Chullin 110

Sugya Map & Snapshot

The Conceptual Topography of Chullin 110

The sugya of Chullin 110a serves as a classic locus classicus for three distinct legal-conceptual fields:

• The Ontological Status of Udder (Kachal): Does the milk contained within an animal's udder (chalav kachal) retain the legal status of "milk" (chalav) regarding the biblical prohibition of cooking meat in milk (Basar Be-Chalav), or is it viewed as an intermediate substance?
• The Jurisprudence of Rabbinic Fences (Bik'ah Matza Ve-Gadar Bah Gader): How does a regional rabbinic authority construct localized prohibitions to safeguard biblical law, and what is the binding scope of these decrees?
• The Spatial Dynamics of Halakhic Custom (Minhag): How do local stringencies (chumrei ha-makon) interact with a traveler’s personal identity, and can these geographic obligations be physically bypassed by exiting the municipal boundary (techum)?

                      [Ontological Status of Chalav Kachal]
                                     |
                +--------------------+--------------------+
                |                                         |
     [Biblical/Rabbinic Status]                  [Cooking vs. Roasting]
     - Chalav Shchutah: Rabbinic                 - Cooking: Bedi'avad forbidden
     - Milk inside udder: Meat-adjacent          - Roasting: Lechatchilah permitted
                |                                         |
                +--------------------+--------------------+
                                     |
                     [Bik'ah Matza Ve-Gadar Bah Gader]
                     - Localized emergency fences (Rav)
                                     |
                       [Spatial Dynamics of Minhag]
                       - Rami bar Tamrei vs. Rav Chisda
                       - Geographic vs. Personal custom

Nafka Minot (Practical Ramifications)

1. Cooking Kachal Post-Facto (Bedi'avad): If chalav kachal is biblically permitted, a post-facto mixture of cooked udder may not require sixty times its volume (bittul be-shishim) to be permitted.
2. The Traveler’s Behavior: Does a traveler who exits the municipal boundary of a stringent city retain their stringencies, or does the geographic exit dissolve the chashad (suspicion) and machloket (discord)?
3. Exemptions from Positive Commandments: The structural differences between tzitzit (a property-dependent obligation, chovat mana) and tefillin (a person-dependent obligation, chovat ha-guf).

Text Snapshot

The Gemara in Chullin 110a describes the dramatic encounter between the Babylonian sage Rami bar Tamrei and the local authority of Sura, Rav Chisda:

"רמי בר תמרי... איקלע לסורא במעלי יומא דכיפורי. שדיוה שיפורי דכחלי, אזל אשקיל אכל. אייתוהו לקמיה דרב חסדא, אמר ליה: אמאי עבדת הכי? אמר ליה: מאתריה דרב יהודה אנא דאכל... אמר ליה: ולא סבר מר 'נותנין עליו חומרי המקום שיצא משם וחומרי המקום שהלך לשם'? אמר ליה: חוץ לתחום אכלתי."

Rami bar Tamrei... arrived in Sura on the eve of Yom Kippur. The residents threw away the udders of slaughtered animals. He went, gathered them, and ate them. They brought him before Rav Chisda, who said to him: "Why did you do this?" He replied: "I am from the place of Rav Yehuda, who eats udders." Rav Chisda said: "But do you not hold of the principle: 'We impose upon him the stringencies of the place he left and the stringencies of the place to which he went'?" Rami bar Tamrei replied: "I ate them outside the municipal boundary (techum) of Sura."

---

Readings

Reading 1: The Ontological Status of Chalav Kachal

To understand the baseline permit of eating an udder, we must examine the nature of the milk contained within it. The Torah prohibits cooking a kid in its mother’s milk Exodus 23:19. The Rishonim ask: is the milk still inside the udder of a slaughtered animal biblically considered "milk"?

Rashi on Chullin 110a:1 and the Rosh explain that the milk of a slaughtered animal (chalav shechutah) is biblically permitted to be cooked with meat. The biblical prohibition of Basar Be-Chalav applies only to the milk of a living animal (chalav chayah). Since the animal has been slaughtered, the milk within its udder loses its biblical designation of chalav.

Steinsaltz, in his commentary on Chullin 110a:1, unpacks this distinction:

שבשלה בחלבה (החלב שינק הגדי מאמו) — הריהי אסורה, שאפילו בדיעבד נמי [שנעשה הדבר גם כן] לא יאכלנה, לכך תנא נמי רישא [שנה גם כן בהתחלה] שבשלה בלשון בדיעבד, ואולם מעיקר הדין, אף לכתחילה מותר לצלות את הכחל בחלבו. (An udder that one cooked in its milk—referring to the milk that a kid suckled from its mother—behold, it is prohibited, so that even post-facto [if the act has occurred] one may not eat it. Therefore, the Tanna also taught the first clause using a post-facto formulation. However, from the letter of the law, even initially it is permitted to roast the udder in its milk.)

Here, Steinsaltz points out a crucial distinction in the Mishnah's symmetry. The milk inside the udder's tissue is not biblically "milk" but rather meat-adjacent. Thus, roasting it is permitted lechatchilah because roasting expels the milk outward without forcing it to cook back into the meat. Conversely, cooking it in a pot is rabbinically forbidden because the pot traps the milk, causing it to cook together with the udder tissue.

The Rashba, in his Torat HaBayit (Bayit 3, Shaar 1), conceptualizes this further: Is the rabbinic prohibition of cooking kachal due to the appearance of eating meat and milk (mar'it ayin), or did the Sages apply a formal rabbinic status of Basar Be-Chalav to chalav shechutah?

• If it is merely mar'it ayin, then roasting—where the milk drains away—removes the visual problem.
• If it is a formal rabbinic status of Basar Be-Chalav, then even roasting should have been banned. The Sages chose a middle path, permitting roasting because the milk drains out (miflat plit), but forbidding pot-cooking where the milk is re-absorbed.

Reading 2: The Jurisprudence of "Bik'ah Matza Ve-Gadar Bah Gader"

When Rabbi Elazar asks Ze'eiri if there is a Tanna who taught Rav that roasting an untorn udder is forbidden, Ze'eiri points to Rav Yitzchak bar Avudimi, who declares:

"אני לא שניתי לו כחל כל עיקר, אלא רב בקעה מצא וגדר בה גדר." (I did not teach him about the udder at all; rather, Rav found an open, unguarded valley and fenced it in.)

What is the legal mechanism of "finding a valley and fencing it in" (bik'ah matza ve-gadar bah gader)? The Ran (on the Rif, Chullin 39b) explains that this does not represent a standard, universal Rabbinic decree (gezeirah). Rather, it is a localized emergency measure (hora'at sha'ah or migdar miltah) enacted by a regional halakhic authority who observes a breakdown in religious observance.

In Tatlefush, Rav witnessed a woman asking how much milk was needed to cook a quarter-weight of meat. Realizing the local population was ignorant of the basic biblical prohibition of Basar Be-Chalav, Rav knew that if they saw scholars eating roasted udders (which contain milk), they would assume all meat and milk could be cooked together. To prevent this, Rav prohibited kachal entirely in that region—even roasted, and even if torn.

The Rambam, in Hilkhot Mamrim Mamrim 2:4, codifies the authority of a court to issue temporary or localized decrees to protect the Torah:

"יש לבית דין לגזור גזירות ולאסור דברים המותרים... כדי לעשות סייג לתורה" (A court has the authority to issue decrees and prohibit permitted matters... in order to create a fence around the Torah.)

The Brisker Rav (Rav Yitzchok Ze'ev Soloveitchik) asks: did Rav’s localized decree change the halakha for the residents of Tatlefush, transforming a permitted act into an actual prohibition, or was it merely a disciplinary boundary?

He argues that bik'ah matza ve-gadar operates on the gavra (the person) rather than the cheftza (the object). The udder itself remained objectively permitted, but the residents of Tatlefush were bound by an obligation of obedience to their halakhic leader. Therefore, when Rav left Tatlefush, or for travelers visiting the town, the parameters of this "fence" depended on whether the decree was tied to the geographical location or the specific community.

Reading 3: The Spatial Geography of Custom (Minhag)

The confrontation between Rami bar Tamrei and Rav Chisda highlights the tension between personal practice and regional custom. Rami bar Tamrei, a disciple of Rav Yehuda in Pumbedita, was accustomed to eating roasted udders. When he visited Sura—where udders were treated as forbidden and thrown away—he gathered and ate them.

Rav Chisda challenged him based on the Mishnah in Pesachim 50a:

"נותנין עליו חומרי המקום שיצא משם וחומרי המקום שהלך לשם" (We impose upon a person the stringencies of the place they left and the stringencies of the place to which they have gone.)

Rami bar Tamrei’s defense is brilliant: "I ate them outside the municipal boundary (techum) of Sura."

How does stepping outside the techum permit an act that is forbidden inside the city? The Rosh Rosh Chullin 8:19 explains that the restriction against violating a local stringency is rooted in two concerns:

1. Avoiding Dispute (Machloket): Publicly violating a local custom creates social friction and communal strife.
2. Suspicion (Chashad or Mar'it Ayin): Onlookers might assume the traveler is violating an actual law.

By traveling outside the techum (beyond 2,000 cubits from the city limits), Rami bar Tamrei was no longer in the public eye of Sura. Since there were no local residents present to witness his actions, there was no risk of machloket or chashad.

The Ritva Ritva Chullin 110a adds a key spatial dimension: municipal customs are geographically bound. A local Beit Din’s jurisdiction to establish a communal standard extends only to the city limits (techum Shabbat). Once a person crosses that boundary, they are in a halakhic "no-man's-land" where their home custom (minhag ha-makon she-yatzah mi-sham) reassumes dominance.

       [SURA MUNICIPAL BOUNDARY (Techum)]
  +-------------------------------------------+
  |  Local Minhag: Udder is forbidden         |
  |  Public violation = Machloket & Chashad    |
  +-------------------------------------------+
                        |
                        | (Crosses Techum Boundary > 2000 cubits)
                        v
       [OUTSIDE THE TECHUM (No-Man's-Land)]
  +-------------------------------------------+
  |  No local residents present               |
  |  No Machloket / No Chashad                |
  |  Home Minhag (Pumbedita) reassumes sway   |
  +-------------------------------------------+

Reading 4: The Exemptions of Tzitzit and Tefillin

To understand Rami bar Tamrei’s defense of his personal practice, we must analyze his exemptions from Tefillin and Tzitzit as recorded in Chullin 110a:10 and Chullin 110a:11.

The Tefillin Exemption

Rav Chisda noticed that Rami bar Tamrei was not wearing Tefillin. Rami bar Tamrei replied that he suffered from an bowel illness (choli me'ayim).

Rashi on Chullin 110a:10:1 explains:

פטור מן התפילין - מפני שצריך לחלצן תדיר: (Exempt from Tefillin—because he needs to remove them constantly.)

Steinsaltz on Chullin 110a:10 expands on this:

חזייה דלא הוה מנח... תפילין... חולי מעיין הוא... פטור מן התפילין, שכן תפילין דורשות גוף נקי, ואילו אדם זה שנזקק תכופות לצרכיו, הריהו צריך לחולצן פעמים רבות. (Rav Chisda saw that he was not donning Tefillin... Rami bar Tamrei said to him: I suffer from an intestinal illness, and Rav Yehuda said that one who has an intestinal illness is exempt from Tefillin, because Tefillin require a clean body [guf naki], whereas this person who frequently needs to relieve himself must remove them constantly.)

The concept of guf naki (a clean body), derived from Shabbat 49a in the name of Elisha Ba'al Kenafayim, is not merely a physical preparation; it is a structural requirement of the mitzvah.

The Rashba (Shut HaRashba 1:695) explains that Tefillin are unique because the Torah describes them as "a sign upon your hand" Exodus 13:9. This "sign" requires continuous, conscious awareness (heseach ha-da'at) and physical purity.

A person with an intestinal illness cannot maintain the necessary physical purity. Because they must constantly remove and re-don the Tefillin, they are exempt from the mitzvah entirely during their illness.

The Tzitzit Exemption

Rav Chisda then noticed that Rami bar Tamrei had no Tzitzit on his cloak. Rami bar Tamrei replied that it was a borrowed garment (talit she'ulah).

Rabbeinu Gershom on Chullin 110a:10 and Chullin 110a:11 notes:

חזיה. דלית ליה חוטי ציצית... פטורה מן הציצית כל ל' יום. כלומר בתוך ל' יום אבל אם שאלה יותר מל' יום חייבת בציצית: (He saw that he did not have the threads of Tzitzit... Exempt from Tzitzit for all of thirty days. That is to say, within thirty days, but if he borrowed it for more than thirty days, it is obligated in Tzitzit.)

Rashi on Chullin 110a:11:1 concurs:

דלא הוה רמי חוטי - לא הטיל ציצית לטליתו: (That he did not place threads—he did not cast Tzitzit onto his cloak.)

This distinction is based on the biblical text. The Torah states: "upon the four corners of your garment (kesutcha)" Deuteronomy 22:12. The word kesutcha implies personal ownership.

The Meiri on Chullin 110a:7 explains the biblical exemption and the rabbinic decree:

טלית שאולה מן התורה פטורה מן הציצית לעולם שנא' כסותך ולא של אחרים ומדברי סופרים לחייבה בציצית אחר שלשים יום מפני שכל הרואה אותו שלבשה שלשים יום סבור שהיא שלו שאין דרך להשאיל ביתר משלשים יום ויביא עצמו בכך לידי חשד: (A borrowed cloak is biblically exempt from Tzitzit forever, as it is said, "your garment" and not that of others. However, by rabbinic decree, one is obligated to place Tzitzit on it after thirty days, because anyone who sees him wearing it for thirty days assumes that it is his—since it is not customary to lend a garment for more than thirty days—and he would thus bring himself into suspicion [of neglecting the mitzvah].)

The Meiri highlights a classic halakhic mechanism:

• Biblically (Min HaTorah): A borrowed garment lacks the cheftza (object) requirement of ownership (kesutcha). It is permanently exempt.
• Rabbinically (MiDeRabanan): After thirty days, the public assumes the garment belongs to the wearer, as garments are rarely borrowed for longer. To prevent suspicion (chashad), the Sages obligated the wearer to add Tzitzit.

This distinction demonstrates how rabbinic law bridges the gap between objective biblical exemptions and community perception.

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Friction

Kushya 1: The Spatial Paradox of Minhag

The primary friction in our sugya lies in Rami bar Tamrei's claim: "I ate outside the boundary (techum) of Sura."

This defense seems conceptually flawed. If Rami bar Tamrei is bound by the rule of notenim alav chumrei ha-makon she-halach lesham (imposing the stringencies of his destination), how does leaving the city limits lift that obligation?

If the stringency becomes a personal obligation (chovat ha-gavra) once he enters Sura, that obligation should accompany him wherever he goes until he returns to his home town of Pumbedita. If the obligation is geographic (chovat ha-makon), then why does the techum serve as the boundary?

Furthermore, if he plans to return to Sura that evening, he remains under the jurisdiction of Sura's custom. How can a brief walk beyond the techum suspend his communal obligations?

Terutz 1: The Jurisdictional Limit of Chashad and Machloket

To resolve this, we must examine the underlying reason for notenim alav chumrei ha-makon.

The Ran (on Pesachim 50a) explains that this rule is not designed to permanently change a person’s personal halakhic identity (chovat ha-gavra). It is a protective measure designed to prevent two specific social problems: strife (machloket) and suspicion (chashad).

When a traveler visits a town with stringent customs, their actions are evaluated based on how they appear to the local community.

• Inside the Techum: The traveler is within the social sphere of the city. Any deviant behavior is visible to the residents, leading to potential conflict or suspicion that the traveler is ignoring halakha.
• Outside the Techum: The traveler has exited the social sphere of the city. Because there are no local residents present to witness the act, the concerns of machloket and chashad no longer apply.

Therefore, Rami bar Tamrei’s personal status as a Pumbeditan (who is permitted to eat roasted udder) was never erased. It was merely suppressed while he was inside Sura.

Once he stepped outside the techum—where Sura's residents could not see him—the social concerns disappeared. His baseline custom of Pumbedita returned, permitting him to eat the roasted udder.

This reveals a key insight: the traveler's obligation to adopt local stringencies is contextual and social, not ontological. It is bound by the physical presence of the community that maintains the custom.

Is the local stringency a Personal Obligation (Chovat HaGavra)
or a Social/Geographic Obligation (Chovat HaMakon)?

                   [Local Stringency]
                           |
         +-----------------+-----------------+
         |                                   |
 [Chovat HaGavra]                    [Chovat HaMakon]
 (Traveler is permanently            (Traveler is bound only
 bound until returning home)          within the social sphere)
         |                                   |
   *Incompatible with*                 *Compatible with*
   Rami's exit from techum             Rami's exit from techum

Kushya 2: The Double Standard of Miflat Plit in Liver and Udder

A second friction arises in the Gemara's discussion of liver (kaved) and udder (kachal).

Regarding liver, the Gemara states that it is not forbidden by its own blood because as it cooks, it expels blood rather than absorbing it (miflat plit ve-la balei).

Yet, regarding an udder, the Gemara maintains that if one cooks it in a pot, it is forbidden because it absorbs its own milk.

Why do we differentiate between these two cases?

• If we apply the principle of miflat plit (expulsion over absorption) to blood in a liver, why do we not apply it to milk in an udder?
• Both are dense organs filled with a prohibited fluid (blood and milk, respectively). Why does the liver expel its blood without re-absorbing it, while the udder is assumed to absorb its milk?

Terutz 2: The Physicality of Blood vs. Milk

The Rashba Torat HaBayit 3:1 and the Tosafot Chullin 110a s.v. כבד resolve this by distinguishing between the physical properties of blood and milk, as well as the halakhic categories of the organs themselves.

1. The Density of the Organ: Liver is uniquely dense and dry. Its tissue is structured to expel fluid under heat, and its dry texture prevents it from re-absorbing liquid once it has been expelled. An udder, by contrast, is soft, fatty, and porous meat. It easily absorbs liquids cooked in the same pot.
2. The Halakhic Status of the Fluids:
   • Blood: The blood in a liver is an independent, forbidden substance (issur). The liver expels this blood during cooking. While the blood is draining, the liver's outward flow prevents it from absorbing any external liquid.
   • Udder Milk: The milk inside an udder (chalav shechutah) is permitted on a biblical level. It only becomes rabbinically forbidden when cooked together with the meat of the udder. Because the milk is permitted while inside the tissue, the udder does not treat it as an external, forbidden substance to be expelled. When cooked in a pot, the milk mixes with the meat, creating a new rabbinic prohibition (Basar Be-Chalav) that is absorbed back into the udder.

Thus, the principle of miflat plit is not a blanket rule for all organs. It depends on the physical density of the tissue and whether the fluid inside is biblically permitted or forbidden.

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Intertext

Biblical Foundations of Tzitzit: "Kesutcha" vs. "Al Kanfei Vigdeihem"

The exemption of a borrowed garment from Tzitzit, discussed by Rami bar Tamrei, highlights a textual tension between two biblical verses:

1. Numbers 15:38:

   "וְעָשׂוּ לָהֶם צִיצִת עַל־כַּנְפֵי בִגְדֵיהֶם" (And they shall make for themselves Tzitzit on the corners of their garments)

2. Deuteronomy 22:12:

   "גְּדִלִים תַּעֲשֶׂה־לָּךְ עַל־אַרְבַּע כַּנְפוֹת כְּסוּתְךָ" (You shall make tassels for yourself on the four corners of your garment)

The term "their garments" (vigdeihem) in Numbers suggests that any garment worn by a Jewish person requires Tzitzit, regardless of ownership. However, the term "your garment" (kesutcha) in Deuteronomy limits the obligation to personally owned garments.

The Sifrei on Deuteronomy resolves this by applying the limitation of kesutcha to exclude a borrowed garment from the biblical obligation.

This mirrors the laws of Mezuzah. The Torah writes: "upon the doorposts of your house (beitecha)" Deuteronomy 6:9, which the Gemara in Bava Metzia 101b interprets as exempting a rented house from the obligation of Mezuzah for the first thirty days.

In both cases, the Torah uses possessive language (kesutcha, beitecha) to limit the biblical obligation to owned property. In both cases, the Sages stepped in and established a thirty-day window.

After thirty days, a borrowed garment or a rented home is rabbinically obligated in the mitzvah to prevent the appearance of neglecting the law (chashad).

Mitzvah	Biblical Source	Possessive Term	Exemption	Rabbinic Obligation	Reason for Rabbinic Decree
Tzitzit	Deuteronomy 22:12	כסותך (Your garment)	Borrowed garment	After 30 days	Onlookers assume it is owned (Chashad)
Mezuzah	Deuteronomy 6:9	ביתך (Your house)	Rented home	After 30 days (in Diaspora)	Appears like a permanent residence (Chashad)

The "Clean Body" (Guf Naki) of Tefillin vs. Other Mitzvot

Rami bar Tamrei’s exemption from Tefillin due to an intestinal illness (choli me'ayim) is based on the requirement of a guf naki (clean body). This requirement is codified in the Shulchan Aruch:

"חולי מעיים פטורים מן התפילין... מפני שצריכים לגוף נקי." (Those with intestinal illnesses are exempt from Tefillin... because they require a clean body.) Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 38:1

Why does this physical requirement apply to Tefillin but not to other mitzvot, such as Tzitzit or eating Matzah?

The Yerushalmi Berakhot 2:3 explains that Tefillin are compared to the Torah itself, as it is written: "that the Torah of the Lord may be in your mouth" Exodus 13:9. Just as a Torah scroll must be kept in a clean place, so too must the person wearing Tefillin maintain physical and mental purity.

An intestinal illness makes this level of focus and purity impossible. Therefore, the illness does not merely excuse the person from wearing Tefillin; it renders them temporarily ineligible to fulfill the mitzvah.

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Psak/Practice

The Halakhic Status of Kachal (Udder)

How does our sugya land in practical halakha? The Shulchan Aruch codifies the laws of cooking and eating an udder in Yoreh Deah:

"כחל אינו בשר מן התורה, לפיכך מותר לצלותו ולאכלו... ואם בשלו בקדירה לבדו, מותר בדיעבד." (An udder is not biblically considered meat [with respect to its own milk]; therefore, it is permitted to roast and eat it... and if one cooked it alone in a pot, it is permitted post-facto.) Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 90:1

The Rama adds that the Ashkenazic custom is more stringent:

"והאידנא נהגו שלא לאכול כחל כלל, אפילו צלי... אלא אם כן קרעו שתי וערב וטיחלו בכותל." (And nowadays, the custom is not to eat an udder at all, even roasted... unless it was torn horizontally and vertically and pressed against a wall to drain its milk.) Yoreh Deah 90:1

This progression illustrates how Rav’s localized fence in Tatlefush eventually influenced broader Ashkenazic practice, leading to a communal custom that treats the udder with extra care.

The Halakhic Status of Kaved (Liver)

Regarding liver, the Shulchan Aruch rules:

"הכבד יש בו ריבוי דם, לפיכך אינו ניתר בישולו אלא על ידי צלייה." (The liver contains a large amount of blood; therefore, it cannot be cooked in a pot unless it is first roasted.) Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 73:1

Because the liver is dense and filled with blood, it must be roasted over an open fire to drain the blood completely before it can be cooked in a pot. This practical ruling directly applies the Talmudic principle of miflat plit (expulsion over absorption) during the roasting process.

The Traveler’s Custom in Modern Halakha

The dispute between Rami bar Tamrei and Rav Chisda remains a central guide for modern halakhic decisions regarding travelers.

The Shulchan Aruch rules:

"ההולך ממקום שיש בו מנהג למקום שאין בו מנהג... אל ישנה אדם מפני המחלוקת." (One who travels from a place with a certain custom to a place without that custom... should not deviate [from the local custom] in order to avoid dispute.) Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 468:4

Modern authorities apply this principle to variations in customs between Sephardic and Ashkenazic communities, as well as different practices on the second day of Yom Tov in Israel.

If an Diaspora resident is visiting Israel, they must perform the second day of Yom Tov privately to avoid public dispute (machloket) and suspicion (chashad). This ruling directly mirrors Rami bar Tamrei's spatial defense: private actions that do not cause public discord are permitted.

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Takeaway

The sugya of Chullin 110 teaches that halakha is not defined solely by abstract, objective categories. Rather, it is shaped by physical reality, social context, and geographic boundaries. From the physical properties of liver and udder to the social dynamics of local customs, the Torah provides a framework that balances absolute truth with the practical realities of human community.