Zevachim 114

Sugya Map

• Issue: The Gemara dissects the Mishna's enumeration of pesulei mukdashin (disqualified consecrated items) regarding liability for Karet (excision) when sacrificed Chutz La'aretz (outside the Temple courtyard). Specifically, it clarifies the ta'am (reasoning) for Rabbi Shimon's position that an animal Pasul Be'tzorech Zman (disqualified due to time) incurs a lo ta'aseh (negative prohibition), even if not Karet.
• Nafka Mina(s):
  • The precise definition and scope of various disqualifications (e.g., roved/nirba, atnan/mechir, mum over, oto ve'et beno) and their implications for Chutz La'aretz.
  • The nature of pesul gufa (inherent disqualification) versus pesul me'alma (external disqualification) and their relative severity.
  • The source of a lo ta'aseh for Pasul Be'tzorech Zman according to Rabbi Shimon, and whether such a lav carries malkot (lashes) when committed bifnim (inside the Temple).
  • The textual integrity of the Mishna (e.g., Metzora and Nazir additions).
  • The concept of lishmah (for its own sake) versus lo lishmah regarding a korban chatat (sin offering) that is pasul be'tzorech zman.
• Primary Sources: Mishna Zevachim 113b; Gemara Zevachim 114a; Devarim 12:8-9; Devarim 16:5-6; Vayikra 5:21; Vayikra 22:23, 22:27; Sifrei Devarim (cited by Rashi).

Text Snapshot

The Gemara on Zevachim 114a delves into the Mishna's categories of pesulei mukdashin for Chutz La'aretz. It addresses the unique case of roved and nirba (bestialized animals), explaining that the issur takes effect after consecration, thus requiring a specific exclusion from Karet rather than simply being considered unfit from the outset. This leads to the discussion of kodshei kalim (offerings of lesser sanctity) being mammon ba'alim (owner's property) according to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, allowing disqualification after consecration even for muktze or avodah zarah (idol worshiped) animals.

The sugya then pivots to the Mishna's disagreement between the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon regarding animals Pasul Be'tzorech Zman. The Gemara enumerates a tzrichuta (necessity) for the Mishna's three examples:

• "ואם תנא הני תרתי – הוה אמינא משום דפסולא דגופייהו. אבל אותו ואת בנו, דפסולא מעלמא קאתי לה, אימא מודו ליה רבנן לרבי שמעון; צריכא." (Zevachim 114a)
  • This passage distinguishes between pesul gufa (inherent disqualification, like a temporary blemish or doves not yet old enough) and pesul me'alma (external disqualification, like oto ve'et beno where the animal itself is fit but its parent was sacrificed). The dikduk of "דפסולא מעלמא קאתי לה" emphasizes the external nature of the disqualification for oto ve'et beno.

Subsequently, the Gemara seeks the ta'ama (reason) for Rabbi Shimon's chiddush that Pasul Be'tzorech Zman incurs a lo ta'aseh:

• "מאי טעמא דרבי שמעון? רבי אילעא אמר ר"ל: דאמר קרא: 'לא תעשון את כל אשר אנחנו עושים פה היום איש כל הישר בעיניו. כי לא באתם עד עתה אל המנוחה ואל הנחלה אשר ה' אלקיך נותן לך'. אמר להם משה לישראל: כי עייליתו לארץ, ישרות תקריבו, חובות לא תקריבו." (Zevachim 114a, Devarim 12:8-9)
  • The phrase "לא תעשון את כל אשר אנחנו עושים פה היום" is interpreted by Reish Lakish as a prohibition on sacrificing chovot (obligatory offerings) during the period of Bamot Mutarot (permitted private altars) when their time for the permanent Mishkan had not yet arrived. The dikduk of "ישרות תקריבו, חובות לא תקריבו" highlights the distinction between voluntary and obligatory offerings.

Later, Rabba provides an alternative source for Rabbi Shimon:

• "רבא אמר: טעמא דרבי שמעון, דתניא: אומר רבי שמעון: מנין לשוחט את פסחו בבמה בזמן איסור במות שהוא בלא תעשה? שנאמר: 'לא תוכל לזבוח את הפסח באחד משעריך... כי אם אל המקום אשר יבחר ה' אלקיך לשכן שמו שם תזבח את הפסח'." (Zevachim 114a, Devarim 16:5-6)
  • The verse "לא תוכל לזבוח את הפסח באחד משעריך" is used, with the leshon "בכל אחד משעריך" interpreted to prohibit the Paschal offering on a private altar even when other offerings are permitted, because the community is eḥad (united) at the chosen place.

The sugya concludes with the discussion of chatat (sin offering) of zav, zava, yoldet, metzora, and nazir, and Rabbi Ḥilkiya's chiddush that a chatat pasul be'tzorech zman is liable for Chutz La'aretz if slaughtered lo lishmah because it is "fit not for its own sake inside."

Readings

Rashi: Clarifying the Pesulim and Rabbi Shimon's Lav

Rashi, with characteristic conciseness, illuminates two crucial aspects of our sugya. First, regarding the initial chalukah (division) of pesulim mentioned in the Mishna, Rashi clarifies why roved and nirba are distinct. He explains that these animals were initially kasher (fit) when consecrated ("אקדשינהו מעיקרא"¹), and only subsequently became disqualified through bestiality. Therefore, they are considered "ראויים קרינא בהו שנראו כבר" – they were once fit and then became rejected. This means their exemption from the general rule of Chutz La'aretz cannot be based on their innate unfitness for the Temple courtyard; rather, a separate pasuk (verse) is needed to exclude them from the Karet for Chutz La'aretz specifically because they were "נראה לבא" (appeared fit to be brought) at one point². This sets up the Gemara's discussion about how other pesulim also fit this model of post-consecration disqualification, particularly for kodshei kalim being mammon ba'alim according to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili³.

Second, Rashi explains Reish Lakish's derivation of Rabbi Shimon's lav from Devarim 12:8-9. He details the derasha (exegetical interpretation) from Sifrei, explaining that during the 14 years of conquest and division of Eretz Yisrael (the period of Gilgal), when Bamot Mutarot (private altars were permitted), there was a distinction: "ישרות תקריבו, חובות לא תקריבו"⁴. Yasharot (voluntary offerings like nedarim and nedavot) could be sacrificed on private altars because they were "כל הישר בעיניו" (whatever is right in his own eyes), implying personal discretion. However, chovot (obligatory offerings) were forbidden on private altars even then, because their zman (time) had not yet arrived for a permanent sanctuary like Shiloh. Thus, sacrificing a chovah during Gilgal was a violation of "לא תעשון כן"⁵. This chiddush establishes a lav for Pasul Be'tzorech Zman even prior to the Beit HaMikdash era, linking it to the specific historical context of Bamot.

Tosafot: Re-evaluating Pesul Gufa vs. Pesul Me'alma

Tosafot grapples with the Gemara's tzrichuta (necessity) for listing three distinct cases of Pasul Be'tzorech Zman (temporarily blemished animals, doves not yet old enough, and oto ve'et beno). The Gemara distinguishes between pesul gufa (inherent disqualification) for the first two and pesul me'alma (external disqualification) for oto ve'et beno. The Gemara suggests that pesul gufa might be considered kil (less severe) here, leading the Rabbis to exempt, while pesul me'alma might be chameira (more severe), causing the Rabbis to concede to Rabbi Shimon. This stands in apparent contradiction to other sugyot.

Tosafot directly addresses this tension: "בכל דוכתי משמע דפסול הגוף חמיר מפסולא דאתי מעלמא כדאמרינן בפרק קמא (לעיל זבחים דף ד.) מה לשינוי קודש שכן פסולו בגופו ובפסחים בסוף אלו דברים (פסחים דף עג:) נמי אמרינן כל שפסולו בגופו ישרף מיד"⁶. Tosafot notes that generally, pesul gufa is considered more severe, as seen in Zevachim 4a regarding temurah and Pesachim 73b regarding immediate burning.

Tosafot resolves this apparent contradiction by clarifying the specific context of Chutz La'aretz for Pasul Be'tzorech Zman: "הכא איפכא לאו משום דפסול הגוף קיל אלא הכי קאמר דמום עובר ותורין שלא הגיע זמנן הפסול תלוי בגופו ואם היה מום עובר מיד והתורים גדילין לאלתר היו ראוין אבל אותו ואת בנו אין הפסול תלוי בגופו שיועיל לו שום תיקון דלכולי יומא לא חזי"⁷. The chiddush of Tosafot is that in this specific sugya, pesul gufa (for mum over and turim) is kil not because it's inherently a lesser disqualification, but because it implies a potential for fitness; with the passage of time, the blemish will pass or the doves will mature. Their unfitness is temporary and remediable. In contrast, oto ve'et beno, while superficially an "external" disqualification, is chameira because for the entire day, the animal is absolutely unfit, with no possibility of remedy or future fitness within that same day. Thus, the distinction between pesul gufa and pesul me'alma here is reinterpreted as between a remediable temporary disqualification and an absolute temporary disqualification for the given timeframe. This nuanced reading allows the Gemara's tzrichuta to hold without contradicting other sugyot on the severity of pesul gufa.

Friction

The Lash-Worthy Lav: A Chakira on Scope

The Gemara presents a potent chakira by Rabbi Yirmeya to Rabbi Zeira regarding Rabbi Shimon's lav: If Rabbi Shimon derives a negative prohibition from "לא תעשון כן" (Devarim 12:8-9) for Pasul Be'tzorech Zman offerings, then "if so, anyone who sacrifices an offering whose time has not yet arrived, even if he sacrifices it inside the Temple courtyard, should also receive lashes" (Zevachim 114a). Rabbi Zeira's prior teaching (elsewhere) exempted one from malkot for such an offering bifnim (inside) due to the verse "It shall not be accepted" (Vayikra 22:23) being "transmuted into a positive mitzva" by "But from the eighth day forward it may be accepted" (Vayikra 22:27). However, this transmutation only applies to the lav of temurah or mekubbal offerings, not to the distinct lav of "לא תעשון כן" derived by Rabbi Shimon. The kushya is sharp: if Rabbi Shimon's lav is a full-fledged prohibition, why would it not incur malkot bifnim? This highlights a fundamental tension concerning the scope and punitive nature of a lav derived from a historical context like Gilgal.

Two Terutzim: Contextualizing the Prohibition

The Gemara offers two distinct terutzim to resolve this kushya:

1. The Gemara's Initial Terutz: A Partisan Prohibition. The first answer posits that Rabbi Zeira's statement (that one doesn't receive lashes bifnim) applies "only according to the opinion of the Rabbis" (Zevachim 114a), who do not hold that "לא תעשון כן" applies to Pasul Be'tzorech Zman. "But according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, one would indeed receive lashes" (Zevachim 114a) for sacrificing such an offering bifnim. This is a straightforward resolution: Rabbi Yirmeya's kushya is valid, and Rabbi Shimon's position does entail malkot bifnim. Rabbi Zeira's statement is simply irrelevant to Rabbi Shimon's shiṭṭah. This terutz accepts the universal application of Rabbi Shimon's lav to both bifnim and chutz.

2. Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak's Terutz: A Context-Specific Prohibition. Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak offers a more nuanced terutz: "Rabbi Zeira’s statement is even in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon... A prohibition cannot be derived from the prohibition stated with regard to the Tabernacle in Gilgal, since inside the Tabernacle in Gilgal, in relation to the Tabernacle in Shiloh, is considered like outside, and the prohibition: 'You shall not do,' pertains only to sacrificing an offering whose time has not yet arrived outside the Temple courtyard" (Zevachim 114a). This radical interpretation argues that the lav of "לא תעשון כן" (Devarim 12:8-9) is fundamentally a lav of Chutz La'aretz (or Bamah) for chovot. Even inside the Mishkan at Gilgal, relative to the chosen, permanent site of Shiloh, was considered "outside" for chovot. Therefore, this lav never applied to a properly designated Mishkan or Beit HaMikdash in its bifnim (inside) capacity. Consequently, even according to Rabbi Shimon, sacrificing Pasul Be'tzorech Zman bifnim does not incur malkot from this specific lav, as the lav's geographic and temporal scope is limited to the Bamah context. This terutz refines our understanding of the lav's applicability, making it a lav specific to Bamot or Chutz La'aretz conditions, rather than a general prohibition on Pasul Be'tzorech Zman per se.

Intertext

Devarim 12 & 16: The Source of Rabbi Shimon's Lav

The core of Rabbi Shimon's chiddush in our sugya rests upon specific pesukim from Devarim. Reish Lakish (Zevachim 114a) derives the lav from Devarim 12:8-9: "לא תעשון את כל אשר אנחנו עושים פה היום איש כל הישר בעיניו. כי לא באתם עד עתה אל המנוחה ואל הנחלה אשר ה' אלקיך נותן לך." This passage, addressed to Bnei Yisrael before entering the land, contrasts the current chaotic practice of "איש כל הישר בעיניו" with the future unified worship at the chosen place. The Gemara (and Rashi, citing Sifrei) interprets "לא תעשון כן" as a prohibition on sacrificing chovot (obligatory offerings) on bamot (private altars) even during the Bamot Mutarot period, because their time for the central sanctuary had not yet arrived. This establishes a lav for Pasul Be'tzorech Zman based on a historical-liturgical context.

Rabba (Zevachim 114a) offers an alternative source for Rabbi Shimon, citing Devarim 16:5-6: "לא תוכל לזבוח את הפסח באחד משעריך... כי אם אל המקום אשר יבחר ה' אלקיך לשכן שמו שם תזבח את הפסח." This verse explicitly prohibits the Paschal offering "within any of your gates" (meaning, on a private altar) and commands it to be brought only to the chosen place. Rabba interprets this to apply even when bamot were generally permitted for nedarim and nedavot, but not for the Paschal offering. The nuance "בכל אחד משעריך" is crucial, implying a collective unity required for the Pesach offering that transcends the individual discretion permitted for other offerings during the Bamot Mutarot period. Both pesukim, therefore, underline the concept of tzorech zman and tzorech makom (time and place requirements) as fundamental to sacrificial law, even for a lav that doesn't incur Karet.

Zevachim 4a & Pesachim 73b: The Gravity of Pesul Gufa

The tension addressed by Tosafot (Zevachim 114a) regarding the relative severity of pesul gufa (inherent disqualification) versus pesul me'alma (external disqualification) finds parallels elsewhere. In Zevachim 4a, the Gemara discusses temurah (an exchange for a consecrated animal) and asks: "מה לשינוי קודש שכן פסולו בגופו?" This implies that a disqualification inherent to the guf (body) of the animal itself is a more stringent form of pesul. Similarly, Pesachim 73b states: "כל שפסולו בגופו ישרף מיד," meaning any item with an inherent disqualification should be burned immediately. These sugyot generally treat pesul gufa as chameira (more severe).

Tosafot's chiddush on Zevachim 114a is to recontextualize this principle within the specific framework of Pasul Be'tzorech Zman. While pesul gufa is indeed severe, in the case of mum over (temporary blemish) or turim (doves not yet old enough), the disqualification is temporary and remediable by the passage of time. The animal will become fit. This "potential for fitness" makes it kil (less severe) in the context of Chutz La'aretz for Pasul Be'tzorech Zman. Conversely, oto ve'et beno, though seemingly pesul me'alma, is absolute for the entire day, with no potential for fitness within that timeframe. This comparative analysis demonstrates how a general halachic principle (pesul gufa is severe) can be nuanced and reinterpreted when applied to specific cases, showcasing the dynamic interplay of klalim (general rules) and pratim (particular details) in lomdus.

Psak/Practice

The halacha generally follows the Rabbis (Chachamim) who disagree with Rabbi Shimon regarding Pasul Be'tzorech Zman. Thus, one who slaughters an animal Pasul Be'tzorech Zman Chutz La'aretz is typically exempt from Karet and even from a lav that incurs malkot. For example, a temporarily blemished animal, or oto ve'et beno slaughtered Chutz La'aretz, would not incur Karet. The consensus is that Karet for Chutz La'aretz applies only to an animal that is fit to be sacrificed bifnim at that very moment (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 500:1, based on Rambam, Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 19:1).

However, the Gemara's discussion and Rabbi Shimon's position are not without practical implications. The detailed tzrichuta (necessity) analysis for the Mishna's three cases (temporarily blemished, doves, oto ve'et beno) underscores a crucial meta-psak heuristic: the minute differences between various types of pesulim are often halachically significant. Even if the ultimate psak follows the Rabbis, the process of parsing these distinctions is fundamental to Halachic reasoning. A pasul is not merely a pasul; its nature, origin, and potential for rectification can drastically alter its legal consequences. This meticulous categorization is a hallmark of Korbanot law, impacting karet, malkot, me'ilah (misuse of consecrated property), and the ability to redeem or burn the offering. Furthermore, the discussion of chatat lo lishmah for a pasul be'tzorech zman highlights the principle that an offering can be "fit not for its own sake" even if it's currently unfit for its designated purpose, a concept that influences the validity and disposal of korbanot (Rambam, Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 14:10).

Takeaway

The sugya masterfully dissects the intricate taxonomy of pesulei mukdashin and their specific liabilities for Chutz La'aretz, revealing how the nature of disqualification (inherent vs. external, temporary vs. absolute) dictates halachic outcomes. Rabbi Shimon's chiddush and the ensuing chakira regarding malkot force a profound exploration into the contextual and temporal scope of Torah prohibitions, even those derived from historical periods.

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¹ Rashi, Zevachim 114a s.v. בשלמא רובע ונרבע משכחת לה. ² Rashi, Zevachim 114a s.v. בשלמא רובע ונרבע משכחת לה. ³ Zevachim 114a. ⁴ Rashi, Zevachim 114a s.v. ישרות תקריבו. ⁵ Rashi, Zevachim 114a s.v. לא תעשון כן. ⁶ Tosafot, Zevachim 114a s.v. משום דפסולא דגופייהו. ⁷ Tosafot, Zevachim 114a s.v. משום דפסולא דגופייהו.