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Menachot 47

StandardExpert – Beit Midrash AnalysisFebruary 27, 2026

Sugya Map

The sugya on Menachot 47a delves into the intricate halachic mechanics of consecrating the Shtei HaLechem (two loaves) of Shavuot, specifically exploring the precise sacrificial act that effects this consecration and the implications of partial or improper intent.

Issue

What action performed on the two kivsei Atzeret (sheep of Shavuot) consecrates the accompanying Shtei HaLechem? Does the consecration occur at shechita (slaughter) or zerikat ha'dam (sprinkling of the blood)? What are the practical differences (מאי בינייהו) between different stages or degrees of consecration?

Nafka Mina(s)

  • Degree of Consecration: Whether the loaves are "partially consecrated" (kadosh v'eino kadosh) or fully consecrated, and what that entails.
  • Pidyon (Redemption): Whether the loaves, if disqualified, can transfer their sanctity to redemption money.
  • Yotzei (Leaving the Courtyard): Whether the loaves become disqualified if they leave the Temple courtyard after shechita but before zerika.
  • Piggul (Improper Intent): Whether an improper intent during zerika can render the loaves piggul, especially if they are already outside the courtyard or partially consecrated.
  • Shelo Lishmah (Not for its Sake): The permissibility of performing zerika shelo lishmah on the sheep to permit their meat when the loaves have been lost.

Primary Sources

  • Baraita (Menachot 47a): Central dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabbi Elazar ben Rabbi Shimon regarding the timing and completeness of consecration.
  • Bamidbar 6:17: "וְהִקְרִיב אֶת הָאַיִל קָרְבַּן שְׁלָמִים לַה' עַל סַל הַמַּצּוֹת" (And he shall offer the ram as a sacrifice of peace offerings to the Lord, with the basket of unleavened bread). This pasuk from the Nazirite offering serves as the exegetical basis for the Tannaitic dispute.
  • Mishna Me'ilah 6b: Cited in the sugya to elucidate the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva regarding yotzei and the efficacy of zerika on disqualified offerings.
  • Menachot 46a: Indirectly referenced regarding the Korban Todah (Thanksgiving Offering) and its loaves.

Text Snapshot

The sugya opens with a foundational baraita:

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: שְׁנֵי כִּבְשֵׂי הָעֲצֶרֶת אֵין מְקַדְּשִׁין אֶת הַלֶּחֶם אֶלָּא בִּשְׁחִיטָה. כֵּיצַד? שָׁחַט לִשְׁמָן וְזָרַק דָּמָן לִשְׁמָן — הַלֶּחֶם קָדוֹשׁ. שָׁחַט שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן וְזָרַק שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן — אֵין הַלֶּחֶם קָדוֹשׁ. שָׁחַט לִשְׁמָן וְזָרַק שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן — הַלֶּחֶם קָדוֹשׁ וְאֵינוֹ קָדוֹשׁ. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי. רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: לְעוֹלָם אֵינוֹ קָדוֹשׁ עַד שֶׁיִּשְׁחוֹט לִשְׁמוֹ וְיִזְרוֹק דָּמוֹ לִשְׁמוֹ.

The Sages taught in a baraita: The two sheep of Shavuot consecrate the loaves only by means of their slaughter. How so? If one slaughtered them for their own sake and sprinkled their blood for their own sake, the loaves are consecrated. If one slaughtered them not for their own sake and sprinkled their blood not for their own sake, the loaves are not consecrated. If one slaughtered them for their own sake and sprinkled their blood not for their own sake, the loaves are partially consecrated, but they are not fully consecrated. This is the statement of Rabbi [Yehuda HaNasi]. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: They are never consecrated at all until one slaughters the offerings for their own sake and sprinkles their blood for their own sake. (Menachot 47a)

Dikduk/Leshon Nuance

The phrase "קָדוֹשׁ וְאֵינוֹ קָדוֹשׁ" (consecrated and not consecrated) is central to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi's position. This seemingly oxymoronic expression immediately signals a nuanced state of sanctity – a form of partial consecration. The sugya will later explore its precise meaning through the dispute of Abaye and Rava. Rabbi Elazar b. R. Shimon, by contrast, presents a binary: either fully consecrated (via both shechita and zerika lishmah) or not consecrated at all. The Gemara's subsequent analysis delves into the scriptural derivations for these positions, focusing on the words "זֶבַח" (sacrifice/slaughter) and "וְהִקְרִיב" (and he shall offer) from Bamidbar 6:17. The choice of which term is primary for consecration defines the Tannaitic machloket.

Readings

The sugya pivots on the interpretation of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi's statement, "הַלֶּחֶם קָדוֹשׁ וְאֵינוֹ קָדוֹשׁ" (the loaves are consecrated but not fully consecrated). This ambiguity leads to a fundamental Amoraic dispute between Abaye and Rava, which in turn necessitates a deeper examination by the Rishonim.

Rashi

Rashi, as is his wont, provides a concise yet profound explanation, setting the stage for subsequent Rishonim.

Rashi on Menachot 47a:1:1

Rashi clarifies the opening statement of the baraita, "אֵין מְקַדְּשִׁין אֶת הַלֶּחֶם אֶלָּא בִּשְׁחִיטָה" (The two sheep... consecrate the loaves only by means of their slaughter). He notes: "טעמא מפ' לקמן" (The reason is explained later)1. This immediately directs the reader to the Gemara's forthcoming derashot from the pasuk in Bamidbar 6:17, indicating that the initial baraita presents a conclusion whose scriptural basis is yet to be revealed. This is crucial for understanding the flow of the sugya, as the baraita seems to present Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi's view as a given, only for the Gemara to later ask for its reasoning and then contrast it with Rabbi Elazar b. R. Shimon.

Rashi on Menachot 47a:10:1 (Abaye's View)

When the Gemara asks, "מאי קדוש ואינו קדוש?" (What does 'consecrated and not consecrated' mean?), Abaye offers: "קָדוֹשׁ, וְלֹא מִתְקַדֵּשׁ קְדוּשָּׁה גְּמוּרָה" (consecrated, but not completely consecrated)2. Rashi elaborates on the nafka mina (practical difference) for Abaye's view. The Gemara presents the difference between Abaye and Rava as the ability to transfer sanctity to redemption money (pidyon). Rashi explains Abaye's position: "אלא לאביי — דאמר לא תפיס פדיונו" (According to Abaye, who says its redemption money does not transfer sanctity)3. For Abaye, since the consecration is not gemura (complete), it lacks the robust sanctity that would allow for pidyon to take effect. This incomplete sanctity prevents the loaves from achieving a state where their inherent holiness can be transferred to monetary value.

Rashi on Menachot 47a:10:2 (The Gemara's Question on Abaye)

The Gemara then challenges Abaye: "בשלמא לרבא היינו דאיכא בין רבי לרבי אלעזר ב"ר שמעון. אלא לאביי מאי איכא בין רבי לרבי אלעזר ב"ר שמעון?" (Granted, according to Rava, that is the difference between Rabbi [Yehuda HaNasi] and Rabbi Elazar b. R. Shimon. But according to Abaye, what is the difference between Rabbi and Rabbi Elazar b. R. Shimon?)4. Rashi clarifies the thrust of this question: "וקדוש דא"ר למאי הלכתא הא לא תפיס פדיונו ולתרוייהו אסור באכילה" (And what is the halachic implication of Rabbi [Yehuda HaNasi]'s statement that it is 'consecrated,' seeing that its redemption money does not transfer sanctity, and for both opinions it is forbidden to eat it?)5. Rashi highlights that if Abaye is correct, and the loaves are not fully consecrated, and pidyon doesn't work, and they are forbidden to eat, then what practical difference remains between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabbi Elazar b. R. Shimon, who says they are not consecrated at all? This question forces the Gemara to find a different nafka mina for Abaye's interpretation.

Rashi on Menachot 47a:11:1 (The Gemara's Answer and Rashi's Revision)

The Gemara answers: "לאיפסולי ביוצא" (with regard to being rendered unfit by leaving the Temple courtyard)6. Rashi initially explains: "לרבי דאמר קדוש קצת בשחיטה אם יצא נפסל שאפי' זרקו לשמו נמי אסור באכילה לרבי אלעזר דאמר שחיטה לא מקדשא אין נפסל ביוצא דאינו קדוש אם יצאו בין שחיטה לזריקה ואם אחר כך זרק לשמן כשר" (According to Rabbi [Yehuda HaNasi], who says it is somewhat consecrated by slaughter, if it leaves, it becomes disqualified, for even if one sprinkles for its sake, it is forbidden to eat. According to Rabbi Elazar, who says slaughter does not consecrate, it is not disqualified by leaving, for it is not consecrated; if they left between slaughter and sprinkling, and afterwards one sprinkled for their sake, it is kosher)7. However, Rashi immediately adds a critical self-correction: "שבוש גמור הוא זה" (This is a complete error)8. He explains that his initial interpretation is flawed because if the loaves are consecrated by shechita to the extent that they are disqualified by yotzei, they must possess a substantial sanctity (kedushat haguf). Such sanctity, even if partial, should not allow them to revert to a state where they are not consecrated at all according to R. Elazar, or where pidyon doesn't work according to Abaye. Rashi then offers a revised interpretation, which he presents as "לפיכך נראה לר' דה"ג ולשון הגון הוא" (Therefore, it seems appropriate to read this way, and it is a fitting expression)9. In this revised reading, Rashi suggests the Abaye/Rava dispute is actually reversed regarding pidyon: "לאביי תפיס פדיונו ולרבא לא תפיס פדיונו" (According to Abaye, its redemption money transfers sanctity, and according to Rava, its redemption money does not transfer sanctity)10.

  • Abaye's revised view: For Abaye, "קדוש ואינו קדוש" means it's partially consecrated, but not kedushat haguf gemura. This partial sanctity is sufficient for pidyon to apply. He argues that since it's not fully kedushat haguf, it still retains a potential for pidyon, like an object that has kedushat damim (sanctity of value).
  • Rava's revised view: For Rava, "קדוש גמור" (fully consecrated) implies kedushat haguf gemura (complete sanctity of the object itself), which means it can never be redeemed. Once something has complete kedushat haguf, it cannot transfer its sanctity to money, as it is inherently sanctified. This radical reinterpretation by Rashi highlights the difficulty in understanding the nature of "partial consecration" and how it interacts with different halachic outcomes like pidyon and yotzei. He seeks an interpretation that aligns better with the concept of kedushat haguf versus kedushat damim.

Rashba (Attributed)

The Rashba (attributed to him in this Sefaria text, likely reflecting the standard Rishonim's understanding) provides a structured analysis of the Gemara's challenge to Abaye and the subsequent resolution. He largely follows the Gemara's plain sense before Rashi's self-correction.

Rashba on Menachot 47a:5

The Rashba begins by reiterating the Gemara's initial question: "בשלמא לרבא היינו דאיכא בין ר' לראב"ש" (Granted, according to Rava, that is the difference between Rabbi and Rabbi Elazar b. R. Shimon)11. He explains that Rava, who says Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi means the loaves are fully consecrated (kadosh gamur) but not permitted for eating, implies that pidyon would apply. This creates a clear distinction from Rabbi Elazar b. R. Shimon, who says there's no consecration at all, and thus no pidyon. "אלא לאביי דאמר דלר' לא תפיס פדיונו בעבור שאינו קדוש קדושה גמורה וכ"ש לראב"ש דלא קדיש כלל דאין לו פדיון ודלא תפיס בה פדיונו א"כ מאי בינייהו" (But according to Abaye, who says that according to Rabbi [Yehuda HaNasi], its redemption money does not transfer sanctity because it is not completely consecrated, and certainly according to Rabbi Elazar b. R. Shimon, who says it is not consecrated at all, it has no redemption and its redemption money does not transfer sanctity. If so, what is the difference between them?)12. The Rashba precisely outlines the Gemara's challenge: If Abaye says Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi's "partial consecration" is insufficient for pidyon, then practically, there's no nafka mina from Rabbi Elazar b. R. Shimon's view of no consecration at all. Both views would lead to no pidyon and no eating. The Gemara's answer: "ומשני איכא בינייהו לאפסולי ביוצא" (And it answers: The difference between them is regarding disqualification by yotzei)13. The Rashba clarifies this: "דלר' דאמר דהוא קדוש קצת בשחיטה אם יצא נפסל... ר"ל אם יצא בין שחיטה לזריקה כיון דשחיטה מקדשא ליה קצת הרי קדשתו ליפסל ביוצא" (For Rabbi [Yehuda HaNasi], who says it is somewhat consecrated by slaughter, if it leaves, it is disqualified... meaning, if it left between slaughter and sprinkling, since the slaughter consecrated it somewhat, it has consecrated it to be disqualified by yotzei)14. This means that even a "partial consecration" is enough to trigger the disqualification of yotzei. The Rashba emphasizes that the state of "קדוש ואינו קדוש" is sufficient to make the loaves susceptible to yotzei, even if not fully consecrated for consumption. This understanding aligns with the Gemara's straightforward resolution before Rashi's complex self-correction. The Rashba here represents a more direct reading of the Gemara's flow, where "partial consecration" has a specific, albeit limited, halachic effect.

Rabbeinu Gershom

Rabbeinu Gershom offers a similar, yet distinct, perspective on the Abaye/Rava dispute and the subsequent questions.

Rabbeinu Gershom on Menachot 47a:2

He explains the initial nafka mina between Abaye and Rava regarding pidyon: "בשלמא לרבא היינו דאיכא בין רבי לר"א בר"ש דלרבי דאמר קדוש למתפס פדיונו ואינו קדוש שאינו ניתר באכילה. ורבי אלעזר ב"ר שמעון דאמר אינו קדוש דאפי' פדיונו לא תפיס" (Granted, according to Rava, that is the difference between Rabbi and Rabbi Elazar b. R. Shimon, for according to Rabbi [Yehuda HaNasi], who says it is consecrated, its redemption money transfers sanctity, but it is not consecrated to be permitted for eating. And Rabbi Elazar b. R. Shimon says it is not consecrated, so even its redemption money does not transfer sanctity)15. Rabbeinu Gershom's reading of Rava is that the loaves are fully consecrated (implied by the ability for pidyon to take effect), but the shelo lishmah sprinkling prevents them from being eaten. This is a crucial distinction: full consecration, but an impediment to consumption. This interpretation aligns with the Gemara's initial presentation. He then presents the challenge to Abaye: "אלא לאביי דאמר אינו קדוש קדושה גמורה דלא תפיס פדיונו, מאי איכא בין ר' לר"א בר"ש? דלר"א בר"ש נמי אינו קדוש ואפילו פדיונו לא תפיס" (But according to Abaye, who says it is not completely consecrated, so its redemption money does not transfer sanctity, what is the difference between Rabbi and Rabbi Elazar b. R. Shimon? For according to Rabbi Elazar b. R. Shimon, it is also not consecrated, and even its redemption money does not transfer sanctity)16. This is the same challenge as in Rashi and Rashba, highlighting the need for a practical distinction if Abaye's interpretation is accepted. Rabbeinu Gershom confirms the Gemara's resolution: "ומשני איכא בינייהו לאיפסולי ביוצא" (And it answers: The difference between them is regarding disqualification by yotzei)17. He then explains the implication: "דלרבי דאמר קדוש קצת בשחיטה, אם יצא נפסל... ולר"א בר"ש דאמר שחיטה לא מקדשא, אין נפסל ביוצא" (For Rabbi [Yehuda HaNasi], who says it is somewhat consecrated by slaughter, if it leaves, it is disqualified... And according to Rabbi Elazar b. R. Shimon, who says slaughter does not consecrate, it is not disqualified by yotzei)18. Rabbeinu Gershom, like the Rashba, takes the Gemara's answer at face value. For Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, even partial consecration by shechita is enough to trigger the disqualification of yotzei. For Rabbi Elazar b. R. Shimon, since shechita doesn't consecrate at all, yotzei before zerika has no effect. This straightforward interpretation avoids Rashi's complex revision, suggesting that the concept of "partial consecration" is sufficient to create susceptibility to yotzei, even if not for pidyon or consumption.

Steinsaltz (Contextualizing the Rishonim)

Steinsaltz, while a modern commentator, provides an excellent summary and contextualization that helps to frame the Rishonim's discussions.

Steinsaltz on Menachot 47a:1

He summarizes the initial baraita: "שני כבשי העצרת אין מקדשין את שתי הלחם אלא בשחיטה של הכבשים וזריקת דמם על המזבח" (The two sheep of Shavuot do not consecrate the two loaves except through the slaughter of the sheep and the sprinkling of their blood on the altar)19. This is Steinsaltz's initial interpretation of the baraita's opening clause, which seems to imply both actions. However, the baraita immediately presents Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi who attributes partial consecration to shechita alone, and Rabbi Elazar b. R. Shimon who requires both. Steinsaltz's initial summary thus captures the conclusion of Rabbi Elazar b. R. Shimon, which is the stricter view and arguably the more intuitive understanding of hakrava.

Steinsaltz on Menachot 47a:10

Steinsaltz clearly lays out the Gemara's initial distinction between Abaye and Rava: "בשלמא לרבא האומר בפירוש דברי רבי שהתקדש הלחם בקדושה גמורה, היינו ההבדל דאיכא בין רבי לר' אלעזר בר' שמעון" (Granted, according to Rava, who clearly states Rabbi's words that the bread was consecrated with complete sanctity, that is the difference that exists between Rabbi and Rabbi Elazar b. R. Shimon)20. This highlights that Rava's interpretation of "קדוש ואינו קדוש" as "fully consecrated but not permitted" creates a clear nafka mina regarding pidyon. If fully consecrated, pidyon applies. Then, for Abaye: "אלא לשיטת אביי האומר שלדברי רבי לא התקדש הלחם קדושה גמורה, מאי איכא [מה ההבדל להלכה שיש] בין רבי לר' אלעזר בר' שמעון?" (But according to Abaye, who says that according to Rabbi the bread was not completely consecrated, what is the halachic difference between Rabbi and Rabbi Elazar b. R. Shimon?)21. Steinsaltz succinctly captures the Gemara's challenge: If it's not complete, and therefore pidyon doesn't work, what's left to distinguish Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi from Rabbi Elazar b. R. Shimon? This summary from Steinsaltz provides a clear framework for understanding why the Rishonim expend so much effort on this particular section. The seemingly simple phrase "קדוש ואינו קדוש" hides a deep halachic discussion about the nature and gradations of sanctity, and how these gradations manifest in practical halacha. Rashi's revised reading, in particular, demonstrates the lengths to which Rishonim would go to reconcile an Amoraic discussion with fundamental principles of kedusha. The Rashba and Rabbeinu Gershom, by contrast, illustrate an attempt to maintain a more direct reading of the Gemara's initial flow, where "partial consecration" has a specific, limited legal effect.

Friction

The sugya on Menachot 47a is rich with friction, featuring Tannaitic disputes, Amoraic disagreements, and subsequent kushyot and terutzim that delve into the nuanced nature of kedusha.

Strongest Kushya: The Nature of "Kadosh V'eino Kadosh" (Menachot 47a)

The core friction arises from Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi's statement in the baraita: "שָׁחַט לִשְׁמָן וְזָרַק שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָן — הַלֶּחֶם קָדוֹשׁ וְאֵינוֹ קָדוֹשׁ" (If one slaughtered them for their own sake and sprinkled their blood not for their own sake, the loaves are partially consecrated, but they are not fully consecrated)22. This paradoxical phrase "קדוש ואינו קדוש" immediately begs for clarification. The Gemara asks: "מאי קדוש ואינו קדוש?" (What is meant by 'consecrated and not consecrated'?)23.

Abaye vs. Rava

This question introduces the Amoraic dispute:

  • Abaye: "קָדוֹשׁ, וְלֹא מִתְקַדֵּשׁ קְדוּשָּׁה גְּמוּרָה" (Consecrated, but not completely consecrated)24. For Abaye, "קדוש ואינו קדוש" means the consecration is incomplete, lacking some aspect of full sanctity.
  • Rava: "קָדוֹשׁ, וְלֹא מִיתָּר" (Consecrated, but not permitted to be eaten)25. Rava holds that the loaves are fully consecrated; the "אינו קדוש" (not consecrated) part refers only to their inability to be consumed, due to the improper zerika.

The Gemara's Challenge to Abaye

The Gemara then probes the practical difference (nafka mina) between these interpretations. Everyone agrees the loaves cannot be eaten. The Gemara suggests pidyon (redemption) as a nafka mina:

  • Rava's view: If consecrated fully (as Rava understands Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi), pidyon should apply if they are disqualified (e.g., if one attempts to redeem them). This distinguishes Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi from Rabbi Elazar b. R. Shimon, who holds they are not consecrated at all, so pidyon would not apply.
  • Abaye's view: "לֹא תָּפִיס פִּדְיוֹנוֹ" (its redemption money does not transfer sanctity)26. If the consecration is not complete, Abaye argues it's insufficient for pidyon. This leads to the critical kushya: "בְּשֶׁלָּמָא לְרָבָא הַיְינוּ דְּאִיכָּא בֵּין רַבִּי לְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן. אֶלָּא לְאַבַּיִּי, מַאי אִיכָּא בֵּין רַבִּי לְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן?" (Granted, according to Rava, that is the difference between Rabbi and Rabbi Elazar b. R. Shimon. But according to Abaye, what is the difference between Rabbi and Rabbi Elazar b. R. Shimon?)27. If Abaye's "incomplete consecration" means no pidyon and no eating, then what is Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi's chiddush over Rabbi Elazar b. R. Shimon, who says they are not consecrated at all, also leading to no pidyon and no eating? This is a fundamental challenge to the very existence of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi's opinion under Abaye's interpretation.

Best Terutz (or two): The "Yotzei" and Rashi's Revision

Terutz 1: Loaves are Disqualified by "Yotzei" (Menachot 47a)

The Gemara resolves the challenge to Abaye by introducing a new nafka mina: "אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ לְאִיפְסוּלֵי בְּיוֹצֵא" (The practical difference between them is with regard to whether the loaves are rendered unfit by means of leaving the Temple courtyard)28.

  • Abaye's view (R. Yehuda HaNasi): Even though the consecration is incomplete, it's sufficient to make the loaves susceptible to disqualification if they leave the courtyard between shechita (which initiated the partial consecration) and zerika.
  • R. Elazar b. R. Shimon's view: Since shechita does not consecrate at all, if the loaves leave the courtyard before zerika, they are not consecrated and therefore not subject to the rules of yotzei for consecrated items. They would not become disqualified by leaving and could be brought back and consecrated by a proper zerika.

This terutz provides a clear halachic distinction for Abaye's interpretation, demonstrating that "partial consecration" still carries significant legal weight, even if not enough for pidyon or consumption. The sanctity, though not gemura, is real enough to trigger yotzei.

Terutz 2: Rashi's Radical Reinterpretation (Menachot 47a:11:1)

As noted in the "Readings" section, Rashi finds this terutz problematic. He initially explains it as above but then retracts it, stating "שבוש גמור הוא זה" (This is a complete error)29. Rashi argues that if "partial consecration" is enough to trigger yotzei, it must be a form of kedushat haguf (sanctity of the object itself). If it's kedushat haguf, it should always be applicable for pidyon if disqualified, or never be redeemable if it's considered fully sanctified. To resolve this, Rashi proposes a radical reinterpretation, reversing the nafka mina of pidyon between Abaye and Rava:

  • Abaye (revised): "קדוש ואינו קדוש" means it has an incomplete kedushat haguf, which allows for pidyon if it's disqualified. The incompleteness means it's still somewhat in a redeemable state, like an object with kedushat damim (sanctity of value).
  • Rava (revised): "קדוש גמור" means it has complete kedushat haguf. A fully sanctified object cannot transfer its sanctity to pidyon money because it is inherently holy and cannot be "exchanged." Once something is fully kedushat haguf, it never leaves that status, and therefore pidyon (which implies a transfer out of the original state) is irrelevant. According to this revised Rashi, the distinction between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabbi Elazar b. R. Shimon would still be pidyon, but with the roles of Abaye and Rava reversed from the Gemara's initial presentation. This reinterpretation is a classic example of Rishonim grappling with the fundamental nature of kedusha and its implications, even to the point of suggesting a re-reading of the Gemara's plain sense to fit a deeper conceptual framework.

Second Major Friction: Rav Pappa's Challenge to Rabbi Akiva/Eliezer (Menachot 47a)

A later kushya in the sugya arises from a dilemma posed by Rabbi Shmuel bar Rav Yitzchak concerning piggul and yotzei, which leads to a dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva. The Gemara states that both Tannaim agree with Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi that shechita consecrates. Their dispute hinges on whether zerika has an effect on loaves that have left the courtyard.

  • R. Eliezer: Zerika is ineffective on yotzei items.
  • R. Akiva: Zerika is effective on yotzei items (even to make them piggul).

Rav Pappa's Objection

Rav Pappa objects to this interpretation: "מנא לן דבחוץ קא פליגי?" (From where do we know that they disagree in a case where the loaves are outside the courtyard?)30. Rav Pappa suggests an alternative: "אפשר דבחוץ כ"ע לא קא מודו דלא מיתפסי ביוצא, וקא פליגי דאייתונהו לגו" (Perhaps in a case where the loaves are still outside the courtyard, everyone agrees that sprinkling the blood is not effective with regard to offerings that left the Temple courtyard, and they disagree in a case where one then brought them back into the courtyard before the sprinkling)31. Rav Pappa's alternative interpretation:

  • R. Eliezer: Agrees with Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi that shechita consecrates, making the loaves yotzei and disqualified upon leaving. Even if brought back, they remain disqualified.
  • R. Akiva: Agrees with Rabbi Elazar b. R. Shimon that shechita does not consecrate. Therefore, yotzei before zerika has no effect. If brought back into the courtyard, the zerika can then consecrate them and make them piggul (if the intent is improper).

Gemara's Rejection of Rav Pappa's Interpretation

The Gemara rejects Rav Pappa's proposal: "ומי מקדשא זריקה דפיגול?" (Does sprinkling with an intent that renders the sheep piggul actually consecrate the loaves?)32. This is a crucial point. If R. Akiva holds like R. Elazar b. R. Shimon (that shechita doesn't consecrate), then the loaves aren't consecrated until zerika. But if the zerika itself is shelo lishmah or piggul, can it simultaneously effect consecration and disqualification? The Gemara cites Rav Giddel in the name of Rav: "זריקה דפיגול לא מיתפסה ולא מיפקא" (Sprinkling with an intent that renders an offering piggul does not cause items to become subject to the prohibition against misuse of consecrated property, and it does not remove items from being subject to the prohibition against misuse of consecrated property)33. This implies that a piggul zerika is largely ineffective in terms of establishing or removing kedusha. If so, how could R. Akiva say that piggul zerika can consecrate the loaves? The Gemara ultimately dismisses this objection to Rav Pappa's terutz by stating: "מי לא איתפליג עליה דרב גדל אמר רב?" (Wasn't that which Rav Giddel says that Rav says conclusively refuted?)34. This cryptic statement means that Rav Giddel's teaching is not accepted as halacha, thus allowing Rav Pappa's interpretation of R. Akiva to stand, potentially leading to a deeper understanding of the R. Eliezer/R. Akiva dispute. However, the Gemara's rejection of Rav Giddel's statement is itself a source of friction, as it leaves open the question of the exact efficacy of a piggul zerika in other contexts.

Intertext

The sugya on Menachot 47a draws upon several scriptural and Mishnaic parallels to establish and resolve its intricate halachic discussions.

Nazirite Ram (Bamidbar 6:17)

The primary scriptural source for the Tannaitic dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabbi Elazar b. R. Shimon is the verse describing the Nazirite's ram:

"וְהִקְרִיב אֶת הָאַיִל קָרְבַּן שְׁלָמִים לַה' עַל סַל הַמַּצּוֹת" (And he shall offer the ram for a sacrifice [zevach] of peace offerings to the Lord, with the basket of unleavened bread) (Bamidbar 6:17)35.

This verse is critical because the halacha of the Shtei HaLechem of Shavuot is derived from the loaves of the Nazirite's offering through a gezeirah shavah or similar exegetical link (though the specific derivation is not detailed here). The dispute revolves around which word in the pasuk is the operative term for consecrating the loaves:

  • Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: Focuses on "זֶבַח" (sacrifice), which can also mean "slaughter" (zevichah). He interprets the pasuk as "By what means should he offer the ram in order to consecrate the loaves? By means of slaughtering." This implies that shechita alone effects consecration (Menachot 47a)36.
  • Rabbi Elazar b. R. Shimon: Focuses on "וְהִקְרִיב" (and he shall offer). He understands this term to encompass the entire sacrificial process, including shechita and zerikat ha'dam. Thus, for him, the loaves are not consecrated until all the primary actions are performed properly (Menachot 47a)37. The Gemara further refines the understanding of "וְהִקְרִיב" for Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, stating that if it were written "זבח יקריב," it would imply a further action after shechita. But since it's "יקריב את האיל זבח," the "זבח" defines how the offering is brought, i.e., through slaughter (Menachot 47a)38. Conversely, Rabbi Elazar b. R. Shimon uses the term "זבח" to teach that the loaves must exist at the time of slaughter, indicating that even for him, shechita is a crucial, though not sufficient, step (Menachot 47a)39. This intertextual analysis is the very foundation of the Tannaitic positions.

Korban Todah (Thanksgiving Offering) (Vayikra 7:12-13)

Later in the sugya, Rabbi Yirmeya poses a dilemma to Rabbi Zeira: If the Shavuot sheep were slaughtered lishmah but the loaves were lost, can the blood be sprinkled shelo lishmah (for the sake of a Korban Shelamim instead of Shtei HaLechem) to permit the meat? Rabbi Yirmeya attempts to find a precedent in the Korban Todah:

"וְאִם עַל תּוֹדָה יַקְרִיבֶנּוּ וְהִקְרִיב עַל זֶבַח הַתּוֹדָה חַלּוֹת מַצּוֹת בְּלוּלֹת בַּשֶּׁמֶן וּרְקִיקֵי מַצּוֹת מְשֻׁחִים בַּשָּׁמֶן וְסֹלֶת מֻרְבֶּכֶת חַלֹּת סֹלֶת בְּלוּלֹת בַּשָּׁמֶן. עַל חַלֹּת לֶחֶם חָמֵץ יַקְרִיב קָרְבָּנוֹ עַל זֶבַח תּוֹדַת שְׁלָמָיו." (And if he offers it for a thanksgiving offering, then he shall offer with the sacrifice of thanksgiving unleavened cakes mixed with oil, and unleavened wafers smeared with oil, and fine flour mixed with oil, as cakes. Besides the cakes, he shall offer leavened bread as his offering, with the sacrifice of his thanksgiving peace offering.) (Vayikra 7:12-13)40.

Rabbi Yirmeya suggests that if a Korban Todah is slaughtered and its loaves are lost, the blood can be sprinkled shelo lishmah for a shelamim to permit the meat (Menachot 47a)41. This is because the Todah is similar to a Shelamim, and the meat of a Shelamim is permitted without loaves. Rabbi Zeira rejects this comparison, stating: "קָרְבַּן תּוֹדָה שָׁאנִי, דְּקָרָא קָרֵי לֵיהּ שְׁלָמִים" (The thanks offering is different, as the Merciful One called it a peace offering)42. The verse "עַל זֶבַח תּוֹדַת שְׁלָמָיו" (with the sacrifice of his thanksgiving peace offering) explicitly connects Todah to Shelamim. This unique identification allows the Todah to be treated as a Shelamim if its loaves are lost, something not applicable to the Shtei HaLechem which have a unique requirement for loaves. This intertextual nuance reveals a meta-halachic principle: explicit scriptural categorization can override general sacrificial rules.

Mishna Me'ilah 6b

The dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva regarding the effectiveness of zerika on yotzei items is explicitly referenced and elucidated by the Mishna in Me'ilah:

"חלקי קדשי קדשים שיצאו לפני זריקת דמים, ר"א אומר אינן מועלין בהן ואם אכלן אינו חייב משום פיגול נותר וטמא. ר"ע אומר מועלין בהן ואם אכלן חייב משום פיגול נותר וטמא." (Sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity that left the Temple courtyard before the sprinkling of the blood, Rabbi Eliezer says: The sprinkling of the blood is completely ineffective with regard to these portions, and therefore one is not liable for misusing them. And if one eats them, he is not liable due to the prohibitions of piggul, notar, or of partaking of sacrificial meat while one is ritually impure. Rabbi Akiva says: The sprinkling is effective and therefore, one is liable for misusing them. And if one eats them he is liable due to the prohibitions of piggul, notar, or of partaking of sacrificial meat while one is ritually impure.) (Mishna Me'ilah 6b, cited in Menachot 47a)43.

This Mishna is directly quoted to explain the Tannaitic positions in the dilemma raised by Rabbi Shmuel bar Rav Yitzchak. It clarifies that Rabbi Eliezer believes a yotzei item is fundamentally flawed, rendering subsequent zerika ineffective for all purposes (including piggul or misuse). Rabbi Akiva, however, holds that zerika can still be effective, at least to the extent of making the item susceptible to piggul and me'ilah, even if it had left the courtyard. This intertextual reference is crucial for understanding the various degrees of disqualification and the efficacy of sacrificial actions on already flawed offerings, deeply impacting the discussions on kedusha and its implications.

Psak/Practice

The sugya presents deep conceptual discussions, but how do these machloktot land in practical Halacha? The central dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabbi Elazar b. R. Shimon, and the subsequent Amoraic interpretations, have significant implications for the validity and status of the Shtei HaLechem.

Consecration of Shtei HaLechem

The Rishonim generally follow Rabbi Elazar b. R. Shimon's stringent view, requiring both shechita lishmah and zerikat ha'dam lishmah for the full consecration of the Shtei HaLechem. The Rambam, for example, states: "הלכה ג: כבשי עצרת ששחטן לשמן וזרק דמן לשמן הלחם קדוש. שחטן שלא לשמן וזרק שלא לשמן הלחם אינו קדוש. שחטן לשמן וזרק דמן שלא לשמן, רבי אומר קדוש ואינו קדוש, ורבי אלעזר בן שמעון אומר לעולם אינו קדוש עד שישחוט לשמו ויזרוק לשמו, והלכה כרבי אלעזר בן שמעון." (Rambam, Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 15:15)44. The Rambam explicitly rules according to Rabbi Elazar b. R. Shimon, meaning that shechita alone does not consecrate the loaves at all. This negates the concept of "קדוש ואינו קדוש" in practice for Shtei HaLechem. Consequently, for the loaves to be fully consecrated and fit for hakravah (waving and eating by priests), both shechita and zerika must be performed lishman (for their sake). If the zerika is shelo lishmah, the loaves are not consecrated and are therefore not fit.

Implications for Pidyon and Yotzei

Since the psak is like Rabbi Elazar b. R. Shimon, the practical nafka mina between Abaye and Rava regarding pidyon or yotzei becomes moot for the Shtei HaLechem. If shechita does not consecrate, then:

  • The loaves are not consecrated by shechita, so pidyon cannot apply if they are subsequently disqualified, as they were never truly sanctified in the first place.
  • They would not be disqualified by yotzei (leaving the courtyard) between shechita and zerika, because they have no sanctity at that point to be lost.

Piggul and Shelo Lishmah

The sugya also touched upon the efficacy of zerika shelo lishmah or piggul in consecrating or disqualifying the loaves. According to the psak like Rabbi Elazar b. R. Shimon, a zerika shelo lishmah simply fails to consecrate the loaves. It does not create a state of "קדוש ואינו קדוש" and thus does not lead to piggul for the loaves themselves if they are not yet consecrated. However, if the zerika of the sheep is piggul, the sheep themselves become piggul and are disqualified. The loaves, not having been consecrated, would simply remain chullin (non-sacred) and would not become piggul themselves.

Meta-Psak Heuristics

The sugya provides a valuable meta-halachic insight into the nature of kedusha. The concept of "קדוש ואינו קדוש" highlights that sanctity is not always an all-or-nothing proposition. There can be gradations of holiness, where an item may acquire certain legal statuses (e.g., susceptibility to yotzei) without achieving full consecration (e.g., for consumption or pidyon). While the psak for the Shtei HaLechem leans towards a binary view (fully consecrated or not at all), the conceptual discussion about partial sanctity remains relevant in other areas of Halacha where intermediate stages of kedusha might exist, such as in the stages of consecrating keli sharet (sacred vessels) or the processing of terumah. The debate between Abaye and Rava, and Rashi's subsequent reinterpretation, underscore the intellectual rigor required to define and apply the nuanced concept of kedusha.

Takeaway

The sugya on Menachot 47a meticulously dissects the concept of kedusha, revealing that sanctity can be a multi-faceted state rather than a simple binary, even if the final psak for Shtei HaLechem favors a strict, all-or-nothing approach to consecration. It underscores how every word in a pasuk can be the battleground for fundamental Tannaitic and Amoraic disputes regarding the very nature of sacred acts and objects.


1 Rashi on Menachot 47a:1:1 2 Menachot 47a 3 Rashi on Menachot 47a:10:1 4 Menachot 47a 5 Rashi on Menachot 47a:10:2 6 Menachot 47a 7 Rashi on Menachot 47a:11:1 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 Rashba on Menachot 47a:5 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 Rabbeinu Gershom on Menachot 47a:2 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid. 19 Steinsaltz on Menachot 47a:1 20 Steinsaltz on Menachot 47a:10 21 Ibid. 22 Menachot 47a 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 Rashi on Menachot 47a:11:1 30 Menachot 47a 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid. 35 Bamidbar 6:17 36 Menachot 47a 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid. 40 Vayikra 7:12-13 41 Menachot 47a 42 Ibid. 43 Mishna Me'ilah 6b, cited in Menachot 47a 44 Rambam, Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 15:15