the affair can continue in secret, which is psychologically more thrilling than marrying her as a widow.
The Gemara answers that Rava's ruling stands. But this is highly problematic: If the psychological phenomenon of "stolen waters are sweet" is a recognized biblical truth, how can Rava simply brush it aside? The thrill of the forbidden is a powerful human drive. If saving the husband’s life preserves this illicit thrill, the adulterer’s warning is not proof of innocence! He might save the husband precisely to keep the illicit affair alive!
The Adulterer's Dilemma (Kushya 2)
┌────────────────────────────────┐
│ Adulterer warns husband of the │
│ poisoned cress (Tachlei) │
└───────────────┬────────────────┘
│
Why did he save the husband?
│
┌────────────────────────┴────────────────────────┐
▼ ▼
[ Rava's Premise ] [ Gemara's Objection ]
If they had sinned, He saved him to keep the
he would want him thrill of "stolen waters"
to die (Ezekiel 23:37). alive (Proverbs 9:17).
│ │
└────────────────────────┬────────────────────────┘
▼
How does Rava resolve this?
Terutz 2: The Maharsha and Ritva on Survival vs. Luxury
The Maharsha[^5] and the Ritva[^6] resolve this by analyzing the hierarchy of human desires.
The thrill of "stolen waters are sweet" is a psychological luxury. It is a sophisticated, twisted form of pleasure that can only be enjoyed when there is a baseline of physical security. However, adultery carries a massive, existential risk. If the husband dies of poisoning shortly after the adulterer is seen in the house, the adulterer will immediately be suspected of murder, which carries the death penalty.
Furthermore, the Ritva explains that the verse "For they have committed adultery and blood is on their hands" Ezekiel 23:37 reveals an ontological reality: the adulterous relationship naturally breeds a murderous, venomous hatred toward the husband. The husband is the ultimate barrier to their union. The primal drive to eliminate the obstacle (the husband) always overrides the refined, intellectualized pleasure of "stolen waters."
Therefore, Rava’s logic is flawless: If they had actually crossed the line into adultery, the adulterer would have been entirely consumed by the primal, murderous hatred of the husband. He would have stood by silently and let the husband eat the poisoned cress, gladly accepting the risk of investigation to be rid of his rival. The fact that the adulterer actively stepped in to save the husband's life proves that he did not possess this murderous, adulterous animus. This indicates that they had not yet sinned, and she remains permitted to her husband.
Intertext
1. Biblical Psychology: Ezekiel vs. Proverbs
The sugya on Nedarim 91b presents a fascinating dialectic between two biblical verses that outline competing psychological profiles of the sinner:
┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐ ┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Ezekiel 23:37 │ │ Proverbs 9:17 │
├─────────────────────────────────────────┤ ├─────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ "For they have committed adultery and │ │ "Stolen waters are sweet, and bread │
│ blood is on their hands." │ │ eaten in secret is pleasant." │
├─────────────────────────────────────────┤ ├─────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ • The Adulterous Psyche: Primal, │ │ • The Adulterous Psyche: Intellectual, │
│ murderous, destructive. │ │ thrill-seeking, covert. │
│ • Drive: Eliminate the obstacle. │ │ • Drive: Maintain the secret status quo.│
└─────────────────────────────────────────┘ └─────────────────────────────────────────┘
The Gemara’s synthesis of these verses establishes a hierarchy of human nature: while the desire for the forbidden is driven by the logic of Proverbs 9:17, the actualization of mortal sin triggers the destructive, dark reality of Ezekiel 23:37. Once the line is crossed, the relationship ceases to be a playful game of "stolen waters" and becomes a dangerous, murderous conflict.
2. Halachic Codification: Shulchan Aruch Even HaEzer 17:2
The Rambam and the Shulchan Aruch codify the dispute of Gerashtani according to Rava’s view (that she is not believed).
The Shulchan Aruch rules:
"האומרת לבעלה 'גרשתני', אינה נאמנת." (A woman who says to her husband 'You divorced me' is not believed)[^7].
However, the Beir Heitev and the Chelkat Mechokek[^8] note a crucial nuance: If the woman makes this claim and then produces a torn or damaged get (divorce document), we combine the chazakah of ein ishah me'izah with the physical evidence of the document (raglayim ladavar) to rule that she is indeed believed.
This demonstrates that while Rava rejected Rav Hamnuna's sweeping use of ein ishah me'izah as an absolute, standalone proof, the psychological presumption still exists as a contributing factor. It can be combined with minor circumstantial evidence to create a complete halachic proof (s'feik sfeika or raglayim ladavar).
3. Cross-Reference: Even HaEzer 115 and the Mechanics of "Tameiah Ani Lach"
The Mishnah's case of a woman saying "I am defiled to you" (tameiah ani lach) is codified in Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 115:6. The Shulchan Aruch writes:
"האומרת לבעלה 'טמאה אני לך'... אם נתנה אמתלא לדבריה, נאמנת." (If she says 'I am defiled,' she is not believed unless she provides a plausible, logical explanation for her words).
If she has "cast her eyes on another" (eyneha natnah be-acher), her testimony is completely disregarded. The Rema[^9] adds that in contemporary times, we are highly suspicious of any woman who suddenly claims to be defiled, assuming she has ulterior motives to dissolve the marriage unless there are clear, independent witnesses to the event.
Psak/Practice
1. The Modern Rabbinic Court (Beit Din)
In contemporary rabbinic courts, the psychological assumptions of Nedarim 91a are not applied as rigid, automatic rules of evidence. Instead, they are utilized as interpretive tools within a broader, comprehensive psychological assessment (umdana d'mucha'at).
Modern Beit Din Analytical Framework
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Evaluation of Marital Claims (e.g., Infidelity or Informal Divorce) │
└──────────────────────────────────┬───────────────────────────────────┘
│
┌─────────────────────────┴─────────────────────────┐
▼ ▼
┌─────────────────────────────────┐ ┌─────────────────────────────────┐
│ Formulary Presumptions │ │ Dynamic Circumstantial │
│ (Classical Chazakot) │ │ Evidence (Umdana) │
├─────────────────────────────────┤ ├─────────────────────────────────┤
│ • "Ein ishah me'izah" │ │ • Forensic digital evidence │
│ • "Eyneha natnah be-acher" │ │ • Financial/marital history │
│ │ │ • Psychological profiling │
└────────────────┬────────────────┘ └────────────────┬────────────────┘
│ │
└────────────────────┬──────────────────────┘
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Integrated Psak: Dynamic assessment │
│ overrides static formulary rules. │
└──────────────────────────────────────┘
The transition from a formulary system of evidence (where a claim is accepted or rejected based on rigid, formal chazakot) to a dynamic system of assessment (umdana) is one of the hallmarks of modern halachic jurisprudence.
For example, a modern Beit Din will not automatically reject a woman’s claim of divorce or abuse based solely on the assumption of katzah beh or eyneha natnah be-acher. Instead, the Dayanim (judges) will employ forensic accounting, psychological evaluations, and digital communication logs (such as text messages or emails) to establish the objective reality of the marriage. The Talmud’s psychological insights are treated as timeless archetypes of human behavior that guide the judges in analyzing the evidence, rather than blind legal axioms.
2. The Meta-Psak Heuristic: "Nisatpeha Sadeh" as a Model for Force Majeure
The concept of nisatpeha sadeh developed by the Ran on Nedarim 91a serves as a foundational meta-psak heuristic for all of Choshen Mishpat (monetary law) and Even HaEzer.
The heuristic can be formulated as follows:
When a contract is terminated due to an external force majeure (ones), the loss is allocated to the party whose specific legal identity or status converted the neutral event into a legal barrier.
This principle is widely applied in modern Choshen Mishpat rulings concerning employment contracts and commercial leases:
- The Covid-19 Pandemic: If a government-mandated lockdown prevents a school from operating, is the school exempt from paying its teachers?
- Using the heuristic of nisatpeha sadeh, we ask: Is the inability to teach a result of a defect in the teacher's physical capacity (which would be a loss for the teacher), or is it a result of the employer's business being shut down by a decree that targets the institution (which would be a loss for the employer)?
- Many contemporary Batei Din utilized the Ran's formulation of nisatpeha sadeh to allocate financial losses during the pandemic, placing the burden on the party whose "field" (the business entity) was directly impacted by the regulatory change[^10].
Takeaway
The Gemara in Nedarim 91 reveals that halachic truth is never flatly mechanical; it is deeply psychological. Whether defining the financial liabilities of a ruined marriage or assessing the credibility of a confession, Halacha demands that we read through human behavior—balancing the protective behavioral shields of social shame against the desperate, survivalist audacities of the human heart.
Hebrew/Aramaic Glossary
- נסתחפה שדהו (Nisatpeha Sadeh): "His field was flooded." A legal metaphor indicating that a force majeure loss must be borne by the owner/husband.
- אין אשה מעיזה פניה בפני בעלה (Ein ishah me'izah paneha bifnei ba'alah): "A woman is not brazen to her husband's face." The psychological presumption that a wife will not look her husband in the eye and state a direct lie that he can immediately refute.
- קצה ביה (Katzah Beh): "She loathes him." A state of extreme marital alienation that shatters standard psychological and social inhibitions.
- שוויה אנפשיה חתיכה דאיסורא (Shavyeh a-nafshei chatichah de-issura): "He/she made it a forbidden piece upon themselves." The legal principle that a person's self-incriminating admission is halachically binding upon them, even without external witnesses.
- עיניה נתנה באחר (Eyneha natnah be-acher): "She cast her eyes on another." A circumstantial assessment (umdana) that a woman's claim of defilement or divorce is a fabrication designed to free her to marry another man.
- אומדנא דמוכח (Umdana de-mochiach): A highly logical, self-evident circumstantial assessment that carries legal weight in court.
- אונס (Ones): A force majeure; an event occurring completely beyond a person's control.
- רצון (Ratzon): Willful intent or consent.
[^1]: Ran on Nedarim 91a:1:1. [^2]: Shev Shema'tata, Shema'tata 6, Chapters 1-3. [^3]: Avnei Miluim, Siman 115, s.v. "Shavyeh A-Nafshei". [^4]: Kehillot Yaakov, Nedarim, Siman 36. [^5]: Maharsha, Chiddushei Halachot, Nedarim 91b, s.v. "Tachlei". [^6]: Chiddushei HaRitva, Nedarim 91b, s.v. "U'Shema Mina". [^7]: Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 17:2. [^8]: Chelkat Mechokek, Even HaEzer 17, Se'if Katan 5. [^9]: Hagahat HaRema, Even HaEzer 115:6. [^10]: See, for example, Shut Chasam Sofer, Choshen Mishpat, Siman 161, which utilizes this exact model of nisatpeha sadeh to evaluate lease disputes during plagues, a precedent heavily cited during modern commercial lease litigations.
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