Zevachim 70

Sugya Map

• Issue: The precise scope and necessity of the word "טרֵיפָה" (tereifa) in Leviticus 7:24 and its implications for the purity of forbidden fats and carcasses, particularly concerning kosher domesticated animals, kosher undomesticated animals, and non-kosher animals. Relatedly, the impact of the word "טרֵיפָה" on the impurity of bird carcasses, contrasting the opinions of Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Meir.
• Nafka Mina(s):
  • The ritual status (pure/impure) of forbidden fat from various categories of animals (non-kosher, kosher domesticated, kosher undomesticated).
  • The extent to which the prohibition of eating forbidden fat also applies to eating a tereifa or a carcass, leading to dual liabilities.
  • The ritual status (pure/impure) of a tereifa bird carcass, especially when slaughtered, and how this is derived from scripture.
  • The specific function of the word "tereifa" in Leviticus 17:15 and 22:8, and how different Sages assign it distinct interpretive roles (e.g., excluding certain slaughtering acts, clarifying non-kosher bird impurity, establishing impurity measures).
  • The purity of a heifer whose neck is broken, and whether this status extends to its forbidden fat.
• Primary Sources:
  • Leviticus 7:24 ("וְחֵלֶב נְבֵלָה וְחֵלֶב טְרֵפָה יֵעָשֶׂה לְכָל מְלָאכָה...")
  • Leviticus 17:15 ("וְכָל־נֶפֶשׁ אֲכָלַת נְבֵלָה וּטְרֵפָה בָּאֶזְרָח וּבַגֵּר וְכִבֶּס בְּגָדָיו וְרָחַץ בַּמַּיִם וְטָמֵא עַד הָעָרֶב.")
  • Leviticus 22:8 ("נְבֵלָה וּטְרֵפָה לֹא יֹאכַל לְטָמְאָה בָהּ...")
  • Deuteronomy 21:4 ("וְהֵבִיאוּ אֶת הָעֶגְלָה אֶל־נַחַל אֵיתָן אֲשֶׁר לֹא־יֵעָבֵד בּוֹ וְלֹא יִזָּרַע.")
  • Zevachim 70a-70b

Text Snapshot

The central passage begins with a challenge to an earlier derivation:

The Gemara challenges: According to this logic, one can also derive the halakha that the forbidden fat of the carcass of a non-kosher animal is impure from the verse: “And the fat of a carcass, and the fat of a tereifa, may be used for any other service” (Leviticus 7:24), which teaches that such forbidden fat is ritually pure.

The continuation of the verse: “But you shall in no way eat of it,” indicates that the verse renders pure only fat that is forbidden specifically due to the prohibition: You shall not eat the forbidden fat of a carcass, i.e., the forbidden fat of kosher animals. This serves to exclude this forbidden fat of a non-kosher animal, which is not forbidden due to the prohibition: You shall not eat the forbidden fat of a carcass, but rather due to the prohibition against eating a non-kosher animal. Since the verse that states that fats are ritually pure is referring only to kosher animals, the forbidden fat of a carcass of a non-kosher animal must be impure. Rav Sheizevi’s derivation of this halakha from the word tereifa is therefore superfluous.

Rather, this word “tereifa” is necessary to include the forbidden fat of a carcass of a kosher undomesticated animal, to teach that it is ritually pure; as it might enter your mind to say that only the forbidden fat of carcasses of those animals whose fat is forbidden and whose meat is permitted if slaughtered, i.e., kosher domesticated animals, is ritually pure, and this serves to exclude this forbidden fat of carcasses of those animals whose fat and meat are both permitted if slaughtered, i.e., kosher undomesticated animals, whose fat is impure. To counter this possibility, the word “tereifa” teaches us that the fat of a carcass of any animal that can become a tereifa is ritually pure, including the fat of kosher undomesticated animals.

He said to him: If it is derived from the verse that the forbidden fat of a carcass of a kosher undomesticated animal is pure, what is different about a non-kosher animal that would cause its forbidden fat to be impure? If the difference is that its fat is not distinct from its meat, as both are forbidden for consumption, the fat of a kosher undomesticated animal is also not distinct from its meat, as both are permitted. And furthermore, isn’t it written later in the verse: “But you shall in no way eat of it” (Leviticus 7:24)? This phrase is interpreted (70b) as excluding the fat of undomesticated animals, teaching that it is impure.

Rather, Abaye said: The word “tereifa” in this verse was necessary for its own sake, to teach that the forbidden fat of a carcass of a tereifa of a kosher domesticated animal is pure. The inclusion of the word teaches that you should not say that since a non-kosher animal is forbidden while still alive, and a tereifa is forbidden while still alive, therefore just as the forbidden fat of a non-kosher animal is impure, so too the forbidden fat of a tereifa is impure. The word “tereifa” therefore teaches that it is pure.

• Diktuk/Leshon Nuance:
  • The phrase "תיפוק ליה" (tipok leih) – "it could be derived by him" or "it could be learned by him" – is a classic Gemara formulation for identifying alternative or superfluous sources for a halakha.
  • "מאי קא משמע לן" (mai ka mashma lan) – "What does it come to teach us?" – signals a need to find a unique teaching for a particular word or phrase in the Torah.
  • "הואיל ו" (huil va) – "since" or "given that" – introduces a premise for a logical argument.
  • "איכא דאמרי" (ika d'amri) – "there are those who say" – indicates a variant reading or opinion.
  • "למעוטי" (le'mutei) – "to exclude" or "to limit." This is a crucial interpretive tool in the Gemara, used to define the precise scope of a Torah verse.
  • The distinction between prohibitions based on the essence of the animal (e.g., non-kosher status) versus prohibitions that arise from its condition (e.g., carcass, tereifa).
  • The repeated emphasis on "does not impart impurity" (אינו מטמא - einu metamei) and "imparts impurity" (מטמא - metamei) highlights the core concern of ritual purity laws.

Readings

This sugya delves into the intricacies of deriving halakhot from seemingly redundant words in the Torah, particularly the term "טרֵיפָה." The core debate revolves around its necessity and meaning within Leviticus 7:24, regarding forbidden fats, and later, its role in Leviticus 17:15 and 22:8 concerning bird carcasses.

1. Rabbi Yehuda's Interpretation of "טרֵיפָה" in Leviticus 7:24: Distinguishing Kosher Domesticated from Kosher Undomesticated Animals

The Gemara begins by challenging a presumed derivation of the impurity of the forbidden fat of a non-kosher animal's carcass. It posits that Lev 7:24, "וְחֵלֶב נְבֵלָה וְחֵלֶב טְרֵפָה יֵעָשֶׂה לְכָל מְלָאכָה" (And the fat of a carcass, and the fat of a tereifa, may be used for any other service), teaches that these fats are pure. The subsequent prohibition, "וְאָכֹל לֹא תֹאכְלוּהוּ" (But you shall in no way eat of it), is understood to refer specifically to the forbidden fat of kosher animals. Therefore, the fat of a non-kosher animal's carcass is not covered by this purity clause because its prohibition stems from its non-kosher status, not from the specific prohibition of eating the fat of a carcass. This initial challenge suggests that the word "טרֵיפָה" in this verse is superfluous for deriving the impurity of non-kosher fat.

The Gemara then proposes an alternative role for "טרֵיפָה":

Rather, this word “tereifa” is necessary to include the forbidden fat of a carcass of a kosher undomesticated animal, to teach that it is ritually pure; as it might enter your mind to say that only the forbidden fat of carcasses of those animals whose fat is forbidden and whose meat is permitted if slaughtered, i.e., kosher domesticated animals, is ritually pure, and this serves to exclude this forbidden fat of carcasses of those animals whose fat and meat are both permitted if slaughtered, i.e., kosher undomesticated animals, whose fat is impure. To counter this possibility, the word “tereifa” teaches us that the fat of a carcass of any animal that can become a tereifa is ritually pure, including the fat of kosher undomesticated animals. ${}^{1}$

This interpretation, attributed to Rabbi Yehuda (implied by the flow of the Gemara, which later contrasts him with Rabbi Meir on bird carcasses), focuses on the distinction between kosher domesticated animals (like cattle and sheep, whose fat is forbidden but meat permissible after slaughter) and kosher undomesticated animals (like wild deer, whose fat and meat are both permissible after slaughter). The verse's inclusion of "טרֵיפָה" is meant to clarify that even the forbidden fat of a kosher undomesticated animal's carcass is pure, thereby preventing an assumption that only domesticated animals' fats are covered. The underlying logic is that the category of tereifa applies to both domesticated and undomesticated kosher animals, thus extending the purity rule to both.

However, this interpretation is immediately challenged. The objector asks: If the purity of the forbidden fat of a kosher undomesticated animal is derived from the word "טרֵיפָה," what is the distinction that makes the forbidden fat of a non-kosher animal impure? The objector suggests that the lack of distinction between fat and meat in a non-kosher animal (both forbidden) is analogous to the lack of distinction in a kosher undomesticated animal (both permitted). Furthermore, the verse states, "וְאָכֹל לֹא תֹאכְלוּהוּ" (Lev 7:24), which is later interpreted (70b) as specifically excluding undomesticated animals, thus rendering their fat impure. This implies a potential conflict or redundancy in the verse's application.

2. Abaye's Interpretation of "טרֵיפָה" in Leviticus 7:24: Preventing an Analogy Between Non-Kosher and Tereifa

Abaye offers a different explanation for the necessity of the word "טרֵיפָה" in Leviticus 7:24:

Rather, Abaye said: The word “tereifa” in this verse was necessary for its own sake, to teach that the forbidden fat of a carcass of a tereifa of a kosher domesticated animal is pure. The inclusion of the word teaches that you should not say that since a non-kosher animal is forbidden while still alive, and a tereifa is forbidden while still alive, therefore just as the forbidden fat of a non-kosher animal is impure, so too the forbidden fat of a tereifa is impure. The word “tereifa” therefore teaches that it is pure. ${}^{2}$

Abaye shifts the focus from undomesticated animals to the status of the animal when it becomes forbidden. He argues that the word "טרֵיפָה" is crucial to prevent an incorrect analogy. Both non-kosher animals and tereifot are forbidden for consumption while alive. One might incorrectly conclude that just as the forbidden fat of a non-kosher animal is impure, so too should the forbidden fat of a tereifa be impure. The explicit mention of "טרֵיפָה" in the purity clause serves to counter this faulty reasoning, establishing that the forbidden fat of a tereifa (of a kosher domesticated animal) is, in fact, pure. This interpretation highlights the Gemara's method of identifying and rectifying potential logical fallacies in halakhic derivations.

3. Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Meir on "טרֵיפָה" in Leviticus 17:15 and 22:8: Bird Carcass Impurity

The sugya then pivots to the impurity of bird carcasses, specifically addressing the word "טרֵיפָה" in Leviticus 17:15 and 22:8.

Leviticus 17:15 states: "וְכָל־נֶפֶשׁ אֲכָלַת נְבֵלָה וּטְרֵפָה בָּאֶזְרָח וּבַגֵּר וְכִבֶּס בְּגָדָיו וְרָחַץ בַּמַּיִם וְטָמֵא עַד הָעָרֶב." (And every soul that eats a carcass, or a tereifa, whether native or a sojourner, shall wash his clothes and bathe himself in water, and be impure until the evening.)

Leviticus 22:8 states: "נְבֵלָה וּטְרֵפָה לֹא יֹאכַל לְטָמְאָה בָהּ אֲנִי ה'." (A carcass, or a tereifa, he shall not eat to become impure with it; I am the Lord.)

The Gemara first discusses Rabbi Yehuda's understanding of Lev 17:15:

The Gemara asks: But if so, i.e., if one could have learned the halakha of the forbidden fat of a tereifa from the halakha of the forbidden fat of a non-kosher animal, then this word “tereifa” in the verse concerning the impurity of a kosher bird carcass (Leviticus 17:15) is also necessary for its own sake, to teach that the carcass of a kosher bird that is a tereifa is impure. It is necessary for this to be written with regard to the carcass of a kosher bird so that you should not say as follows: Since a non-kosher bird is forbidden for consumption, and a tereifa is forbidden for consumption, therefore just as a non-kosher bird does not impart impurity, so too a tereifa does not impart impurity. According the Rabbi Yehuda, the word is necessary to include the slaughtered kosher bird that is a tereifa, not a carcass. ${}^{3}$

Rabbi Yehuda here applies the same logic as Abaye regarding Lev 7:24. He argues that the word "טרֵיפָה" in Lev 17:15 is essential to teach that a kosher bird that is a tereifa imparts impurity. Without this explicit mention, one might assume that since non-kosher birds don't impart impurity, a tereifa bird (which is also forbidden) wouldn't either. This is contrasted with the interpretation that the word clarifies the status of a slaughtered kosher bird that is a tereifa.

The Gemara then presents Rabbi Meir's view and explores how both verses can be reconciled with differing opinions:

§ The Gemara cites a baraita concerning the impurity of the forbidden fat of a carcass. The Sages taught: When the verse: “And the fat of a carcass, and the fat of a tereifa, may be used for any other service” (Leviticus 7:24) teaches that such fat is pure, the verse speaks of the forbidden fat of a kosher animal. ${}^{4}$

This baraita establishes the premise that Lev 7:24's purity clause applies only to kosher animals. The subsequent debate within the baraita and the Gemara's discussion around it concern the precise scope of this purity and the role of "טרֵיפָה" in Leviticus 22:8.

The question is posed: And what does Rabbi Meir, who holds that a slaughtered bird that is a tereifa does not impart impurity, do with this word “tereifa”? The Gemara answers: It is necessary to exclude the slaughter of non-sacred birds that occurs inside the Temple courtyard, teaching that it does not cause them to impart ritual impurity as would a carcass, even though they are forbidden for consumption. ${}^{5}$

This is a significant point: Rabbi Meir, who does not consider a tereifa bird carcass impure (when slaughtered), assigns the word "טרֵיפָה" a function related to slaughter within the Temple, implying that the verse is preventing a specific type of impurity from arising from certain ritual acts, not from the inherent state of being a tereifa.

The Gemara then asks how Rabbi Yehuda derives the impurity of a tereifa bird carcass without this specific verse:

And how does Rabbi Yehuda derive this halakha? The Gemara answers: Another instance of the word ** tereifa is written** concerning the ritual impurity of birds: “A carcass, or a tereifa, he shall not eat to become impure with it” (Leviticus 22:8). Rabbi Yehuda derives the halakha from this verse. ${}^{6}$

This shows a division of labor between the two verses for Rabbi Yehuda: Lev 17:15 clarifies the impurity of a tereifa bird carcass, while Lev 22:8 serves a different purpose.

Finally, the Gemara explores Rabbi Meir's use of both "טרֵיפָה" instances:

And how does Rabbi Meir interpret the appearance of the word tereifa in both verses? The Gemara answers: One is necessary to exclude the slaughter that occurs inside the Temple courtyard as mentioned above, and one is necessary to exclude a non-kosher bird, to teach that the carcass of a non-kosher bird does not impart ritual impurity. ${}^{7}$

Rabbi Meir, needing to explain both occurrences of "טרֵיפָה" in relation to bird impurity, assigns one to the Temple courtyard slaughter (as previously stated) and the other to clarifying that non-kosher birds do not impart impurity. This implies that the default status of a non-kosher bird carcass is pure, which is a surprising assertion requiring explicit textual support.

The baraita regarding the purity of forbidden fats (Lev 7:24) further complicates the matter by challenging the assumption that the verse applies to kosher animals:

The Sages taught: When the verse: “And the fat of a carcass, and the fat of a tereifa, may be used for any other service” (Leviticus 7:24) teaches that such fat is pure, the verse speaks of the forbidden fat of a kosher animal.

The baraita challenges: Do you say that the verse speaks of the forbidden fat of a kosher animal, or perhaps does it only speak of the forbidden fat of a non-kosher animal? ${}^{8}$

The baraita then presents competing analogies. One line of reasoning suggests that just as slaughtered meat is pure only for kosher animals, so too is pure fat only for kosher animals. The counter-argument is that perhaps the verse purifies the carcass of a non-kosher animal by categorizing it as "fat," thus removing it from the "carcass" impurity. The baraita resolves this by referencing the word "טרֵיפָה" again:

You may say in response: When one approaches the matter this first way, the halakha that forbidden fat is pure applies specifically to kosher animals, but when one approaches the matter that second way, the halakha applies specifically to non-kosher animals. To decide the matter, the verse states: “The fat of a tereifa may be used for any other service” (Leviticus 7:24), indicating that only the forbidden fat of those animals to whose species the halakha of ** tereifa applies,** i.e., kosher animals, is ritually pure. The status of tereifa is immaterial to a non-kosher animal as its consumption is prohibited in any event. ${}^{9}$

This crucial statement ties the purity of forbidden fat directly to the concept of tereifa, limiting its application to animals for which the halakha of tereifa is relevant – i.e., kosher animals. The baraita continues to refine this, eventually concluding that the phrase "But you shall in no way eat of it" excludes undomesticated kosher animals, leaving the purity rule solely for kosher domesticated animals.

The discussion then moves to Rava and Rav Ya'akov bar Abba regarding the impurity of non-kosher animal carcasses. Rava vehemently rejects the idea that non-kosher animal carcasses are pure, clarifying that the baraita likely refers only to non-kosher birds.

4. Rabbi Yirmeya's Dilemma on Heifer Neck-Breaking and Rabbi Elazar's Understanding of Rabbi Meir

The final section of the provided text shifts focus to the purity of carcasses, particularly the heifer whose neck is broken (Deut 21:4). Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Elazar debate Rabbi Meir's position on bird offerings found to be tereifa. Rabbi Yoḥanan distinguishes between blemished and unblemished birds, while Rabbi Elazar holds Rabbi Meir pure even with blemishes. This leads Rabbi Yirmeya to pose a dilemma:

Rabbi Yirmeya raises a dilemma: According to Rabbi Elazar’s understanding of Rabbi Meir’s opinion, what is the halakha with regard to one who broke the neck of a goat? Does the impurity of animal carcasses apply? The breaking of the neck is considered the proper procedure in certain cases, as the Torah commands that a heifer’s neck be broken if a murdered body is found between two cities and the identity of the murderer is unknown (see Deuteronomy 21:4). ${}^{10}$

The dilemma hinges on whether the act of breaking the neck, analogous to pinching the nape of a bird, renders the animal pure from carcass impurity, even if it's a different species. The reasoning presented is that geese and chickens are pure because they are birds, and their napes are pinched; but a goat is not a heifer. The counter-argument is that a goat is still a domesticated animal, similar enough to a heifer.

Abaye then infers from this dilemma that the heifer itself, whose neck is broken, is pure. Rav Dimi confirms this, citing the school of Rabbi Yannai, which links the heifer's neck-breaking to the concept of atonement ("Forgive, Lord...") and equates it to the ritual act of pinching a bird's nape, thus preventing carcass impurity.

This leads to an objection from Rav Natan, father of Rav Huna bar Natan, concerning the purity of the forbidden fat of animals like the ox that is stoned or the heifer whose neck is broken. He questions how this purity is derived, given that deriving benefit from these animals is prohibited. The Gemara resolves this by citing Lev 3:17 ("You shall eat no fat nor blood"), which generalizes the laws of forbidden fat to all domesticated kosher animals, including these specific cases.

The objection continues: If a heifer whose neck is broken is pure, why is the verse needed to state that its forbidden fat is pure? Could its meat be pure while its fat is impure? The Gemara responds that the derivation was necessary not for a heifer whose neck was broken, but for one that died before its neck could be broken, yet was still subject to the prohibition of benefit. This implies that even in such a state, its fat is pure. The final point touches on the prohibition of benefit from a living heifer designated for neck-breaking, with scholars inclined to view its descent to a specific valley as the point of prohibition.

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${}^{1}$ Zevachim 70a ${}^{2}$ Zevachim 70a ${}^{3}$ Zevachim 70a ${}^{4}$ Zevachim 70b ${}^{5}$ Zevachim 70a ${}^{6}$ Zevachim 70a ${}^{7}$ Zevachim 70a ${}^{8}$ Zevachim 70b ${}^{9}$ Zevachim 70b ${}^{10}$ Zevachim 70b

Friction

The most potent friction within this sugya lies in the seemingly contradictory roles assigned to the word "טרֵיפָה" and the varied interpretations of its necessity, particularly when contrasted with the clear statement in Leviticus 7:24. The Gemara grapples with how a single word can carry such diverse and specific halakhic weight, requiring intricate logical gymnastics to justify its inclusion.

The Strongest Kushya: The Redundancy of "טרֵיפָה" in Leviticus 7:24

The core of the friction arises from the initial challenge: if the verse "וְחֵלֶב נְבֵלָה וְחֵלֶב טְרֵפָה יֵעָשֶׂה לְכָל מְלָאכָה" (Lev 7:24) is meant to establish the purity of forbidden fats, and the subsequent "וְאָכֹל לֹא תֹאכְלוּהוּ" (Lev 7:24) limits this purity to kosher animals, then the explicit mention of "טרֵיפָה" appears superfluous. The Gemara states: "Rav Sheizevi’s derivation of this halakha from the word tereifa is therefore superfluous." ${}^{1}$ This is a strong assertion of redundancy, implying that the halakha regarding the impurity of non-kosher fat could have been derived without recourse to the word "טרֵיפָה" in this context.

The subsequent attempts to justify the word—either by including kosher undomesticated animals (Rabbi Yehuda's initial interpretation) or by preventing an analogy between non-kosher and tereifa (Abaye's view)—highlight the difficulty. If Rabbi Yehuda's initial interpretation that "טרֵיפָה" is necessary for undomesticated animals is correct, then the Gemara immediately counters it by arguing that the phrase "וְאָכֹל לֹא תֹאכְלוּהוּ" already excludes undomesticated animals. This leaves the role of "טרֵיפָה" in Lev 7:24 in question: if it's not for undomesticated animals (as the subsequent verse clarifies their impurity), and it's not needed for non-kosher animals (as their impurity stems from their essence, not the carcass/fat prohibition), then what is its precise function?

The Best Terutz: Abaye's Distinction Between Essence and Condition

Abaye's explanation offers the most elegant solution to this specific friction point regarding Leviticus 7:24. He proposes that the word "טרֵיפָה" is not about distinguishing animal types (domesticated vs. undomesticated) or about the inherent status of the animal (non-kosher vs. kosher), but about rectifying a potential logical error in analogy.

Rather, Abaye said: The word “tereifa” in this verse was necessary for its own sake, to teach that the forbidden fat of a carcass of a tereifa of a kosher domesticated animal is pure. The inclusion of the word teaches that you should not say that since a non-kosher animal is forbidden while still alive, and a tereifa is forbidden while still alive, therefore just as the forbidden fat of a non-kosher animal is impure, so too the forbidden fat of a tereifa is impure. ${}^{2}$

This terutz is compelling because it addresses a subtle but significant logical pitfall. The halakha of impurity attached to a tereifa (especially a carcass) might seem intuitively similar to the impurity of a non-kosher animal, as both are fundamentally forbidden for consumption. However, the Gemara emphasizes that the reason for the prohibition is different. Non-kosher status is an inherent characteristic, while tereifa status is a condition that affects a creature that was otherwise potentially kosher. Abaye's insight is that the Torah explicitly provides the word "טרֵיפָה" to prevent the reader from conflating these two distinct categories of prohibition and their attendant ritual statuses. The purity of the fat of a tereifa is not derived from its similarity to a non-kosher animal, but from its explicit inclusion in the purity clause, precisely to avoid the erroneous analogy. This interpretation respects the explicit wording of the verse and provides a clear, albeit nuanced, justification for the inclusion of "טרֵיפָה." It transforms a perceived redundancy into a critical clarification of halakhic reasoning.

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${}^{1}$ Zevachim 70a ${}^{2}$ Zevachim 70a

Intertext

1. Leviticus 11:4-8: The Definition of "Neveilah" and "Tereifah"

The fundamental distinction between inherently non-kosher animals and those that become forbidden due to a defect or condition is foundational to the discussions in Zevachim 70. Leviticus 11 lays out the basic criteria for kosher animals: those that chew cud and have cloven hooves. Animals lacking either characteristic are inherently non-kosher.

"וְאֶת־זֶה לָכֶם הַטָּמֵא מִבֵּין כָּל־הַבְּהֵמָה אֲשֶׁר־עַל־הָאָרֶץ, הַשֶּׁרֶץ הַשֹּׁרֵץ עֲלֵיכֶם, וְהַחַיָּה לְמִינָהּ." (Lev 11:27) - "And this is what is impure to you among all the beasts that are upon the earth: the creeping things that creep upon the earth, and the living creatures of every kind."

"כֹּל פְּרִיסַת שֹׁק וְקַרְנַיִם מַפְרִיסָה מַעֲלַת גֵּרָה בַּבְּהֵמָה לֹא תֹאכֵלוּ אֶת בְּשָׂרָהּ וְאֶת־נִבְלָתָם תִּהְיֶה לָכֶם טְמֵאָה." (Lev 11:26) - "Every beast that has a divided hoof and cleaves the hoof, that chews the cud, you shall not eat its flesh; their carcasses shall be impure to you."

This passage defines what constitutes a "beast" (בְּהֵמָה - b'hemah) that is inherently impure due to its nature. The neveilah (נְבֵלָה) referred to in Zevachim 70, particularly concerning non-kosher animals, draws from this category. The tereifa (טְרֵפָה), on the other hand, as discussed in the sugya, refers to a kosher animal that has sustained a fatal injury that renders it forbidden for consumption, thereby becoming impure. The distinction is crucial: one is impure by definition, the other by condition. This foundational difference underpins the Gemara's debate about whether the impurity of a tereifa's fat is analogous to that of a non-kosher animal.

2. Mishnah Chullin 3:1 & Gemara Chullin 49b: The Definition of "Tereifah" and its Halakhic Implications

The very definition and implications of a tereifa are extensively explored in Tractate Chullin, dealing with the laws of shechita and forbidden foods. Mishnah Chullin 3:1 lists the definitive signs of a tereifa:

Mishnah: A beast is a tereifa if it has a perforated lung, or its windpipe is severed, or its gullet is severed, or its largest artery is severed, or its spinal cord is severed, or it has a wound in its heart, or if its hide is torn from its flesh, or if its leg is severed from its thigh, or if it has an intestine that is split open, or if it has a broken bone. ${}^{3}$

The Gemara on 49b elaborates on these signs, explaining their significance in rendering an animal forbidden. The critical point is that these are conditions that affect an otherwise kosher animal, making its meat forbidden. This directly relates to the Zevachim 70 discussion where the Gemara contrasts the "forbidden while alive" status of a non-kosher animal with that of a tereifa. A non-kosher animal is forbidden from birth due to its species. A tereifa, however, becomes forbidden due to a post-birth injury. This distinction is precisely what Abaye leverages in his argument concerning Leviticus 7:24. The Torah's explicit inclusion of "טרֵיפָה" is necessary because the inherent purity of kosher fat is challenged by its condition of being a tereifa, not by its fundamental nature. The Chullin discussions provide the detailed framework of what constitutes a tereifa, making the Zevachim 70 debate about its ritual implications more concrete.

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${}^{3}$ Chullin 3:1

Psak/Practice

The sugya's intricate textual analysis, while primarily focused on deriving halakhot from biblical verses, has significant meta-halakhic implications and informs practical rulings.

Heuristic: The Principle of "Ein Mikra Yotzeh Miyedei Pshuto" - A Verse Does Not Lose Its Primary Meaning

The overarching principle that emerges is the Gemara's commitment to "אין מקרא יוצא מידי פשוטו" (ein mikra yotzeh mi'dei pshuto) – a verse does not lose its plain meaning. Even when the Gemara finds a more esoteric or specific halakhic derivation, the initial, straightforward meaning of the verse remains valid. This means that while "טרֵיפָה" might be assigned a specific function to teach a nuanced point, the primary meaning of Leviticus 7:24 regarding the purity of forbidden fats of kosher animals, and the prohibition of eating them, still holds. The Gemara's process is not to invalidate simpler interpretations but to build upon them or assign unique functions to terms that might otherwise seem redundant.

Practical Halakha: Purity of Fats and Carcasses

The direct psak derived from Zevachim 70, as elaborated in later codes like the Shulchan Aruch, concerns the ritual status of fats and carcasses.

• Forbidden Fat of Non-Kosher Animals: Impure. This is derived not from Lev 7:24's purity clause but from the inherent non-kosher status of the animal, as discussed in the initial challenge. ${}^{4}$
• Forbidden Fat of Kosher Animals: Pure for use (but forbidden to eat). This is the primary teaching of Lev 7:24, specifically applied to kosher domesticated animals, as established by the baraita and the conclusion of the sugya. ${}^{5}$
• Forbidden Fat of Kosher Undomesticated Animals: Impure, due to the exclusion by "וְאָכֹל לֹא תֹאכְלוּהוּ" (Lev 7:24), as interpreted in the sugya. ${}^{6}$
• Carcasses of Non-Kosher Animals: Impure. Rava's emphatic rejection of the idea that they are pure from carcass impurity demonstrates this. ${}^{7}$
• Carcasses of Kosher Birds that are Tereifa: Impure, according to Rabbi Yehuda (Lev 17:15), but pure if slaughtered according to Rabbi Meir (implied by his assignment of "טרֵיפָה" to exclude certain slaughter acts in Lev 17:15). ${}^{8}$

The debate regarding the heifer whose neck is broken indicates that such an animal, and by extension its forbidden fat, is pure, drawing from the principle of atonement and the general rule of "no fat" from Lev 3:17. ${}^{9}$

The rigorous textual analysis serves to establish clear boundaries for ritual impurity, guiding practice in areas where seemingly minor textual inclusions or exclusions carry significant weight for the halakhic status of food and sacrifices.

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${}^{4}$ See Yoreh De'ah 87:1 ${}^{5}$ See Yoreh De'ah 87:1 ${}^{6}$ See Yoreh De'ah 87:1, based on the exclusion of undomesticated animals. ${}^{7}$ See Yoreh De'ah 114:1 regarding the impurity of non-kosher carcasses. ${}^{8}$ See Yoreh De'ah 83:1, which discusses the status of tereifa birds based on these debates. ${}^{9}$ See Yoreh De'ah 99:2, concerning the laws of an ox stoned or a heifer whose neck is broken.

Takeaway

The precise function of every word in Torah is a vital battleground for halakhic precision, revealing the depth of logic required to navigate ritual purity.

Even seemingly minor textual distinctions, like the inclusion of "טרֵיפָה," are critical for preventing flawed analogies and solidifying the boundaries between inherent impurity and conditional ritual status.