Chullin 134

Sugya Map

The sugyot on Chullin 134a–134b interrogate the legal mechanics governing matanot kehunah (the priestly gifts: the foreleg, jaw, and maw; Deuteronomy 18:3), tracing where sacred ritual mandates (issura) intersect with, or yield to, civil proprietary rights (mamona).

                    Matanot Kehunah: Issur vs. Mamon
                                   │
         ┌─────────────────────────┴─────────────────────────┐
         ▼                                                   ▼
 Proprietary Mechanics                               Epistemic Uncertainty
   (134a: Shiyur & Gezel)                              (134a-b: Safek Ger)
         │                                                   │
 ┌───────┴───────┐                                   ┌───────┴───────┐
 ▼               ▼                                   ▼               ▼
"Chutz" vs.   Gezel Matanot:                     Safek Issura     Safek Mamona
"Al Menat"    Rav (Nigzalot)                     (Challah, etc.)  (Matanot, etc.)
(Retention    vs. Rav Asi                        Obligated        Exempt
 vs. Tnai)    (Einan Nigzalot)                   (Le-Chumra)      (Hamotzi Mechavero)

• Shiyur vs. Tnai in Priesthood Gifts (Chullin 134a): A kohen sells an animal to an Israelite. If he says chutz mi-matanoteha ("except for its gifts"), he retains bodily ownership in the designated limbs, exempting the transaction from priestly transfer because the animal remains partially owned by a kohen. If he says al menat she-hamatanot sheli ("on condition that the gifts are mine"), the Amoraim dispute whether al menat operates as retention (shiyur) or an external contractual condition (tnai). If it is a mere condition, it collapses: the gifts belong inherently to the entire collective of priests (shevet ha-kehunah), and an individual priest cannot commodify or condition an entitlement he does not yet proprietarily possess.
• Tort Liability and Gezel Matanot (Chullin 134a): If an Israelite butcher sells innards by weight, including the maw (keivah), who is liable to the kohen? Rav holds matanot nigzalot (the gifts constitute an actionable proprietary theft-tort); hence, the kohen may claim restitution directly from either the butcher (the misappropriator) or the purchaser, aligning with Rav Chisda’s ruling in Bava Kamma 111a regarding stolen property consumed by a third party. Rav Asi counters that ein matanot nigzalot (priestly gifts cannot generate a civil theft claim because no specific kohen owns the physical asset prior to delivery); restitution remains an in rem religious duty incumbent exclusively upon the person currently holding the limb.
• The Matrix of Sefeikot in a Convert’s Animal (Chullin 134a–134b): A convert owns an animal slaughtered under doubtful timing (before or after conversion). The Mishnah rules him exempt based on the baseline civil default: ha-motzi me-chavero alav ha-re'ayah ("the burden of proof rests on the claimant").
• Symmetry Broken: Leket vs. Matanot (Chullin 134a–134b): Reish Lakish contrasts this leniency with the stringency governing poor-tithes in ant holes (safek leket leket; Pe'ah 4:11). The Gemara resolves this by segregating safek mamona (pure civil torts/claims, resolved leniently for the possessor) from safek issura (ritual prohibitions, e.g., consuming tevel or unseparated challah, resolved stringently). This culminates in Rav Chisda’s eightfold catalog of conversion doubts.
• Mechanics of Discharge: Netinah (Giving) vs. Azivah (Relinquishment) (Chullin 134b): If no poor exist in an area, the owner may retain gleanings (lo le-orvim ve-lo li-atalephim; "neither for ravens nor for bats"). Priestly gifts and terumah, by contrast, dictate an active affirmative obligation of conveyance (netinah), forcing the owner to expend capital or appraise their value for a kohen.

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Text Snapshot

The Gemara on Chullin 134a captures the operational friction between conditional obligations and civil possession:

אלא לאו שמע מינה, על מנת שיורא הוא? שמע מינה. גופא: אמר לטבח, "מכור לי בני מעיים של פרה," והיו בהן מתנות... רב אמר: לא שנו אלא ששקל לעצמו, אבל שקל לו טבח — דינא ודיינא בהדי טבח! ורב אסי אמר: אפילו שקל לו טבח — אין דינו אלא עם הלוקח. לימא בהא דרב חסדא קמיפלגי... לא, דכולי עלמא כדרב חסדא, והכא ב"מתנות נגזלות" קמיפלגי; מר סבר: מתנות נגזלות, ומר סבר: אין מתנות נגזלות.

Linguistic and Halachic Nuance

1. "שיורא הוא" (Shiyur) vs. "תנאי" (Tnai): The structural syntax pivots on whether al menat subtracts property from the conveyance (shiyur be-guf ha-davar) or imposes an executory covenant upon the purchaser (chiyuv ha-gavra). A shiyur in the animal itself means the transfer of the zero'a, lechayayim, ve-keivah never occurred; they remain in the domain of their initial owner. A condition, however, seeks to redirect an inchoate spiritual-legal allocation (matanot kehunah) which belongs not to the vendor, but to the collective priesthood.
2. "דינא ודיינא בהדי טבח": A colorful Aramaic idiom meaning litigation and administrative execution lie against the butcher. The double root denotes both legal vulnerability (dina) and practical enforcement (dayana).
3. "מתנות נגזלות": The passive participle nigzalot does not merely mean "can be taken by force"; it addresses the classification of the claim. Does withholding or destroying a priestly gift generate an actionable civil obligation of tortious restitution (damim) identical to ordinary conversion of chattel, or does it remain an unfulfilled mitzvat aseh that dissolves upon the limb's physical destruction?

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Readings

1. The Jurisprudence of Gezel Matanot: Rashi vs. Rambam

The dispute between Rav and Rav Asi on Chullin 134a exposes a deep rift concerning the legal ontology of priestly gifts prior to their actual distribution (chaluqqah).

Rashi’s Model: The Personal Tort Obligation

Rashi[^fn-1] establishes that the controversy over whether matanot nigzalot applies centers squarely on whether a non-priest who withholds or consumes the priestly gifts incurs a personal monetary debt (chiyuv mamon) toward the priesthood.

According to Rav, who maintains matanot nigzalot, the Torah's imperative "they shall give to the priest" (Deuteronomy 18:3) constitutes a legal assignment of ownership (zechut mamon) to the priestly collective. While no individual kohen can point to a specific foreleg and declare, "This is mine," the physical limb is nevertheless classified as an asset belonging to the priesthood. Consequently, when the butcher extracts the keivah and sells it by weight—thereby liquidating and commodifying the gift for his own enrichment—he commits an act of conversion (gezel). Under Rav Chisda's rule (Bava Kamma 111a), where a stolen object is consumed by another before the owner's despair (ye'ush), the victim possesses an actionable tort claim against both the original thief and the ultimate consumer.

For Rav, the butcher is a full-fledged gazlan. Thus, the kohen may haul the butcher to beit din and demand its cash equivalence (dmei matanot).

Conversely, Rav Asi maintains ein matanot nigzalot. Because the specific claimant is indeterminate—any kohen could conceivably receive the gift, but none has an exclusive title to it—the limb cannot be the object of standard civil theft. There is no individual ba'al din (plaintiff with standing) who can sue for monetary compensation once the object is gone. The obligation exists exclusively in rem: whoever physically possesses the consecrated limb is commanded to hand it over. If the butcher sold it and the customer now holds it, the mitzvat netinah follows the physical substance. The customer must deliver the limb to a kohen, and the butcher’s civil liability is solely to refund the purchase price of the excess weight back to the customer.

Rambam’s Synthesis: Possession, Destruction, and Monetary Recourse

The Rambam codifies this sugya across two distinct sections of the Mishneh Torah, generating a profound conceptual chiddush:

"טבח ששקל ממתנות אלו לאחרים... הרי זה חייב לשלם לכהן דמיהן... שהרי גזלן." — Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, First Fruits and Other Gifts to the Priests 9:16

"מתנות כהונה אין נגזלות... כיצד? כהן שבא וחטף מתנותיו של חבירו אינו גזלן, שאין לכהן בהן אלא טובת הנאה בלבד." — Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Robbery and Lost Property 5:14

A glaring contradiction emerges. In Hilchot Bikkurim, the Rambam rules in accordance with Rav: if a butcher weighs and sells the gifts, he is obligated to pay their value to the kohen because he robbed them (she-harei gazalan). Yet in Hilchot Gezelah, the Rambam explicitly rules: matanot kehunah einan nigzalot!

The Ketzot HaChoshen[^fn-2] and the Even HaEzel[^fn-3] resolve this by distinguishing between two distinct vectors of gezel:

                           The Bifurcation of "Gezel"
                                       │
            ┌──────────────────────────┴──────────────────────────┐
            ▼                                                     ▼
Substantive Civil Tort                               Inter-Priestly Standing
  (Hilchot Bikkurim 9:16)                               (Hilchot Gezelah 5:14)
   • Butcher vs. Priesthood                               • Kohen A vs. Kohen B
   • Israelite profiting from gifts                       • Both share tribal right
   • Generates monetary debt:                             • Tovat hana'ah precludes
     "Matanot Nigzalot"                                     exclusive ownership:
                                                            "Einan Nigzalot"

1. Actionable Conversion Against Non-Priests (Matanot Nigzalot): An Israelite butcher has zero title to the gifts. The entire tribe of priests holds an collective proprietary lien (shi'abud mamon) upon the gifts. When an Israelite converts that sacred asset into personal profit (selling it by weight), he strips the tribe of its due. Vis-à-vis an Israelite wrongdoer, the law operates with full tortious force: matanot nigzalot, and the butcher must pay restitution to whatever kohen steps forward to claim it.
2. Lack of Specific Proprietary Title (Einan Nigzalot): When one kohen seizes a gift from another kohen before the Israelite owner has selected a recipient, the seizing kohen cannot be sued as a gazlan. Why? Because an individual kohen possesses merely a tovat hana'ah (the beneficial interest of distribution held by the owner) rather than an exclusive title to the limb. Between two kohanim, neither has an antecedent property claim over the other.

Thus, the Rambam adopts Rav's view as practical halacha against an abusive Israelite vendor, but restricts the mechanics of title: matanot are an unassigned collective entitlement, creating a liability to restore value when consumed unlawfully, but lacking individual proprietary ownership prior to delivery.

2. The Nature of "Shiyur" and Tribal Property

The Gemara on Chullin 134a contrasts chutz mi-matanoteha with al menat she-hamatanot sheli. The foundational question, articulated by the Rashba[^fn-4] and the Ritva,[^fn-5] is straightforward: How can a kohen make a reservation (shiyur) on priestly gifts in an animal he is selling, if the gifts are not inherently his to begin with?

The Rashba’s Approach: Retaining the Underlying Flesh

The Rashba explains that the gift of the foreleg, jaw, and maw does not materialize as a distinct, segregated entity while the animal is still alive. The animal in its entirety belongs to its owner. When the Torah states that the foreleg, jaw, and maw belong to the kohen, it imposes an obligation triggered at the moment of slaughter (shechitah).

Consequently, if a kohen owns a live animal and sells it to an Israelite, he possesses complete bodily ownership of all four limbs. When he declares: "I sell you this cow except for the gifts," he is not reserving a mystical halachic entity called "the priestly portions." Rather, he is executing a conventional proprietary retention (shiyur be-guf ha-behemah): he simply declines to sell the right foreleg, the head/jaw, and the stomach tissue.

Because an animal owned in partnership by a kohen and an Israelite is exempt from matanot kehunah (as derived in Chullin 132b from the verse: "from those who slaughter the slaughtering"—excluding an animal in which a kohen retains an equity stake), this physical retention prevents the obligation of matanot from ever crystallizing!

The Tosafist Divergence: Al Menat as a Flawed Acquisition

Why, then, should the term al menat she-hamatanot sheli spark an Amoraic dispute?

Tosafot[^fn-6] and the Rosh[^fn-7] highlight the mechanics of legal language:

• The Tanna who invalidates al menat argues that the syntax of "on condition" signifies a transfer of the entire physical animal to the Israelite buyer, tethered only to an auxiliary personal covenant: "You, the buyer, must return the gifts to me." But once the entire animal passes into the domain of the Israelite, the limbs are instantaneously impressed with the status of matanot kehunah belonging to all kohanim. The Israelite holds the sovereign right of tovat hana'ah (to grant them to any priest he desires). The vendor-kohen has no power to contractually extinguish that statutory distribution right, because one cannot dictate terms over assets designated by Heaven to a third party.
• The Tanna who validates al menat holds that colloquial commercial idiom must be interpreted constructively: when an ordinary person says "on condition that X is mine," his subjective and objective intent is equivalent to chutz—he intends to retain ownership of that very section.

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Friction

The Conflict

On Chullin 134a, the Gemara presents an acute clash between two epistemic models:

                                The Epistemic Clash
                                         │
                 ┌───────────────────────┴───────────────────────┐
                 ▼                                               ▼
     The Cow of a Convert                             The Ant-Holes in Pe'ah
       (Chullin 134a)                               (Pe'ah 4:11)
   • Safek slaughtered before/after                 • Grain behind the reapers
   • Presumption: Patur                             • Presumption: Chiyuv
   • Rule: Hamotzi Mechavero Le-kula                • Rule: Safek Leket Leket

1. The Case of the Convert’s Cow: A gentile converts, owning an ox. The animal is slaughtered, but we are uncertain whether slaughter occurred before conversion (when gentiles are exempt from matanot) or after conversion (when an Israelite is obligated). The Mishnah rules unequivocally: he is exempt, invoking the master axiom of civil jurisprudence: ha-motzi me-chavero alav ha-re'ayah ("the burden of proof rests upon the claimant").
2. The Case of the Ant Holes (Pe'ah 4:11): Grain is discovered in subterranean ant caches located behind the reapers. It is uncertain whether this grain fell during harvest (constituting leket, belonging to the poor) or before harvest (belonging to the landowner). Rabbi Meir rules: Everything belongs to the poor, asserting that safek leket — leket (doubtful gleanings are classified as gleanings). Reish Lakish derives this stringency from Psalms 82:3: "Do justice to the afflicted and destitute"—which the Gemara interprets as: "Be righteous with that which is yours, and give it to them."

The question explodes with forceful dissonance: Both matanot kehunah and matnot aniyim are statutory distributions mandated by the Torah to landless, vulnerable demographics. Why does the civil presumption of possession (chazakat mamon) triumph in the case of the kohen, while being trampled in favor of the poor person?

The Resolution

Rava resolves the friction on two successive structural planes, moving from an evidentiary analysis of Chazakah to an ontological demarcation between Issur and Mamon.

Stage 1: The Evidentiary Pivot (Chazakat Ha-Guf)

Rava initially proposes:

• The cow possessed a presumption of exemption (chazakat petur). From its birth until conversion, it was an animal owned by a gentile, categorically exempt from priestly gifts. When the doubt arises regarding its slaughter, the preexisting status quo of exemption remains operative.
• The standing grain, by contrast, possessed a presumption of obligation (chazakat chiyuv). The entire field grew under an Israelite's ownership and was inherently destined for harvest, where the statutory obligations of pe'ah, shikhechah, and leket attach automatically. When grain is found in ant holes, it emerges from an environment already soaked in legal liability.

Stage 2: The Metaphysical Pivot (Safek Issura vs. Safek Mamona)

Abaye violently shatters Rava’s first formulation by citing the case of a convert’s dough:

If a convert kneads dough, and we are uncertain whether it was kneaded before conversion (exempt from challah) or after conversion (obligated in challah), the convert is obligated to separate challah!

This demolishes Stage 1: Dough, just like the cow, possessed an absolute chazakat petur before conversion! Why does the dough succumb to stringency while the cow remains exempt?

Driven into a conceptual corner, Rava articulates the definitive distinction:

• Challah is an Issur (Ritual Prohibition): Dough subject to challah is tevel—consuming it without separation incurs the catastrophic penalty of mitah bi-ydei shamayim (death at the hand of Heaven). The core of the doubt is not who owns the dough, but whether the food may be eaten at all. In matters of ritual prohibition, we apply the foundational rule: safek de-oraita le-chumra (uncertainties regarding Torah prohibitions are resolved stringently), regardless of monetary possession.
• Matanot Kehunah is Pure Mamon (Civil Property): Failure to separate the foreleg, jaw, and maw does not render the meat of the animal tevel! The meat is 100% kosher and permissible for consumption by an Israelite without any separation whatsoever (as the Gemara establishes on Chullin 134b: lav ki-metukanot damei, yet it does not cause prohibition). The Torah merely imposed a civil delivery lien (chiyuv netinah) to provide food to the kohen.

Therefore, in the case of the convert’s cow, there is zero question of ritual sin. The dispute is purely monetary: Does the convert owe a slice of meat to the priestly tribe? Here, standard tort and property law reasserts ultimate dominion: safek mamona le-kula—the possessor retains his property under ha-motzi me-chavero alav ha-re'ayah.

                    Rava's Taxonomy of Halachic Doubts
                                     │
           ┌─────────────────────────┴─────────────────────────┐
           ▼                                                   ▼
  Ritual Prohibition (Issur)                           Civil Claim (Mamon)
  ==========================                           ===================
   • Example: Challah, Bechor                           • Example: Matanot, Reishit HaGez
   • Non-separation = Tevel / Benefit ban               • Non-separation = Meat remains kosher
   • Rule: Safek De-Oraita Le-Chumra                    • Rule: Hamotzi Mechavero Le-Kula
   • Conversion Doubt: OBLIGATED                        • Conversion Doubt: EXEMPT

This leads systematically into Rav Chisda’s canonical catalogue:

• The Four Stringencies (Chumra): Offerings of a new mother (yoledet), challah, firstborn unkosher animal (peter chamor), and firstborn kosher animal (bechor tahor). All four harbor active prohibitions against consumption, benefit, or slaughter outside the Temple.
• The Four Leniencies (Kula): First shearing (reishit ha-gez), priestly gifts (matanot), redemption of the human firstborn (pidyon ha-ben), and the valuation payment for a donkey (pidyon peter chamor). All four represent pure fiscal transfers devoid of personal dietary or sacrificial taboos.

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Intertext

1. The Dynamic of Possession in Uncertain Consecrations: Bava Metzia 6b

The conclusion on Chullin 134a—that doubts in priestly gifts are decided via ha-motzi me-chavero alav ha-re'ayah—connects directly with the famous sugya of Takpaha Kohen ("If a priest seized the disputed property") in Bava Metzia 6b.

If an animal's firstborn status is in doubt (safek bechor), the owner is exempt from delivering it to the priest. But what if an aggressive kohen swoops in and physically seizes the safek bechor from the Israelite's barn?

• According to the Ri (Tosafot, ad loc.),[^fn-8] if an uncertainty is resolved by ha-motzi me-chavero solely because of the owner’s physical custody (tefisat ha-ba'al), then if the kohen seizes it, the kohen becomes the new possessor (muchzak), and beit din cannot reclaim it from him!
• However, the Rambam (Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Firstborn Animals 2:5) and the Rosh (Chullin 134a) argue that in matanot kehunah, the Israelite is not merely an incidental physical possessor. The Israelite holds an intrinsic legal title (mara kamma—original proprietary owner) over the entire animal and its offspring.

When Chullin 134a rules that the convert is exempt from gifts under ha-motzi me-chavero, it does not rely on a fragile, physical grip that can be overturned through seizure. Rather, the convert possesses an established legal title rooted in the chazakat ha-guf of the animal. If a kohen were to unlawfully seize the zero'a of the convert's doubtful cow, beit din would reclaim it and restore it to the convert. The rule of safek mamona le-kula operates here as a substantive shield of title, not merely an evidentiary draw.

2. Netinah vs. Azivah: Chullin 134b and Pe'ah

The divergent operational verbs governing agricultural allocations delineate their substantive mechanics:

Dimension	Matnot Kehunah & Terumah	Matnot Aniyim (Leket, Pe'ah)
Biblical Mandate	"You shall give to him" (Deuteronomy 18:3, Deuteronomy 18:4)	"You shall leave them for the poor" (Leviticus 23:22)
Legal Classification	Direct Transfer (Netinah)	Renunciation / Abandonment (Azivah)
Locational Burden	Transport to city or assess value	Owner does not transport; collected at field
No Beneficiary Present	Evaluated in money; proceeds paid later	Owner may consume; "not for ravens or bats"

On Chullin 134b, Levi planted crops in Kishar, where no poor people lived. Rav Sheshet instructed him: Eat them yourself, for Scripture commands: "You shall leave them for the poor and the stranger"—and not for the ravens and bats.

Because the Torah defines matnot aniyim as an act of azivah (relinquishment / hefker), the owner is forbidden from gathering them, but he bears zero affirmative obligation to pursue poor people across the globe. If no eligible recipients exist, the statutory purpose lapses, and the property reverts to the baseline owner.

In stark contrast, matanot kehunah are tethered to the mandate of netinah (affirmative conveyance). Even if no priest is physically present when the steer is slaughtered, the owner cannot treat the limbs as ownerless waste. As the Baraita dictates: he must appraise the monetary value of the foreleg, jaw, and maw, consume the physical meat himself before it spoils, and hold the cash in escrow to pay the first kohen he encounters. Netinah imposes an inescapable fiscal liability; azivah merely suspends proprietary control.

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Psak/Practice

Codification in Shulchan Arukh

The codification of these principles in the Shulchan Arukh balances corporate priestly rights against possessory protections:

1. Retention vs. Conditions in Meat Sales:

   "כהן שמכר בהמתו לישראל... אם שייר המתנות לעצמו — מותר. אבל אם מכרה כולה ואמר לו: על מנת שתתן המתנות לפלוני כהן, או שאמר: על מנת שתתנם לי — לא עשה כלום, והלוקח נותנם לכל כהן שירצה." — Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De'ah 61:21

   The Mechaber adopts the resolution of Chullin 134a: an explicit retention (shiyur) of the physical limbs is legally valid, preserving the kohen’s co-ownership and neutralizing the obligation of matanot. Conversely, an external stipulation (al menat) is nullified: the transaction remains binding, but the condition evaporates, restoring full discretionary distribution rights (tovat hana'ah) to the Israelite buyer.

2. Conversion Doubts and the Rule of the Convert:

   "גר שנתגייר והיתה לו פרה... ונשחטה ואין ידוע אם קודם שנתגייר נשחטה אם אחר שנתגייר — פטור, שהמוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה." — Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De'ah 61:8

   The Shulchan Arukh rules purely along the vector of safek mamona. Because matanot kehunah do not carry the sting of tevel, the convert operates with absolute possessory immunity.

3. Modern Halachic Practice: In contemporary practice, the obligation of matanot zero'a, lechayayim, ve-keivah remains binding from the Torah throughout the world (min ha-Torah be-khol makom), independent of Temple services (Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De'ah 61:1).

   However, due to practical complexities in Western commercial slaughterhouses—where skinning and anatomical separation according to exact halachic parameters (as detailed on Chullin 134b) can be commercially disruptive—modern meatpackers routinely employ the very mechanism analyzed in our sugya: the commercial packing plant sells a fractional share in the live animal to a partnering kohen prior to slaughter (shutafut kohen), thereby legally exempting the carcass entirely from the mandate of priestly gifts pursuant to Chullin 132b.

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Takeaway

Priestly gifts exist at the frontier between Heaven's tithe and human commerce: where ritual issur rules, we yield our doubts to Heaven's stringency; but where the altar leaves the meat unprohibited, the Torah lets human equity stand firm—no hand may claim an unproven debt without bearing the absolute burden of proof.

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Footnotes

[^fn-1]: Rashi, Chullin 134a s.v. "U-mar sav matanot nigzalot." [^fn-2]: Ketzot HaChoshen, Choshen Mishpat 361:1. [^fn-3]: Even HaEzel, Hilchot Gezelah ve-Aveidah 5:14. [^fn-4]: Rashba, Chiddushei HaRashba, Chullin 134a s.v. "Chutz mi-matanoteha." [^fn-5]: Ritva, Chiddushei HaRitva, Chullin 134a s.v. "Shiyura hu." [^fn-6]: Tosafot, Chullin 134a s.v. "U-mar sav al menat shiyura hu." [^fn-7]: Rosh, Piskei HaRosh, Chullin, Perek 10, Siman 14. [^fn-8]: Tosafot, Bava Metzia 6b s.v. "Kavshei patur."