Chullin 79

Sugya Map

The sugya in Chullin 79a grapples with the ontological and halachic definition of animal parentage. The core inquiry is whether we recognize paternity in animal progeny—expressed in the classic talmudic formulation of chosheshin le-zera ha-av (we concern ourselves with the seed of the father) versus ein chosheshin le-zera ha-av (we do not concern ourselves with the seed of the father).

This ontological status has immediate ramifications across multiple realms of halacha:

• Oto ve-Et Beno (It and its Offspring): Does the prohibition of Leviticus 22:28 apply to the father (zachar) as well as the mother (nekevah)? This hinges on the exegesis of "oto" (it - masculine) and "beno" (its offspring).
• Kilayim (Diverse Kinds): Can a hybrid offspring (such as a mule) be mated with the species of its mother (piri im ha-em)? If ein chosheshin le-zera ha-av, the offspring is halachically considered identical to the maternal species. If we are in doubt (safoki mesafeka lei), such mating is strictly prohibited.
• Koy (The Hybrid/Ambiguous Creature): How do we classify a creature born of a goat (behemah) and a doe (chayah)? Does it inherit the status of both parents (chosheshin le-zera ha-av), rendering it "partially sheep" (miktzat seh), or does it follow the mother exclusively?
• Matanot Kehunah (Priestly Gifts): Is a hybrid animal subject to the priestly gifts of the foreleg, cheeks, and abomasum (zeroa, lechayayim, ve-keivah) under Deuteronomy 18:3? If its status is doubtful, does the rule of hamotzi me-chavero alav ha-reayah (the burden of proof is on the claimant) exempt the owner from giving these gifts to the Kohen?

                      [Maternal Species (Em)]
                                |
             +------------------+------------------+
             |                                     |
    [Ein Chosheshin]                                [Chosheshin]
 (Paternity Ignored)                             (Paternity Matters)
             |                                     |
• Piri im ha-em: Permitted              • Piri im ha-em: Prohibited
• Oto ve-Et Beno: Mother only           • Oto ve-Et Beno: Father & Mother
• Mules: Differentiated by mother       • Mules: All one hybrid species

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Text Snapshot

The Gemara Chullin 79a establishes the exegetical landscape:

ולחנניה כתיב אותו דמשמע זכר וכתיב בנו מי שבנו כרוך אחריו דמשמע נקבה הילכך נוהג בין בזכרים בין בנקבות

“And according to the opinion of Hananya, the reason for his ruling is that it is written ‘it’ [oto], which indicates a male, and it is written ‘its offspring’ [beno], teaching that the prohibition applies to that parent whose offspring clings to it, which indicates a female. Therefore, this prohibition applies to both males and females.”

Grammatical and Lexical Nuances

1. Oto (אותו): The masculine accusative pronoun oto is read by Hananya as a literal reference to the male parent (the father).

2. Beno (בנו): The suffix -o (his/its) is interpreted through the lens of maternal behavior: "the one whose offspring clings (karuch) after it." In the animal kingdom, young animals follow their mothers, not their fathers.

3. The Dialectic of the Doubt:

   איבעיא להו: מיפשט פשיטא ליה לרבי יהודה דאין חוששין לזרע האב, או דלמא ספוקי מספקא ליה? למאי נפקא מינה? למשרי פירי עם האם...

   The Gemara analyzes Rabbi Yehuda’s position in Mishnah Kilayim 8:4. When Rabbi Yehuda permits mating mules born of horses even if one's father was a donkey, is he certain that we ignore paternity (mifshat pashit lei), or is he uncertain (safoki mesafeka lei)? If he is uncertain, then mating the offspring with the mother (piri im ha-em) is forbidden due to the unresolved paternal element.

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Readings

To understand the mechanics of this sugya, we must analyze the rishonim and acharonim who map out the boundaries of animal identity.

1. Rabbeinu Gershom: Defining the Scope of Hananya's Rule

Rabbeinu Gershom Chullin 79a:1 clarifies:

הילכך נוהג בין בזכרים כו' כלומר בין באב ובנו בין באם ובנה

“Therefore it applies both to males... meaning both to the father and his offspring, and the mother and her offspring.”

Rabbeinu Gershom ensures we do not misunderstand Hananya as replacing the maternal prohibition with a paternal one. Rather, the verse operates as a dual inclusion: the word oto establishes the father, while beno establishes the mother. The legal category of "parent" for Oto ve-Et Beno is non-gendered; both genetic sources are prohibited from being slaughtered on the same day as the offspring.

2. Tosafot and Rashba: The Linguistic Redundancy of "Oto" and "Beno"

Both Tosafot and the Rashba confront an immediate textual difficulty in Hananya’s exegesis. If "beno" inherently means "the one whose offspring clings to it" (the female), why does the Torah need to write both oto and beno? Why not simply write ben (offspring) and omit the pronominal suffix?

Tosafot Chullin 79a:1:1 writes:

וא"ת ולשתוק מאותו ומבנו ולכתוב בן וי"ל דלא מדכתיב את בנו ולא כתיב בן קדריש אלא בן נמי משמע דכרוך אחריו

“And if you say: let [the Torah] remain silent from ‘oto’ and ‘beno’ and simply write ‘ben’ [offspring]? One can answer: It is not because it wrote ‘et beno’ instead of ‘ben’ that he expounds, but rather that even the word ‘ben’ itself implies that which clings after it.”

The Rashba Rashba on Chullin 79a:1 expands on this:

ואם תאמר ולחנניה למאי איצטריך רחמנא למיכתב אותו ואת בנו, לכתוב בן ויהא הכל במשמע, יש לומר דחנניה לאו מדכתיב בנו ולא כתיב בן משמע ליה מי שבנו כרוך אחריו, אלא בן נמי משמע מי שבנו כרוך אחריו.

“And if you say: according to Hananya, why did the Merciful One need to write ‘oto ve-et beno’? Let it write ‘ben’ and everything would be included! It can be said that Hananya does not derive ‘that whose offspring clings after it’ because it wrote ‘beno’ instead of ‘ben’; rather, even the word ‘ben’ itself implies that which clings after it.”

The Conceptual Chiddush of Tosafot and Rashba

The Rashba and Tosafot argue that the word ben (son/offspring) is not merely a biological descriptor but a relational one. In the animal world, "offspringhood" is defined by dependency and proximity—the krichah (clinging). Because this dependency exists only with the mother, any mention of ben automatically points to the mother.

Therefore, if the Torah had only written ben, we would have restricted the prohibition to the mother. The Torah had to write oto (masculine) to overrule this natural association and include the father, despite the lack of post-natal clinging.

3. Steinsaltz: Clarifying the Synthesis of Hananya's Derivation

Adin Steinsaltz Steinsaltz on Chullin 79a:1 captures the dual nature of this derivation:

ומן הצד השני, לשיטת חנניה, כתיב "אותו" שמשמע זכר, וכתיב "בנו" — מי שבנו כרוך אחריו, שמשמע נקבה, הלכך נוהג איסור זה בין בזכרים בין בנקבות.

“And on the other hand, according to the opinion of Hananya, ‘oto’ is written, which implies a male, and ‘beno’ is written—he whose offspring clings after him—which implies a female, therefore this prohibition applies to both males and females.”

This highlights that Hananya is not arguing that oto means mother and beno means father. Rather, the verse contains a built-in semantic tension: a masculine pronoun (oto) paired with a relational noun (beno) that pragmatically denotes the female parent. The Halacha resolves this tension not by choosing one over the other, but by applying the prohibition to both.

4. Rashi: The Identity of the "Mina"

When the Gemara discusses Rabbi Yehuda’s ruling regarding a female mule in heat (perda she-teva’ah zachar), it states: "Rather, [one mates her] with mina (its kind)."

Rashi Rashi on Chullin 79a:10:1 identifies this:

אלא מינה - פרד

“Rather, its kind—a mule [pered].”

Steinsaltz Steinsaltz on Chullin 79a:10 elaborates on this dynamic:

ר' יהודה אומר: פרדה שתבעה זכר — אין מרביעין עליה לא סוס ולא חמור, אלא מינה, כלומר, פרד... ויש לומר שמדובר במקרה דלא ידעינן מינא דאמה מאי ניהו.

“Rabbi Yehuda says: A female mule that sought a male—we do not mate with her either a horse or a donkey, but rather its kind, meaning, a male mule... and it can be said that we are dealing with a case where we do not know what the species of her mother was.”

This highlights the core dilemma: if Rabbi Yehuda was certain that ein chosheshin le-zera ha-av, we should have been able to check the mother’s identity and mate the mule with a member of the mother's species (e.g., a horse if the mother was a horse). The restriction to mate her only with another mule (pered) suggests that either we are in doubt about her maternal origin, or Rabbi Yehuda himself is in doubt regarding the status of the father’s contribution.

5. Rosh: The Halachic Derivation of the Rabbis

The Rosh Rosh on Chullin 5:1:2 provides the comparative textual mechanics between Hananya and the Rabbis:

מ"ט דרבנן דתניא יכול יהא אותו ואת בנו נוהג בין בזכרים בין בנקיבות ודין הוא... מה כשחייב באם על הבנים לא חייב אלא בנקיבות אף כשחייב באותו ואת בנו לא חייב אלא בנקיבות... ואם נפשך לומר אותו כתיב דמשמע זכרים ולא נקיבות הרי הוא אומר בנו מי שבנו כרוך אחריו יצא זכר שאין בנו כרוך אחריו...

The Rabbis utilize a hekesh (analogy) to shiluach ha-ken (sending away the mother bird, Deuteronomy 22:6): just as "sending the mother" applies only to females, so too Oto ve-Et Beno applies only to females.

If you challenge this by pointing out that the Torah wrote the masculine oto, the Rabbis answer with the phrase: "מי שבנו כרוך אחריו" (the one whose offspring clings to it), which excludes the male.

For the Rabbis, the maternal implication of beno completely overrides the masculine pronoun oto. Oto is read not as "male," but as a general, non-gendered accusative ("it").

      [The Exegetical Dispute: "Oto ve-Et Beno"]

       "Oto" (Masc.) + "Beno" (Clinging -> Fem.)
                       |
        +--------------+--------------+
        |                             |
  [The Rabbis]                    [Hananya]
• "Beno" overrides "Oto"        • Both terms are active
• Male is excluded              • Masculine "Oto" = Father
• Applies only to Mother        • "Beno" (Clinging) = Mother
                                • Applies to Both

6. Rif: The Rejection of Hananya and Shmuel

The Rif Rif Chullin 27a:6 presents a crucial halachic analysis:

אמר רב הונא בר חייא אמר שמואל הלכה כחנניא איכא מאן דאמר ליתא לדחנניא דאמר ליה רבי אבא לשמעיה כי מעיילת לי כודניאתא בריספק עיין בהני דדמיאן להדדי ועייל אלמא קסבר אין חוששין לזרע האב וסימנין דאורייתא

“Rav Huna bar Hiyya said in the name of Shmuel: The halacha is like Hananya. But there are those who say that the halacha does not follow Hananya, because Rabbi Abba said to his servant: ‘When you bring me mules... look for those that resemble each other...’ which implies that he holds we do not concern ourselves with the seed of the father...”

The Rif highlights a major post-talmudic debate. Although Shmuel explicitly rules like Hananya (that Oto ve-Et Beno applies to fathers, and we concern ourselves with paternity), the narrative of Rabbi Abba indicates that the final halachic consensus rejects this. By relying on external physical characteristics (simanim) to match mules, Rabbi Abba demonstrates that we look only to maternal lineage, meaning ein chosheshin le-zera ha-av.

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Friction

The Conflict: The Paradox of the Doubtful Sages

The climax of the Gemara’s analysis of the Koy (the hybrid of a goat and a doe) presents a major logical difficulty.

The Gemara concludes:

אלא לעולם בבא תיש על הצבייה וילדה, ורבי אליעזר ספוקי מספקא ליה... וכיון דשמעת להו לרבנן דמספקא להו, ושמעת ליה לרבי אליעזר דמספקא ליה, במה הם חולקים?

“Rather, we are dealing with a case of a male goat that mated with a doe, and she gave birth, and Rabbi Eliezer is also in doubt... and since you have heard that the Rabbis are in doubt, and you have heard that Rabbi Eliezer is in doubt, in what do they differ?”

The Kushya

If both the Rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer are in doubt (mesafeka lehu) as to whether chosheshin le-zera ha-av (whether the father's genetic contribution has halachic standing), why does their dispute regarding Matanot Kehunah (priestly gifts) result in completely opposite rulings?

• The Rabbis rule that the owner is obligated to give half of the priestly gifts (chayav be-chatzi matanot).
• Rabbi Eliezer rules that the owner is exempt from giving any priestly gifts (patur min ha-matanot).

If both sages share the exact same doubt, how can one mandate a half-payment while the other rules a complete exemption?

Furthermore, according to the rule of hamotzi me-chavero alav ha-reayah (the burden of proof is on the claimant), why don't the Rabbis exempt the owner entirely? The Kohen is the claimant (hamotzi), and since the animal's status is doubtful, the owner should be able to say: "Bring proof that this animal is halachically a sheep/goat, and I will give you the gifts."

           [The Priestly Gifts (Matanot) Dilemma]
           
              Hybrid: Male Goat × Female Doe
                             |
             Both Sages are in State of Doubt
                             |
        +--------------------+--------------------+
        |                                         |
   [The Rabbis]                            [Rabbi Eliezer]
• Rule: Pay Half-Gifts                  • Rule: Complete Exemption
• Why not complete exemption            • Why doesn't the doubt
  under "Hamotzi MeChavero"?              produce a half-obligation?

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The Terutzim

Terutz A: The Nature of the Doubt—Ontological vs. Textual

This resolution, developed by the Acharonim (notably the Sha'arei Yosher of Rav Shimon Shkop), distinguishes between two different types of doubt:

1. The Rabbis' Doubt (Genetic/Ontological): The Rabbis are in doubt about a physical and biological reality: does the father's seed create a halachic entity in the offspring?
   • If chosheshin le-zera ha-av, then the offspring is physically half-goat (domesticated) and half-deer (wild).
   • If ein chosheshin, the offspring is entirely a deer (wild).
   • Since they are in doubt, the animal is treated as safek (doubtful). However, because the maternal side is definitely a doe (which is exempt from gifts), the only part of the animal that could be obligated is the paternal side (the goat).
   • Thus, the doubt is on the entirety of the paternal half. The owner says to the Kohen: "Prove that paternity matters, and you can have the half-gift of the paternal side; otherwise, you get nothing."

Wait—if so, why do the Rabbis obligate the owner in half the gifts?

The Gemara is actually dealing with the reverse case: a male deer (wild) that mated with a female goat (domesticated).

• Here, the mother is a goat (100% obligated in gifts).
• If ein chosheshin le-zera ha-av, the offspring is entirely a goat, and the owner must give 100% of the gifts.
• If chosheshin, the father's deer-identity dilutes the animal, making it only half-goat, obligating only 50% of the gifts.
• Therefore, the maternal half (50%) is definitely obligated, because even if paternity matters, the mother's domestic goat status secures at least half the animal's identity.
• The paternal half is the subject of the doubt. On this half, the owner can tell the Kohen: "Prove that we do not worry about paternity, and only then will I give you this second half."
• Thus, the Rabbis rule: the owner must give half (the secure maternal half), and is exempt from the other half due to hamotzi me-chavero alav ha-reayah.

         [Deer (Wild) × Female Goat (Domestic)]
                           |
            +--------------+--------------+
            |                             |
      [If Chosheshin]              [If Ein Chosheshin]
    • 50% Goat / 50% Deer        • 100% Goat
    • Pay 50% of Gifts           • Pay 100% of Gifts
            |                             |
            +--------------+--------------+
                           |
                  [The Rabbis' Verdict]
            • 50% is certain (from the mother)
            • 50% is doubtful (paternal contribution)
            • Result: Pay 50% (Maternal Share)

2. Rabbi Eliezer's Doubt (Textual Exegesis of "Seh"): Rabbi Eliezer’s doubt is not about genetics, but about the biblical definition of the word Seh (sheep/goat) in the verse: "שה כשבים ושה עזים" (a sheep of sheep, or a goat of goats, Deuteronomy 14:4).
   • Rabbi Eliezer is in doubt whether a hybrid—even if it has maternal domestic identity—can be called a "Seh." Does "Seh" require a genetically pure animal (seh ma'utah), or does a hybrid also qualify?
   • If "Seh" requires absolute purity, then any hybridity (even if the mother is a goat) disqualifies the animal from the category of Seh entirely.
   • Because this doubt affects the entire animal's classification, the Kohen cannot even claim the maternal half. The owner can say: "Prove that a hybrid is called a Seh at all; if it is not, I owe you absolutely nothing."
   • Therefore, Rabbi Eliezer rules that the owner is completely exempt.

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Terutz B: The Kehillat Yaakov's Distinction in "Hamotzi MeChavero"

The Kehillat Yaakov (Steipler Gaon) offers an alternative resolution based on the mechanics of mamon mutal be-safek (money whose ownership is in doubt):

The dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer hinges on whether we view the priestly gifts as a debt on the person (chovath gavra) or a lien on the object (shibuda de-cheftza).

• The Rabbis hold that the obligation of Matanot Kehunah is a physical lien on the animal itself. The animal is born with the Kohen's share structurally embedded within it. When there is a doubt regarding the paternal half, we do not view the owner as the definite possessor (muchzak) who can dismiss the Kohen. Rather, both the owner and the Kohen have a doubtful claim on the physical object. In such a case, we split the doubtful portion, or we award the Kohen the portion that is genetically undisputed.
• Rabbi Eliezer holds that Matanot Kehunah is a personal obligation of the owner to pay the Kohen. Since the owner is the definite muchzak of his own money, and the animal's status as a "Seh" is doubtful, the rule of hamotzi me-chavero alav ha-reayah applies to the entire obligation. The Kohen cannot extract even a single cheek or foreleg without bringing absolute proof.

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Intertext

1. Biblical Foundations: The Dual Sources of Hybridity

The sugya of chosheshin le-zera ha-av sits at the intersection of two distinct Torah prohibitions:

• Oto ve-Et Beno: Leviticus 22:28:

  וְשׁוֹר אוֹ־שֶׂה אֹתוֹ וְאֶת־בְּנוֹ לֹא תִשְׁחֲטוּ בְּיוֹם אֶחָד

  The verse uses the masculine oto (it/him) and beno (his/its son). This grammatical masculinity is the engine of Hananya’s view that the father is included.

• Kilayim (Diverse Kinds): Leviticus 19:19:

  בְּהֶמְתְּךָ לֹא־תַרְבִּיעַ כִּלְאַיִם

  The prohibition of crossbreeding animals relies on defining what constitutes a "kind" (min). If we do not worry about paternity (ein chosheshin le-zera ha-av), then the taxonomic identity of any animal is determined exclusively by its mother. A mule born of a female horse is halachically a "horse," and a mule born of a female donkey is a "donkey." Mating them would violate the prohibition of Kilayim.

                [Torah Prohibitions & Animal Identity]
                
             Oto ve-Et Beno                  Kilayim
          Leviticus 22:28          Leviticus 19:19
                  |                            |
          Determining Parent          Determining Species
                  |                            |
          Does "Oto" include           Is species defined
          the genetic father?          by mother or both?

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2. Halachic Codification: Shulchan Aruch

The Shulchan Aruch codifies these principles in two separate sections, resolving the tension between the theoretical talmudic doubts and practical halacha.

Regarding Oto ve-Et Beno

In Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 16:1, the Mechaber rules:

איסור אותו ואת בנו אינו נוהג אלא בנקבות... ואם שחט הזכר ואת בנו אינו לוקה

“The prohibition of Oto ve-Et Beno only applies to females... and if one slaughtered the male [father] and its offspring, he does not receive lashes.”

The Shulchan Aruch explicitly rejects Hananya’s position, ruling in accordance with the Rabbis. The genetic father is not halachically bound to his offspring for the purposes of same-day slaughter.

Regarding Kilayim and the Doubt of Paternity

In Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 297:10, the Rama rules:

פרדה שאנו יודעים שאמה סוסה, מותר להרביע עליה סוס... אבל אם אין יודעים אמה, אין מרביעין עליה לא סוס ולא חמור אלא מינה

“A female mule that we know its mother was a horse, it is permitted to mate a horse with her... but if we do not know her mother, we do not mate with her either a horse or a donkey, but only her kind [another mule].”

The Rama codifies the conclusion of our sugya: we rule stringently because we are in doubt (safoki mesafeka lei). Because we cannot resolve whether chosheshin le-zera ha-av, we must treat the paternal contribution as a potential halachic reality, forbidding any mating that would violate Kilayim under either taxonomic theory.

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3. Connection to Shabbat Chazon: The Collapse and Reconstruction of Boundaries

This sugya, which deals with the blurring of boundaries through the creation of hybrid species (Koy and mules), carries a deep thematic resonance with Shabbat Chazon—the Shabbat of Vision preceding Tisha B'Av.

The prophet Isaiah, in the haftarah of Shabbat Chazon, laments the collapse of Israel's spiritual and moral boundaries:

יָדַע שׁוֹר קֹנֵהוּ וַחֲמוֹר אֵבוּס בְּעָלָיו יִשְׂרָאֵל לֹא יָדַע עַמִּי לֹא הִתְבּוֹנָן “An ox knows its owner, and a donkey its master’s crib; Israel does not know, My people do not perceive.” (Isaiah 1:3)

Isaiah uses the imagery of the shor (ox) and the chamor (donkey)—the very archetypes of the domestic animals that form the basis of the laws of Kilayim and Oto ve-Et Beno.

The tragedy of the Churban (the destruction of the Temple) is represented by a loss of identity: Israel forgot its "parentage," blurring the sacred boundaries between the holy and the profane.

The Beit Midrash’s rigorous attempt in Chullin 79a to define the status of the hybrid—to ask whether the father's identity is remembered or forgotten (chosheshin le-zera ha-av)—is a conceptual rebuilding. By precisely defining the legal status of the ambiguous Koy and the hybrid mule, the Sages restore order to a fractured world. They demonstrate that even in a state of doubt (safek), the Torah provides a framework to navigate and sanctify the gray areas of existence.

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Psak/Practice

The contemporary halachic application of this sugya is structured by several practical guidelines:

1. Oto ve-Et Beno in Practice

We rule that the prohibition applies exclusively to the mother and her offspring. If a kosher slaughterer (shochet) slaughters a bull and its calf on the same day, there is no violation of Oto ve-Et Beno.

However, if there is a doubt whether a calf is slaughter-bound with a female parent, we apply the rule of safek d'oraita le-chumra (doubts regarding Torah laws are ruled stringently) and prohibit the slaughter on that day, though no lashes are administered.

2. Mating Mules (Kilayim)

Because we rule that we are in doubt regarding paternity (safoki mesafeka lei), the following practical rules apply to animal husbandry:

• Known Mother: If a female mule's mother is known to be a horse, she may be mated with a horse. If her mother is known to be a donkey, she may be mated with a donkey. In these cases, we rely on the maternal line as the primary indicator of species.
• Unknown Mother: If a mule’s maternal origin is unknown, it is strictly forbidden to mate it with either a horse or a donkey. It may only be mated with another mule that shares the exact same physical characteristics (simanim) of the ears, tail, and voice, as established by Abaye and Rav Pappa on Chullin 79a.

               [Mating Rules for Mules (Kilayim)]
                               |
              +----------------+----------------+
              |                                 |
     [Maternal Origin Known]          [Maternal Origin Unknown]
              |                                 |
• Mate only with mother's species.     • Forbidden to mate with horse
• Horse-mother = Mate with horse.        or donkey.
• Donkey-mother = Mate with donkey.    • Mate ONLY with similar mule
                                         (matching voice/ears/tail).

3. Priestly Gifts (Matanot Kehunah) from Hybrids

In the case of a hybrid animal born of a wild father (tzvi) and a domestic mother (ez):

• Because we are in doubt regarding paternity, the owner is only obligated to give half of the value of the priestly gifts to the Kohen.
• The owner may retain the other half, invoking the civil law rule of hamotzi me-chavero alav ha-reayah.

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Takeaway

The debate over paternity in hybrids reveals that in Halacha, identity is a composite of biological reality and relational dependency. While genetic origin remains an unresolved doubt, physical proximity and maternal care (krichah) establish the primary legal reality.