Menachot 21

Sugya Map

This sugya on Menachot 21a is a masterclass in derasha, dikduk, and the precise definition of cheftza (the halachic object) for both korbanot and prohibitions. It navigates the intricate requirements of salting Temple offerings and the halachot pertaining to the consumption of blood.

• Core Issue: Defining the scope of the mitzvah of salting korbanot derived from "וכל קרבן מנחתך במלח תמלח" (Leviticus 2:13)¹, and the halachic status of blood after physical alteration (cooking, salting, congealing).
• Nafka Mina(s):
  • Which korbanot and Temple components require salt (e.g., meal offerings, limbs, frankincense vs. wine, blood, wood, incense)².
  • The chiyuv karet status for consuming various forms of altered blood (cooked, salted, congealed) and the distinctions between chulin, dam chatas chitzoniyot, and dam chatas pnimiyot³.
  • The halachot of me'ilah (misuse of consecrated property) for Temple salt⁴.
  • The source of salt for korbanot (communal vs. private funds)⁵.
  • The linguistic interpretation of "תמלח" and "תשבית"⁶.
• Primary Sources:
  • Tanakh: Leviticus 2:13, Leviticus 4:6, Leviticus 4:25, Leviticus 6:16, Leviticus 24:8, Numbers 18:19, Ezekiel 43:24, Exodus 29:25.
  • Mishnah/Tosefta: Shekalim 1:4, Shekalim 7:7, Tosefta Karetot 2:19, Tosefta Mikvaot 6:9, Tosefta Menachot 6:2, Tosefta Menachot 6:4.
  • Gemara: Menachot 20a, Menachot 21a.

Text Snapshot

The sugya opens with an emendation to a baraita:

"אפיק עצים ועייל נסכים דלא טעונין מלח דתניא: אבל היין והדם והעצים והקטרת אין טעונין מלח." (Menachot 21a)⁷ [The Gemara responds:] Wood is removed from the baraita, and insert in its place wine libations, teaching that they do not require the addition of salt. As it is taught in a baraita: But the wine libations and the blood, and the wood and the incense, do not require salt.

This surgical emendation sets the stage for a Tannaic dispute, resolved by Rabbi Yishmael b. Rabbi Yochanan b. Beroka's rigorous derasha:

"רבי ישמעאל ב"ר יוחנן בן ברוקא אומר: מה מנחה מיוחדת שהיא ב"ט וקרבה באש ועל מזבח החיצון, אף כל שהוא ב"ט וקרב באש ועל מזבח החיצון." (Menachot 21a)⁸ Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, says: The verse states: “And every meal offering of yours you shall season with salt” (Leviticus 2:13). Just as the specified detail, i.e., the meal offering, is an item that is susceptible to ritual impurity, and is brought on the fire of the altar, and is sacrificed on the external altar, so too, any item that is susceptible to ritual impurity, and is brought on the fire of the altar, and is sacrificed on the external altar requires salting.

Later, the Gemara pivots to the status of blood:

"דם שבישלו אין עובר עליו, ורב יהודה אמר זעירי: דם שמלחו אין עובר עליו." (Menachot 21a)⁹ Ze’eiri says that Rabbi Ḥanina says: With regard to blood that one cooked, one does not transgress the prohibition against consuming blood by drinking it... And Rav Yehuda says that Ze’eiri says: With regard to blood that one salted, one does not transgress a prohibition by drinking it.

A critical kushya arises from Abaye, challenging Rava, based on Rabbi Mani's query to Rabbi Yochanan:

"הואיל ואידחי אידחי... דם שקרש ואכלו מאי? אמר ליה: הואיל ונדחה ידחה." (Menachot 21a)¹⁰ Abaye objected: But even when blood is curdled by means of the sun, let us say that since it was disqualified from being presented on the altar, it was disqualified, i.e., excluded, from the prohibition against consuming blood; as Rabbi Mani inquired of Rabbi Yoḥanan: With regard to blood that was congealed and one ate it, what is the halakha? Rabbi Yoḥanan responded: He is not liable; since it was disqualified from being presented on the altar, it shall be disqualified from the prohibition against consuming blood.

The resolution distinguishes types of sin offerings:

"כאן בחטאות החיצונות... שם בחטאות הפנימיות... דם חטאות החיצונות ואכלו חייב, מ"ט? דכתיב: 'ולקח', והאי חזי ללקיחה ונתינה. דם חטאות הפנימיות ואכלו פטור, מ"ט? דכתיב: 'וטבל והזה', והאי לא חזי לטבילה והזאה." (Menachot 21a)¹¹ Perhaps here the baraita is certainly referring to the blood of the external sin offerings... whereas there Ze’eiri is referring to the blood of the inner sin offerings... With regard to blood that became congealed, if it is blood of the external sin offerings and one ate it, he is liable, as the Merciful One states in the Torah: “And the priest shall take of the blood... and place it” (Leviticus 4:25), and congealed blood is suitable for taking and placing... if it is blood of the inner sin offerings and one ate it, he is exempt, as the Merciful One states in the Torah: “And the priest shall dip his finger in the blood, and sprinkle” (Leviticus 4:6), and this congealed blood is not suitable for dipping and sprinkling.

Readings

The sugya is rich with Rishonim and Acharonim explicating its nuances. We'll focus on Rashi and Tosafot, with explanatory notes from Steinsaltz.

Rashi's Methodological Precision

Rashi, as always, is indispensable for understanding the Gemara's flow and underlying assumptions. His comments often reveal the Gemara's precise linguistic and halachic distinctions.

1. Emendation Logic: Regarding the initial emendation "אפיק עצים ועייל נסכים"¹², Rashi clarifies the unique status of nesachim (libations): "נסכים - אין אחרים באין לו חובה" (Menachot 21a s.v. נסכים)¹³. This brief comment highlights that nesachim don't incur an obligation on other items to be salted. This is crucial for understanding why nesachim are a suitable candidate for exclusion from the general salt requirement, as they stand apart from the general derasha of "כל מנחתך" that applies to other offerings. He further clarifies the context of the baraita: "דתניא - דיין אין טעון מלח" (Menachot 21a s.v. דתניא)¹⁴, grounding the Gemara's premise in a clear Tannaic statement.

2. Hukira of Congealed Blood: When the Gemara introduces the chiddush of Ze'eiri concerning cooked/salted blood, it then transitions to congealed blood. Rashi, anticipating a kushya, provides the initial hukira: "דם שקרש - קא סלקא דעתך ואפילו דחולין" (Menachot 21a s.v. דם שקרש)¹⁵. This means the Gemara initially considers that Ze'eiri's ruling (that one doesn't transgress on congealed blood) might apply even to chulin (non-sacred) blood. This sets up the critical distinction later between chulin and kedoshim, and within kedoshim, between chatas chitzoniyot and chatas pnimiyot. The chiddush here is that the initial thought is that any congealed blood might lose its "blood" status, a broad stroke that the Gemara will narrow.

3. Defining Liability for Blood: Rashi further develops the Gemara's resolution for congealed blood, linking liability to the blood's potential for atonement: "כאן בחטאות החיצונות - הא דקתני הקפה את הדם בחמה ואכלו חייב והוא הדין לשל חולין הואיל וראוי לכפרה בקדשים" (Menachot 21a s.v. כאן בחטאות החיצונות)¹⁶. This is a profound insight. Even chulin blood, if it congeals in a way that would be suitable for chatas chitzoniyot (i.e., "לקיחה ונתינה" - taking and placing), is subject to the prohibition of consuming blood. The cheftza of "blood" for karet is thus defined not merely by its physical state, but by its halachic potential or kedusha-analogue. Conversely, for chatas pnimiyot, Rashi notes Ze'eiri's ruling of non-transgression, promising further explanation: "והא דאמר זעירי אינו עובר עליו בחטאות הפנימיות - כגון פרים ושעירים הנשרפים וטעמא מפרש לקמן" (Menachot 21a s.v. והא דאמר זעירי)¹⁷. This sets up the distinction between lkiḥa v'netina and tvila v'hazaa.

Tosafot's Dialectical Engagement

Tosafot often engage with the Gemara's arguments by raising conceptual difficulties and offering incisive resolutions, pushing the lomdus forward.

1. Precise Derasha of "מנחתך": Tosafot delve into the Gemara's initial emendation and the derasha of Rabbi Yishmael b. Rabbi Yochanan b. Beroka. They raise a kushya: "אפיק עצים ועייל נסכים. ונמעט נסכים במה מנחה מיוחדת כו' וא"ת אימא איפכא" (Menachot 21a s.v. אפיק עצים)¹⁸. Why should nesachim (libations) be excluded by the special characteristics of mincha ("מה מנחה מיוחדת"), and not, say, blood? Couldn't the derasha be inverted? Their response is a testament to the precision of derashot: "וי"ל דלא שייך לומר איפכא כלל דהא כדי שלא נאמר (משום) צד של מתיר הוא דאיצטריכא למיכתב מעל מנחתך למעוטי דם דמתרבי מההוא צד ואילו נסכים ממעטי מיניה" (Menachot 21a s.v. אפיק עצים)¹⁹. Tosafot explain that the phrase "מעל מנחתך" (from your meal offering) is specifically necessary to exclude blood, which would otherwise be included by the general derasha. Nesachim, however, are inherently excluded by the "מה מנחה מיוחדת" criteria (not susceptible to tumah, not brought on fire). Thus, blood needed a specific ribui (inclusion) and then a mi'ut (exclusion), while nesachim are simply outside the scope of the original ribui. This demonstrates how the choice of words in the Torah (and their derashot) is not arbitrary but critically shapes halachic distinctions.

Steinsaltz's Expository Clarity

Steinsaltz offers a clear, modern articulation of the Gemara's arguments, helping to untangle complex passages.

1. Clarifying the Emendation: Steinsaltz provides a direct explanation of the opening Gemara: "ומשיבים: אפיק [הוצא] עצים מנוסח הברייתא, ועייל [והכנס] נסכים, שאינם טעונין מלח, דתניא [ששנויה ברייתא ]: אבל היין של נסכים, והדם, והעצים והקטרת אין טעונין מלח." (Menachot 21a s.v. אפיק)²⁰. This translation and explanation precisely define the Gemara's initial move, which is critical for setting up the subsequent discussions.

2. Abaye's Objection: Steinsaltz clarifies Abaye's compelling kushya against Rava concerning congealed blood: "הקשה לו אביי: כשהקפה בחמה נמי [גם כן], לימא [נאמר]: הואיל ואידחי אידחי [הואיל ונדחה לזמן מסויים מתורת דם, יידחה] לעולם, דהא בעא מיניה [שהרי שאל אותו] רבי מני מר' יוחנן: דם שקרש ואכלו, מהו לעבור עליו? אמר ליה [לו]: הואיל ונדחה מתורת דם ידחה! אישתיק [שתק] רבא ולא מצא תשובה." (Menachot 21a s.v. הקשה)²¹. This neatly summarizes Abaye's argument, emphasizing the principle of "הואיל ונדחה ידחה" (once disqualified, it remains disqualified) and Rava's initial inability to respond, building the dramatic tension before the sugya's ultimate resolution.

Friction

The most potent friction in this sugya revolves around the halachic status of altered blood, specifically congealed blood, and the principle of "הואיל ונדחה ידחה".

The Strongest Kushya: "הואיל ונדחה ידחה"

Ze'eiri posits that cooked or salted blood loses its status as dam for the prohibition of consumption. Rava initially extends this to congealed blood, suggesting that blood curdled by fire is no longer considered blood. Abaye challenges Rava by arguing that even blood curdled by the sun should be exempt from karet based on the principle of "הואיל ונדחה אידחי" (since it was disqualified [from being offered on the altar], it remains disqualified [from the prohibition of consumption])²². Abaye substantiates this with Rabbi Mani's query to Rabbi Yochanan, who indeed ruled "הואיל ונדחה ידחה" regarding congealed blood²³. This presents a formidable kushya: if the blood is no longer fit for its sacrificial purpose, why should it retain its "blood" status for the karet prohibition? The kushya lies in the perceived inconsistency: if its form change (congealing) disqualifies it from the altar, why doesn't it disqualify it from the prohibition, paralleling the logic of cooked/salted blood? Rava's silence at this point underscores the strength of Abaye's objection.

The Best Terutz (and its Extension)

The sugya provides a brilliant, nuanced terutz by distinguishing between dam chatas chitzoniyot (blood of external sin offerings) and dam chatas pnimiyot (blood of internal sin offerings). This distinction hinges on the specific avodah (Temple service) required for each.

1. Distinction in Avodah: The terutz suggests that Rabbi Mani and Rabbi Yochanan's ruling of "הואיל ונדחה ידחה" applies specifically to dam chatas pnimiyot²⁴. For these, the Torah mandates "וטבל הכהן אצבעו בדם והזה" (Leviticus 4:6)²⁵ – dipping and sprinkling. Congealed blood is "לא חזי לטבילה והזאה" (not suitable for dipping and sprinkling)²⁶, thus it is truly "נדחה" and loses its status. However, for dam chatas chitzoniyot, the Torah states "ולקח הכהן מדם החטאת באצבעו ונתן על קרנות מזבח העולה" (Leviticus 4:25)²⁷ – taking and placing. Congealed blood is "חזי ללקיחה ונתינה" (suitable for taking and placing)²⁸. Therefore, it is not truly "נדחה" from its sacrificial purpose, and thus retains its status as blood for consumption, incurring karet.

2. Rava's Chiddush and Rav Pappa's Extension: Rava then offers a further chiddush: even if it's dam chatas pnimiyot, one is still liable if "דם המקביל לו כשר בחטאות החיצונות" (blood corresponding to it is fit for external sin offerings)²⁹. This implies a meta-halachic principle: the inherent nature of the blood (e.g., from a korban) grants it a residual halachic potential, even if its specific avodah is compromised. Rav Pappa extends this logic dramatically: "דם חמור שקרש ואכלו חייב, הואיל ודם המקביל לו כשר בחטאות החיצונות" (Menachot 21a)³⁰. Even donkey blood, which can never be offered on the altar, if it congeals, still incurs karet if consumed, because "דם המקביל לו כשר בחטאות החיצונות" (blood corresponding to it is fit for external sin offerings)³¹. This is a profound chiddush about the definition of "blood" for karet: it's not just about the specific dam in question, but about its generic capacity to be processed in a way suitable for chatas chitzoniyot. The cheftza of blood for prohibition is thus defined not by its immediate fitness for any avodah, but by its inherent nature as blood that could hypothetically be used for an avodah type that accommodates congealed forms. This complex distinction provides a robust terutz to Abaye's initial kushya, showcasing the Gemara's capacity for nuanced halachic categorization.

Intertext

The sugya on Menachot 21a is deeply rooted in Tanach and resonates throughout later halachic literature.

1. Tanakh: Defining the Covenant of Salt: The discussion about the source of salt for korbanot (communal vs. private) draws a crucial parallel to communal offerings:

   "הואיל והתם כתיב: 'מאת בני ישראל ברית עולם' (ויקרא כד, ח) דמאת בני ישראל קאתי, אף הכא 'ברית מלח עולם' (במדבר יח, יט) נמי מאת בני ישראל קאתי." (Menachot 21a)³² The argument is that "ברית מלח עולם" (Numbers 18:19)³³, the everlasting covenant of salt, is analogous to "מאת בני ישראל ברית עולם" (Leviticus 24:8)³⁴ regarding the shewbread, which is explicitly from communal funds. This gezeirah shavah establishes that salt for korbanot is a communal responsibility, emphasizing its integral and enduring role in the Temple service, akin to other communal offerings. This reinforces the sanctity and universality of the salt requirement.

2. Rambam and Shulchan Aruch: The Halacha of Congealed Blood: The Gemara's intricate discussion about congealed blood and the principle of "הואיל ונדחה ידחה" finds complex expression in the Rishonim and Acharonim.

   • Rambam, Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot 6:5: "דם שבישלו או שמלחו, או שקרש - הרי הוא מותר, ואין לוקין עליו אלא כדם החי." (Rambam, Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot 6:5)³⁵. The Rambam rules that cooked, salted, or congealed blood is permitted and does not incur karet unless it is like "fresh blood." This seems to adopt the principle of "הואיל ונדחה ידחה" more broadly, seemingly disregarding the Gemara's distinction between chatas pnimiyot and chitzoniyot or Rav Pappa's extension to donkey blood.
   • The Kesef Mishneh (ad loc.) grapples with this, suggesting Rambam aligns with Rabbi Yochanan's initial ruling (which Abaye quotes) and perhaps limits Rava's chiddush (regarding "דם המקביל לו") to kedoshim (sacred blood) and not chulin. Or, that the very act of congealing disqualifies it from the category of "blood" for karet in chulin.
   • Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 66:1-2: The practical halacha of melicha (salting meat) to extract blood before consumption is a direct descendant of this sugya's core principle that salting changes the status of blood³⁶. The Shulchan Aruch instructs to salt meat thoroughly to remove all blood, implying that once salted, the extracted liquid is no longer considered "blood" in the prohibited sense. This everyday halacha relies on Ze'eiri's chiddush as foundational. However, the precise definition of what constitutes "blood" for karet (especially congealed blood) remains a point of considerable debate among Poskim, often referencing our sugya.

Psak/Practice

The sugya on Menachot 21a has a significant, albeit sometimes indirect, impact on halachic practice and meta-psak heuristics.

1. Melicha of Meat: The most direct practical outcome is the halacha of melicha (salting) for meat, codified in Shulchan Aruch Yoreh De'ah siman 66³⁷. The principle articulated by Ze'eiri that "דם שמלחו אין עובר עליו" (Menachot 21a)³⁸ forms the bedrock for permitting consumption of meat after its blood has been extracted through salting. This process effectively transforms the blood from a prohibited cheftza to a permitted one.

2. Defining "Blood" for Karet: While we no longer offer korbanot, the meticulous lomdus employed to define what constitutes "blood" for the chiyuv karet (especially the distinctions between chatas pnimiyot and chitzoniyot and Rav Pappa's "דם המקביל לו") provides a critical heuristic for Poskim. It teaches us that the definition of a prohibited substance is not always straightforward but can depend on its potential, its context, and the specific avodah it might have undergone. This analytical framework is transferable to other issurim, emphasizing the need to precisely define the object of the prohibition. The Rambam's psak in Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot 6:5, which seems to take a more lenient stance on congealed blood, highlights the ongoing debate among Poskim regarding how to synthesize the various opinions and principles within this complex sugya.

3. Sanctity of Hekdesh: The discussion regarding me'ilah on Temple salt, and Shmuel's interpretation of the Mishna in Shekalim 7:7³⁹ (that priests may use salt for their offerings but not for non-sacred food, even if brought into the Temple courtyard for teruma), underscores the severe sanctity of hekdesh items. Even common salt, once designated for the Temple, becomes subject to strict halachot of misuse, a principle that permeates all halachot pertaining to consecrated property.

Takeaway

This sugya exemplifies the Talmud's profound rigor in defining halachic categories, demonstrating how subtle linguistic analysis and the specific nature of avodah combine to shape the metziut of a substance and the scope of its prohibitions. The intricate dance between derasha and sevara ensures that every halachic detail is meticulously grounded and precisely understood.

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¹ Leviticus 2:13. ² Menachot 21a. ³ Menachot 21a; Tosefta Karetot 2:19. ⁴ Shekalim 7:7; Menachot 21a. ⁵ Menachot 21a, citing Numbers 18:19 and Leviticus 24:8. ⁶ Menachot 21a. ⁷ Menachot 21a. ⁸ Menachot 21a. ⁹ Menachot 21a. ¹⁰ Menachot 21a. ¹¹ Menachot 21a. ¹² Menachot 21a. ¹³ Rashi, Menachot 21a s.v. נסכים. ¹⁴ Rashi, Menachot 21a s.v. דתניא. ¹⁵ Rashi, Menachot 21a s.v. דם שקרש. ¹⁶ Rashi, Menachot 21a s.v. כאן בחטאות החיצונות. ¹⁷ Rashi, Menachot 21a s.v. והא דאמר זעירי. ¹⁸ Tosafot, Menachot 21a s.v. אפיק עצים. ¹⁹ Tosafot, Menachot 21a s.v. אפיק עצים. ²⁰ Steinsaltz, Menachot 21a s.v. ומשיבים. ²¹ Steinsaltz, Menachot 21a s.v. הקשה. ²² Menachot 21a. ²³ Menachot 21a. ²⁴ Menachot 21a. ²⁵ Leviticus 4:6. ²⁶ Menachot 21a. ²⁷ Leviticus 4:25. ²⁸ Menachot 21a. ²⁹ Menachot 21a. ³⁰ Menachot 21a. ³¹ Menachot 21a. ³² Menachot 21a. ³³ Numbers 18:19. ³⁴ Leviticus 24:8. ³⁵ Rambam, Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot 6:5. ³⁶ Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 66:1-2. ³⁷ Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 66. ³⁸ Menachot 21a. ³⁹ Shekalim 7:7; Menachot 21a.