Zevachim 118

Sugya Map

The sugya on Zevachim 118a grapples with the intricate halachic framework governing sacrificial worship during the various historical phases of the Mishkan (Tabernacle) and Bamot (private altars).

• Issue: The permissibility and scope of sacrificial offerings, particularly chovot (compulsory offerings) versus nedavot (voluntary offerings), for individuals and the public, during the periods of hetter bamot (permitted altars) and issur bamot (prohibited altars). A key point of contention is the nature of the Mishkan in Shiloh and its precise location.
• Nafka Mina(s):
  • Which types of korbanot could an individual bring on a bama ketana (private altar) versus a bama gedolah (public altar) during the hetter bamot periods (Wilderness, Gilgal)?
  • The halachic basis for the prohibition of bamot upon arrival in Shiloh and later in Jerusalem.
  • The geographical and halachic distinction between the Mishkan in Shiloh (a "house" of stone below, "tent" of curtains above) and subsequent Mishkan locations.
  • The permissibility of consuming kodshim kalim (offerings of lesser sanctity) in Shiloh, and the definition of "overlooking" Shiloh.
  • The tribal portion (Joseph vs. Benjamin) in which the Shechinah (Divine Presence) rested during the various periods.
  • The precise chronology of the Mishkan's sojourns in the Wilderness, Gilgal, Shiloh, Nov, and Gibeon.
• Primary Sources: Devarim 12:9, 12:13, 12:14¹; Yehoshua 5:10, 14:7, 14:10, 16:6²; Shemuel I 1:24, 4:18, 7:2³; Divrei HaYamim I 16:39⁴; Tehillim 78:60, 78:67⁵; Bereshit 49:22; Devarim 33:12, 33:16⁶; Yechezkel 40:1⁷; Melachim I 6:1⁸; Gemara Zevachim 118a.

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Text Snapshot

The sugya opens with a sharp dialectic concerning R' Yehuda's view on korbanot chovah (compulsory offerings) on a bama gedolah:

ורבי יהודה אמר לך: כי כתיב הישר, אבעיניו כתיב. אבל בבמה גדולה, אפילו חובות נמי ליקרוב. The Gemara asks: אבל "איש" כתיב? "איש" דלמא לומר לך: איש - הישר קרב, חובות לא קרבי? אלא, כי כתיב "איש", לאכשורי זר בבמה קטנה.⁹

Here, R' Yehuda argues that the verse "כִּי בָאתֶם אֶל הַמְּנוּחָה וְאֶל הַנַּחֲלָה אֲשֶׁר ה' אֱלֹהֶיךָ נֹתֵן לָךְ" (Devarim 12:9) and the subsequent phrase "כֹּל אֲשֶׁר יִישַׁר בְּעֵינֶיךָ" (Devarim 12:8, implying voluntary offerings) refer specifically to a bama ketana (private altar) that is "fitting in his own eyes." On a bama gedolah (public altar), however, R' Yehuda permits even chovot. The Gemara then challenges this: doesn't the word "איש" ("man") in the verse imply that only offerings "fitting in his own eyes" (i.e., voluntary) are for an individual, precluding chovot? The Gemara resolves this by reinterpreting "איש" as qualifying a zar (non-priest) to perform service on a bama ketana. The dikduk of "הישר" (derived from yashar, "straight/fitting") referring to "בעיניו" (in his eyes) is key to R' Yehuda's distinction between types of bamot.

Later, a baraita is presented and challenged by Rav Adda bar Ahava:

תני תנא קמיה דרב אדא בר אהבה: אין בין במה גדולה לבמה קטנה אלא פסח וחובות הקבוע להן זמן. אמר ליה: יחיד חובות שקבוע להן זמן מנא ליה?¹⁰

Rav Adda bar Ahava questions the baraita's inclusion of "חובות הקבוע להן זמן" (compulsory offerings with a set time) for an individual, arguing that such offerings are not found for individuals. This highlights a fundamental distinction in korbanot categorization.

The Gemara's resolution:

אמר ליה: תתרגם מתניתך בעולה, דאיכא עולת נדבה. דאי בחטאת יחיד, חטאת נדבה מי איכא?¹¹

The nuance here is the Gemara's careful parsing of chovot (compulsory) and nedavot (voluntary) and their specific categories (olah, chatat, mincha). The baraita is reinterpreted as referring to an Olat Re'iyah (burnt offering of appearance on pilgrimage festivals), which is an individual chova that has a "set time" (i.e., the festivals), and importantly, has a counterpart in Olat Nedava (voluntary burnt offering). This allows for a meaningful distinction between what can be offered on a bama gedolah (the chova) and what could theoretically be offered on a bama ketana (the nedava). This wouldn't work for a chatat (sin offering) because there are no individual chatatot nedavah.

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Readings

Rashi: Differentiating Bamot and Korbanot

Rashi, ever the master of peshat, elucidates the Gemara's opening lines concerning Rabbi Yehuda's position on bamot. He clarifies the linguistic nuance that underpins R' Yehuda's chiddush:

ורבי יהודה - דאמר יחיד נמי מקריב חובות בגדולה אמר לך כי כתיב הישר דממעט יחיד מהקרבת חובות אבעיניו כתיב:¹²

Rashi explains that Rabbi Yehuda, who permits individuals to offer chovot on a bama gedolah (public altar), resolves the apparent contradiction from the verse "כֹּל אֲשֶׁר יִישַׁר בְּעֵינֶיךָ" (Devarim 12:8) by stating that "הישר" ("whatsoever is fitting") is explicitly written with respect to "בעיניו" ("in his own eyes"). This phrase, Rashi posits, refers only to a bama ketana (private altar), which an individual builds for himself as "fitting in his own eyes." Therefore, the limitation of an individual to nedavot (voluntary offerings) applies solely to a bama ketana. On a bama gedolah, which is a public institution, even chovot (compulsory offerings) are permitted for an individual. This chiddush hinges on a precise reading of the biblical phrase, segmenting its application based on the type of altar.

Later in the sugya, when Rav Adda bar Ahava questions the baraita's mention of "חובות שקבוע להן זמן" (compulsory offerings with a set time) for an individual, Rashi again provides a concise explanation of the Gemara's resolution:

ותתרגם מתניתך בעולה - דקתני חובות הקבוע להם זמן קרבו בגדולה:¹³ בעולה - כגון עולות של תמידין ומוספין צבור קרבו בה [אבל] חטאות הקבוע להם זמן כגון שעירי הרגלים של צבור לא קרבו בה:¹⁴ דאי בחטאת - דאי חובות הקבוע להם זמן בחטאת נמי קאמר:¹⁵ חטאת נדבה מי איכא - ליקרב כיוצא בה בקטנה ועל כרחיך מתניתין קמ"ל דלא קרבו לר"ש בגדולה לבד מפסחים אלא חובות שיש כיוצא בהן נדבה מדקתני אלא פסחים וחובות הקבוע להם זמן ואי ס"ד כל חובות הקבוע להם זמן קאמר פסחים דקתני למה לי הכי הוה ליה למימר אין בין במה גדולה לבמה קטנה אלא חובות הקבוע להם זמן והוו להו פסחים בכלל אלא ה"ק אלא פסחים שקרבו בגדולה ולא קרבו בקטנה כלל ושאר דברים שקרבו כאן וכאן אין חילוק בהן אלא שבזו לא קרבו אלא נדבות ובזו קרבו אף חובות הקבוע להם זמן:¹⁶

Rashi explains that the baraita should be interpreted as referring to an olah (burnt offering), specifically the Olat Re'iyah (burnt offering of appearance) which is an individual chovah with a "set time" (the pilgrimage festivals). The crucial point, according to Rashi, is that there is a corresponding Olat Nedava (voluntary burnt offering) that can be brought on a bama ketana. This allows the baraita to draw a distinction: the chovah (Olat Re'iyah) is brought on a bama gedolah, while its nedavah counterpart could be brought on a bama ketana. This distinction would not apply to a chatat (sin offering), as there are typically no chatatot nedavah for individuals. Rashi further explains that the baraita's explicit mention of Pesachim (Passover offerings) alongside "חובות הקבוע להם זמן" implies that it is discussing only chovot that have a corresponding nedavah type. If all chovot shekavua lahem zman were included, Pesachim would be redundant.

Tosafot: The Logic of Distinction

Tosafot, engaging with Rashi's interpretation, probes deeper into the underlying logic of the baraita's structure and R' Shimon's view:

ותתרגם מתניתך בעולה - פירוש כגון עולות תמידין ומוספין שיש כיוצא בהם נדבות אבל חטאות הצבור כגון שעירי הרגלים אע"ג דקבוע להם זמן לא קרבו והא מילתא דייק לה מדקתני פסחים דליתני קבוע להם זמן ותו לא והוו להו פסחים בכלל אלא על כרחך מתניתין קמ"ל דלא קרבו לרבי שמעון בגדולה לבד מפסחים אלא שיש כיוצא בהם בבמה והכי קאמר אלא פסחים שקרבו בגדולה לא קרבו בקטנה כלל ושאר דברים שקרבו כאן וכאן אין חילוק בהם אלא שבזה לא הקריבו אלא נדבות ובזה קרבו חובות הקבוע להם זמן כדפירש בקונטרס...¹⁷

Tosafot generally concurs with Rashi's approach, affirming that the baraita refers to olot because they have nedavah counterparts. They reinforce Rashi's point that the separate mention of Pesachim indicates a distinction for chovot that have a nedavah-like counterpart. However, Tosafot raises a kushya against R' Shimon's source for this specific distinction regarding chatatot: "ותימה מנא ליה לר' שמעון הא מילתא דחטאת דקבוע להם זמן לא קרב דהא לעיל מפרשינן טעמא דרבי שמעון דיליף מפסח גלגל והא ליכא למילף מפסח דפסח נמי אין כיוצא בו נדבה."¹⁸ R' Shimon's reasoning for what was permitted in Gilgal was derived from the Pesach offering. But the Pesach itself doesn't have a nedavah counterpart in the same way an olah does. So how can Pesach be the source for a rule requiring a nedavah counterpart?

Tosafot offers an alternative explanation to resolve this: "לכן נראה לפרש דקא אמר תתרגם מתניתך בעולה היינו משום דכיון דמפסח יליף אית לן למימר מה פסח שקבוע לו זמן וישנו בצבור כביחיד בשעת היתר הבמות צבור בפסח ראשון ויחיד בפסח שני כדאמרי' פסחים (דף סז.) איש נדחה ואין צבור נדחין אף כל שקבוע להם זמן וישנו בצבור כביחיד בשעת היתר הבמות דהיינו עולות שישנן בצבור בתמידין ומוספין וביחיד בנדבה אבל חטאת לא משכחת ביחיד בשעת היתר הבמות דאפילו בבמה גדולה לא קרבו חובות דיחיד לרבי שמעון כמו לר"מ ורבנן..."¹⁹ Tosafot suggests that the analogy to Pesach is not about nedavah counterparts directly, but about its dual nature as a communal chovah (first Pesach) and an individual chovah (second Pesach for those who were impure or distant) that is also kodshim kalim (offerings of lesser sanctity), akin to nedavot shlamim. Thus, any chovah shekavua lahem zman that also has an individual nedavah form (like olah) fits this paradigm, but chatat does not. This chiddush provides a more nuanced understanding of the Pesach as a paradigm for what chovot were permitted on bamot.

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Friction

The Enigma of Individual "Fixed-Time Obligatory Offerings"

The most potent kushya in this section of the sugya arises from Rav Adda bar Ahava's challenge to the baraita:

תני תנא קמיה דרב אדא בר אהבה: אין בין במה גדולה לבמה קטנה אלא פסח וחובות הקבוע להן זמן. אמר ליה: יחיד חובות שקבוע להן זמן מנא ליה?²⁰ The baraita states that the only difference between a bama gedolah (public altar) and a bama ketana (private altar) is that Pesach and "חובות הקבוע להן זמן" (compulsory offerings with a set time) are brought on the former but not the latter. Rav Adda bar Ahava immediately questions this: From where does an individual (יחיד) even have "חובות שקבוע להן זמן"? The implication is that such offerings are typically communal (tzibbur) or do not apply to individuals in a manner that would necessitate this halachic distinction for bamot. If no such individual chovot exist, the baraita's statement is redundant or nonsensical, implying it's not truly a differentiating factor for individuals. This is a classic kushya of mi utzricha, challenging the very need for the baraita's formulation.

The Gemara's Precision: Olah vs. Chatat

The Gemara offers a concise and precise terutz by reinterpreting the baraita's scope:

אמר ליה: תתרגם מתניתך בעולה, דאיכא עולת נדבה. דאי בחטאת יחיד, חטאת נדבה מי איכא?²¹ The terutz suggests that the baraita refers specifically to an Olah (burnt offering), such as the Olat Re'iyah (burnt offering of appearance) brought by an individual on a pilgrimage festival. This korban is indeed an individual chovah that has a "set time." The critical element that resolves the kushya is the existence of a corresponding Olat Nedava (voluntary burnt offering). The baraita is therefore teaching that while an individual Olat Nedava could be brought on a bama ketana, the individual Olat Re'iyah (the chovah) cannot, and must be brought on a bama gedolah. This distinction is meaningful because it contrasts a chovah with its voluntary type. The Gemara solidifies this by contrasting it with a Chatat (sin offering): "דאי בחטאת יחיד, חטאת נדבה מי איכא?" (If it were referring to an individual chatat, is there such a thing as a voluntary chatat?). Since there is no such thing as an individual chatat nedavah, the baraita's distinction wouldn't be meaningful in that context; a chatat chovah would simply be prohibited on a bama ketana without a voluntary counterpart to compare it to. This terutz thus hinges on the specific category of korban and its potential for a voluntary parallel.

Tosafot's Nuanced Paradigm

Tosafot, while accepting the Gemara's resolution, deepens the rationale behind the baraita's selection of Pesachim as a paradigm. As noted above, Tosafot's kushya challenged how Pesach, which lacks a nedavah counterpart, could serve as a model for chovot that do have such counterparts. Their terutz posits that Pesach serves as a model not necessarily for a nedavah parallel, but for a chovah that is also kodshim kalim and can be brought by an individual (e.g., Pesach Sheni). This broader paradigm includes olot that have nedavah forms, but excludes chatatot. This insight provides a more comprehensive understanding of the baraita's selection criteria, moving beyond a simple chovah/nedavah binary to include the nature of the korban itself (kodshim kalim vs. kodshei kodashim) and its applicability to individuals.

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Intertext

The Shechinah's Dwelling Place: A Geographical Fiction

The sugya delves into the fascinating question of where the Shechinah (Divine Presence) rested during the various periods of the Mishkan. Rav Dimi, in the name of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, states: "לא שרתה שכינה אלא בנחלת בנימין" (The Divine Presence rested only in the portion of Benjamin)²², citing the verse "הַמְכַסֶּה עָלָיו כָּל הַיּוֹם וּבֵין כְּתֵיפָיו שָׁכֵן" (Devarim 33:12) as proof that "all coverings" of the Shechinah were in Benjamin's portion. This statement is challenged by Rav Yosef, who points to verses explicitly stating "וַיִּטֹּשׁ מִשְׁכַּן שִׁלוֹ" (Tehillim 78:60) and "וַיִּמְאַס בְּאֹהֶל יוֹסֵף וּבְשֵׁבֶט אֶפְרַיִם לֹא בָחָר" (Tehillim 78:67), implying Shiloh was in Joseph's (Ephraim's) territory.

The resolution offered by Rav Adda, and accepted after Rav Yosef's initial objection, is that while the Shechinah was in Benjamin, the Sanhedrin (or perhaps the main part of the Mishkan structure) was in Joseph's portion. This is paralleled to the Beit HaMikdash in Jerusalem:

הכא נמי קרובים, כדאמר רבי חמא בר חנינא: רצועה יצאה מנחלת יהודה ונכנסה בנחלת בנימין, והמזבח בנוי עליה.²³ This aggadic principle, derived from Rabbi Hama bar Hanina, posits that a "strip" (רצועה) of land protruded from Judah's territory into Benjamin's, upon which the Mizbeach (altar) was built. This concept of a geographical "strip" resolving territorial disputes for sacred spaces is a recurrent motif. It's found in Middot 2:1 and Yoma 12a concerning the Temple in Jerusalem, where the Heichal (sanctuary) and Mizbeach were in Benjamin, while the Ezrat Nashim (women's courtyard) was in Judah. The sugya explicitly extends this to Shiloh: "הכא נמי, רצועה יצאה מנחלת יוסף ונכנסה בנחלת בנימין" (Here too, a strip of land protruded from Joseph's portion and entered Benjamin's portion)²⁴. This intertextual reference highlights a consistent Rabbinic method for harmonizing biblical narratives with halachic or aggadic principles through a creative geographical interpretation.

Chronology of Sacred Spaces: The Backbone of Hetter Bamot

The latter part of the sugya meticulously details the duration of the Mishkan in each location:

תנו רבנן: ימי אהל מועד שבמדבר - ארבעים שנה חסר אחד. ימי אהל מועד שבגלגל - ארבע עשרה שנה, שבע שכבשו ושבע שחילקו. ימי אהל מועד שבנוב וגבעון - חמשים ושבע שנים. נמצאו ימי אהל מועד שבשילה שלש מאות ושבעים שנה חסר אחד.²⁵ This precise chronology (Wilderness: 39 years; Gilgal: 14 years; Nov & Gibeon: 57 years; Shiloh: 369 years) is foundational for understanding the halachot of hetter bamot and issur bamot. Each period had distinct rules regarding permissible offerings and the validity of private altars. For instance, the hetter bamot existed in the Wilderness and Gilgal, was prohibited in Shiloh and Jerusalem, and then temporarily permitted again in Nov and Gibeon before the First Temple's construction. This detailed timeline, derived from various pesukim (e.g., Yehoshua 14:7-10 for Gilgal; Shemuel I 4:18, 7:2 for Nov/Gibeon; Melachim I 6:1 for the total period until the Temple), is not merely historical trivia. It forms the backbone of Rambam Hilchot Beit HaBechira 1:2-3 and Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 14:1-12, which codify the evolving legal status of sacrificial worship based on the Mishkan's location and permanence. The sugya here provides the amoraic and tannaic sources for these fundamental legal distinctions.

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Psak/Practice

The sugya on Zevachim 118a is foundational for understanding the historical development and halachic nuances of sacrificial worship in Judaism, particularly regarding the concept of bamot.

From a psak perspective, the sugya's detailed chronology of the Mishkan's locations and durations directly informs Rambam Hilchot Beit HaBechira 1:2-3, which delineates the periods of hetter bamot (permitted altars) and issur bamot (prohibited altars). The Rambam explicitly states that bamot were permitted in the Wilderness and Gilgal, prohibited in Shiloh, permitted again in Nov and Gibeon, and permanently prohibited upon the construction of the Temple in Jerusalem. This sugya provides the Talmudic bedrock for these distinctions. The specific discussion regarding "חובות הקבוע להן זמן" and the differentiation between olah and chatat in the context of individual offerings on bamot (Zevachim 118a) highlights the precise limitations and categories of korbanot permitted during the hetter bamot periods. While bamot are no longer relevant in practice, the sugya's analysis of korbanot classifications remains relevant for studying the laws of offerings.

From a meta-psak heuristic standpoint, the discussion concerning the Shechinah's dwelling in Benjamin's portion and the "רצועה" (strip of land) connecting tribal territories for sacred sites (Zevachim 118a) exemplifies a significant Rabbinic methodology. This approach demonstrates how Chazal reconcile seemingly contradictory biblical passages or traditions through creative geographical or conceptual interpretations. This "harmonistic" approach, where a solution (like the "רצועה") is posited to resolve textual tensions and uphold a broader theological or halachic principle (like the Shechinah always resting in Benjamin), is a powerful tool in Rabbinic discourse, appearing in various areas of halacha and aggadah.

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Takeaway

This sugya meticulously charts the evolving landscape of sacrificial worship, from the portable Mishkan to the permanent Temple, revealing the intricate interplay of halachic distinctions and geographical nuances that defined sacred space and permitted offerings. It underscores the Rabbinic endeavor to harmonize disparate biblical narratives into a coherent halachic and theological framework.

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¹ Devarim 12:9, 12:13, 12:14. ² Yehoshua 5:10, 14:7, 14:10, 16:6. ³ Shemuel I 1:24, 4:18, 7:2. ⁴ Divrei HaYamim I 16:39. ⁵ Tehillim 78:60, 78:67. ⁶ Bereshit 49:22; Devarim 33:12, 33:16. ⁷ Yechezkel 40:1. ⁸ Melachim I 6:1. ⁹ Zevachim 118a. ¹⁰ Zevachim 118a. ¹¹ Zevachim 118a. ¹² Rashi on Zevachim 118a s.v. ורבי יהודה. ¹³ Rashi on Zevachim 118a s.v. ותתרגם מתניתך. ¹⁴ Rashi on Zevachim 118a s.v. בעולה. ¹⁵ Rashi on Zevachim 118a s.v. דאי בחטאת. ¹⁶ Rashi on Zevachim 118a s.v. חטאת נדבה מי איכא. ¹⁷ Tosafot on Zevachim 118a s.v. ותתרגם מתניתך בעולה. ¹⁸ Tosafot on Zevachim 118a s.v. ותתרגם מתניתך בעולה. ¹⁹ Tosafot on Zevachim 118a s.v. ותתרגם מתניתך בעולה. ²⁰ Zevachim 118a. ²¹ Zevachim 118a. ²² Zevachim 118a. ²³ Zevachim 118a. ²⁴ Zevachim 118a. ²⁵ Zevachim 118a.