Chullin 121

Sugya Map

The sugya of Chullin 121 serves as a classic locus for investigating the transitional boundaries of halakhic status, exploring the liminal states between life and death, food and waste, and primary source and derivative.

• The Ontological Status of "Intermediary" Tissues (Alal, Beaks, Talons, Horns): Do these tissues qualify as food (okhel) for the purposes of joining (mitztaref) to form the requisite volume (shiur) for tum'at ochlin (food impurity), or are they categorized as inert, non-functional "wood" (etz be'alma)?
• The Twilight Zone of Shechitah (The Mefarkeset / Twitching Animal): Does an animal in its post-slaughter, pre-death convulsive state (mefarkeset) possess the status of a living organism (chai) or a carcass (nevelah)?
• Nafke Minot (Halakhic Ramifications):
  1. Tum'at Ochlin vs. Tum'at Nevelot: Does the contact of a twitching animal with impurity generate the light impurity of food or the severe impurity of a carcass?
  2. Eiver Min HeChai (Limb from a Living Animal): Is a Noahide liable for consuming limbs or flesh severed from a twitching animal?
  3. Ohel HaMet (Tomb Impurity): Does a twitching animal act as a barrier (matzil) to rescue swallowed vessels from contracting impurity under the same roof as a corpse?
• Primary Sources: Chullin 121a–121b; Leviticus 11:38 (the requirement of hekhsher); Leviticus 19:23 (orla); Deuteronomy 26:2 (bikkurim); Mishnah Teharot 1:2 (beaks and talons).

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Text Snapshot

הָעוֹר הַנִּגְרָר עִם הַבָּשָׂר מִצְטָרֵף... הָאַלָּל מִצְטָרֵף...

“The skin that is dragged with the meat joins... the alal joins...”[^1]

The Gemara on Chullin 121a pivots from the Mishnah's ruling on alal (residual meat or connective tissue) to a linguistic and conceptual inquiry:

מאי אלל? רבי יוחנן אמר: מרתקא. וריש לקיש אמר: בשר שפלטתו סכין.

“What is alal? Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The nuchal ligament [marteka]. And Reish Lakish says: The meat residue that is attached to the hide after the knife has flayed the flesh.”[^2]

אמר חזקיה: מתוך שיכול לקצצו פחות פחות מכזית...

“Ḥizkiyya says: Since he is able to chop it into pieces of less than an olive-bulk...”[^3]

Philological and Textual Nuance

The debate over alal (אלל) hinges on its etymological root. The Gemara attempts to resolve the definition by citing Job 13:4: "אֱלִיל" (elil—physicians of no value), mapping it onto Rabbi Yoḥanan’s definition of the nuchal ligament (marteka), which, once severed, cannot heal.[^4]

The textual shift from elil (with an aleph) to alal (with an ayin or aleph depending on manuscript variants) highlights the Sages' sensitivity to biblical Hebrew as a repository for physiological and halakhic taxonomy.

Furthermore, the term paltato sakkin (פלטתו סכין—literally, "that which the knife spit out") denotes the involuntary, residual nature of this meat. It is neither fully integrated into the carcass nor completely detached, creating a physical and legal state of suspension.

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Readings

The Orla/Bikkurim Analogy and the "Zei'ah" Paradox

The Gemara begins by deriving the status of liquids emerging from orla (forbidden fruit of the first three years) from the laws of bikkurim (first fruits) via a gezeirah shavah (verbal analogy) of pri-pri ("fruit" to "fruit"):

וערלתם ערלתו את פריו (ויקרא יט, כג) ... מראשית כל פרי האדמה (דברים כו, ב)

This analogy restricts the prohibition of liquids emerging from orla to grapes and olives alone, excluding other fruit juices as mere "sweat" (zei'ah be'alma).

Tosafot's Challenge (Pesachim vs. Chullin)

In Pesachim 24b, the Gemara attempts to derive the general principle that "for all prohibitions in the Torah, one only receives lashes if they are consumed in their normal manner of benefit" (derekh hana'atan) from our Mishnah's ruling that there are no lashes for drinking non-grape/olive orla liquids.[^5]

There, the Gemara rejects this, asserting that non-grape/olive liquids are excluded because they are zei'ah be'alma (mere sweat).

Tosafot on our daf point out a glaring contradiction: If the exclusion of these liquids is due to their ontological status as zei'ah (sweat), why does our Gemara require a formal gezeirah shavah from bikkurim to exclude them?[^6]

"וי"ל דרבוי דהכא צריכי דלא נימא זיעה בעלמא הוא"

“And one can answer that the inclusion [or derivation] of here is necessary, so that we should not say it is mere sweat.”[^7]

The Maharam Schiff's Resolution

The Maharam Schiff resolves this by restructuring the conceptual framework of zei'ah.[^8] There are two ways to understand "sweat" in this context:

1. Physical/Natural Reality: The liquid is physically nothing more than metabolic condensation, entirely distinct from the fruit's essence.
2. Halakhic Definition: The liquid contains the flavor and essence of the fruit, but the Torah legally defines it as non-fruit (zei'ah).

The Maharam Schiff argues that without the gezeirah shavah of pri-pri from bikkurim, we would have assumed that highly flavorful juices (such as pomegranate or apple juice) are halakhically considered the "fruit itself" because they carry its primary taste.

The gezeirah shavah comes to establish a formal halakhic decree (gzeirat hakatuv): only the liquids of grapes and olives are legally elevated to the status of "fruit" (pri). For all other fruits, their juices are dismissed under the legal fiction of zei'ah be'alma, regardless of their actual culinary significance or flavor concentration.

"אלא דאצטריך למילף מבכורים שנחשב משקין של תירוש ויצהר כמו הפרי ולא נימא דזיעה בעלמא הוא..."

“Rather, it was necessary to learn from Bikkurim that the liquids of wine and oil are considered like the fruit, and we do not say they are mere sweat...”[^9]

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The Ontological Status of Alal: Rabbi Yoḥanan vs. Reish Lakish

The debate over alal centers on whether it can join with other meat to constitute the minimum egg-bulk (k'beitzah) required to contract and transmit tum'at ochlin.[^10]

רבי יוחנן אמר: מרתקא. וריש לקיש אמר: בשר שפלטתו סכין.

Rabbi Yoḥanan’s View (The Nuchal Ligament)

For Rabbi Yoḥanan, alal is the marteka (nuchal ligament), a tough, fibrous band of connective tissue. Physically, it is virtually inedible—"merely wood" (etz be'alma).

Yet, Rabbi Yoḥanan maintains that the Sages viewed it as sufficiently contiguous with the flesh to join for tum'at ochlin.

The conceptual breakthrough here is that tum'at ochlin does not require every constituent part of the shiur to be independently edible; rather, a non-edible tissue that serves a structural or connective purpose (shomer or yad) can halakhically "join" (mitztaref) the edible flesh.

Reish Lakish’s View (The Flayed Meat Residue)

Reish Lakish defines alal as bassar she'paltato sakkin—scraps of edible meat left clinging to the hide after flaying. Here, the tissue is objectively food.

The problem is subjective: the flayer has abandoned this meat, implicitly nullifying its status as food (bitlo mada'at).

Reish Lakish's chiddush (novelty) is that while the owner's subjective abandonment (bitul) is powerful enough to prevent this meat from contracting impurity by itself, it cannot strip the meat of its objective biological status as "food" when it is physically contiguous with other meat. It can still "join" to make up the shiur.

The Resolution of Rabbi Avin and Rabbi Meyasha

To defend Reish Lakish's view against the challenge of subjective nullification, the Gemara cites Rabbi Avin and Rabbi Meyasha, who present two distinct scenarios:

חד אמר: מחשב על מקצתו... וחד אמר: פלטתו חיה ופלטתו סכין...

1. Partial Intent: The owner intends to eat part of the residue, but this part is physically indistinguishable from the rest. Because of this subjective ambiguity, the entire mass cannot become impure on its own, but it retains enough "food" status to join other meat.
2. The Mixed Origin (Paltato Chayah / Paltato Sakkin): Part of the meat was torn by a wild beast (paltato chayah), which does not undergo subjective nullification because it was not flayed by human hands. Another part was flayed by a knife (paltato sakkin) and is thus nullified. Because the two parts are mixed and indistinguishable, the entire mass is suspended in a state of doubt.

Rashi elucidates this second scenario with precision:

"וההוא דפלטתו חיה לא בטיל מסתמא וההוא דסכין בטליה מדעת... הלכך כי הוי בהדי שאר אוכלין מצטרף ההוא קצת דחיה בהדייהו..."

“And that which was flayed by the wild beast is not nullified by default, whereas that of the knife was nullified by intent... Therefore, when it is together with other foods, that small part of the beast's flaying joins with them...”[^11]

The Haggahot Ya'avetz sharpens this Rashi, demonstrating that the entire physical mass of the alal is treated as a single unit for joining, even though only an undefined fraction of it (מקצתו) possesses active, un-nullified food status.[^12]

This indicates that mitztaref (joining) does not require localized, definite food status; rather, a generalized, non-nullified element within a physical continuum is sufficient to bridge the halakhic measure.

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The Twilight of the Twitching Animal (Mefarkeset)

השוחט בהמה טמאה לעובד כוכבים ומפרכסת... מטמאה טומאת אוכלין אבל לא טומאת נבלות.

The Mishnah rules that if a Jew performs shechitah on a non-kosher animal for a gentile, or a gentile performs shechitah on a kosher animal, and the animal is still twitching (mefarkeset), it can contract tum'at ochlin but does not yet possess the severe impurity of a carcass (tum'at nevelot).

Rabbi Asi's Two Requirements

Rabbi Asi asserts that to contract tum'at ochlin, this twitching animal requires:

1. Active Intent (Machshavah): The slaughterer must explicitly intend to use the flesh as food while it is still twitching.
2. External Susceptibility (Hekhsher): It must come into contact with water or another qualifying liquid from an external source. The blood of this slaughter does not qualify as a machshir (susceptibility agent) because the slaughter is not halakhically valid to permit consumption (as it is a non-kosher animal or slaughtered by a gentile).

The Gemara's Challenge: "Destined for Severe Impurity"

The Gemara objects based on a tannaitic principle derived by the School of Rabbi Yishmael from Leviticus 11:38 ("Ki yutan mayim..."):

"כל שסופו לטמא טומאה חמורה אינו צריך הכשר"

“Anything that will eventually contract severe impurity does not require susceptibility [hekhsher].”[^13]

Since this twitching animal will inevitably die and become a nevelah (which carries severe impurity), it should bypass the need for hekhsher entirely!

                    [Twitching Animal (Mefarkeset)]
                                  │
                   Is it destined to become Nevelah?
                                  │
                     ┌────────────┴────────────┐
                     ▼                         ▼
                  [ YES ]                   [ NO ]
                     │                         │
         Bypasses need for Hekhsher       Chizkiyah: Owner can
         (School of R' Yishmael)         chop it into < כזית
                                               │
                                       Eliminates potential
                                        for severe impurity
                                               │
                                      Requires Hekhsher!

Ḥizkiyya's Defense: The Theoretical Chopping Loophole

Ḥizkiyya rescues Rabbi Asi's requirement of hekhsher with a radical conceptual move:

"מתוך שיכול לקצצו פחות פחות מכזית"

“Since he is able to chop it into pieces of less than an olive-bulk...”[^14]

Because the owner has the physical capacity to cut the twitching animal into tiny pieces before it dies, it is not guaranteed to ever contract the severe impurity of nevelah (which requires a minimum volume of an olive-bulk).

Because this severe impurity can be theoretically averted through human intervention, the animal does not fall under the category of "destined for severe impurity." Thus, it still requires active hekhsher to contract tum'at ochlin.

This reveals a profound principle in the mechanics of halakhic destiny (סופו לטמא): A potential future status is only considered "inevitable" if it cannot be disrupted by simple, standard human actions.

If a human can theoretically intervene and dismantle the physical substrate of the future status (by slicing the meat into sub-halakhic portions), the future is classified as contingent, not destined.

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Friction

The Metaphysical Paradox of the Mefarkeset

The most formidable conceptual friction in our sugya lies in the dispute between Ḥizkiyya and Rabbi Yoḥanan regarding the status of limbs severed from a twitching animal (mefarkeset):

חזקיה אמר: אין שם משום אבר מן החי. רבי יוחanan אמר: יש שם משום אבר מן החי.

“Ḥizkiyya says: There is no prohibition of a limb from a living animal. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: There is a prohibition of a limb from a living animal.”[^15]

This dispute exposes a deep metaphysical tension. How can we map the biological transition from life to death onto a binary halakhic system?

               [ACT OF SHECHITAH]
                       │
                       ▼
             [TWITCHING (Mefarkeset)]
                       │
         ┌─────────────┴─────────────┐
         ▼                           ▼
    [ḤIZKIYYA]               [RABBI YOḤANAN]
  "It is Dead"                "It is Alive"
  Shechitah = Instant       Death = Gradual Process
  Halakhic Death            Vitality Remains

The Kushya

If, according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, the animal is still considered "alive" such that a Noahide violates the prohibition of eiver min he_chai (consuming a limb from a living animal) by eating its twitching flesh, how can this same animal simultaneously contract tum'at ochlin (food impurity)?

Halakhic food (okhel), by definition, must be detached from life. A living creature cannot contract tum'at ochlin (אין אוכל חי טמא).

How can the mefarkeset be legally "alive" to generate the prohibition of eiver min he_chai, yet legally "dead" (or detached) to receive the impurity of food?

Terutz A: The Dual Nature of Shechitah (The Rashba's Approach)

The Rashba resolves this by dissecting the mechanics of shechitah.^16

Shechitah is not merely a biological cause of death; it is a formal halakhic act that initiates a dual process:

1. Permitting the Meat (Hatter): It begins the halakhic transformation of the animal's physical body into permissible "food" (okhel).
2. Terminating the Life (Chayut): It legally cuts the thread of life, rendering the animal's ultimate demise a foregone conclusion.

The Rashba argues that the moment the simanim (throat organs) are severed, the animal loses its halakhic status of guf chai (a living body).

It is no longer classified as a "living beast" in terms of its systemic integrity, allowing it to immediately acquire the status of okhel (food) and contract tum'at ochlin.

However, the biological chayut (residual life force) still crackles through the twitching limbs. This residual vitality is sufficient to trigger the prohibition of eiver min he_chai for anyone who consumes it before that vitality has fully dissipated.

Thus, the animal is halakhically "dead" (as a structured organism) but biologically "alive" (as localized muscle tissue).

Terutz B: The Brisker Analysis (Rechovot HaNahar)

The Brisker school reframes this division using the classic distinction between the cheftza (object) and the gavra (subject), or more precisely, between two distinct definitions of "life" in Halakha:

1. The Status of the Organism (Shem Chai): This is the holistic definition of a living animal.
2. The Presence of Vitality (Metziut Chayut): This is the localized, physical reality of cellular or muscular movement.

                  ┌─────────────────────────────────┐
                  │      THE MEFARKESET HYBRID      │
                  └────────────────┬────────────────┘
                                   │
         ┌─────────────────────────┴─────────────────────────┐
         ▼                                                   ▼
  [ORGANISM STATUS]                                  [PHYSICAL VITALITY]
  "Shem Chai"                                        "Metziut Chayut"
  Destroyed instantly by Shechitah.                 Persists during twitching.
  Result: Susceptible to Tum'at Ochlin.              Result: Prohibits Eiver Min HeChai.

When Ḥizkiyya and Rabbi Yoḥanan argue, they are debating which of these two definitions governs the prohibition of eiver min he_chai:

• Ḥizkiyya holds that eiver min he_chai depends entirely on the holistic status of the organism (shem chai). Once the simanim are severed, that holistic status is shattered. The animal is no longer a "living creature"; it is a collection of meat in motion. Therefore, the prohibition of eiver min he_chai vanishes instantly.
• Rabbi Yoḥanan maintains that eiver min he_chai is rooted in the physical reality of localized vitality (metziut chayut). As long as the limbs are twitching, the life force has not fully departed. The prohibition of eiver min he_chai remains active because the meat is physically alive, even though the holistic shem chai has been destroyed, allowing the animal to contract tum'at ochlin.

This Brisker resolution elegantly accounts for the ruling of Abaye on Chullin 121b:

"הבא על בהמה זו... בסקילה"

“One who has relations with this [twitching] animal is liable to stoning.”[^17]

Bestiality requires a living partner. Because the physical chayut is still present, the act of bestiality is halakhically complete, even though the animal is simultaneously classified as "food" due to the destruction of its holistic shem chai.

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Intertext

Parallel I: The Goses (Dying Human) vs. The Mefarkeset

To fully understand the halakhic profile of the mefarkeset, we must compare it to the goses (a human on their deathbed).

The Mishnah in Massekhet Semachot rules:

"גוסס הרי הוא כחי לכל דבריו"

“A goses is considered alive in all regards.”[^18]

If one kills a goses, they are liable for murder. If a goses is a Kohen, they still defile others under a roof (metamei b'ohel), and one may not close their eyes or move them, as any touch might hasten their death.

The Contrast in Halakhic Trajectory

Why is a goses treated as fully alive, while a mefarkeset is treated as a hybrid state that can contract food impurity?

The distinction lies in the concept of halakhic inevitability and the cause of the transition:

• A goses is experiencing a natural, biological decline. Although death is highly probable, there is no physical severance that guarantees immediate demise. Halakhically, the goses retains their full human status (chazakat chai) until the soul departs.
• The mefarkeset, by contrast, has undergone shechitah—a definitive, violent act of halakhic severance. The neck organs are cut. This act instantly strips the animal of its halakhic standing as a living entity, even though the biological machinery continues to twitch.

Thus, while human life is protected by a continuous, indivisible shield of vitality until the final breath, animal life can be halakhically terminated by the act of shechitah prior to biological death.

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                          COMPARATIVE TRAJECTORY                         │
├────────────────────────────────────┬────────────────────────────────────┤
│       HUMAN GOSES (Natural)        │     ANIMAL MEFARKESET (Shechitah)  │
├────────────────────────────────────┼────────────────────────────────────┤
│ • Retains Chazakat Chai            │ • Shem Chai shattered instantly    │
│ • Indivisible legal status         │ • Dual status: Dead yet twitching  │
│ • Any touch is murder             │ • Susceptible to Tum'at Ochlin     │
└────────────────────────────────────┴────────────────────────────────────┘

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Parallel II: Leviticus 11:38 and the Mechanics of Hekhsher

The Gemara's discussion of hekhsher (rendering food susceptible to impurity through liquid) draws on the classic derivation of the School of Rabbi Yishmael:

"וכי יתן מים על זרע ונפל מנבלתם עליו טמא הוא לכם" (ויקרא יא, לח)

                   [Seeds (זרעים)]
                         │
        Never contract severe impurity (נבלה)
                         │
           Require Hekhsher (Susceptibility)
                         │
      ───────────────────────────────────────
                         │
               [Meat / Animal Tissue]
                         │
         Destined to contract severe impurity
                         │
        Do NOT require Hekhsher (by default)

This principle creates a taxonomy of susceptibility based on inherent vulnerability:

• Vegetable matter (זרעים) can never contract severe impurity (tum'ah chamurah, such as carrying or transmitting impurity to humans or vessels). It can only contract light food impurity (tum'at ochlin). Because its capacity for impurity is limited, the Torah demands an external trigger—hekhsher (water)—to activate its susceptibility.
• Animal carcass (nevelah) is inherently destined for severe impurity. Because it carries this potential for severe impurity, it does not require any external trigger to become susceptible to light food impurity. Its inherent nature is charged with potential impurity.

By showing that the mefarkeset can be chopped into sub-olive-bulk pieces, Ḥizkiyya demonstrates that human agency can strip animal tissue of its "severe destiny." This returns the tissue to the status of vegetable matter, requiring hekhsher to activate its susceptibility.

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Psak/Practice

Eating Post-Slaughter Before Death: The Neck-Tissue Loophole

The Tosefta, cited on Chullin 121b, presents a startling practical ruling:

"הרוצה שיאכל מבשר בהמה קודם שתצא נפשה: חותך כזית בשר מבית שחיטתה, ומולחו יפה יפה, ומדיחו יפה יפה, וממתין לו עד שתצא נפשה, ואוכלו."

“One who wishes to eat of the meat of an animal before its soul departs: he may cut an olive-bulk of meat from the area of its slaughter, and salt it very well, and rinse it very well, and wait until its soul departs, and then eat it.”[^19]

This ruling, supported by Rav Idi bar Avin, is codified in the Shulchan Aruch:

"הרוצה לאכול בשר בהמה קודם שתצא נפשה, חותך כזית בשר מבית השחיטה... ומולחו יפה ומדיחו יפה וממתין עד שתצא נפשה ואוכלו..."

“One who wishes to eat... cuts an olive-bulk from the area of slaughter... and salts it well and rinses it well...”[^20]

The Logic of the Loophole

Why is this meat not prohibited as eiver min he_chai (a limb from a living animal) or basar min he_chai (flesh from a living animal)?

1. The Location: The meat must be taken specifically from the area of slaughter (m'beit shechitatah).
2. The Effect of Shechitah: The act of shechitah has already passed through this specific tissue, halakhically severing its connection to the living animal. It is legally dead, even though the rest of the animal's body is still twitching.
3. The Requirement to Wait: One must wait until the animal's soul departs before eating the meat. Eating it while the animal is still twitching is strictly prohibited under the rabbinic injunction against eating a twitching animal (בל תשקצו or אבר מן החי depending on the authority).

                     [PERFORM SHECHITAH]
                              │
                    Animal is still twitching
                              │
               [Cut piece from area of slaughter]
                              │
             [Salt and rinse to extract blood]
                              │
               [Wait for total cessation of life]
                              │
                           [EAT IT]
             Permitted for both Jew and Noahide!

Modern Applications: Halakhic Brain Death and Organ Donation

The conceptual models forged in our sugya regarding the mefarkeset—where an entity can be legally dead for some matters (susceptible to food impurity) yet legally alive for others (bestiality liability)—serve as primary precedents in the modern halakhic debate over brain death and organ transplantation.

Posekim who permit organ transplantation after brain death (such as the Chief Rabbinate of Israel in 1986) utilize the model of the mefarkeset. They argue that once the brain stem has permanently ceased functioning, the integrated holistic life of the human (shem chai) has ended, much like the animal whose simanim have been severed.

The remaining cellular or cardiac function, maintained by artificial respirators, is classified as residual localized vitality (metziut chayut), akin to the twitching of the mefarkeset.

Conversely, opponents of brain death (such as Rabbi Eliezer Waldenberg) argue that as long as there is any biological activity (like the twitching animal), the human is considered alive. Hastening the removal of an organ is thus treated as murder, matching the ruling that "a goses is considered alive in all regards."[^21]

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Takeaway

Halakhic identity is not a passive reflection of biological status. Through the legal mechanisms of shechitah, bitul, and machshavah, the Sages demonstrate that human intent and formal Torah frameworks can redefine the boundaries of life, death, and food.

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[^1]: Mishnah Chullin 9:1 (Chullin 117b). [^2]: Chullin 121a:2. [^3]: Chullin 121a:17. [^4]: Chullin 121a:3. [^5]: Pesachim 24b:12. [^6]: Tosafot, Chullin 121a:1:1 s.v. "והדר מייתי". [^7]: Ibid. [^8]: Maharam Schiff on Chullin 121a:1 s.v. "תד"ה והדר מייתי". [^9]: Ibid. [^10]: Chullin 121a:2. [^11]: Rashi on Chullin 121a:10:1 s.v. "פלטתו חיה". [^12]: Haggahot Ya'avetz on Chullin 121a:3 s.v. "ד"ה פלטתו חי'". [^13]: Chullin 121a:15. [^14]: Chullin 121a:17. [^15]: Chullin 121a:19. [^16]: Chiddushei HaRashba, Chullin 121a s.v. "חזקיה אמר". [^17]: Chullin 121b:13. [^18]: Massekhet Semachot, Chapter 1, Halakha 1. [^19]: Tosefta Oholot 2:1, cited in Chullin 121b:6. [^20]: Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 27:1. [^21]: Tzitz Eliezer, Vol. 10, Siman 25.