Zevachim 110

Sugya Map

• Issue 1: הקטרת כזית מן הקומץ שקבעו במנא (Burning an olive-bulk from a kometz designated in a vessel)
  • Dilemma: Does "קביעות מנא" (designation by placing in a vessel) make the entire content liable for hotza'ah (burning outside)?
  • Nafka Mina(s):
    1. If one designates a large amount of incense in a vessel, then burns only a k'zayit (olive-bulk) outside the courtyard: Is he liable for burning the k'zayit (Rabbis), or exempt because the designation made the entire quantity liable, and he only burned a part (R' Eliezer)?
    2. Rava's example: Designating 6 log wine for a bull, removing 4 log and libating them outside. Is he liable for the 4 log (fit for a ram) even though it's not the original designated amount?
  • Primary Sources: Zevachim 110a: "מר סבר קביעות מנא מילתא היא... ומר סבר קביעות מנא לאו מילתא היא."
• Issue 2: חסרון בחוץ (A lack occurring outside the courtyard)
  • Dilemma: If an offering becomes chaser (lacking) after it leaves the courtyard, is that chesaron considered for exemption? Or, since it's already pasul (disqualified) by hotza'ah, does the chesaron not matter?
  • Nafka Mina(s): If a kometz is taken outside whole, then a piece is removed, and the remainder is burned: Is one liable (since it was whole when hotza'ah occurred, and the chesaron is irrelevant) or exempt (since it's now chaser)?
  • Primary Sources: Zevachim 110a: "חסרון שבחוץ שמיה חסרון או לא שמיה חסרון." Mishna: "וכולן שחסרו והקריבן בחוץ פטור."
• Issue 3: קומץ שחזר לקומצו (A kometz returned to its remainder)
  • Dilemma: If a kometz (handful) is separated from a minchah (meal offering) and then returned, is it nullified by the majority?
  • Nafka Mina(s): Is one liable for burning this mixture outside?
  • Primary Sources: Zevachim 110b Mishna: "נטל קומצה והחזיר קומצה למקומה... חייב." Gemara: "לשתוקף רובא וליבטליה לקומץ?" R' Zeira's gezera shava.
• Issue 4: קומץ ולבונה / שנים מתירין (Handful and frankincense / two permitters)
  • Dilemma: If one of two matirim (permitters) is burned, does it permit "half" of the korban or merely "weaken" the prohibition?
  • Nafka Mina(s): If one burns only the kometz or only the levona outside, is he liable? (R' Eliezer vs. Rabbis). What is the halacha if one is burned inside?
  • Primary Sources: Zevachim 110b Mishna: "קומץ ולבונה... שהקריב אחד מהן בחוץ חייב." R' Yitzchak Nappacha's chakira: "מהו שיעביר חציו."

Text Snapshot

The Gemara on Zevachim 110a opens with a machloket regarding the kometz of incense:

מַר סָבַר קְבִיעוּת מָנָא מִילְּתָא הִיא. וּמַר סָבַר לָאו מִילְּתָא הִיא.

One Sage, Rabbi Eliezer, holds that the designation of a measure of incense larger than an olive-bulk by placing it in a vessel is a significant matter... And one Sage, the Rabbis, holds that it is nothing... (Zevachim 110a)

This sets the stage for the chakira of kavua b'manah. The core of the sugya then shifts to the Mishna's general rule about chesaron:

וְכׇל אֵלּוּ שֶׁחָסְרוּ, הִקְרִיבָן בַּחוּץ – פָּטוּר.

And with regard to any of these offerings that were lacking any amount, if one sacrifices it outside the courtyard, he is exempt. (Zevachim 110a)

This Mishnaic statement directly leads to the chakira about chesaron sheb'chutz:

מִילְּתָא הוּא דְאִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: חֶסְרוֹן שֶׁבַּחוּץ שְׁמֵיהּ חֶסְרוֹן, אוֹ לָא שְׁמֵיהּ חֶסְרוֹן?

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Is a lack that occurs to an offering outside the courtyard considered a lack in order to exempt one who sacrifices the remainder outside the courtyard? Or is it not considered a lack? (Zevachim 110a)

The Gemara grapples with the logic:

מִי אָמְרִינַן: כֵּיוָן דְּנָפֵיק אִיפְּסֵיל, מַאי נָפְקָא לִי מִינָּהּ חָסֵר וּמַאי נָפְקָא לִי מִינָּהּ שָׁלֵם? אוֹ דִּלְמָא יְצִיאָה דְּאִיתֵיהּ בְּעֵינֵיהּ — אִין, לָא אִיתֵיהּ בְּעֵינֵיהּ — לָא?

Do we say that once an offering emerges from the courtyard it is in any event disqualified... so what difference is there to me if there is an additional disqualification of being lacking and what difference is there to me if it is still complete? Or perhaps it is only with regard to emerging from the courtyard, where it is still in its original state, that yes, one is liable... but where it is not in its original state, one would not be liable. (Zevachim 110a)

This precise formulation highlights the core chakira: does an additional pesul (disqualification) affect liability when the item is already pasul? And specifically, does the concept of "original state" (b'eineiha) limit the scope of hotza'ah liability?

Readings

Rashi on "קביעות מנא"

Rashi, elucidating the initial machloket regarding the incense, states:

ורבנן סברי - קביעותא דמנא לאו כלום היא:

And the Rabbis hold – designation by a vessel is nothing. (Rashi, Zevachim 110a s.v. v'rabbanan savri)

Rashi clarifies that the dispute hinges on whether placing a kometz (or other offering) into a vessel designates the entire contents for the avodah (service). According to R' Eliezer, if one places, say, 10 k'zaytim of incense in a vessel, the entire 10 k'zaytim are now considered a single, designated unit. Therefore, burning just one k'zayit outside is not considered "burning the kometz" but rather burning a part of a larger, designated entity. Since hotza'ah liability is generally for a complete offering, burning a part would exempt him. The Rabbis, however, disagree. For them, the vessel does not kove'a (designate) the entire contents. Thus, if one burns a k'zayit outside, it is considered a complete act of hotza'ah for that k'zayit, making him liable. This machloket establishes a foundational principle regarding the role of a vessel in consecrating or designating offerings.

Steinsaltz on "קביעות מנא"

Steinsaltz offers a contemporary phrasing of the same distinction:

במנא [בכלי] אחד, ובזאת נחלקו: מר סבר [חכם זה, ר' אליעזר, סבור]: קביעות מנא [כלי] מילתא היא [דבר קובע הוא], ונקבע בכך כל מה שבכלי להקטרה, ולכן אם הקטיר רק כזית מחוץ לעזרה אין זו נחשבת הקטרת חוץ. ואילו מר סבר [חכם זה, חכמים, סבור]: קביעות בכלי לאו מילתא היא [לא דבר קובע הוא], והואיל ולא נקבע כל מה שבכלי להקטרה, ולכן גם אם הקטיר רק כזית מחוץ לעזרה יהיה חייב על כך.

In one vessel, and regarding this they disagreed: one Sage [R' Eliezer] holds: the designation by a vessel is a matter [a designating matter], and thereby everything in the vessel is designated for burning. Therefore, if he burned only an olive-bulk outside the courtyard, this is not considered burning outside. Whereas the other Sage [the Rabbis] holds: designation by a vessel is not a matter [not a designating matter], and since everything in the vessel was not designated for burning, therefore even if he burned only an olive-bulk outside the courtyard, he would be liable for it. (Steinsaltz, Zevachim 110a s.v. b'mana)

Steinsaltz's explanation mirrors Rashi's, emphasizing the kavua aspect. The key takeaway is that for R' Eliezer, the vessel creates a halachic unit. Burning only a part of that unit outside does not trigger the chiyuv (liability) of hotza'ah, which applies to the entire offering. For the Rabbis, the vessel is merely a container; the individual k'zayit still retains its identity as a complete shiur (measure) for hotza'ah liability.

Tosafot on "חסרון בחוץ"

When the Gemara attempts to resolve the chakira of chesaron sheb'chutz from the Mishna "וכולן שחסרו... פטור" (and all of them that were lacking... exempt), and this proof is rejected with "לא, בחסרו מבפנים" (No, it refers to a lack from inside), Tosafot raises a kushya:

אבל בחסרון מודו ליה - ומסיק בחסרו מבפנים ותימה מאי קא משמע לן תנינא לעיל (זבחים דף קט:) וכולן שחסרו כל שהוא כו' וכל הפחות היינו חסרו מבפנים:

But regarding a lack, they concede to him [R' Eliezer] – and it concludes that it refers to a lack from inside. And it is a wonder: what does it come to teach us? We already learned above (Zevachim 109b) "and all of them that were lacking any amount, etc." and "any less than that" means it was lacking from inside. (Tosafot, Zevachim 110a s.v. aval b'chesaron)

Tosafot's kushya highlights a perceived redundancy. If the Gemara's conclusion is that the Mishna's exemption for chaser offerings applies only to those that became chaser inside the courtyard, what chiddush (novel insight) is being presented? We already knew from Zevachim 109b that a chaser offering is exempt from hotza'ah liability. The Gemara's repeated rejection of chesaron sheb'chutz as the scenario for the Mishna's statement makes the Mishna's statement seem obvious if it only refers to chesaron m'bifnim. This forces us to question the initial chakira itself or seek a more nuanced understanding of the Gemara's attempt to prove from the Mishna.

Sha'arei Torat Bavel on "חסרון בחוץ"

Sha'arei Torat Bavel addresses Tosafot's kushya regarding the chiddush of "חסרו מבפנים":

ד"ה אבל וכו' ותימה מאי קמ"ל תנינא לעיל וכולן שהסרו וכו'. —נראה דקמ"ל דלא נימא דמה ששנינו "וכולן שחסרו כ"ש וכו'" מסיום דברי ר"א הוא (וכעין זה מה ששנינו "וכולן שהקריב בפנים וכו'" שהוא מדברי ר"א) וחכמים חולקים עליו וסברי דאפי' בחסרו חייב, אלא דברי הכל הוא, ואפי' לחכמים פטור כשחסרו.

s.v. aval etc. And it is a wonder: what does it come to teach us? We already learned above "and all of them that were lacking etc." – It seems that it comes to teach us that we should not say that what we learned "and all of them that were lacking any amount etc." is from the concluding words of R' Eliezer (and similarly what we learned "and all of them that one sacrificed inside etc." which is from the words of R' Eliezer) and the Rabbis disagree with him and hold that even if it is lacking, one is liable; rather, it is divrei hakol (unanimous), and even according to the Rabbis, one is exempt if it is lacking. (Sha'arei Torat Bavel, Zevachim 110a)

Sha'arei Torat Bavel suggests a subtle chiddush. Even if the exemption for chesaron m'bifnim is generally known, one might have thought that the specific Mishnaic statement "וכולן שחסרו..." is part of R' Eliezer's opinion (who often holds for higher chiyuv for completeness, as seen with kavua b'manah and kometz u'levona). The Gemara, by asserting "לא, בחסרו מבפנים" for this Mishna, clarifies that this particular ruling (exemption for chesaron) is divrei hakol – universally accepted, even by the Rabbis. This means that even the Rabbis, who are more lenient regarding the completeness requirement in some contexts, agree that a fundamentally chaser offering is not subject to hotza'ah liability. This resolves Tosafot's kushya by identifying a chiddush in the scope of the Mishna's statement rather than its content.

Friction

The Strongest Kushya: חסרון שבחוץ שמיה חסרון?

The core tension in this sugya is articulated in the chakira: "חסרון שבחוץ שמיה חסרון, או לא שמיה חסרון?" (Is a lack that occurs outside the courtyard considered a lack, or not?). The Gemara immediately presents the dilemma:

מִי אָמְרִינַן: כֵּיוָן דְּנָפֵיק אִיפְּסֵיל, מַאי נָפְקָא לִי מִינָּהּ חָסֵר וּמַאי נָפְקָא לִי מִינָּהּ שָׁלֵם?

Do we say that once an offering emerges from the courtyard it is in any event disqualified, and yet the Torah deems one liable for offering it there, so what difference is there to me if there is an additional disqualification of being lacking and what difference is there to me if it is still complete? (Zevachim 110a)

This is a powerful kushya. The chiyuv of hotza'ah applies to an offering that is pasul (disqualified) by virtue of being taken outside the courtyard, yet still "fit" in its essential nature. If the offering is already pasul by hotza'ah, why would an additional pesul (like chesaron) matter? From the perspective of hotza'ah, the damage is already done; the offering is no longer valid for the altar inside. Why should a subsequent chesaron outside exempt one from the chiyuv that has already attached due to hotza'ah? It seems like a pesul al gabei pesul (a disqualification on top of a disqualification) should not alter the initial liability.

The Best Terutz: יציאה דאיתיה בעיניה

The Gemara offers a potential distinction to address this kushya:

אוֹ דִּלְמָא יְצִיאָה דְּאִיתֵיהּ בְּעֵינֵיהּ — אִין, לָא אִיתֵיהּ בְּעֵינֵיהּ — לָא?

Or perhaps it is only with regard to emerging from the courtyard, where it is still in its original state, that yes, one is liable despite the fact that it was disqualified by emerging from the courtyard, but where it is not in its original state, one would not be liable. (Zevachim 110a)

This terutz introduces the concept of "איתיה בעיניה" (being in its original state). The argument is that the Torah's chiyuv for hotza'ah applies specifically when the offering is taken outside while it is still in its complete, original form. Even though it becomes pasul by being outside, its fundamental identity as a complete offering remains intact, making it subject to chiyuv. However, if after leaving the courtyard, it undergoes a fundamental change – becoming chaser and thus "לא איתיה בעיניה" (not in its original state) – then it loses the very essence that the chiyuv of hotza'ah targets. The chiyuv for hotza'ah is not merely for any pasul item taken outside, but for a pasul item that could have been valid if not for the hotza'ah, and which retains its essential integrity. A chaser item, even if taken outside, is already fundamentally flawed, and therefore, the additional pesul of hotza'ah might not trigger liability if the chesaron occurred before the act of hakrava (offering).

This distinction is crucial. It suggests that the chiyuv of hotza'ah is not just about the place of offering, but also about the state of the offering at the time of the avodah. If the offering is not "in its original state" due to chesaron, it might be exempt, regardless of where the chesaron occurred. The Gemara's subsequent attempts to prove this from Abaye's statement and the Mishna, and their ultimate rejection, lead to the chakira remaining unresolved (teiku), indicating the depth of the problem and the lack of a definitive textual resolution within this sugya.

Intertext

Piggul and Matir Chatzi (Zevachim 2a)

The chakira of kometz u'levona on Zevachim 110b, specifically R' Yitzchak Nappacha's dilemma: "מהו שיעביר חציו, מי מתיר או מי מחליש?" (What is the halacha if one burned the handful but not the frankincense, will it permit half of the remainder, or will it merely weaken the prohibition?), directly references a foundational machloket in Hilchot Piggul. The Gemara immediately asks: "למאן אילימא לרבי מאיר דאמר מפגל בחציו" (According to whom [is this dilemma]? If according to R' Meir who says one can render an offering piggul by having piggul intention during half of two acts that together permit the offering...). This refers to the machloket on Zevachim 2a:

רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: מְפַגֵּל בַּחֲצִי הַמַּתִּיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אֵין מְפַגֵּל עַד שֶׁיְּהֵא מְפַגֵּל בְּכׇל הַמַּתִּיר.

Rabbi Meir says: One can render an offering piggul by having piggul intention during half of the permitting acts. And the Rabbis say: One cannot render an offering piggul unless he has piggul intention during all the permitting acts. (Zevachim 2a)

The connection is profound. If R' Meir holds that a partial act (e.g., burning the kometz without the levona) is significant enough to trigger piggul intention, it implies that this partial act itself has a permitting effect, even if not a full one. Hence, "מתיר חציו" (it permits half). Conversely, the Rabbis, who require piggul intention over all permitting acts, suggest that a partial act has no independent permitting power, leading to the "לא מתיר ולא מחליש" (neither permits nor weakens) position. Our sugya uses this piggul debate as a heuristic for understanding the nature of matirim and their individual efficacy, demonstrating how principles from one area of Kodshim inform another.

"דאיתיה בעיניה" (In its Original State)

Abaye's distinction regarding chesaron sheb'chutz – "יציאה דְּאִיתֵיהּ בְּעֵינֵיהּ — אִין, לָא אִיתֵיהּ בְּעֵינֵיהּ — לָא" (Zevachim 110a) – resonates with halachic principles found elsewhere, particularly regarding items that change their status or form. A notable parallel is found in Hilchot Muktzah on Shabbat. For instance, in Eruvin 13b, when discussing whether a shofar that cracked on Shabbat becomes muktzah for that Shabbat (since it's no longer usable), the Gemara considers the argument that it's no longer "איתיה בעיניה" (in its original state) as a usable shofar. This idea that a change in the essential, functional state of an object can alter its halachic category or liability is a recurring theme. While the context is different (Shabbat vs. Korbanot), the underlying principle is similar: halachic responsibility or classification often depends on the object's integrity and whether it remains "as it was." If an offering, initially complete, becomes chaser, it undergoes a transformation that might remove it from the category of items for which hotza'ah liability applies, because it's no longer "the offering" in its original sense.

Psak/Practice

The sugya's discussions have several implications for halachic practice and meta-psak heuristics.

1. קביעות מנא: The machloket between R' Eliezer and the Rabbis regarding "קביעות מנא" (designation by vessel) is a fundamental point. While the Gemara doesn't explicitly pasken here, the general rule is Halacha k'Rabban b'Kodshim (Halacha is according to the Rabbis in matters of offerings) unless R' Eliezer is explicitly supported. Thus, the prevailing view would be that "קביעות מנא לאו מילתא היא" – a vessel does not designate the entire contents, and one would be liable for burning a k'zayit outside even if it was part of a larger designated quantity in a vessel. This impacts the definition of a shiur (measure) for liability when an item is transferred or contained.

2. חסרון בחוץ: The chakira of "חסרון שבחוץ שמיה חסרון או לא שמיה חסרון" remains a teiku (unresolved dilemma) at the end of the Gemara's discussion. When a chakira remains a teiku in the Gemara, the practical halacha in cases of chiyuvei karet (liabilities of spiritual excision) or chiyuvei mizbe'ach (liabilities regarding the altar) is generally patur (exempt) due to safek (doubt). Therefore, if an offering became chaser outside the courtyard before being offered, one would likely be patur from hotza'ah liability. This reflects a broader heuristic: safek de'Oraita l'kula (doubt in Torah law is lenient).

3. קומץ שחזר לקומצו: R' Zeira's gezera shava (verbal analogy) "שורף שורף" (burning, burning) implies that the kometz does not get nullified by the rov (majority) of the minchah. This means that if a kometz is removed and then returned, the halacha is that it retains its distinct status, and burning the mixture outside incurs liability. This principle is accepted l'halacha and influences how we understand the non-nullification of davar sheb'minyan (a counted item) or items crucial for mitzvot.

4. שנים מתירין: R' Yitzchak Nappacha's chakira "מתיר או מחליש" regarding partial matirim also remains a teiku. Again, in cases of chiyuv, this would lead to an exemption in practice. This highlights the complexity of multi-stage avodah and how the halacha struggles to define the efficacy of incomplete steps.

Takeaway

This sugya rigorously explores the interplay between pesul (disqualification) by location (hotza'ah) and pesul by state (chesaron), demonstrating that hotza'ah liability is not simply about an item being outside, but its being outside in its original, complete form. The unresolved chakirot underscore the nuanced complexity of Kodshim, where even seemingly obvious questions can lack definitive answers, leading to practical leniencies based on safek.