Zevachim 118

Sugya Map

This sugya on Zevachim 118a grapples with the intricate halachot and historical progression of the permissible sacrificial altars (Bamot) during the various stages of Klal Yisrael's settlement in Eretz Yisrael, preceding the construction of the Beis HaMikdash. It meticulously defines what offerings were permitted, by whom, and where, at each historical juncture.

• Core Issue: The permissibility of individual and public Bamot and the scope of sacrifices thereon, specifically differentiating between nedarim/nedavot (vow/gift offerings) and chovot (compulsory offerings), as well as chovot shekavua lahem zman (compulsory offerings with a set time).
• Nafka Mina(s):
  • Whether individuals could offer chovot on a Bama Gedolah (public altar) during the permitted Bamot period, contrasting R' Yehuda with the Rabbis.
  • The precise definition of Bama Gedolah vs. Bama Ketana regarding Pesachim and chovot shekavua lahem zman.
  • The nature of the Tabernacle in Shiloh – its construction, the duration of its dwelling, and the permitted consumption areas for kodshim kalim.
  • The tribal location of the Mishkan in Shiloh, and later Nov and Givon, and the Beis HaMikdash, in light of parshas Bereishit and Devarim.
  • The exact chronology of the different Mishkan periods (Wilderness, Gilgal, Shiloh, Nov/Givon).
• Primary Sources:
  • Torah: Devarim 12:9 ("rest and inheritance"), 12:13-14 ("Take heed... in every place... there you shall offer"); Yehoshua 5:10 ("Gilgal; they kept the Passover"), 14:7, 14:10 (Caleb's age), 16:6 ("Taanath Shiloh"); Bereishit 49:22 (Joseph's blessing); Devarim 33:12 (Benjamin's blessing), 33:16 (Moses' blessing to Joseph).
  • Nevi'im/Ketuvim: Shmuel I 1:24 (Hannah to "house of the Lord in Shiloh"), 4:18 (Eli's death), 7:2 (Ark in Kiriath Jearim), 22:19 (Saul destroys Nov); Divrei HaYamim I 16:39 (Givon); Tehillim 78:60 ("forsook the Tabernacle of Shiloh"), 78:67 ("abhorred the tent of Joseph"); Melachim I 6:1 (Temple construction date); Yechezkel 40:1 (Jubilee Year).
  • Talmudic Literature: Mishnah Zevachim 14a; Tosefta Zevachim 13:6.

Text Snapshot

The sugya opens with a complex exegetical debate concerning Bamot, immediately diving into the dikduk of pesukim:

• "וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, דְּאָמַר יָחִיד נָמִי מַקְרִיב חוֹבוֹת בִּגְדוֹלָה, אָמַר לָךְ: כִּי כְּתִיב 'הַיָּשָׁר', 'בְּעֵינָיו' הוּא דִּכְתִיב, אֲבָל בִּגְדוֹלָה אֲפִילּוּ חוֹבוֹת נָמִי לִיקְרוֹב." (Zevachim 118a)

  • Rabbi Yehuda, who holds an individual may offer chovot on a bama gedolah, explains that when "whatsoever is fitting" (הישר) is written (implying nedarim/nedavot), it refers to "in his own eyes" (בעיניו), i.e., a private altar. But on a public altar, even chovot may be offered.
  • Dikduk/Leshon Nuance: The Gemara's interpretation hinges on parsing the smichut of "הישר בעיניו" (Devarim 12:8, 12:13) — does "הישר" qualify all individual offerings, or only those brought to a private altar (bama ketana)? R' Yehuda dissects the phrase to limit the restriction.

• "תָּנָא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה: אֵין בֵּין בָּמָה גְּדוֹלָה לְבָמָה קְטַנָּה אֶלָּא פֶּסַח וְחוֹבוֹת הַקָּבוּעַ לָהֶן זְמַן." (Zevachim 118a)

  • A tanna taught before Rav Adda bar Ahava: The only difference between a bama gedolah and a bama ketana is Pesach and chovot shekavua lahem zman.
  • Dikduk/Leshon Nuance: Rav Adda bar Ahava immediately challenges "יחיד חובות שקבוע להן זמן מנא ליה?" – from where would an individual have chovot shekavua lahem zman? This prompts the clarification "ותתרגם מתניתך בעולה" (interpret your baraita as referring to an olah), to which the Gemara adds "דאיכא עולת נדבה" (as there is a voluntary olah). This dikduk on the wording of the baraita is crucial for its halachic precision.

• "כִּי אָתוּ לְשִׁילֹה אֲסוּרִין. מִנַּיִן לָהֶן לִדְבָרִים אֵלּוּ? אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: כְּתִיב 'וַתַּעֲלֵהוּ בֵּית ה' שִׁילֹה' וּכְתִיב 'וַיִּטּוֹשׁ מִשְׁכַּן שִׁלוֹ אֹהֶל שִׁכֵּן בָּאָדָם'. וְכִי לָא קַשְׁיָא, כָּאן — לֹא הָיָה לָהּ גַּג שֶׁל אֶבֶן וְלֹא שֶׁל קוֹרוֹת, אֶלָּא מִלְּמַטָּה אֶבֶן וּמִלְמַעְלָה יְרִיעוֹת." (Zevachim 118b)

  • When they arrived at Shiloh, Bamot were prohibited. From where is this derived? R' Chiya bar Abba in the name of R' Yochanan cites contradictory verses: "house of the Lord in Shiloh" (Shmuel I 1:24) and "Tabernacle of Shiloh, the tent" (Tehillim 78:60). The resolution: it had stone walls below and tent curtains above.
  • Dikduk/Leshon Nuance: The Gemara here engages in classic midrash aggadah, reconciling apparent textual contradictions to reveal the physical nature of the Mishkan in Shiloh. The dual description (bayit and ohel) is key to understanding its unique status.

Readings

The sugya on Zevachim 118a is a tapestry woven from halacha, aggadah, and historical chronology, all underpinned by rigorous drashos from Pesukim. We will delve into key interpretations of Rishonim and Acharonim, particularly Rashi, Tosafot, and Steinsaltz, to illuminate the Gemara's flow.

R' Yehuda's Chiddush: The Scope of "הישר בעיניו" (118a)

The Gemara opens with a debate between the Rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda regarding what an individual (yachid) may sacrifice on a Bama Gedolah (public altar) during the period of permitted Bamot. The Rabbis hold that an individual may only offer nedarim and nedavot (vow and gift offerings), but not chovot (compulsory offerings), even on a Bama Gedolah. Rabbi Yehuda, however, contends that an individual may offer chovot on a Bama Gedolah. The Gemara then presents Rabbi Yehuda's rationale:

Rashi on Zevachim 118a:1:1 (ורבי יהודה)

"ורבי יהודה - דאמר יחיד נמי מקריב חובות בגדולה אמר לך כי כתיב הישר דממעט יחיד מהקרבת חובות אבעיניו כתיב:" Translation: "And Rabbi Yehuda – who says that an individual also offers chovot on a Bama Gedolah, could say to you: when 'whatsoever is fitting' (הישר) is written, which excludes an individual from offering chovot, it is written with reference to 'in his own eyes' (בעיניו) [i.e., a private altar]."

Steinsaltz on Zevachim 118a:1 (ור' יהודה)

"ור' יהודה הסבור שבבמה גדולה גם יחיד מקריב קרבנות חובה, אמר לך [יכול לומר לך]: כי כתיב [כאשר נאמר] "הישר" שרק קרבנות הבאים בנדר ונדבה ("ישרות") מקריב היחיד, הרי על "בעיניו" הוא דכתיב [שנאמר], כלומר, במקום שישר בעיניו להקריב, בבמת יחיד שהוא בונה לעצמו, אבל בבמה גדולה — אפילו חובות נמי ליקרוב [גם כן יקרבו]." Translation: "And R' Yehuda, who holds that on a bama gedolah an individual also offers korbanot chova, could say to you: when 'whatsoever is fitting' (הישר) is written, that an individual offers only korbanot that come as neder and nedava ('yasharot'), behold it is written concerning 'in his own eyes' (בעיניו), meaning, in a place that is fitting in his eyes to offer, on a private altar that he builds for himself. But on a bama gedolah — even chovot may also be offered."

Chiddush: Rashi and Steinsaltz clarify R' Yehuda's drasha. The pasuk (Devarim 12:8) states "כֹּל אֲשֶׁר יָשָׁר בְּעֵינָיו אִישׁ", commonly interpreted to mean that during the Bamot period, individuals would sacrifice "whatever was fitting in their eyes." The Rabbis understand "הישר" as a blanket description of individual offerings – only nedarim/nedavot (which are "fitting" in one's eyes as a voluntary act) are permitted, never chovot. R' Yehuda, however, performs a precise smichut reading. He argues that the phrase "הישר" is intrinsically linked to "בעיניו," thereby limiting the restriction to Bamot Ketanot (private altars) where one chooses a location "fitting in his own eyes." On a Bama Gedolah (a public, designated altar), where the choice of location is not "in his own eyes" but public, the restriction of "הישר" does not apply, and therefore, chovot are permissible for an individual as well. This is a classic example of how dikduk on lashon hatorah can yield vastly different halachic outcomes.

The Baraita's Distinction: Pesach and Chovot Shekavua Lahem Zman (118a)

Later in the sugya, a baraita is presented to Rav Adda bar Ahava that articulates a distinction between a Bama Gedolah and a Bama Ketana: only Pesach and chovot shekavua lahem zman (compulsory offerings with a fixed time) are offered on a Bama Gedolah but not on a Bama Ketana. Rav Adda bar Ahava challenges this, asking about an individual's chovot shekavua lahem zman, as such an offering doesn't exist. This leads to a crucial clarification:

Steinsaltz on Zevachim 118a:10 (ובענין פסחים וחובות)

"ג ובענין פסחים וחובות שקבוע להם זמן, שהוזכרו בדברי ר' שמעון, מסופר: תני תנא קמיה [שנה חוזר המשניות לפני] רב אדא בר אהבה ברייתא זו: אין הבדל בין במה גדולה כגון זו שבגלגל לבמה קטנה שמקריב בה היחיד, אלא פסח וחובות הקבוע להן זמן, שמקריבים בבמה גדולה ואין מקריבים בבמה קטנה. אמר ליה [לו] רב אדא בר אהבה: יחיד קרבנות חובות שקבוע להן זמן מנא ליה [מנין לו]? שהרי אין קרבנות כאלו, ואין צורך להשמיענו שאינם קרבים בבמה קטנה!" Translation: "And concerning Pesachim and chovot shekavua lahem zman, which were mentioned in the words of Rabbi Shimon, it is related: A tanna taught this baraita before Rav Adda bar Ahava: There is no difference between a bama gedolah, such as that in Gilgal, and a bama ketana, on which an individual offers, except for Pesach and chovot shekavua lahem zman, which are offered on a bama gedolah but not on a bama ketana. Rav Adda bar Ahava said to him: From where would an individual have chovot shekavua lahem zman? For there are no such korbanot, and there is no need to inform us that they are not offered on a bama ketana!"

Rav Adda's kushya is profound: the baraita distinguishes between bama gedolah and ketana, and the latter is for yachid. But yachid has no chovot shekavua lahem zman (e.g., S'eirei Regalim are tzibur). This leads to the resolution:

• "אָמַר לֵיהּ: תַּרְגֵּם מַתְנִיתָךְ בְּעוֹלָה, דְּאִיכָּא עוֹלַת נְדָבָה. דְּאִי בְּחַטָּאת — חַטַּאת נְדָבָה מִי אִיכָּא?" (Zevachim 118a)
  • [Rav Adda] said to him: Interpret your mishnah as referring to an olah, for there is a voluntary olah. For if it refers to a chatat, is there a voluntary chatat?

Rashi on Zevachim 118a:11:1 (ותתרגם מתניתך)

"ותתרגם מתניתך - דקתני חובות הקבוע להם זמן קרבו בגדולה:" Translation: "And interpret your baraita – that it states chovot shekavua lahem zman are offered on a Bama Gedolah:"

Rashi on Zevachim 118a:11:2 (בעולה)

"בעולה - כגון עולות של תמידין ומוספין צבור קרבו בה [אבל] חטאות הקבוע להם זמן כגון שעירי הרגלים של צבור לא קרבו בה:" Translation: "As referring to an olah – for example, olot of temidim and musafim (public offerings) were offered on it [a Bama Gedolah]. But chataot shekavua lahem zman, such as the s'eirei haRegalim of the public, were not offered on it."

Rashi on Zevachim 118a:11:4 (דאי בחטאת)

"דאי בחטאת - דאי חובות הקבוע להם זמן בחטאת נמי קאמר: חטאת נדבה מי איכא - ליקרב כיוצא בה בקטנה ועל כרחיך מתניתין קמ"ל דלא קרבו לר"ש בגדולה לבד מפסחים אלא חובות שיש כיוצא בהן נדבה מדקתני אלא פסחים וחובות הקבוע להם זמן ואי ס"ד כל חובות הקבוע להם זמן קאמר פסחים דקתני למה לי הכי הוה ליה למימר אין בין במה גדולה לבמה קטנה אלא חובות הקבוע להם זמן והוו להו פסחים בכלל אלא ה"ק אלא פסחים שקרבו בגדולה ולא קרבו בקטנה כלל ושאר דברים שקרבו כאן וכאן אין חילוק בהן אלא שבזו לא קרבו אלא נדבות ובזו קרבו אף חובות הקבוע להם זמן:" Translation: "For if it refers to a chatat – for if chovot shekavua lahem zman also includes chatat: Is there a chatat nedava (voluntary sin offering)? – for its counterpart to be offered on a Bama Ketana? And perforce, our baraita teaches us that according to R' Shimon, nothing was offered on a Bama Gedolah besides Pesachim, except for chovot that have a nedava counterpart. This is derived from the wording 'except for Pesachim and chovot shekavua lahem zman.' For if you would think it means all chovot shekavua lahem zman, why does it mention Pesachim? It should simply say: 'The only difference between a bama gedolah and a bama ketana is chovot shekavua lahem zman,' and Pesachim would be included. Rather, it means this: Pesachim were offered on a bama gedolah and not at all on a bama ketana. And other things that were offered both here and there – there is no difference between them, except that on this [a bama ketana] only nedavot were offered, and on that [a bama gedolah] chovot shekavua lahem zman were also offered."

Tosafot on Zevachim 118a:11:1 (ותתרגם מתניתך בעולה)

"ותתרגם מתניתך בעולה - פירוש כגון עולות תמידין ומוספין שיש כיוצא בהם נדבות אבל חטאות הצבור כגון שעירי הרגלים אע"ג דקבוע להם זמן לא קרבו והא מילתא דייק לה מדקתני פסחים דליתני קבוע להם זמן ותו לא והוו להו פסחים בכלל אלא על כרחך מתניתין קמ"ל דלא קרבו לרבי שמעון בגדולה לבד מפסחים אלא שיש כיוצא בהם בבמה והכי קאמר אלא פסחים שקרבו בגדולה לא קרבו בקטנה כלל ושאר דברים שקרבו כאן וכאן אין חילוק בהם אלא שבזה לא הקריבו אלא נדבות ובזה קרבו חובות הקבוע להם זמן כדפירש בקונטרס והכי נמי הוה מצי למידק אברייתא דלעיל דקאמר ר"ש אף צבור לא הקריבו כו' ואי משום דלא איירי התם רבי שמעון בחילוק שבין במה גדולה לבמה קטנה כדאיירי הכא מ"מ על חנם הזכיר פסחים דהא הוו בכלל חובות הקבוע להם זמן ותימה מנא ליה לר' שמעון הא מילתא דחטאת דקבוע להם זמן לא קרב דהא לעיל מפרשינן טעמא דרבי שמעון דיליף מפסח גלגל והא ליכא למילף מפסח דפסח נמי אין כיוצא בו נדבה ואי הוה מפרשינן כן דפסח חשיב כיוצא בו נדבה משום דהוי קדשים קלים כעין שלמים הוה ניחא אבל בקונטרס לא פירש כן וע"ק היכי דייק מדקתני פסחים דלמא הא דקתני פסחים משום דעיקר טעמא מפסח יליף וכן בפ"ק דמגילה (דף ט:) תני פסחים לחוד ופריך בגמרא פסחים ותו לא אלא כעין פסחים ע"כ מה שהזכיר פסחים טפי מאינך משום דכולהו מפסח ילפינן לכן נראה לפרש דקא אמר תתרגם מתניתך בעולה היינו משום דכיון דמפסח יליף אית לן למימר מה פסח שקבוע לו זמן וישנו בצבור כביחיד בשעת היתר הבמות צבור בפסח ראשון ויחיד בפסח שני כדאמרי' פסחים (דף סז.) איש נדחה ואין צבור נדחין אף כל שקבוע להם זמן וישנו בצבור כביחיד בשעת היתר הבמות דהיינו עולות שישנן בצבור בתמידין ומוספין וביחיד בנדבה אבל חטאת לא משכחת ביחיד בשעת היתר הבמות דאפילו בבמה גדולה לא קרבו חובות דיחיד לרבי שמעון כמו לר"מ ורבנן והכי פירושו דשמעתא ותתרגם מתניתך בעולה דאיכא עולת נדבה ונדבות דיחיד קרבו והוי דומיא דפסח דאי בחטאת חטאת נדבה מי איכא דמשכחת ביה חטאת ביחיד דאילו חובות דיחיד לא קרבו לא עולות ולא חטאות ופריך ונוקמה במנחה דאיכא חביתים ומשני אין מנחה בבמה וא"ת ונוקמה בשלמים כגון כבשי עצרת דהא איכא ביה שלמי נדבה וי"ל כדפרש"י דכבשי עצרת קק"ד נינהו ושלמי יחיד קדשים קלים ולא משכחת כיוצא בהן ביחיד:" Translation: "And interpret your baraita as referring to an olah – meaning, for example, olot of temidim and musafim (public burnt offerings) which have voluntary counterparts. But public chataot, like the s'eirei haRegalim (goat offerings of the festivals), even though they have a fixed time, were not offered. And this matter is inferred from the baraita stating 'Pesachim,' for it should just say 'chovot shekavua lahem zman' and no more, and Pesachim would be included. Rather, perforce, the baraita teaches us that according to Rabbi Shimon, nothing was offered on a bama gedolah besides Pesachim, except for those [chovot] that have voluntary counterparts on a bama. And this is what it means: Pesachim were offered on a bama gedolah but not at all on a bama ketana. And other things that were offered both here and there – there is no difference between them, except that on this [a bama ketana] only nedavot were offered, and on that [a bama gedolah] chovot shekavua lahem zman were also offered, as the Kuntres (Rashi) explained. And this could also be inferred from the earlier baraita where R' Shimon says even the public did not offer [all offerings] etc. And even if R' Shimon there did not deal with the distinction between bama gedolah and bama ketana as he does here, nonetheless, Pesachim were mentioned unnecessarily, for they would have been included in chovot shekavua lahem zman. And it is a wonder: from where does R' Shimon derive this matter, that a chatat shekavua lahem zman is not offered? For earlier, we explained R' Shimon's reason is derived from Pesach Gilgal. And this cannot be derived from Pesach, for Pesach also has no voluntary counterpart. And if we were to explain that Pesach is considered to have a voluntary counterpart because it is kodshim kalim (offerings of lesser sanctity) similar to shelamim (peace offerings), it would be fine. But the Kuntres (Rashi) did not explain it so. And further, how does he infer from 'Pesachim'? Perhaps the reason it states 'Pesachim' is because the main reason is derived from Pesach. And similarly in the first chapter of Megillah (9a), it states 'Pesachim' separately, and the Gemara asks 'Pesachim and no more?' Rather 'similar to Pesachim.' Therefore, the mention of Pesachim more than others is because all [other chovot] are derived from Pesach. Therefore, it seems to explain that when it says 'interpret your baraita as an olah,' it is because since it is derived from Pesach, we can say: just as Pesach has a fixed time and exists for the public as well as for an individual during the time of permitted Bamot (public for Pesach Rishon, and individual for Pesach Sheini, as we say in Pesachim 67a 'an individual is pushed off but the public is not pushed off'), so too any chovot shekavua lahem zman that exist for the public as well as for an individual during the time of permitted Bamot (namely, olot that exist for the public as temidim and musafim, and for an individual as nedava). But a chatat is not found for an individual during the time of permitted Bamot, for even on a bama gedolah, an individual's chovot were not offered according to R' Shimon, just like according to R' Meir and the Rabbis. And this is the interpretation of the shmu'ata: And interpret your baraita as an olah, for there is an olat nedava and individual nedavot were offered, and this is similar to Pesach. For if it refers to a chatat, is there an chatat nedava that is found for an individual? For chovot of an individual were not offered, neither olot nor chataot. And it asks: And let it be established as a mincha, for there are chavitin (High Priest's daily meal offering). And it answers: there is no mincha on a bama. And if you ask: And let it be established as shelamim, such as the kivsei Atzeret (lambs of Shavuot), for there are shelamei nedava. One can answer, as Rashi explained, that kivsei Atzeret are kodshim kodshei kodshim (most sacred offerings) while individual shelamim are kodshim kalim (offerings of lesser sanctity), and one does not find a counterpart for them in an individual."

Chiddush of Rashi: Rashi's chiddush lies in his precise dikduk on the baraita's wording. He notes that the baraita lists "Pesachim AND chovot shekavua lahem zman." If Pesachim were merely a type of chovah shekavua lahem zman, its separate mention would be superfluous. This implies a specific quality shared by Pesachim and the chovot permitted on a Bama Gedolah: they must have a "voluntary counterpart" (nedava) that could be offered on a Bama Ketana. This immediately excludes chataot (sin offerings), as there is no chatat nedava. Therefore, the chovot shekavua lahem zman referred to in the baraita must be olot (like temidim and musafim), which do have olat nedava counterparts.

Chiddush of Tosafot: Tosafot initially agrees with Rashi's dikduk from the superfluous "Pesachim," leading to the same conclusion about excluding chataot. However, Tosafot then raises a formidable kushya against Rashi: R' Shimon's entire position is derived from Pesach Gilgal ("And they kept the Passover..." Yehoshua 5:10). If Pesach itself has no nedava counterpart (it's a chova), how can it serve as the model for other chovot that must have a nedava counterpart? This is a direct challenge to the internal consistency of Rashi's peshat.

Tosafot then offers its own brilliant terutz, re-interpreting the siman (sign/reason) from Pesach. Tosafot suggests that the siman of Pesach is not its nedava counterpart (which it lacks), but rather its unique status as a chova that is brought by tzibur (Pesach Rishon) and by yachid (Pesach Sheini, for those who were impure or distant). This dual public/individual nature makes Pesach parallel to olot, where temidim and musafim are public chovot, and olat nedava is an individual offering. Chatat, by contrast, is never brought by an individual during the Bamot period, making it fundamentally different from Pesach and olah. This re-calibrates the limud from Pesach, preserving R' Shimon's consistency while still excluding chatat. Tosafot's chiddush is in identifying a deeper, more nuanced commonality between Pesach and certain chovot, demonstrating a profound sensitivity to the nuances of halachic derivation.

Friction

The most potent friction in this sugya arises from the Gemara's discussion of the baraita concerning Pesach and chovot shekavua lahem zman and the subsequent dikduk by Rav Adda bar Ahava, as illuminated by Rashi and Tosafot.

The Strongest Kushya: Tosafot's Challenge to Rashi

The baraita states: "אין בין במה גדולה לבמה קטנה אלא פסח וחובות הקבוע להן זמן" (The only difference between a bama gedolah and a bama ketana is Pesach and chovot shekavua lahem zman). Rav Adda bar Ahava questions the inclusion of chovot shekavua lahem zman for an individual on a bama ketana, as individuals typically don't bring such offerings. This leads to the Gemara's clarification: "ותתרגם מתניתך בעולה, דאיכא עולת נדבה. דאי בחטאת — חטאת נדבה מי איכא?" (Interpret your baraita as referring to an olah, for there is a voluntary olah. For if it refers to a chatat, is there a voluntary chatat?).

Rashi's Interpretation: Rashi understands this clarification to mean that the chovot shekavua lahem zman allowed on a bama gedolah (and implicitly, distinguished from a bama ketana) must be olot because olot have a nedava counterpart. He bolsters this by arguing that the baraita's separate mention of "Pesachim" (instead of simply including them within "chovot shekavua lahem zman") implies that only chovot that have a nedava counterpart are included. Thus, chataot are excluded from bama gedolah even for the public because they lack a nedava counterpart.

Tosafot's Kushya (118a:11:1 s.v. ותתרגם מתניתך בעולה): Tosafot, while initially agreeing with Rashi's dikduk from the superfluous mention of Pesachim, raises a significant challenge: "ותימה מנא ליה לר' שמעון הא מילתא דחטאת דקבוע להם זמן לא קרב דהא לעיל מפרשינן טעמא דרבי שמעון דיליף מפסח גלגל והא ליכא למילף מפסח דפסח נמי אין כיוצא בו נדבה." Translation: "And it is a wonder: from where does Rabbi Shimon derive this matter, that a chatat shekavua lahem zman is not offered? For earlier, we explained Rabbi Shimon's reason is derived from Pesach Gilgal. And this cannot be derived from Pesach, for Pesach also has no voluntary counterpart."

This is a powerful kushya. R' Shimon's entire position regarding what was permitted in Gilgal (and by extension, on a bama gedolah) is derived from the pasuk "ויעשו בני ישראל את הפסח בגלגל" (Joshua 5:10). The Gemara explains that this teaches that "רק חובות כעין פסח" (only chovot similar to Pesach) were sacrificed. If Pesach itself is a chova that has no nedava counterpart, how can it be the paradigm for chovot that must have a nedava counterpart? Rashi's interpretation creates an internal contradiction for R' Shimon's drasha. The very source R' Shimon uses to establish the halacha seemingly violates the condition Rashi imposes on that halacha. This makes the kushya particularly acute, striking at the root of Rashi's peshat.

The Best Terutz: Tosafot's Refined Limud

Tosafot, recognizing the strength of this kushya, offers a brilliant re-evaluation of the limud (derivation) from Pesach. Instead of focusing on Pesach's lack of a nedava counterpart, Tosafot proposes a more nuanced characteristic that Pesach shares with olot, but not with chataot.

Tosafot's Terutz (118a:11:1 s.v. לכן נראה לפרש): "לכן נראה לפרש דקא אמר תתרגם מתניתך בעולה היינו משום דכיון דמפסח יליף אית לן למימר מה פסח שקבוע לו זמן וישנו בצבור כביחיד בשעת היתר הבמות צבור בפסח ראשון ויחיד בפסח שני כדאמרי' פסחים (דף סז.) איש נדחה ואין צבור נדחין אף כל שקבוע להם זמן וישנו בצבור כביחיד בשעת היתר הבמות דהיינו עולות שישנן בצבור בתמידין ומוספין וביחיד בנדבה אבל חטאת לא משכחת ביחיד בשעת היתר הבמות דאפילו בבמה גדולה לא קרבו חובות דיחיד לרבי שמעון כמו לר"מ ורבנן והכי פירושו דשמעתא ותתרגם מתניתך בעולה דאיכא עולת נדבה ונדבות דיחיד קרבו והוי דומיא דפסח דאי בחטאת חטאת נדבה מי איכא דמשכחת ביה חטאת ביחיד דאילו חובות דיחיד לא קרבו לא עולות ולא חטאות..." Translation: "Therefore, it seems appropriate to explain that when it says 'interpret your baraita as an olah,' it is because since it is derived from Pesach, we must say: just as Pesach has a fixed time and exists for the public (Pesach Rishon) as well as for an individual (Pesach Sheini, as we say in Pesachim 67a: 'an individual is pushed off but the public is not pushed off') during the time of permitted Bamot, so too all [chovot] that have a fixed time and exist for the public as well as for an individual during the time of permitted Bamot [are included]. These are olot, which exist for the public as temidim and musafim, and for an individual as nedava. But a chatat is not found for an individual during the time of permitted Bamot, for even on a bama gedolah, an individual's chovot were not offered according to R' Shimon, just like according to R' Meir and the Rabbis... And this is the interpretation of the shmu'ata: And interpret your baraita as an olah, for there is an olat nedava, and individual nedavot were offered, and this is similar to Pesach. For if it refers to a chatat, is there a chatat nedava that is found for an individual? For chovot of an individual were not offered, neither olot nor chataot..."

Analysis of the Terutz: Tosafot's terutz shifts the focus from the superficial existence of a nedava counterpart to a more fundamental characteristic: the capacity for both public and individual expression of the korban during the Bamot period.

1. Pesach as a Dual Offering: The Pesach offering, while a chova, uniquely has a public dimension (Pesach Rishon) and an individual dimension (Pesach Sheini, for those who qualify). This makes it a paradigm for offerings that bridge the public and private spheres.
2. Olah's Dual Nature: Olot fit this paradigm. Public olot are temidim and musafim (which are chovot shekavua lahem zman for the tzibur). Individual olot are olat nedava (which were permitted on bamot). Thus, olah has both public chova (with a set time) and individual nedava forms.
3. Chatat's Exclusion: Chataot, however, fundamentally lack this dual nature in the context of bamot. While there are public chataot shekavua lahem zman (e.g., s'eirei haRegalim), there are no individual chataot permitted on bamot at all, neither chova nor nedava. The Gemara explicitly says "חטאת נדבה מי איכא?" (is there a chatat nedava?), and even individual chovot are generally restricted on bamot according to the Rabbis (and R' Shimon, as Tosafot points out, agrees with this restriction for individual chovot).
4. Reconciling R' Shimon: By redefining the limud from Pesach as requiring an offering to have a parallel in both public chovot (with a set time) and individual offerings (even if nedava), Tosafot resolves the internal contradiction. R' Shimon's drasha from Pesach is now consistent: Pesach is the model because it represents an offering type that can manifest in both public (obligatory) and individual (potentially voluntary or second-chance obligatory) forms. This allows olot (public temidim/musafim and individual nedava) to be included, while excluding chataot (public chovot but no individual bamot counterpart).

This terutz demonstrates a deep engagement with the textual nuances and underlying halachic principles. It's not just a superficial fix, but a re-conceptualization of the middah (method of derivation) that allows for a harmonious understanding of the different layers of the sugya.

Intertext

The sugya on Zevachim 118a, rich in both halacha and aggadah, offers several opportunities for illuminating intertextual connections, deepening our understanding of its themes.

1. The Dynamic Nature of Kedushah: Bamot and the Prohibition of Sacrifice Outside the Designated Place

The entire sugya revolves around the evolving halacha of Bamot (private altars) – when they were permitted, when they were prohibited, and what could be sacrificed on them. This is a foundational topic in Avodat Hashem and connects to the broader sugya of Kedushah (sanctity) and Ma'aseh Korbanot (sacrificial service).

• Devarim 12:13-14: "הִשָּׁמֶר לְךָ פֶּן תַּעֲלֶה עֹלֹתֶיךָ בְּכָל מָקוֹם אֲשֶׁר תִּרְאֶה. כִּי אִם בַּמָּקוֹם אֲשֶׁר יִבְחַר ה' אֱלֹהֶיךָ בְּאַחַד שְׁבָטֶיךָ שָׁם תַּעֲלֶה עֹלֹתֶיךָ וְשָׁם תַּעֲשֶׂה כֹּל אֲשֶׁר אָנֹכִי מְצַוֶּךָּ." (Deuteronomy 12:13-14)
  • "Take heed to yourself that you do not offer your burnt offerings in every place that you see. But in the place that the Lord your God shall choose in one of your tribes, there you shall offer your burnt offerings, and there you shall do all that I command you."
  • Connection: This pasuk is the source for the prohibition of Bamot once a central, chosen place for the Shechina (Divine Presence) is established. Our sugya meticulously traces the historical periods when this prohibition was not in effect (Wilderness, Gilgal, Nov/Givon), and when it was (Shiloh, Beis HaMikdash). The Gemara's discussion about Shiloh's "rest" (מנוחה) and the various stages of Bamot directly expounds upon the practical application and nuances of this Deuteronomic command. The sugya on Zevachim 14b and Megillah 9b-10a extensively discusses the different periods of Bamot and their halachic implications, drawing from this very pasuk. The halacha of Ma'aser Sheni also hinges on this concept of a designated place (Devarim 14:22-26), where it must be eaten "in the place that the Lord shall choose."

2. The Geographic and Spiritual Intersection: Benjamin's Portion and the Shechina

The sugya concludes with a fascinating aggadic debate concerning the tribal location of the Mishkan and Beis HaMikdash. Rav Dimi, in the name of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, claims the Shechina always rested in Benjamin's portion, citing "חֹפֵף עָלָיו כָּל הַיּוֹם וּבֵין כְּתֵפָיו שָׁכֵן" (Devarim 33:12 – "He covers him all the day and He dwells between his shoulders"). Abaye challenges this from Tehillim 78:60, 78:67, which imply Shiloh was in Joseph's (Ephraim's) portion. Rav Adda resolves this by suggesting a "strip" of land from Joseph's portion protruded into Benjamin's, where the Mishkan stood.

• Yehoshua 16:6 (Taanath Shiloh): "וְיָצָא הַגְּבוּל הַיָּמָּה הַמִּכְמְתָת מִצָּפוֹן וְנָסַב הַגְּבוּל מִזְרָחָה תַּאֲנַת שִׁלֹה וְעָבַר אוֹתָהּ מִמִּזְרָח יָנוֹחָה." (Joshua 16:6)
  • "And the border went out westward to Michmethath northward; and the border turned about eastward to Taanath Shiloh, and passed by it on the east to Janohah."
  • Connection: This pasuk, describing the border of Joseph's tribe, becomes a key piece of evidence. The Gemara interprets "Taanath Shiloh" not just as a geographic marker, but as an aggadic lament (mitane'ach) over the consumption of kodshim kalim or Benjamin's yearning for the Mishkan to be fully within its borders. This demonstrates how Chazal imbue geographical names with profound spiritual meaning, connecting them to tribal virtues and divine favor.
  • Yoma 12a: The sugya there similarly discusses the precise location of the Beis HaMikdash and the Mizbeach (Altar) on the border between Benjamin and Judah, with the Mizbeach specifically being on a strip from Judah that extended into Benjamin. This is precisely the parallel Rav Adda draws: "מה מצינו בבית עולמים דאית לן [היינו] קני בבנימין וסנהדרין ביהודה, הכא נמי קני בבנימין וסנהדרין ביוסף." (Just as we found in the Eternal House that the Shechina was in Benjamin and the Sanhedrin in Judah, so too here [in Shiloh] the Shechina was in Benjamin and the Sanhedrin in Joseph). This aggadic tradition underscores Benjamin's unique relationship with the Shechina, fulfilling Moshe's blessing (Devarim 33:12), and highlights the subtle yet crucial interplay between tribal boundaries and sacred spaces.

These intertextual connections reveal the intricate web of halachic and aggadic thought that Chazal employed to interpret and apply the Torah, transforming geographical and historical details into profound spiritual lessons.

Psak/Practice

The sugya on Zevachim 118a, while dealing with halachot of Bamot that are no longer applicable in our post-Temple era, provides crucial insights into halachic methodology, the nature of kedushah, and meta-psak heuristics.

1. The Rigor of Derivations from Pesukim

The Gemara's meticulous dikduk on pesukim like "הישר בעיניו" or the specific mention of "פסחים" in a baraita exemplifies the foundational principle of אין מקרא יוצא מידי פשוטו (a verse never loses its plain meaning), yet its plain meaning can be subject to incredibly precise textual analysis. The debate between Rashi and Tosafot over the limud from Pesach for R' Shimon's opinion is a prime example. This teaches us that every word, every phrase, every structural choice in a pasuk or baraita is potentially laden with halachic significance. This heuristic demands a deep, non-superficial engagement with the source text, always asking why a particular word or phrase was chosen over another. This is a core lomdus skill, applicable to all areas of halacha.

2. Hierarchies of Kedushah and Geographic Boundaries

The discussion of Bamot (private vs. public), Shiloh's unique construction (stone below, curtains above), and the delineation of where kodshim kalim could be eaten ("כל מקום שרואה") all underscore the concept of a multi-layered Kedushah. The sanctity of a place is not monolithic but can be graduated, with different halachot applying based on proximity, visibility, or the nature of the structure. This principle is vital in many areas of halacha, such as the boundaries for eating Ma'aser Sheni or Kodshim Kalim in Jerusalem (e.g., Mishnah Ma'aser Sheni 3:5), or the varying degrees of kedushah within the Beis HaMikdash itself (e.g., Kodesh HaKodashim, Heichal, Azara). The unresolved dilemmas (teikku) regarding "seeing" Shiloh (standing vs. sitting, in the stream vs. on the bank) further highlight the practical challenges in defining and applying these nuanced geographic halachot, demonstrating Chazal's honesty in presenting unresolved cases where the boundaries of kedushah were not definitively clear.

3. Aggadah as Halachic Context and Meta-Psak

The aggadic sections – particularly the debate about Shiloh's tribal location and the "strip of land" from Joseph into Benjamin – illustrate how aggadah often provides a profound meta-halachic context or even an underlying spiritual rationale for halachic realities. While not directly dictating psak, these narratives reveal Chazal's understanding of divine providence, tribal blessings, and the spiritual geography of Eretz Yisrael. The idea that the Shechina preferentially rested in Benjamin's portion, even through a "strip" of land, offers a theological framework for understanding the sanctity of the Beis HaMikdash site and the enduring significance of ancient blessings. This heuristic reminds us that halacha is not merely a set of rules but is embedded within a rich spiritual and historical narrative, which can inform our appreciation and application of the law, even if not directly prescriptive.

Takeaway

This sugya meticulously unpacks the evolving halachot of sacrificial altars across historical epochs, demonstrating Chazal's rigorous textual analysis in deriving complex laws from seemingly simple verses, and revealing the profound interplay between physical space, temporal phase, and the nuanced gradations of kedushah.

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Footnotes:

1. Zevachim 118a.
2. Devarim 12:8.
3. Rashi on Zevachim 118a s.v. ורבי יהודה.
4. Steinsaltz on Zevachim 118a s.v. ור' יהודה.
5. Zevachim 118a.
6. Steinsaltz on Zevachim 118a s.v. ובענין פסחים וחובות.
7. Zevachim 118a.
8. Rashi on Zevachim 118a s.v. ותתרגם מתניתך.
9. Rashi on Zevachim 118a s.v. בעולה.
10. Rashi on Zevachim 118a s.v. דאי בחטאת.
11. Tosafot on Zevachim 118a s.v. ותתרגם מתניתך בעולה.
12. Zevachim 118a.
13. Rashi on Zevachim 118a s.v. דאי בחטאת.
14. Tosafot on Zevachim 118a s.v. ותתרגם מתניתך בעולה.
15. Yehoshua 5:10.
16. Zevachim 118a.
17. Tosafot on Zevachim 118a s.v. לכן נראה לפרש.
18. Devarim 12:13-14.
19. Zevachim 14b, Megillah 9b-10a.
20. Devarim 14:22-26.
21. Devarim 33:12.
22. Tehillim 78:60, 78:67.
23. Yehoshua 16:6.
24. Zevachim 118b, Yoma 12a.
25. Yoma 12a.
26. Devarim 33:12.
27. Devarim 12:8.
28. Zevachim 118a.
29. Zevachim 118a.
30. Mishnah Ma'aser Sheni 3:5.