Daf Yomi
Chullin 138
In another voice
Sugya Map
The sugyot spanning Chullin 138a–138b traverse the conceptual terminus of Reishit HaGez (the first shearings of the flock) and initiate the final perek of the tractate, Shiluach HaKein (sending away the mother bird). The Gemara negotiates three core mechanics:
[Chullin 138a–138b]
│
├── 1. Shiur Reishit HaGez: Definition of Priest's Portion
│ └── Source: Deut 18:5 ("La'amod le-sharet") ──► Avnet (Priestly Belt)
│ └── Reconciles: Sela weights & high/common priest vestment symmetry
│
├── 2. Structural Genesis of Chiyuv: Retention & Piecemeal Dispersal
│ ├── "Gazaz u-machar rishonah" (R. Chisda vs. R. Natan bar Hoshaya)
│ │ └── Pivot: Does "Tzo'necha" apply at shearing or completion?
│ └── "Sheyyer ha-mocher" (R. Yehuda in Pe'ah vs. Rava's Matanot Kehunah)
│ └── Pivot: Agrarian field-unity vs. Commercial exclusion of priestly dues
│
└── 3. Redactional Architecture & Exclusions of Shiluach HaKein
├── R. Avin & R. Meyasha: Formulaic redundancy vs. Halakhic chiddush
└── Exclusions: Hekdesh & Avian Homicide ("Mi she-atah metzuveh leshalcho")
- Shiur Matanah and Vestment Symmetry: Determining the minimum fleece quantity owed to the kohen (five sela in Judea / ten in Galilee, post-scouring). Derived from Deuteronomy 18:5, “la’amod le-sharet” demands an object capable of cultic service—identified as the avnet (belt). The Gemara calibrates the shiur against the debate concerning the identity of the common priest's belt (avneto shel kohen hedyot) with that of the High Priest (avneto shel kohen gadol).
- Piecemeal Shearing and Alienation (Gazaz u-machar rishonah): If one shears five sheep sequentially, selling each sheep immediately after its shearing, Rav Chisda obligates the owner in reishit ha-gez, whereas Rabbi Natan bar Hoshaya exempts. The nafka mina lies in the nature of chov: does “tzo’necha” (your flock) demand proprietorship across the flock at the moment the quantitative threshold (five fleeces) is fulfilled (gemar shiur), or does ownership at the moment of each respective shearing suffice to crystallize an inchoate lien?
- Alienation with Reservation (Sheyyer ha-mocher): When fleeces are sold while retaining a residual portion, who must separate the priestly gift? Rav Chisda initially assimilates this to Rabbi Yehuda’s principle in Peah 3:5 regarding tree-sales. Rava deconstructs this analogy, establishing a fundamental divergence between pe'ah (where harvesting the first stalk triggers a field-wide lien) and reishit ha-gez, ultimately grounding the liability in the proprietary presumption that ein adam mocher matanot kehunah (a person does not transfer that which belongs to the priesthood).
- Perek Shiluach HaKein – Redactional Taxonomy and Cultic Preclusion: The opening mishnah of Perek 12 introduces categorical formulations (ba-aretz u-ve-chutz la-aretz, bifnei ha-bayit ve-she-lo bifnei ha-bayit, be-chullin aval lo be-mukdashin). Rabbi Avin and Rabbi Meyasha establish an interpretive rule governing the repetition of these clauses throughout the tractate. The sugya then deduces that mukdashin (sacrificial birds) and a bird that killed a human are exempt from the obligation of sending away the dam via the exegetical limiter: “shaleach teshalach”—only that which you are commanded to release, excluding that which must be sequestered to the sanctuary treasury (gizbar) or to the court (beit din).
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Text Snapshot
Chullin 138a:
אמר רבי יהושע בן לוי אמר קרא לעמד לשרת דבר הראוי לשרת ומאי ניהו אבנט
אימא מעיל תפסת מרובה לא תפסת תפסת מועט תפסת
אימא כיפה של צמר דתניא כיפה של צמר היתה מונחת בראש כהן גדול ועליה ציץ נתון...
אמר קרא אתו ואת בניו דבר השוה בין באהרן ובין בבניו...
Chullin 138a–138b:
גזז ומכר ראשונה, רב חסדא אמר חייב, ורבי נתן בר הושעיא אמר פטור...
בשעת גמר שיעור בעינן צאנך וליכא...
אלא אמר רבא האי תנא הוא, דתנן: מכר לו קרביה וכו', אלמא אין אדם מוכר מתנות כהונה...
The syntax of Chullin 138a hinges on the juxtaposition between “la’amod le-sharet” (to stand to minister) and the phrase “oto ve-et banav” (him and his sons). The Gemara does not read “la’amod le-sharet” as an open-ended metaphor for dignity; rather, it invokes an exact, functional baseline: the minimum quantum of material capable of comprising an autonomous item of the bigdei kehunah.
Notice the linguistic tension in Rava's refutation of Rav Chisda: “התם כתיב ובקצרכם את קציר ארצכם, מכי שרי ליה במקצת איחייב ליה בכוליה; הכא לא איחייב ליה בכוליה מעידן דשרי ליה למיגזז”. In pe'ah, the Torah employs an ingressive temporal trigger (u-ve-kutzrechem); in reishit ha-gez, the obligation remains structurally non-existent until the completion of the aggregate threshold (gemar shiur).
Readings
1. The Ontology of the Shiur: Pure Quantity vs. Cultic Imputation
What is the operational nature of the requirement that the wool must equal five sela—the weight of an avnet?
Two Conceptions of the "Avnet" Metric:
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Rashi / Tosafot: Quantitative Benchmark │
│ • The avnet merely defines a numerical weight (5 sela). │
│ • Once reached, any generic fleece satisfies the duty. │
└──────────────────────────────┬──────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Rambam: Functional Integrity (Chashivut Beged) │
│ • Requires wool fit for actual weaving into a garment. │
│ • Imputes a quasi-sacred character into the priestly share. │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Rashi understands this derivation as a formal quantitative benchmark: the Torah sought a measure of substance (chashivut) and calibrated it against the smallest discrete woolen garment worn in the Temple service, which is the belt. Once this physical quantity (five sela of scoured wool) is determined, the actual wool transferred does not require cultic utility; it merely requires this standardized weight.1
The Rambam, however, suggests a more integrated mechanism.2 In Hilkhot Bikkurim 10:14, he formulates the obligation: the giver must donate clean wool that has the capacity to be woven directly into a small garment. The invocation of “la’amod le-sharet” does not merely furnish a static weight metric; it injects a functional requirement of re’uyah le-sherut (usability for service) into the matanah itself. If the wool is frayed, chemically destroyed, or of a quality incapable of sustaining the structural integrity of a weave, the metric is void, even if it weighs five sela.
Furthermore, this sugya addresses the dispute regarding avneto shel kohen hedyot (whether an ordinary priest's belt was of linen alone or contained sha'atnez, identical to the High Priest's belt throughout the year; see Yoma 12b). The Gemara questions: according to the position that an ordinary priest's belt was linen alone, the woolen avnet was not common to Aaron and his sons, violating the metric of “oto ve-et banav”!
The Gemara answers: “shem avnet echad hu” (the categorical nomenclature of "belt" is uniform). The Rashba notes that this is an exceptional hermeneutical maneuver.3 We do not require that the material (wool) be functionally worn by both; rather, we require that the name of the garment in which wool can be utilized be structurally shared across the priestly hierarchy. This reveals that the Torah’s linkage between reishit ha-gez and bigdei kehunah is not purely material-quantitative, but conceptual-taxonomic: the fleece must represent an autonomous vestment category within the Tabernacle.
2. The Genesis of Liability: Tzo'necha and the Temporal Mechanics of Shearing
The dispute between Rav Chisda and Rabbi Natan bar Hoshaya regarding “gazaz u-machar rishonah” (shearing and selling sheep consecutively) unearths a classical dispute concerning the temporal onset of halakhic obligations.
Model A: Inchoate Lien (Rav Chisda)
Shearing 1 ──► Shearing 2 ──► Shearing 3 ──► Shearing 4 ──► Shearing 5 (Gemar Shiur)
[Lien Attached] [Lien Attached] [Lien Attached] [Lien Attached] ──► [Retroactive Crystallization]
* Ownership of sheep at individual moments of shearing suffices.
Model B: Punctual Concurrence (R. Natan bar Hoshaya)
Shearing 1 Shearing 2 Shearing 3 Shearing 4 Shearing 5 (Gemar Shiur)
│
Requires "Tzo'necha"
(Simultaneous ownership
of flock at this instant)
Rav Chisda maintains that if an owner sheared a sheep while owning it, the fleece acquired an inchoate attachment to the mitzvah. Although the shiur of reishit ha-gez is not realized until five fleeces coalesce, the proprietary qualification—“tzo’necha”—is evaluated at the moment of the physical act of severance (she'at gezizah). When the fifth fleece is finally severed, the latent obligations crystallize retroactively.
Rabbi Natan bar Hoshaya contends that “tzo’necha” is not a prerequisite for the isolated act of shearing; it is a prerequisite for the chalut ha-chiyuv (the legal advent of the obligation). Because no obligation exists until the terminal point of the fifth fleece is reached, the Torah demands that the animal source must be “tzo’necha” at that exact moment: “bi-she’at gemar shiur בעינן צאנך וליכא”.4
The Ketzot HaChoshen clarifies this debate by contrasting it with the status of lien acquisitions (shi'budim).5 According to Rav Chisda, each shearing generates a dormant status of huktza le-mitzvato (designated for its mitzvah), or a partial chovat gavra (personal duty) waiting for quantitative completion.
For Rabbi Natan bar Hoshaya, reishit ha-gez is fundamentally a chovat ha-tzo’n (an obligation resident within the flock itself). If the flock is alienated prior to the completion of the quantitative threshold, there is no collective substrate upon which the obligation can attach. The fleeces sitting in the basket are decoupled from the pastoral unit that generated them; hence, no reishit ha-gez can emerge.
3. Alienation of Fleeces: Rava’s Deconstruction of Rav Chisda’s Pe’ah Paradigm
When an owner sells fleeces but keeps a remainder, Rav Chisda attempts to identify the Tanna who assigns responsibility to the seller based on Rabbi Yehuda’s ruling in Peah 3:5. Rabbi Yehuda rules that one who sells fruit trees while retaining a portion gives pe’ah for the entire grove.
Rava completely dismantles this connection:
┌────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Rava's Distinction │
└────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
┌────────────────────────────┴────────────────────────────┐
▼ ▼
Pe'ah (Lev. 19:9) Reishit HaGez (Deut. 18:4)
"U-ve-kutzrechem..." "Reishit gez tzo'necha..."
• Ingressive Trigger • Threshold Trigger
• First stalk harvested binds • No lien until all 5 fleeces
the entire field to Pe'ah. are shorn.
• Prior lien survives tree sale. • Sale before gemar shiur severed
from source.
In pe'ah, the verse “u-ve-kutzrechem” institutes an ingressive trigger: the very first harvesting motion creates an overarching lien across the entire landholding. Thus, when the trees are subsequently alienated, they are sold as items already mortgaged to the chiyuv pe’ah; the seller merely resolves his pre-existing proprietary obligation. In reishit ha-gez, however, cutting the first fleece induces zero liability regarding the rest of the flock.
Rava therefore redirects the sugya to the principle found in Chullin 132a: “ein adam mocher matanot kehunah” (a person does not sell the gifts belonging to the priesthood).
The Nesivot HaMishpat addresses how Rava’s mechanism operates.6 If the obligation has not yet crystallized, how can we assert that the seller "did not sell" the priestly gifts? The gifts do not yet exist!
Rava’s chiddush is that the phrase “ein adam mocher matanot kehunah” is not merely an interpretation of physical objects already endowed with holiness; it is a default rule of commercial intent (kavanat ha-makneh). A seller standardly reserves (meshayer) whatever material will eventually be required to fulfill divine dues.
Therefore:
- If the seller retains any residual wool, the baseline presumption is that his reservation was designed to absorb the emergent matanot kehunah, releasing the buyer from an encumbrance.
- If the seller alienated everything, the transaction was structurally absolute. The buyer cannot claim indemnity, because the seller effectively declared: “I am selling you raw material; whatever halakhic liabilities manifest upon its completion fall exclusively within your domain.”
4. Hermeneutics of Redaction: The Redundancy Axiom of R. Avin and R. Meyasha
The transition to Perek 12 introduces a foundational sugya in mishnaic hermeneutics. Rabbi Avin and Rabbi Meyasha establish an overarching taxonomy for mishnaic preambles across Masekhet Chullin:
Classification of Mishnah Preambles in Chullin:
1. "Ba-Aretz u-ve-Chutz la-Aretz" ──► Formulaic surplus (Shelo le-tzorech)
* Exception: Reishit HaGez (Excludes R. Ilai's territorial limit).
2. "Bifnei ha-Bayit ve-she-lo Bifnei ha-Bayit" ──► Formulaic surplus (Shelo le-tzorech)
* Exception: Oto ve-Et Beno (Appears in sacral context; requires affirmation).
3. "Be-Chullin aval lo be-Mukdashin" ──► Substantive necessity (Le-tzorech)
* Exception: Gid HaNasheh (Offspring of consecrated animals already clarified).
Tosafot investigate the operative mechanics of this taxonomy.7 Why does the Gemara tolerate the principle that a Tanna would incorporate introductory formulas shelo le-tzorech (needlessly)?
The Tosafists explain that the redaction of the Mishnah frequently operates through chimud (rhythmic and structural parallelism). Once a phrase is coined for a case where it represents an essential halakhic novelty, the Tanna carries that pedagogical cadence into other chapters to maintain mnemonic cohesion.
Yet, regarding mukdashin, the default assumption flips: mukdashin represents an exceptional domain governed by unique sacral mechanics. Hence, wherever the Mishnah notes “be-chullin aval lo be-mukdashin”, it is inherently le-tzorech—it is actively functioning to resolve a specific exegetical tension—with the sole exception of Gid HaNasheh, which was included solely to conform to the established linguistic architecture of the tractate.
Friction
Kushya 1: The Paradox of Commercial Reservation
If, as Rava concludes, the operative principle governing sheyyer ha-mocher is “ein adam mocher matanot kehunah”, an acute conceptual paradox arises.
If a person cannot sell priestly gifts because they are not his to sell, why does the buyer ever become liable to give reishit ha-gez when the seller liquidates his entire lot without retaining a portion?
The Paradox:
Premise A: "Ein adam mocher matanot kehunah" (A person cannot sell priestly dues).
│
▼
Premise B: Seller sells ALL fleeces without keeping any remainder.
│
▼
Dilemma: If the seller cannot sell what belongs to the Kohen, then the sale of
that portion must be void! The seller should still be obligated to bring
the matanah, or the buyer should pay the Kohen and deduct it from the sale!
Yet the Mishnah rules: Buyer pays out of pocket, NO deduction permitted!
If the seller lacks the legal capacity to alienate the priestly portion, the transaction concerning that share should be legally nullified, and the seller should remain perpetually liable! Alternatively, the buyer should deliver the fleece to the kohen and deduct its monetary value from the purchase price, just as he does in the case of a butcher who sold meat by weight (mikarvei de-dekar; see Chullin 132a)! Why does the Gemara sanction that the buyer must pay the priest entirely out of pocket without any financial recourse against the seller?
Terutz A: Quantitative Inchoation vs. Post-Shearing Liens (The Rashba)
The Rashba draws a structural distinction between the gifts of the slaughterhouse (zro'a, lechayayim, ve-keivah) and reishit ha-gez.8
In the case of animal innards, the moment the animal is slaughtered, the matanot exist as distinct, realized physical entities embedded in the flesh. Consequently, the vendor genuinely sells an object that is partially owned by the priesthood. If he sells it by weight, he is taking money for the priest's asset; thus, the buyer deducts it.
In reishit ha-gez, however, as long as the fleeces have not yet coalesced into the requisite five-fleece weight under a single owner's control, no priestly lien has attached to any thread of the wool. The phrase “ein adam mocher matanot kehunah” does not mean that the priestly share is inalienable property in the seller’s hands; rather, it means that where the seller retains a remainder, we interpret his intent as an assumption of personal liability.
When he sells the entire lot, however, he sells an unencumbered physical mass. The priestly obligation is generated ex nihilo within the buyer’s estate because it is the buyer who establishes the final consolidation (gemar shiur). The buyer cannot deduct anything from the purchase price because the seller transferred fully legitimate, unencumbered goods.
Terutz B: The Brisker Analysis of Personal Duty (Chovat Gavra) vs. Object Encumbrance (Cheftza)
Rav Chaim Soloveitchik reframes Rava’s reading of “I did not sell you the gift of the priest”.9
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Rav Chaim's Bifurcation │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
┌────────────────────────────┴────────────────────────────┐
▼ ▼
Case 1: Remainder Retained (Sheyyer) Case 2: Total Liquidation
• Chovat Ha-Cheftza manifests. • Chovat Ha-Gavra manifests.
• Priestly due settles upon the mass • Buyer completes the aggregate.
retained by the original owner. • Obligation crystallizes on buyer
• Buyer is entirely exonerated. as the producer of the shiur.
When the seller retains a portion, the Torah directs the chovat ha-cheftza (the lien residing in the substance of the wool) to settle upon the mass that remains in the possession of the original owner.
However, when the entire flock's shearing is sold, the seller’s commercial transfer is complete. The obligation does not strike the past; it strikes the present. The buyer is the individual who actualizes the aggregate quantum (gemar shiur).
The buyer's obligation is a pure chovat gavra born at the moment he brings the wool into his domain. He cannot make a claim against the seller, because the seller committed no tort and sold no illicit property; the buyer's own acquisition is the legal event that generated the obligation to give reishit ha-gez.
Kushya 2: The Double Exclusion of the Homicidal Bird (Of She-Harag et Ha-Adam)
Ravina states on Chullin 138b:
“Therefore, a kosher bird that killed a person is exempt from the mitzvah of sending away from the nest. What is the reason? ‘You shall surely send the dam’—to that which you are commanded to send, excluding this one, which you are not commanded to send, but to bring to court.”
The Gemara asks: what is the case? If the bird's verdict has already been issued (nigmar dino), it is an entity condemned to execution, which is intrinsically forbidden from all benefit (asur be-hana'ah; see Avodah Zarah 6b). If an object is forbidden from benefit, how could the mitzvah of shiluach ha-kein ever apply to it?
The Conceptual Impasse:
- If nigmar dino: It is ASUR BE-HANA'AH.
└── Take the young? Prohibited (cannot acquire/eat an asur be-hana'ah object).
└── Send the dam? The verse "ve-et ha-banim tikach lach" fails (must be fit for "lach").
- If LO nigmar dino: It has no formal status of a killer yet!
└── Why should it be excluded from Shiluach HaKein based on "bring it to court"?
No court conviction has occurred!
Why did Ravina require a novel hermeneutic derivation (“mi she-atah metzuveh leshalcho”) when the foundational law of issurei hana’ah should effortlessly nullify the mitzvah?
Terutz: The Mechanics of "Lach" vs. The Autonomous Interruption of Execution
The Gemara addresses this friction directly, yielding a critical insight into the relationship between court obligations and ritual mitzvot.
If the bird has not yet undergone the completion of its trial (lo nigmar dino), it is not forbidden from benefit. Yet, a severe conflict of legal imperatives arises:
┌────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Conflict of Imperatives at Nest │
└────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
┌────────────────────────────┴────────────────────────────┐
▼ ▼
Mitzvah A: Shiluach HaKein Mitzvah B: Ba'ar Ta'anit Damim
(Deut. 22:7) (Beit Din Adjudication)
"Shaleach teshalach et ha-eim" "Bring it to court to execute"
Demands: Release into the wild. Demands: Seize and escort to court.
The Gemara's chiddush is that without the verse's exclusion (“mi she-atah metzuveh leshalcho”), one might have applied the rule of aseh docheh lo ta'aseh (a positive commandment overrides a negative commandment), or assumed that the immediate mitzvah of shiluach takes precedence over the uncertain, future judicial execution by beit din.
The verse explicitly teaches that the overarching societal obligation to bring the homicidal agent to the judicial forum (“le-havi'o le-veit din”) structurally revokes the applicability of the nest. The nest ceases to be halakhically defined as a “kan” subject to release; instead, it is transformed into a sanctuary of fugitives that the finder is obligated to seize for capital adjudication.
Intertext
The tension in Chullin 138a concerning whether an obligation crystallizes retroactively upon completion or progressively during harvest parallels the classic sugya of agricultural obligations in Peah 3:5 and Bava Metzia 110a.
Cross-Textual Nexus: The Mechanics of Agricultural Liens
┌───────────────────────────────┐ ┌───────────────────────────────┐
│ Chullin 138a │ │ Bava Metzia 110a │
│ (Reishit HaGez) │ │ (Chovat Chovesh) │
├───────────────────────────────┤ ├───────────────────────────────┤
│ • No flock-wide lien until │ │ • Obligation of Pe'ah and │
│ 5th fleece is shorn. │ │ Ma'asrot: Does harvest of │
│ • "U-ve-kutzrechem" is │ │ part bind the unharvested │
│ absent. │ │ crop to the landholder? │
└───────────────┬───────────────┘ └───────────────┬───────────────┘
│ │
└───────────────────┬────────────────────┘
│
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Shulchan Arukh YD 333:1 │
│ Residual retention (Sheyyer) leaves │
│ the full lien upon the original │
│ owner; complete sale transfers it. │
└──────────────────────────────────────┘
In Bava Metzia 110a, the Gemara evaluates a sharecropper (aris) who divides a field with the landowner. If the aris reaps his half and departs, who must give pe'ah?
There, the Gemara operates with the identical premise that Rav Chisda cited: “miki shari liah bi-mkzat, ichayav lei be-khulei” (once harvesting initiates on a portion, the entirety of the parcel becomes bound to the requirement of pe'ah).
This stands in stark opposition to the laws of Tevel and Ma'asrot, where liability is governed strictly by miru'ach (smoothing the pile), a terminal processing threshold (gemar melakhah). Rava’s distinction in our sugya definitively places reishit ha-gez into the category of gemar melakhah: the flock does not function as a cohesive territory that can be captured by an initial cut; it is an aggregate of raw produce that demands a completed shiur before any priestly dimension descends upon it.
Psak/Practice
The codification of these principles reveals how the Rishonim translated the mechanics of Chullin 138 into practical halakhic guidelines:
- Codification of the Shiur: The Rambam Mishneh Torah, First Sheep Shearing 2:10 and the Shulchan Arukh Yoreh De'ah 333:1 rule that the minimum volume to be given to the kohen is scoured wool equivalent to five sela in Judean weight (which equals the weight of 10 Judean sela of dirty, unscoured wool). The donor is forbidden from providing wool so corrupted that it cannot serve as yarn for an avnet.
- Alienation and the Rule of Retention (Sheyyer): In Yoreh De'ah 333:10, the Mechaber rules precisely according to Rava's resolution:
- If an individual sells the shearing of his sheep to an associate, if the seller retained any part of the shearing for himself, the seller must give the priestly gift from what remains, accounting for the entire flock.
- If the seller did not retain any wool, the purchaser must furnish the five sela from the acquired wool directly to the priest, and he cannot deduct its value from the purchase price paid to the seller.
- Contemporary Applications of Shiluach HaKein: The baseline mishnaic rule established on Chullin 138b—that the mitzvah applies “she-lo bifnei ha-bayit” and “be-chutz la-aretz”—is universally accepted in Yoreh De'ah 292:1.
However, the exclusion derived by Ravina regarding items not destined for freedom (“mi she-atah metzuveh leshalcho”) serves as the legal foundation for the modern consensus (exemplified by the Chazon Ish and Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach): birds nesting in private domestic spaces that are fully owned and secured do not qualify for the mitzvah, because the element of hefker (wildness/unclaimed status) and the unrestricted capacity to send the dam into the commons are foundational halakhic prerequisites of the act.
Takeaway
Reishit HaGez and Shiluach HaKein demand more than mere quantitative compliance: the priestly wool must inherently bear the dignity of Temple vestments, while the mother bird can only be sent away when the act of release does not collide with a higher judicial obligation to detain.
Footnotes
1 Rashi, Chullin 138a s.v. le-sharet.
2 Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Bikkurim 10:14.
3 Rashba, Chiddushei HaRashba, Chullin 138a s.v. shem avnet echad hu.
4 Chullin 138a: בשעת גמר שיעור בעינן צאנך וליכא.
5 Ketzot HaChoshen, Choshen Mishpat, Siman 399, s.k. 1.
6 Nesivot HaMishpat, Choshen Mishpat, Siman 212, s.k. 4.
7 Tosafot, Chullin 138b s.v. kol makom she-shana.
8 Rashba, Chiddushei HaRashba, Chullin 138b s.v. alman ein adam mocher.
9 R. Chaim Soloveitchik, Chiddushei Rabbeinu Chaim HaLevi, Hilkhot Bikkurim 10:18.
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