Chullin 77

Sugya Map

This sugya on Chullin 77a navigates intricate halachic distinctions concerning anatomical definitions and the status of embryonic matter. The discussion branches into several key areas:

The Halachic Status of Sinews (Gidin)

• Issue: Are sinews considered basar (flesh) for halachic purposes? This impacts the permissibility of a tereifa (a mortally wounded animal) and the fulfillment of the mitzvah of eating the Korban Pesach.
• Nafka Mina(s):
  • Tereifa: If a broken bone is covered only by sinews, is the animal still a tereifa? The baraita on 76b implies coverage by skin and flesh permits it.
  • Korban Pesach: Can one register for the Korban Pesach solely to eat sinews, implying they constitute basar?
• Primary Sources: Chullin 77a (beginning of the daf, discussion of R. Yochanan vs. Reish Lakish), Pesachim 84a (context for R. Yochanan's retraction), Vayikra 11:39 (regarding tumah of gidin).

The Tereifa of a Protruding Bone (Etzem Shenifraq V'Yatzah)

• Issue: What constitutes sufficient covering (flesh/skin) for a broken, protruding bone to prevent the animal from being a tereifa? The Gemara explores various states of damaged flesh.
• Nafka Mina(s): Permissibility of the animal for consumption.
• Primary Sources: Chullin 76b (Baraita: "העצם נשבר ונפרק ויצא"), Chullin 77a (Ravina's questions: nikbatz, nitpases, nismuq; Ulla's statement on skin; Rav Ashi's kurtita k'min taba'at dilemma).

The Halachic Status of a Placenta (Shilya)

• Issue: Under what conditions is a shilya permitted for consumption, and what are its tumah ramifications? Specifically, what if part of it emerged before shechita? This leads to a debate about the concern for an "another fetus" (walad acher).
• Nafka Mina(s):
  • Consumption: Permitted by mother's shechita or prohibited.
  • Tumah: Tumah Ochel (food impurity) or Tumah Neveila (carcass impurity).
  • Kedusha: Status of a shilya from a bechor (firstborn) or korban (sacrificial animal).
• Primary Sources: Mishnah Chullin 77a, Devarim 14:6 (source for shilya permit), Vayikra 11:39 (source for tumah of gidin and shilya), Chullin 77b (R. Elazar vs. R. Yochanan dispute).

The Prohibition of Darkei ha'Emori (Ways of the Amorite)

• Issue: What types of non-Jewish superstitious practices are prohibited?
• Nafka Mina(s): Permissibility of certain rituals for healing or good fortune.
• Primary Sources: Mishnah Chullin 77b, Chullin 77b (Abaye and Rava's principle).

Text Snapshot

The sugya opens with a foundational discussion on the nature of sinews:

רב פפא אמר לרבא: והא רבי שמעון בן לקיש סבר דאינן בשר, וחייבת מן התורה, ואת אמרת מאי דאית לך בהא? שתק. Chullin 77a Rav Pappa said to Rabba: But Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish holds that sinews are not flesh, and it is prohibited by Torah law, and you say: What concern is there in this case? Rabba was silent.

This exchange sets the stage for the debate regarding gidin as basar, particularly in the context of a tereifa where a broken bone is covered by sinews. Rabba's silence is immediately questioned, leading to the crucial point of Rabbi Yochanan's retraction:

הכא שאני, דהדר ביה רבי יוחנן מדרבי שמעון בן לקיש, דאמר ליה: לא תתגרה בי, דאני שונה אותה דעת יחיד. Chullin 77a Here, it is different, as Rabbi Yoḥanan retracted his ruling in favor of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, as when Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish raised a difficulty against Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion, Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: Do not provoke me by asking questions to refute my opinion that the fact that the sinews will ultimately harden is disregarded, as I teach it in explanation of a lone opinion.

This passage is pivotal, shifting the halachic landscape for gidin. The term "דעת יחיד" (da'at yachid) is crucial; it implies R. Yochanan's original position (that gidin are basar despite hardening) is not normative halacha.

Later, the mishnah introduces the complex laws of a shilya (placenta):

שילייה מקצתה יצאה אסורה לאכילה, מפני שהיא סימן לוולד באשה וסימן לוולד בבהמה. Mishnah Chullin 77b A placenta, part of which emerged, its consumption is prohibited, because it is an indication of a fetus in a woman and an indication of a fetus in an animal.

This mishnah establishes a fundamental prohibition based on a safek (doubt) concerning a fetus. The Gemara then delves into a dispute between R. Elazar and R. Yochanan regarding this mishnah, which is initially presented in one direction and then corrected:

רבי אלעזר אומר: לא שנו אלא שאין שם וולד, אבל יש שם וולד אין חוששין לוולד אחר. ורבי יוחנן אומר: בין שיש שם וולד ובין שאין שם וולד חוששין לוולד אחר. אי הכי, והא רבי ירמיה אומר: רבי אלעזר אמר חומרא? אלא אי אתמר הכי אתמר: רבי אלעזר אומר: לא שנו אלא שאינה מודבקת לוולד, אבל מודבקת לוולד אין חוששין לוולד אחר. ורבי יוחנן אומר: לא שנו אלא שילייה בלא וולד, אבל וולד עמה בין מודבקת לוולד בין שאינה מודבקת לוולד אין חוששין לוולד אחר. Chullin 77b Rabbi Elazar says: They taught this only in a case where there was no fetus found in the mother’s womb, but if there was a fetus... one need not be concerned for another fetus. But Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Whether there was no fetus... or whether there was a fetus, one needs to be concerned for another fetus. The Gemara asks: Is that so? But doesn’t Rabbi Yirmeya say concerning this dispute: Rabbi Elazar said an explanation of the mishna that presents a stringency? Rather, if it was stated, it was stated like this: Rabbi Elazar says: They taught this only in a case where the placenta is not attached to the fetus found inside... But if it is attached to the fetus found inside, there is no concern for another fetus. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: We have the ruling that the placenta is prohibited only in a case where there is a placenta without any fetus being found. But if a fetus was found with it, then whether it is attached to the fetus or whether it is not attached to the fetus, there is no concern for another fetus.

This correction of the Amoraic dispute is a classic sugya development, highlighting the rigorous process of talmudic analysis and the importance of precise articulation. The nuance lies in the distinction between an attached versus unattached placenta when a fetus is present.

Readings

The sugya on Chullin 77a, particularly concerning the status of gidin (sinews) as basar (flesh) and the implications for tereifot and Korban Pesach, has elicited significant discussion among Rishonim and Acharonim. The Gemara's initial premise that gidin are basar for Korban Pesach, followed by R. Yochanan's retraction, creates a complex halachic landscape.

1. The Enigmatic Status of Gidin: Rashi vs. Rambam

The starting point of our sugya on 77a is the assertion that gidin are considered basar, evidenced by the possibility of registering for them for the Korban Pesach: "נמנין עליהם בפסח, אלמא בשר נינהו" Chullin 77a. This hava amina (initial assumption) is immediately challenged by the opinion of Reish Lakish, who holds gidin are not basar, leading to a tereifa status. The Gemara resolves this by stating R. Yochanan retracted his lenient view, aligning with Reish Lakish. The practical upshot is that gidin are generally not considered basar when they harden.

Rashi's Perspective: Contextualizing "אלמא בשר נינהו"

Rashi, in his commentary on the opening lines of Chullin 77a, clarifies the initial premise: "נמנין עליהם - דאפי' לא נמנה אדם עם החבורה אלא לאכול מהן יצא ידי אכילת פסח. אלמא בשר נינהו" Rashi on Chullin 77a:1:1. He explicitly states that if one enrolls in a group for the Pesach offering only to eat sinews, they fulfill the obligation, thereby demonstrating that sinews are considered basar. This understanding aligns with the Gemara's hava amina. However, Rashi must then contend with the Gemara's conclusion that R. Yochanan retracted. For Rashi, the retraction of R. Yochanan means that the halacha follows Reish Lakish, and thus gidin are not considered basar where they harden. This psak applies to the tereifa discussion. How does this square with the initial Pesach proof? Rashi implies that the Pesach proof itself must be re-evaluated or limited. Perhaps the Pesach context refers to a different type of sinew, or the initial statement was merely a rejected premise. Rashi does not explicitly resolve the Pesach proof after the retraction, but the implication is that for Halacha L'Ma'aseh, gidin are not basar.

Rambam's Definitive Stance: Gidin are Not Basar

The Rambam, in Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot, unequivocally rules that gidin are not basar:

בשר אסור מן התורה, אבל העור והגידים והעצמות והקרנים והטלפים מותרים באכילה, ואין בהם משום בשר אלא אם כן נתבשל עם הבשר ונטעם כבשר. Rambam, Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot 7:8 Meat is forbidden by Torah law, but the hide, sinews, bones, horns, and hooves are permitted to be eaten, and they are not considered meat unless they are cooked with meat and taste like meat.

Furthermore, regarding the Korban Pesach, the Rambam states:

הגידין והעצמות והקרנים והטלפים והעורות והראש וכל הדומה לזה אינו מן המנין, ואין בו אכילת פסח. Rambam, Hilchot Korban Pesach 2:10 The sinews, bones, horns, hooves, hides, head, and anything similar are not counted, and one does not fulfill the eating of the Paschal offering with them.

These statements by Rambam present a direct challenge to the initial premise of our sugya ("אלמא בשר נינהו"). For Rambam, gidin are never basar for the purposes of Korban Pesach, nor for the general prohibition of basar (e.g., neveilah, tereifah), unless they acquire the taste of meat through cooking. This firm position implies that the Gemara's initial Pesach proof was either completely rejected by the conclusion of the sugya, or it referred to a context where gidin were considered basar by a da'at yachid that is not accepted halacha.

Kesef Mishneh's Harmonization

The Kesef Mishneh on Rambam, Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot 7:8 addresses the sugya in Chullin and the apparent contradiction. He explains that the Gemara's initial hava amina in Chullin 77a, derived from Pesach, was ultimately rejected by the conclusion of the sugya itself. The retraction of R. Yochanan means that the halacha follows Reish Lakish, who holds gidin are not basar. Thus, the Rambam's ruling, which is categorical that gidin are not basar, is fully consistent with the final psak of the sugya. The Pesach source from Pesachim 84a is then understood as referring to a specific instance or a unique derasha that does not establish a general rule that gidin are basar.

2. The Shilya (Placenta) Debate: R. Elazar vs. R. Yochanan and its Halachic Fallout

The mishnah states that if part of a placenta emerged before shechita, it is forbidden due to concern for a fetus that might have emerged. The Gemara then presents a debate between R. Elazar and R. Yochanan, which is subsequently corrected.

The Corrected Dispute

The sugya first presents R. Elazar as lenient (no concern for another fetus if one is found) and R. Yochanan as stringent (always concerned). Then, R. Yirmiya's statement ("R. Elazar said a stringency") necessitates a correction:

• R. Elazar (stringent): The mishnah's prohibition (if part emerged) applies only if the placenta is not attached to the fetus found inside. If it is attached, there's no concern for another fetus, and it's permitted.
• R. Yochanan (lenient): The mishnah's prohibition applies only if no fetus is found. If a fetus is found with the placenta, then whether attached or not, there is no concern for another fetus, and it's permitted. Chullin 77b

This corrected version reverses their positions dramatically. R. Yochanan becomes the lenient one, permitting the placenta if any fetus is found, regardless of attachment. R. Elazar remains stringent, only permitting if the placenta is found attached to a fetus. The Gemara concludes by saying this corrected version is consistent with R. Yirmiya's statement. The baraita that follows is also taught "in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar" Chullin 77b, further solidifying his position as the more stringent one, at least in the context of tum'at leidah (impurity of childbirth).

Rambam on Shilya: A Strict Interpretation

The Rambam, in Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot, rules:

שיליית בהמה שנטבחה, אם לא יצא מקצתה מן הרחם, מותרת באכילה. ואם יצא מקצתה מן הרחם קודם השחיטה, אסורה. ואין חילוק בין אם נמצא וולד עמה ובין אם לא נמצא, ואין חילוק בין אם מודבקת לוולד ובין אם אינה מודבקת. Rambam, Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot 5:2 A placenta of an animal that was slaughtered, if no part of it emerged from the womb, is permitted to be eaten. But if part of it emerged from the womb before the slaughter, it is forbidden. And there is no difference whether a fetus was found with it or not, and there is no difference whether it was attached to the fetus or not.

The Rambam's psak is strikingly stringent. He rules that if any part of the shilya emerged, it is forbidden, irrespective of whether a fetus is found or if it's attached. This position seems to align more closely with the initial, uncorrected understanding of R. Yochanan in the Gemara, or a highly stringent reading of the mishnah itself, prior to the Amoraic debate. It completely disregards the leniencies presented in the corrected versions of both R. Elazar and R. Yochanan.

Kesef Mishneh's Explanation of Rambam

The Kesef Mishneh on Rambam, Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot 5:2 grapples with this apparent discrepancy. He notes that the Rambam's ruling contradicts the final conclusion of the Gemara's corrected dispute, where both R. Elazar and R. Yochanan offer leniencies under certain conditions. The Kesef Mishneh proposes that the Rambam follows the Stam Mishnah (unattributed Mishnah) itself, which states "שילייה מקצתה יצאה אסורה לאכילה" without any qualifiers. The Rambam might consider the Amoraic debate to be specifically about tum'at leidah (as the baraita following the corrected dispute discusses) or simply a non-normative derasha. Alternatively, the Rambam might hold that the safek (doubt) of another fetus is so grave that no leniency can be applied based on attachment or the presence of a fetus. This is a common phenomenon in halacha where the Stam Mishnah is sometimes given precedence over Amoraic discussions, especially when the latter are complex and involve corrections. The Kesef Mishneh thus views Rambam as taking the most straightforward, stringent reading of the mishnah in the context of issur v'heter (forbidden/permitted), while the Gemara's Amoraic debate might be understood as a more nuanced discussion for other halachic domains, or simply not definitive for issur v'heter.

3. Rav Ashi's "Ring-Cut" Dilemma and Medical Halacha

The sugya then shifts to practical considerations for healing a broken bone, specifically if the flesh and skin are "cut in the shape of a ring" (kurtita k'min taba'at) around the break Chullin 77a.

Rashi on Rav Ashi's Dilemma

Rashi clarifies the "ring-cut" scenario: "נקדר - הבשר בסכין מעל השבר בעגול כמין טבעת ורוב הקיפו מכוסה" Rashi on Chullin 77a:10:1. The question is whether such a cut, even if the majority of the bone's circumference is still covered, prevents healing (ma'aleh arucha) or renders it a tereifa Rashi on Chullin 77a:10:2. The resolution comes from Rav Yehuda who consulted both Sages and doctors.

The Medical-Halachic Resolution

Rav Yehuda reports that "מסרטו בעצם" — one makes an incision with a sharp bone, which causes blood to flow and congeal, leading to healing (ma'aleh arucha). Iron, however, would cause inflammation (m'zarref zarif). Rav Pappa adds a crucial condition: "והוא דקנה גרמא דידיה" — this advice is only for a case where "the bone is holding firmly onto its flesh" Chullin 77a, meaning the flesh is still adhering to the bone. Rashi explains "מסרטו בעצם" as using a bone from another animal to make the incision, promoting blood flow and tissue regeneration Rashi on Chullin 77a:10:3. He further clarifies "מזרף זריף" as iron cutting but not healing, causing more damage Rashi on Chullin 77a:10:4. And "קנה גרמא דידיה" means the bone already shows signs of adherence to the flesh around the incision, indicating the start of healing Rashi on Chullin 77a:10:5. This demonstrates a remarkable integration of practical medical knowledge with halachic inquiry, showing the Sages' pragmatic approach to resolving tereifa questions. The condition of "קנה גרמא דידיה" is a siman (sign) that the wound has the capacity to heal naturally, making the intervention effective and the animal permissible.

The detailed discussions of these Rishonim and Acharonim reveal the deep analytical layers involved in understanding the Gemara. They highlight the ongoing effort to reconcile initial textual inferences with final halachic conclusions, often by reinterpreting earlier statements or prioritizing different halachic principles.

Friction

The most potent kushya arising from this sugya is the apparent contradiction between the Gemara's initial hava amina regarding the status of gidin (sinews) as basar (flesh) and the ultimate psak of the Rishonim and Shulchan Aruch.

The Strongest Kushya: Gidin as Basar for Pesach vs. Halacha L'Ma'aseh

The sugya opens with Rabba's initial assertion that gidin are considered basar, based on the rule that "נמנין עליהם בפסח, אלמא בשר נינהו" Chullin 77a. This means one can fulfill the mitzvah of eating the Korban Pesach by consuming sinews, which implies they are halachically defined as basar. However, this is immediately challenged by Rav Pappa, who cites Reish Lakish, stating that gidin are not basar (as they harden) and therefore an animal with a broken bone covered only by sinews would be a tereifa "חייבת מן התורה". The Gemara ultimately resolves this by stating that R. Yochanan, who initially held gidin are basar, retracted his opinion in favor of Reish Lakish, conceding his view was "דעת יחיד" Chullin 77a.

The halacha l'ma'aseh unequivocally follows the position that gidin are not basar.

• For tereifot, the Shulchan Aruch rules: "שבר עצם ונדד ממקומו... אם רובו מכוסה בבשר ועור כשר. ואם אינו מכוסה אלא בגידים... טרפה" Yoreh Deah 47:11. This explicitly states that coverage by sinews is insufficient; gidin are not basar in this context.
• For Korban Pesach, the Shulchan Aruch rules: "אין מונין על הגידין והעצמות והקרנים והטלפים והעורות וראשי אברים" Orach Chaim 476:5. This means gidin do not count towards the minyan (quorum) for the Pesach offering, nor for the shiur k'zayit (olive-sized portion) required.

The kushya is stark: If the Gemara's opening proof for gidin being basar relies on the Pesach context ("נמנין עליהם בפסח"), and the halacha states that gidin are not basar for Pesach, how can we reconcile the Gemara's initial statement? Did R. Yochanan's retraction completely nullify the premise derived from Pesach, or was that premise itself flawed even before the retraction? If the Pesach source was strong enough to form a hava amina, why is it entirely discarded in psak?

Best Terutz (or two): Reconciling the Retraction and the Pesach Source

The resolution lies in a deeper analysis of R. Yochanan's retraction and the nature of the Pesach discussion itself.

Terutz 1: The Retraction is Comprehensive, and the Pesach Source is Limited

The most straightforward terutz is that R. Yochanan's retraction was indeed comprehensive, meaning he fully conceded that gidin are not basar in the general sense, particularly when they harden. The phrase "דעת יחיד" indicates that his earlier opinion was not the accepted tradition. As for the Pesach source from Pesachim 84a (the full context of R. Yochanan's "לא תתגרה בי"), it discusses whether gidin can be machshiv (considered significant) for minyan. Even if gidin are not basar for k'zayit purposes, they might have been considered "part of the animal" for minyan purposes in some opinions, or perhaps the initial hava amina on 77a was based on a nuance that didn't survive the deeper Amoraic debate.

The Kesef Mishneh on Rambam, Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot 7:8 explains that the Gemara's original proof from Pesach was merely a hava amina that was ultimately rejected. The conclusion of the sugya is that the halacha follows Reish Lakish, meaning gidin are not basar. Therefore, the Rambam's categorical ruling that gidin are not basar (for Korban Pesach, tereifot, etc.) is perfectly aligned with the final conclusion of the sugya. The Pesach reference on 77a, then, is simply part of the dialectical process of the Gemara, an initial thought that is ultimately refined and rejected.

Terutz 2: Distinction Between Types of Gidin or Shem Basar

Some Acharonim suggest a more nuanced distinction. There might be gidin lechachim (soft sinews) that do have the status of basar, and gidin kashim (hard sinews) that do not. Reish Lakish's opinion and R. Yochanan's retraction would then apply specifically to the gidin kashim. However, the common understanding is that gidin generally refers to the hard, sinewy tissue, which is distinct from muscle.

Alternatively, the term "בשר" in the context of Pesach might be used in a broader sense (shem basar) for minyan purposes, meaning "part of the edible animal," even if it doesn't count for the k'zayit or other halachic shiurim where strict basar is required. However, this distinction is not explicitly made in the Gemara. The Shulchan Aruch in Orach Chaim 476:5 explicitly states "אין מונין על הגידין," indicating gidin are excluded even from the minyan, which weakens this terutz.

Therefore, the first terutz – that the retraction is comprehensive and the initial Pesach proof is ultimately nullified by the sugya's conclusion – is the most robust. The Gemara's journey from an initial premise to a final, refined halacha often involves discarding earlier proofs or reinterpreting them in light of new information or a stronger argument. In this case, Reish Lakish's position, supported by R. Yochanan's retraction, becomes the definitive halacha that gidin are not basar. The Pesach example on 77a serves as a springboard for the discussion, but its initial implication about the nature of gidin is ultimately not sustained.

Intertext

The sugya in Chullin 77a, particularly its discussions on gidin and darkei ha'Emori, reverberates across various halachic domains, revealing consistent principles in Torah Sheb'al Peh.

1. The Definitive Exclusion of Gidin from Basar – Beyond Tereifot and Pesach

The debate and subsequent retraction regarding gidin as basar is not an isolated incident. The principle that gidin are generally not basar for most halachic purposes is foundational and has wide-ranging implications.

a. Tumah of a Carcass (Tum'at Neveilah)

Our sugya on Chullin 77a itself cites a baraita that directly addresses this:

"וכי ימות מן הבהמה אשר היא לכם לאכלה הנוגע בנבלתה יטמא עד הערב" Vayikra 11:39 – בנבלתה ולא בעורה, ולא בעצמותיה, ולא בגידיה, ולא בקרניה, ולא בטלפיה. Chullin 77a And when a domesticated animal dies, of those that you eat, one who touches its carcass shall be impure until the evening. The verse indicates that one is rendered impure if he touches its carcass, but not if he touches its hide, and not its bones, and not its sinews, and not its horns, and not its hooves.

This baraita explicitly excludes gidin from imparting tum'at neveilah. This is a powerful intertextual parallel, as it provides a clear Torah-level source for the distinction between gidin and basar. The Gemara's initial hava amina for Pesach (that gidin are basar) is thus in tension not only with Reish Lakish but also with this explicit derasha regarding tumah. This strengthens the need for R. Yochanan's retraction, as it brings the gidin discussion into alignment with other established halachic categories. The baraita further elaborates on tzikei kedera (meat pudding), stating that even if gidin are cooked to edibility, they do not acquire tum'at neveilah. This further solidifies their distinct status from basar.

b. Gid HaNasheh (Sciatic Nerve)

The prohibition of gid hanasheh Bereishit 32:33 is another example of a gid with unique halachic status. While the prohibition is due to Yaakov Avinu's injury, the subsequent halachic discussions often differentiate between the gid itself and the basar surrounding it. The Shulchan Aruch rules that one must remove not only the gid but also "הבשר המכסה עליו והגידים הקטנים הדבוקים בו" (the flesh covering it and the small sinews attached to it) Yoreh Deah 65:5, but the primary prohibition is on the gid. This distinction, while not directly about gidin as basar, reinforces the idea that gidin are often treated as a distinct anatomical category, sometimes requiring special halachic consideration separate from basar.

2. The Nuance of Darkei ha'Emori – Intent vs. Superstition

The mishnah on Chullin 77b prohibits certain superstitious practices related to a placenta "due to the prohibition against following the ways of the Amorite." The Gemara then cites Abaye and Rava's crucial principle:

אביי ורבא דאמרי תרווייהו: כל דבר שיש בו משום רפואה, אין בו משום דרכי האמורי. וכל דבר שאין בו משום רפואה, יש בו משום דרכי האמורי. Chullin 77b Abaye and Rava both said: Anything that has an apparently effective medicinal purpose or any other logical reason behind it is not subject to the prohibition against following the ways of the Amorite. But if it does not have an apparently effective medicinal purpose it is subject to the prohibition against following the ways of the Amorite.

This principle is a cornerstone for determining what constitutes darkei ha'Emori and is widely applied across Shas and Halacha.

a. Masechet Shabbat and Healing Practices

The Gemara in Shabbat extensively discusses various practices, distinguishing between genuine medicinal remedies and superstitious acts. For example, Shabbat 67a-b brings numerous cases:

• "תליוה באילן... חטט והוציא הדם... מותר" Shabbat 67a. Certain actions to stop bleeding are permitted because they are for healing.
• "תליוה באילן... ושמנה בשמן... אסור משום דרכי האמורי" Shabbat 67a. Hanging a bone on a tree and anointing it with oil is forbidden because it's purely superstitious.

The specific example of "עץ המפיל פירותיו" (a tree that sheds its fruit prematurely) cited on Chullin 77b is taken directly from Shabbat 67a:

תניא: עץ המפיל פירותיו, צובעו אדום, וטוענו אבנים. בשלמא טוענו אבנים, משום דקשי ליה. אלא צובעו אדום? Chullin 77b It is taught in a baraita: If there is a tree that sheds its fruit prematurely, one may paint it with red paint and load it with stones. Granted, it is permitted to load it with stones, as one does so for a logical reason. But painting it red?

Here, the Gemara on Chullin uses the Shabbat example to challenge Abaye and Rava's rule. The resolution, that loading stones is rational (to prevent strong winds), but painting red is superstitious, perfectly illustrates Abaye and Rava's principle. It highlights that the intent and rationality behind an action are critical in classifying it as darkei ha'Emori.

b. Avodah Zarah and Broader Superstitions

The principle is also discussed in Avodah Zarah 11a, in the context of various magical practices and superstitions. The fundamental distinction between a practice based on natural science or observed efficacy (even if the science is rudimentary or folk-based) and one based on pure superstition or idolatrous custom remains paramount.

These intertextual connections demonstrate that the discussions in Chullin 77a are not isolated but rather deeply integrated into the broader tapestry of Halacha. The rulings regarding gidin reflect a consistent anatomical classification, while the darkei ha'Emori principle provides a meta-halachic framework for discerning prohibited superstitious practices from permissible folk remedies.

Psak/Practice

The intricate discussions in Chullin 77a, particularly regarding the status of gidin and shilya, have direct and significant ramifications in halacha l'ma'aseh.

1. Gidin and Tereifot

The Gemara's conclusion, following R. Yochanan's retraction in favor of Reish Lakish, is that gidin are not basar where they harden. This is codified in the Shulchan Aruch:

שבר עצם ונדד ממקומו... אם רובו מכוסה בבשר ועור כשר. ואם אינו מכוסה אלא בגידים... טרפה. Yoreh Deah 47:11 If a bone broke and protruded from its place... if the majority of it is covered by flesh and skin, it is kosher. But if it is covered only by sinews... it is a tereifa.

This ruling is unequivocal: sinews do not provide the necessary covering to render a broken bone permissible. The animal is a tereifa by Torah law. This highlights the rigorous anatomical definitions employed in halacha for tereifot, where the structural integrity provided by basar is distinct from that offered by gidin.

2. Gidin and Korban Pesach

The initial hava amina on Chullin 77a, that gidin are basar for Korban Pesach, is rejected by the halacha l'ma'aseh. The Shulchan Aruch rules:

אין מונין על הגידין והעצמות והקרנים והטלפים והעורות וראשי אברים. Orach Chaim 476:5 One does not count sinews, bones, horns, hooves, hides, or heads of limbs for the Paschal offering.

This means gidin do not count towards the minyan (quorum) of people who register for the Korban Pesach, nor do they count towards the shiur k'zayit (olive-sized portion) of meat that must be eaten. This reinforces the principle that gidin are not considered basar for the most stringent consumption mitzvot.

3. Shilya (Placenta) and its Permissibility

Regarding a placenta that partially emerged before shechita, the mishnah prohibits it. The Amoraic debate in the Gemara offers various leniencies based on the presence or attachment of a fetus. However, the psak generally follows a more stringent approach, similar to the Rambam's view mentioned in the "Readings" section. The Shulchan Aruch rules:

שילייה מקצתה יצאה מן הרחם קודם שחיטה, אסורה. Yoreh Deah 59:1 If a placenta, part of which emerged from the womb before slaughter, it is forbidden.

This ruling does not introduce the distinctions of "attached to a fetus" or "fetus found with it" that were debated in the corrected R. Elazar / R. Yochanan dispute. Rather, it adheres to the simple, stringent reading of the mishnah, likely due to the inherent safek (doubt) of a prohibited fetus. This is a common meta-psak heuristic: in cases of issur v'heter (forbidden/permitted), especially when dealing with safek d'Oraita (Torah-level doubt), the halacha tends towards stringency, favoring the Stam Mishnah over Amoraic leniencies that might be open to interpretation or limited to other contexts (like tum'at leidah).

4. Darkei ha'Emori

Abaye and Rava's principle for darkei ha'Emori is a foundational rule in halacha:

כל דבר שיש בו משום רפואה, אין בו משום דרכי האמורי. וכל דבר שאין בו משום רפואה, יש בו משום דרכי האמורי. Chullin 77b This principle is codified in Shulchan Aruch: אין מנחשין... אבל כל דבר שיש בו משום רפואה, אין בו משום דרכי האמורי. Yoreh Deah 179:1 One may not practice divination... but anything that has a medicinal purpose is not subject to the prohibition of the ways of the Amorite.

This provides practical guidance: if an action has a rational, even if folk-based, therapeutic or logical basis, it is permitted. If it is purely superstitious, without any discernible cause-and-effect, it is prohibited. This rule allows for the use of many traditional remedies while safeguarding against idolatrous or nonsensical practices.

Takeaway

The sugya on Chullin 77a exemplifies the rigorous, multi-layered process of halachic analysis: from anatomical classification and Amoraic dialectics to the nuanced application of safek and meta-psak heuristics, all aimed at precisely defining the permissible and the prohibited. The journey from initial hava amina to final psak often involves a deep dive into textual reconciliation and the prioritization of foundational principles.