Zevachim 108

Sugya Map

The daf of Zevachim 108a presents a rich tapestry of korbanos halachos, featuring three distinct, yet interconnected, sugyot:

• Issue 1: Kezayit of Flesh with Adhering Salt

  • Core Question: Does salt, integral to the korban but shelo mino (not of the same kind) as the flesh, contribute to the kezayit (olive-bulk) minimum for liability of haka'ah b'chutz (offering outside the Temple)?
  • Nafka Minas: Liability for karet (Divine excision) or chatas (sin-offering) if offered outside. The very definition of a "complete" kezayit for sacrificial purposes.
  • Primary Sources: Leviticus 17:9 (prohibition of haka'ah b'chutz), Leviticus 2:13 (commandment of salt for korbanos).

• Issue 2: Tumah of Person vs. Tumah of Sacrifice – Order of Prohibition

  • Core Question: In what order do prohibitions (specifically tumah of the body vs. tumah of the meat) take effect, and how does this interact with the principle of ein issur chal al issur (one prohibition cannot take effect upon another already existing prohibition)?
  • Nafka Minas: Liability for karet or chatas for an impure person eating impure kodshim. The underlying lomdus of issur chal al issur and its exceptions (issur kolel, issur chamur).
  • Primary Sources: Leviticus 7:20 (prohibition of tameh eating kodshim).

• Issue 3: Shochtei Chutz vs. Ma'aleh Chutz – Deriving Liability for Multiple Actors

  • Core Question: How do derashos (exegetical interpretations) from ish ish ("any man") and hahu ("that man") differentiate liability for one person vs. two people acting together in shechitat chutz (slaughtering outside) and haka'at chutz (offering outside)?
  • Nafka Minas: Determining individual vs. joint liability for karet or chatas. The methodology of drasha and the concept of lashon bnei adam (Torah speaks in human language).
  • Primary Sources: Leviticus 17:3-4 (prohibition of shechitat chutz), Leviticus 17:8-9 (prohibition of haka'at chutz).

Text Snapshot

The daf opens with a classic dilemma regarding volumetric measures in korbanos:

"ראש יונה של עולת העוף שאין בו כזית, ומלח משלימו לכזית, מהו? חייב או פטור על העלאתו בחוץ?" (Zevachim 108a)

"The head of a pigeon burnt offering that does not have on it an olive-bulk of flesh, but the salt that adheres to it completes the measure to make an olive-bulk, what is the halakha? Is one liable for offering it up outside?"

This sets the stage for a discussion on whether a non-flesh component, albeit a commanded one (מצות מליחה), can contribute to the shiur kezayit (minimum measure). The Gemara notes the dilemma can be raised according to Rabbi Yoḥanan and the dilemma can be raised according to Reish Lakish, highlighting the fundamental debate between min b'mino (same kind) vs. shelo mino (not same kind) for shiurim.

Later, Rava provides a critical distinction in the Tumah sugya:

"אמר רבא: כל היכא דנטמא גופו של זה ואח"כ נטמא הבשר — דכולי עלמא לא פליגי דחייב…כי פליגי בשנטמא בשר תחילה ואח"כ נטמא הגוף." (Zevachim 108a)

"Rava said: Wherever one is first rendered impure with impurity of the body and then afterward the sacrificial meat is rendered impure, everyone agrees that he is liable…When they disagree is in a case where first the meat is rendered impure and then afterward the person’s body is rendered impure."

This distinction regarding the chronological order of tumah is pivotal to understanding the disagreement between Rabbi Yosei HaGelili and the Rabbanan concerning issur chal al issur.

Dikduk/Leshon Nuance

• "ראש יונה": Steinsaltz clarifies this refers to "של עולת העוף" (of a bird burnt offering)¹. The specificity of a bird offering is important because its shechita is actually melika (pinching the neck), and the head is often a significant component.
• "מלח אי פריש מצוה לחזור ולמולחו": Rashi explains this phrase by citing the verse "ולא תשבית מלח ברית אלהיך מעל מנחתך" (Leviticus 2:13), indicating that salt is not merely an incidental addition but a fundamental, divinely commanded component whose absence requires replacement². This elevates the status of salt beyond a mere foreign object, fueling the safek (doubt) as to its contribution to a kezayit.

Readings

The sugya concerning an impure person eating kodshim offers a profound lomdus debate on the principle of ein issur chal al issur and its exceptions. Rava's analysis³, as illuminated by Rishonim, is particularly insightful.

Rava's Chiddush: The Order of Tumah

Rava introduces a crucial distinction:

1. Person becomes tameh first, then meat becomes tameh: Everyone agrees the person is liable for eating. The prohibition of tum'at haguf (impurity of the body) – a karet offense – took effect while the meat was still tahor (pure) and permissible. Once this more stringent prohibition applies, it is not abrogated even if the meat subsequently becomes tameh⁴.
2. Meat becomes tameh first, then person becomes tameh: This is the core of the disagreement between Rabbi Yosei HaGelili and the Rabbanan. Here, the meat is already prohibited due to tum'at habasar (impurity of the meat) before the person becomes impure.

Rashi's Elucidation of R' Yosei HaGelili

Rashi, in his commentary on Rava, clarifies Rabbi Yosei HaGelili's position. He states that Rabbi Yosei adheres strictly to the principle of ein issur chal al issur⁵. Since the meat is already prohibited by tum'at habasar (for which there is no chatas, only malkos or asur b'achilah), the tum'at haguf (for which there is karet) cannot take effect upon it. The initial prohibition "occupies" the meat, preventing a second, even more stringent, prohibition from applying. This is a powerful demonstration of the halachic "property" of a prohibition.

Tosafot's Insight into the Rabbanan: Issur Kolel

Tosafot, addressing the Rabbanan's view, introduces the concept of issur kolel (an inclusive prohibition)⁶. They explain that the Rabbanan believe that even if the meat is already prohibited, a kolel prohibition can still apply. The prohibition of tum'at haguf is kolel because it prohibits the tameh person from eating all kodshim, both pure and impure. Therefore, even though this specific piece of meat is already tameh, the tum'at haguf extends its reach to it, as part of its broader scope. Tosafot explicitly links this principle to the discussion in Gid Hanasheh (Chulin 101a)⁷, indicating its broader applicability in halacha. The chiddush of issur kolel is that the second issur does not merely "add" to the first; rather, its encompassing nature means it inherently applies to the item, even if that item already falls under a narrower prohibition. This suggests a hierarchical understanding of issurim.

Friction

The Gemara's discussion of issur chal al issur reaches its apex with a critical challenge to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili's stance and the insightful terutz offered by Rav Ashi.

The Strongest Kushya: Issur Chamur Chal Al Issur Kal

The Gemara challenges Rabbi Yosei HaGelili: "But even according to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, granted that we do not say that since it is a more inclusive prohibition it will take effect. But still, the prohibition due to the impurity of a person’s body, which is a more stringent prohibition as it carries the punishment of karet, should come and take effect upon the prohibition due to the ritual impurity of the meat itself, as that prohibition is less stringent as it carries only the punishment of lashes." (Zevachim 108a)

This kushya posits an exception to ein issur chal al issur: the principle of issur chamur chal al issur kal (a more stringent prohibition takes effect upon a less stringent one). If tum'at haguf (a karet offense) is more stringent than tum'at habasar (a lav offense), why doesn't it take effect, even according to Rabbi Yosei? This is a powerful challenge, as issur chamur is a well-established exception to ein issur chal al issur in other sugyot. The Rabbanan's position, by recognizing issur kolel, implicitly bypasses this specific kushya, but for Rabbi Yosei, who rejects issur kolel, this kushya is direct and potent.

The Best Terutz: Rav Ashi's Nuanced Comparison

Rav Ashi provides a brilliant terutz, re-evaluating the very premise of "stringency": "Rav Ashi said: From where is it apparent that the prohibition due to the impurity of the person’s body is more stringent? Perhaps the prohibition due to the impurity of the meat is more stringent, as impure meat does not have the possibility of purification in a ritual bath, whereas a ritually impure person does." (Zevachim 108a)

Rav Ashi deconstructs the assumption that tum'at haguf is unequivocally more stringent. While tum'at haguf carries karet, it is a temporary state, remediable through tevila (immersion) in a mikvah. Tum'at habasar, however, once it occurs, is permanent; the meat remains pasul (unfit) and cannot be purified. Thus, in terms of its ultimate, irreversible status, tum'at habasar is arguably more stringent.

This terutz is profound because it challenges a superficial understanding of "stringency." It demonstrates that halachic stringency is not always measured solely by the severity of punishment (e.g., karet vs. malkos), but can also encompass other factors like the possibility of tahara (purification) or the permanence of the disqualification. By showing that tum'at habasar can be considered chamur in a particular aspect, Rav Ashi preserves Rabbi Yosei's adherence to ein issur chal al issur, as the condition of issur chamur chal al issur kal is not universally met.

Intertext

The sugyot on Zevachim 108a resonate with fundamental halachic principles found throughout Shas and Tanakh.

Issur Chal Al Issur and Issur Kolel

The debate between Rabbi Yosei HaGelili and the Rabbanan regarding ein issur chal al issur and the exception of issur kolel (inclusive prohibition) is a cornerstone of halachic reasoning. Tosafot on our daf explicitly refers to this principle as discussed in Gid Hanasheh (Chulin 101a)⁸. There, the Gemara discusses whether the prohibition of basar b'chalav (meat and milk) can take effect on gid hanasheh (sciatic nerve), which is already prohibited. The distinction between a prohibition that is kolel (encompassing a broader category of items, some already prohibited and some not) and one that is not, is crucial there, mirroring the sugya in Zevachim. Similarly, Nedarim 15a explores the implications of issur chal al issur in the context of nedarim (vows), examining when a person can impose a new prohibition on an item already forbidden. These discussions highlight the sophisticated logic behind the application and exceptions to this foundational principle.

Ish Ish and Hahu Derivations

The Gemara's meticulous analysis of the seemingly redundant phrases "איש איש" (any man) and "ההוא גברא" (that man) in Leviticus 17 to derive halachos regarding shochtei chutz and ma'aleh chutz is characteristic of drashos throughout Shas.

• The phrase "איש איש" is frequently used as an ribui (amplification) to include additional cases or individuals beyond the apparent scope. For instance, Sanhedrin 49a uses "איש איש" to derive that a Kohen Gadol is liable for violating Tumah prohibitions, not just an ordinary Kohen.
• Conversely, "ההוא גברא" (or similar singular references like "הוא") often serves as a mi'ut (exclusion) to limit liability. Kiddushin 35a, for example, discusses hahu in the context of mumar l'davar echad, indicating a specific exclusion. The sugya in Zevachim demonstrates the delicate balance in drasha, where a phrase can be interpreted as an amplification in one context (ish ish for ma'aleh chutz to include two actors) and a limiting factor in another (hahu for shochtei chutz to exclude two actors), all dependent on the specific textual juxtaposition and svara.

Psak/Practice

The sugyot on Zevachim 108a yield several implications for halachic practice and meta-psak heuristics.

1. Kezayit with Salt: The opening sugya regarding the salt completing a kezayit remains a Teiku (unresolved dilemma). In practice, a Teiku typically implies a chumra (stringency) l'chumra in issurim (prohibitions) due to safek de'oraita (doubt concerning a Torah law). Therefore, one would likely be considered liable for haka'ah b'chutz if the salt completes the kezayit. This exemplifies the principle of chayeshinan l'chumra in safek de'oraita.

2. Issur Chal Al Issur: Rava's distinction between the order of tumah (person first vs. meat first) and the underlying debate between Rabbi Yosei HaGelili (ein issur chal al issur) and the Rabbanan (issur kolel) are fundamental halachic principles. The halacha generally follows the Rabbanan, accepting the concept of issur kolel as an exception to ein issur chal al issur. Rav Ashi's terutz regarding the comparative stringency of tum'at habasar also demonstrates the nuanced approach to defining "stringency" in halacha, not solely by karet but by other factors like permanence. This lomdus forms the basis for numerous psakim in areas like kashrus, kodshim, and nedarim.

3. Shochtei Chutz / Ma'aleh Chutz – Joint Liability: The mishna and Gemara delineate specific liabilities for shochtei chutz and ma'aleh chutz. The halacha accepts the distinction that two individuals performing shechitat chutz are exempt, while two performing haka'at chutz are liable⁹. This is derived from the drashos of ish ish and hahu as explained in the Gemara. This illustrates how even seemingly minor textual variations in the Torah lead to significant halachic distinctions regarding criminal liability.

Takeaway

Zevachim 108a masterfully dissects foundational halachic principles like kezayit composition, the intricate rules of issur chal al issur, and the art of drasha, revealing the depth and precision of Chazal's legal thought. The daf highlights how nuanced textual interpretations and redefinitions of core concepts ("stringency," "completeness") drive profound halachic distinctions.

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¹ Steinsaltz on Zevachim 108a:1 s.v. ראש בן יונה. ² Rashi on Zevachim 108a:1:1 s.v. מלח אי פריש מצוה לחזור ולמולחו. ³ Zevachim 108a s.v. אמר רבא כל היכא דנטמא גופו. ⁴ Steinsaltz on Zevachim 108a:12 s.v. אמר רבא. ⁵ Rashi on Zevachim 108a:13:1 s.v. כי פליגי בשנטמא בשר תחילה. ⁶ Tosafot on Zevachim 108a:13:1 s.v. רבנן סברי מיגו. ⁷ Chulin 101a. ⁸ Tosafot on Zevachim 108a:13:1 s.v. רבנן סברי מיגו; Chulin 101a. ⁹ Zevachim 108a s.v. משנה: חומרא בשוחט.