Zevachim 71

Sugya Map

The sugya on Zevachim 71a-b delves into the intricate halachot of ta'aroves (intermingling) involving kodshim (sacred offerings) and various types of prohibited or disqualified animals. The core tension revolves around discerning the precise nature of different issurim (prohibitions) and psulim (disqualifications), and their consequent impact on bitul (nullification) when mixed with other animals.

Issue

The Mishnah presents a series of cases where a sacred animal becomes intermingled with another animal that is either prohibited from sacrifice, prohibited from benefit, or of a different sacred status. The Gemara then grapples with the apparent redundancy of these halachot with other mishnayot in Temura and Avoda Zara, leading to a profound analysis of the distinctions between various categories of prohibitions and their respective rules of nullification.

Nafka Mina(s)

1. Categorization of Issurim and Psulim: The sugya meticulously distinguishes between issur hana'ah (prohibition of benefit, e.g., shor haniskal after a verdict, avoda zara) and issur mizbe'ach (prohibition of sacrifice, e.g., rove'a v'nirba, kilayim, tereifa). This distinction is paramount, as it determines whether an item is batel b'rov (nullified by a majority) or batel b'chol shehu (nullified by any amount) in a mixture.
2. Rules of Bitul in Kodshim: Does bitul operate differently for kodshim than for chullin? The Gemara's discussion, particularly Rav Ashi's analysis, highlights that the scope of bitul b'chol shehu for issurei hana'ah extends even to kodshim, rendering the entire mixture prohibited. Conversely, issurei mizbe'ach might only disqualify l'Gavoah while remaining mutar l'hedyot, leading to different halachic outcomes for the mixture.
3. The Takanah of Yer'u ad Sheyista'avu: The Mishnah prescribes a unique remedy for psulei kodshim that cannot be sacrificed, namely, they "shall graze until they become unfit for sacrifice and then they shall be sold, and from the money received... bring another offering of the monetary value of the highest-quality animal." This takanah is a specific mechanism for handling sacred items that are no longer fit for their primary purpose but retain a degree of sanctity. The Gemara identifies the teaching of this takanah as a primary chiddush (novelty) of our Mishnah, justifying its existence despite parallels.
4. Interplay of Mishnayot: The Gemara's efforts to reconcile Mishnah Zevachim 71a-b with Mishnah Temura 28a and Mishnah Avoda Zara 74a reveal the lomdus of discerning specific novelties in seemingly overlapping halachic texts. Each Mishnah, despite thematic similarities, is shown to teach a distinct chiddush that would not be derivable from the others in isolation.

Primary Sources

• Mishnah Zevachim 71a-b
• Gemara Zevachim 71b
• Mishnah Temura 28a
• Mishnah Avoda Zara 74a
• Rashi Zevachim 71b:1:1
• Tosafot Zevachim 71a:1:1
• Tosafot Zevachim 71b:1:1
• Tosafot Zevachim 71b:1:2
• Rashash Zevachim 71a:1

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Text Snapshot

The sugya opens with a rich Mishnah outlining various cases of ta'aroves involving kodshim. We will focus on the initial clauses and the Gemara's subsequent analysis.

Mishnah Zevachim 71a-b – Initial Cases

The Mishnah states:

"an ox that is known to have killed a person based on the testimony of one witness or based on the admission of the owner. Had two witnesses testified, deriving benefit from the ox would have been prohibited. Additional examples include when an offering is intermingled with an animal that copulated with a person; or an animal that was the object of bestiality; or with an animal that was set aside for idol worship; or one that was worshipped as a deity; or with an animal that was given as payment to a prostitute or as the price of a dog, as it is written: “You shall not bring the payment of a harlot, or the price of a dog, into the house of the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 23:19). Additional examples include an offering that was intermingled with an animal born of a mixture of diverse kinds, e.g., the offspring of a ram and a goat, or with an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months [tereifa], or with an animal born by caesarean section. In all these cases the animals that are intermingled shall graze until they become unfit for sacrifice and then they shall be sold. And from the money received in the sale, the owner shall bring another offering of the monetary value of the highest-quality animal among them, of the same type of offering that the intermingled offering was."

Dikduk/Leshon Nuance – Initial Cases

• "שור שהמית את האדם על פי עד אחד או על פי הבעלים" (an ox that killed a person based on one witness or owner's admission): This phrasing is critical. A shor haniskal (ox sentenced to be stoned) that has been convicted by two witnesses is assur b'hana'ah (prohibited from benefit) as well as assur l'Gavoah (prohibited for the altar). However, if the knowledge is al pi eid echad (by one witness) or al pi ha'ba'alim (by the owner's admission), it is not liable for stoning (due to ein adam neherag al pi atzmo and ein din kenas al pi eid echad). The Mishnah specifies this scenario, implying that its issur status is different from a fully convicted shor haniskal. The Gemara will later clarify that such an ox is assur l'Gavoah but mutar l'hedyot (permitted for an ordinary person's benefit) in terms of its flesh, though the Mishnah appears to group it with issurei hana'ah for the takanah.
• "ברובע ונרבע... במוקצה ובנעבד... אתנן ומחיר" (with an animal that copulated... set aside for idol worship... payment of harlot/price of dog): These are distinct categories of psulim. Rove'a v'nirba (an animal that copulated with a human, or was the object of bestiality) are assurim l'Gavoah from the Torah ("לא תקריב את אלה" - Leviticus 18:23, though the context here is psul korbanos). Muktzah v'ne'evad (set aside for idol worship or worshipped) are issurei hana'ah from the Torah. Atnan u'mechir (harlot's payment or dog's price) are assurim l'Gavoah from the Torah ("לא תביא אתנן זונה ומחיר כלב בית ה' אלקיך" - Devarim 23:19). The Mishnah lists them together, but their halachic basis and scope of issur (benefit vs. altar) differ.
• "כלאים, טריפה, ויוצא דופן" (diverse kinds, tereifa, caesarean section): These are further categories of psulim l'Gavoah. Kilayim (offspring of diverse kinds) are disqualified from sacrifice ("מן הבהמה... מן הצאן" – Vayikra 1:2, implying specific species). Tereifa (an animal with a fatal wound) is inherently unfit for sacrifice ("תמים" – Vayikra 1:3). Yotzei dofen (caesarean-born) is generally not considered "פתח רחם" (firstborn opening the womb) and thus not eligible for korban status unless specifically brought as a nedava. Rashi will clarify that these are mutarim l'hedyot.
• "ירעו עד שיסתאבו ונמכרים ויביא בדמי היפה שבהן מאותו המין" (shall graze until they become unfit and sold, and bring from the money of the highest-quality among them, of the same type): This is the crucial takanah. The animals cannot be sacrificed (due to psul) nor can they be immediately redeemed and used for chullin (due to their mixed status or inherent sanctity). Thus, they are left to graze until they develop a mum (blemish) rendering them ne'emanim (unfit) for korban. Once blemished, they are sold, and a new korban is purchased from the proceeds. The phrase "בדמי היפה שבהן" (from the money of the most valuable among them) is subject to interpretive debate, particularly whether it implies that the kodshim might have been the more valuable and thus redeemed, or if it speaks to the value of the issur item itself.

Gemara Zevachim 71b – Initial Query & Rav Ashi's Reconciliation

The Gemara immediately questions the Mishnah's phrasing concerning issurei hana'ah (which it understands the Mishnah to be addressing based on its structure, specifically chatat shemita and shor haniskal convicted by two witnesses, which are assurim b'hana'ah):

"The mishna teaches the halakha of all the offerings that were intermingled with animals from which deriving benefit is forbidden. This indicates that one offering became intermingled with a majority of prohibited animals, as it is usual to describe the smaller unit as being intermingled with the larger unit. The Gemara asks: If so, what is the meaning of the term: Even, in the clause: Even if the ratio is one in ten thousand, deriving benefit from them all is prohibited and they all must die. If the permitted animal is rendered prohibited by a simple majority, of course it is prohibited if the ratio is one in ten thousand." This implies the Mishnah is teaching bitul b'chol shehu for issurei hana'ah. The Gemara then proposes that the Mishnah is referring to: "All the offerings in which were intermingled sin offerings left to die, or in which an ox that was sentenced to be stoned was intermingled, even if the ratio is one forbidden animal intermingled with ten thousand offerings, they all must die." The Gemara then challenges this by citing Mishnah Temura 28a: "We already learn this halakha on another occasion, in a mishna (Temura 28a): With regard to all animals whose sacrifice on the altar is prohibited, if they are intermingled with animals whose sacrifice is permitted they render the entire mixture prohibited in any amount, regardless of the ratio of permitted to prohibited animals. The mishna adds that these are the animals whose sacrifice is prohibited: An animal that actively copulated with a person, and an animal that was the object of bestiality." This leads to Rav Ashi's famous reconciliation: "Rav Ashi says: I said this halakha in the presence of Rav Shimi, and he explained to me that both mishnayot are necessary, as each teaches a novelty not included in the other. Rav Ashi clarifies: As, if this halakha was learned only from there, the mishna in Temura, I would say that this statement, that prohibited animals render a mixture prohibited in any ratio, applies only to prohibiting the animals from being sacrificed to the Most High; but with regard to prohibiting the animals even to an ordinary person [hedyot], e.g., that if they became intermingled with an ox that is to be stoned they all must die without the possibility of redemption, one might say that they are not all rendered prohibited in benefit, as the prohibited animal is nullified in a majority. Therefore, the mishna here teaches that even with regard to deriving benefit, all the animals in the mixture are prohibited. Rav Ashi continues: And if this halakha was learned only from here, I would say that it is only these categories that are mentioned in this mishna, i.e., sin offerings that were condemned to die or an ox that was sentenced to be stoned, that render a mixture prohibited in any ratio. The halakha is stringent with regard to them, as they are items from which deriving benefit is prohibited. But with regard to these categories mentioned in the mishna in Temura, e.g., an animal that copulated with a person, which are not items from which deriving benefit is prohibited, one might say that they are not disqualified from being sacrificed, and they are nullified in a majority. Therefore, both mishnayot are necessary."

Dikduk/Leshon Nuance – Gemara

• "אפילו אחד בעשרת אלפים" (even one in ten thousand): The Gemara's initial question hinges on this phrase. If bitul were by majority, this phrase would be superfluous. Its presence signifies bitul b'chol shehu.
• "הוא הדין לבהמה" (this refers to the animal): The Gemara interprets the Mishnah's list of psulim as referring to categories that are issur hana'ah and therefore batel b'chol shehu. This is a crucial interpretive step.
• "אסורין לגבוה" (prohibited for the Most High) vs. "אסורין להדיוט" (prohibited for an ordinary person): Rav Ashi's entire reconciliation hinges on this dichotomy. Issur l'Gavoah refers to disqualification from the altar. Issur l'hedyot refers to a prohibition of personal benefit. The chiddush of Temura is bitul b'chol shehu for issurei mizbe'ach, while the chiddush of Zevachim (as interpreted by the Gemara for the "even" clause) is bitul b'chol shehu for issurei hana'ah.

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Readings

The sugya provides a fertile ground for Rishonim and Acharonim to explore the nuanced distinctions between various types of issurim and psulim and their implications for bitul.

Rashi on Zevachim 71b:1:1 – The Nature of Psulei Gavoah

Rashi, commenting on the Mishnah's inclusion of kilayim, tereifa, and yotzei dofen, provides a foundational distinction that underpins Rav Ashi's Gemara. Rashi states:

"כלאים וטריפה ויוצא דופן - שור או כשב פרט לכלאים כי יולד פרט ליוצא דופן טריפה התם אמרינן כשהוא אומר מן הבקר למטה שאין ת"ל להוציא את הטריפה ולהדיוט מותרת בהנאה להשליכה לכלבים" (Kilayim, Tereifa, Yotzei Dofen – An ox or a sheep [are sacrificed, but the verses] exclude Kilayim, as it says "when it is born" [implying natural birth, excluding Yotzei Dofen]. For Tereifa, it is said there [in the Gemara, e.g., Bechorot 32a] that when it says "from the cattle," there is no need to state it, [so the extra phrase] comes to exclude a Tereifa. And for an ordinary person [hedyot], it is permitted for benefit, to throw it to dogs.)

Chiddush of Rashi

Rashi's chiddush here is explicit and far-reaching. He clearly articulates that categories like kilayim, tereifa, and yotzei dofen are only psulim l'Gavoah – they are disqualified from being offered on the altar. Crucially, they are not issurei hana'ah; they are mutar l'hedyot. Rashi even adds the specific example of "להשליכה לכלבים" (to throw it to dogs), emphasizing that they are entirely permissible for non-sacred use. This distinction is vital for understanding Rav Ashi's reconciliation between the Mishnah in Zevachim and the Mishnah in Temura. Rav Ashi posits that Temura teaches bitul b'chol shehu for issurei mizbe'ach that are mutar l'hedyot (like rove'a v'nirba), while Zevachim (in the "even" clause) teaches bitul b'chol shehu for issurei hana'ah. Rashi, by defining tereifa (and its ilk) as psul l'Gavoah but mutar l'hedyot, neatly places it within the category addressed by the Temura Mishnah – an item that disqualifies l'Gavoah b'chol shehu but is not an issur hana'ah. This precise categorization is fundamental to the entire sugya's analytical framework. Without this clear division, Rav Ashi's terutz would lose its logical footing, as the Mishnah would be mixing categories indiscriminately without a clear halachic rationale for distinct bitul rules.

Tosafot on Zevachim 71a:1:1 – The Nuance of Shor Haniskal al Pi Eid Echad

Tosafot grapples with the Mishnah's opening clause: "שור שהמית את האדם על פי עד אחד או על פי הבעלים" (an ox that killed a person based on one witness or owner's admission). The Mishnah immediately contrasts this with a shor haniskal convicted by two witnesses, which is assur b'hana'ah. Tosafot asks about the status of the ox in the specified case:

"על פי עד אחד או על פי הבעלים - פירש בקונטרס דפטר ליה מסקילה משום דמודה בקנס פטור וכן פירש במכות (דף ו.) דאין אדם נהרג על פי עצמו מטעם קנס ונראה דאפי' אמרי שנגמר דינם בבית דין פלוני אין נהרגים על פיהם ואע"ג דכי האי גוונא מחייב בקנס כדמוכח בפרק קמא דמכות (דף ד.) וגבי פלוני רבע שורי בפרק קמא דסנהדרין (דף י.) מפרש משום דאדם קרוב אצל ממונו לא אמרינן ונהרג שורו ולא פלגינן דיבורא אלא הרובע והשור נהרגין ואי קנס מיקרי כי נמי אמת הוא שרבע שורו אמאי נהרג שור על פיו והא מודה בקנס פטור כמו אם אמר גנבתי וטבחתי דפטור מכפל וד' וה' ונראה לי טעמא דאינו נהרג על פי הבעלים אם אין עד אחד עמו כדאיתא פרק כל האסורין (תמורה דף כט.) זה וזה מותרות באכילה מנלן אי ס"ד להדיוט אסירי למה לי למעוטינהו. לרובע ונרבע לגבוה ואע"ג דהתם לא מזכיר ברובע ונרבע על פי הבעלים מכל מקום על כל ענין שפסול גבוה ומותר להדיוט קאי מנהני מילי. ברוך:"

Chiddush of Tosafot

Tosafot, following Rashi (referred to as "בקונטרס"), explains that an ox testified against by one witness or confessed to by its owner is exempt from stoning because modeh b'kanas patur (one who admits to a penalty is exempt). This is because stoning a shor haniskal is considered a kanas (penalty) in the sense that the owner loses the ox. Tosafot then delves deeper, citing Makkos 6a that a person is not executed based on self-incrimination, and that even if a court verdict is given, it's not based on eid echad or ba'alim. The core chiddush here is Tosafot's analysis of the issur status of such an ox. If it's not stoned, is it assur b'hana'ah? Tosafot quotes Temura 29b ("פרק כל האסורין") which implies that rove'a v'nirba (and by extension, perhaps, this specific shor haniskal) are mutarim b'achila for a hedyot. The phrase there, "זה וזה מותרות באכילה מנלן אי ס"ד להדיוט אסירי למה לי למעוטינהו לרובע ונרבע לגבוה" (from where do we know that both are permitted for eating? If you think they are forbidden to an ordinary person, why would I need to exclude rove'a v'nirba for the altar?), supports the idea that these types of psulim (including the shor haniskal al pi eid echad) are mutar l'hedyot. This chiddush reinforces Rashi's categorization. The shor haniskal in our Mishnah's opening clause is psul l'Gavoah but mutar l'hedyot. It is thus distinct from a shor haniskal convicted by two witnesses, which is assur b'hana'ah. This allows the Mishnah to list it alongside other psulim l'Gavoah (like rove'a v'nirba, kilayim, tereifa), all of which fall under the category of issurei mizbe'ach that are mutar l'hedyot, addressed by Temura's bitul b'chol shehu for Gavoah. Tosafot's intricate discussion clarifies the precise halachic status of the shor haniskal in this specific scenario, confirming that not all shor haniskal cases are equal in their issur scope.

Tosafot on Zevachim 71b:1:2 – The Takanah and Bitul

Tosafot challenges Rashi's interpretation of "ויביא בדמי היפה שבהן" (and bring from the money of the most valuable among them). Rashi suggests that this implies the original korban was mixed with a majority of issur animals (e.g., rove'a v'nirba), and the phrase refers to redeeming the original korban (which might have been the "most valuable") by declaring it mechulal (profaned) on money.

"ויביא בדמי היפה שבהן - פירש"י ויקח מעות כשיעור דמי היפה שבכולן ויאמר כל מקום שהוא הזבח יהא מחולל על מעות הללו משמע לפירושו שהזבח מעורב בריבוא של רובע ונרבע והלשון משמע כן ואי איפשר לומר כן דדומיא דרישא קתני שהנסקל נתערב ברוב זבחים וכן מוכח בגמרא ובדמי היפה שבהן היינו דמי היפה של כל אחד ואחד ומניח הגרוע שבהן שלא יחלל:"

Chiddush of Tosafot

Tosafot strongly disagrees with Rashi's interpretation. Tosafot argues that Rashi's explanation implies that the sacred animal (ha'zevach) is mixed with a majority of prohibited animals (e.g., rove'a v'nirba), and that it is then redeemed based on its value. However, Tosafot contends that the Mishnah's initial discussion (about chatat shemita and shor haniskal assur b'hana'ah) implies the opposite: that the assur item is mixed into a majority of kodshim (a "ribo" - ten thousand), and yet it renders all of them assur. This is the whole point of bitul b'chol shehu. Therefore, Tosafot asserts, the phrase "בדמי היפה שבהן" cannot refer to the korban being redeemed from a majority of issurim. Rather, it must mean that after the mixture has grazed and become blemished, they are all sold. From the total money received, one must set aside the value of the "highest quality" animal of each type of offering that was in the mixture, and use that money to purchase new korbanot. The point is not to redeem the original korban from being batel, but rather to ensure that a korban of proper quality is brought, representing the potential value of the original sacred animal, even if that original sacred animal cannot be identified. This approach avoids the problematic implication that the korban itself was batel in a majority, which would contradict the bitul b'chol shehu principle discussed elsewhere in the sugya. Tosafot's chiddush clarifies the takanah's mechanics, ensuring it aligns with the broader halachic principles of bitul in kodshim, particularly that kodshim are not easily batel or redeemed from sacred status unless specifically permitted. It reframes the takanah as a mechanism for replacement rather than redemption of the original sacred entity.

Rashash on Zevachim 71a:1 – Source for Psul l'Gavoah Before Verdict

The Rashash, commenting on the Mishnah's mention of rove'a v'nirba, delves into the halachic source for their psul l'Gavoah even before a formal court verdict. He references the Rambam and the Ra'avya, and explores the nature of their disqualification.

"במשנה ברובע ונרבע. עי' בפי' הרע"ב. ומה שהוסיפו בד"ח בדבריו מלת של. נראה שבוש וכן בפי' הרמב"ם אשר ממנו לקח הרע"ב ליתא. וכוונתם פשוטה דר"ל שהיה הרובע או הנרבע והנהרג עובד כוכבים. דאז אין הבהמה נהרגת עי' רמב"ם פ"ט מהל' מלכים ה"ו. ודע דמה שחדשו לנו הרמב"ם והרע"ב דקודם שנגמר דינו אסור לגבוה. יש לו מקור נאמן מהגמרא ר"פ כל האסורים לפי' הראשון של התוס' שם בד"ה טול. אך ע"י עובד כוכבים לא ראיתי עדיין מקורו. ואולי דחילייהו מהא דקרא סתמא כתיב מן הבהמה להוציא את הרובע והנרבע ומן הצאן להוציא את הנוגח. ממעטינן כל הני דליכא בהו סקילה ועי' תד"ה ע"פ עד אחד. שוב נזכרתי שגם זה גמ' בר"פ אין מעמידין לוקחין מהם בהמה לקרבן וא"ח לא משום רובע ולא משום נרבע. דמשמע דאם ידעינן שכן הוא נאסרים לגבוה. וממילא מוכח גם הא דלא נגמר דינו. [וכמו כן מהא דנפסל ע"י ע"א] ועמש"כ לקמן (פד) דברים הסותרים לכאורה לזה. אבל דעת לנבון נקל לחלק בניהם:"

Chiddush of Rashash

The Rashash addresses a subtle but significant point: when does the psul l'Gavoah for rove'a v'nirba take effect? Is it only after a formal beit din verdict, or immediately upon the act? The Rambam and Ra'avya (as cited by the Rashash via the Ra'avya's commentary on the Mishnah) rule that even before a verdict, such an animal is assur l'Gavoah. The Rashash seeks the source for this chiddush. He finds a "מקור נאמן" (reliable source) in the Gemara in Temura 29b ("פרק כל האסורין"), specifically in the first explanation of Tosafot there (ד"ה טול). This interpretation suggests that the very fact of the animal being a rove'a or nirba renders it intrinsically unfit for the altar, independent of judicial proceedings. The Rashash also raises the scenario of the rove'a/nirba being owned by a goy (non-Jew). In such a case, the animal would not be executed, but would it still be psul l'Gavoah? The Rashash notes he hasn't found an explicit source for this, but speculates it could be derived from the general exclusion of rove'a/nirba from sacrificial eligibility in the Torah ("מן הבהמה" – Vayikra 1:2), which applies irrespective of ownership or verdict. He later recalls another Gemara (Avoda Zara 22a, "פרק אין מעמידין") that discusses taking animals for korbanot from goyim, and implies that if we know it's a rove'a or nirba, it's assur l'Gavoah. This implies the psul is inherent to the animal's status, not just its legal judgment. The Rashash's chiddush reinforces the idea that psulim like rove'a v'nirba are distinct from shor haniskal. While shor haniskal al pi eid echad might derive its psul l'Gavoah from the general category of shor haniskal even without stoning, rove'a v'nirba seems to carry an inherent psul that arises immediately upon the act itself, making it a clear case of issur mizbe'ach that is mutar l'hedyot, precisely the type of chiddush Rav Ashi attributes to Temura. This deep dive into the source of the psul further solidifies the categorical distinctions upon which the Gemara's reconciliation rests.

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Friction

The sugya presents several points of friction that highlight the profound lomdus involved in discerning precise halachic categories and their implications. The Gemara's discussion of the Mishnah's apparent redundancy is a prime example.

Kushya 1: The Redundancy of Dual Mishnayot

The Gemara on Zevachim 71b immediately raises a difficulty concerning the Mishnah's discussion of bitul b'chol shehu for certain prohibited items. If our Mishnah (Zevachim 71a-b) teaches that chatat shemita (sin offering left to die) or shor haniskal (ox sentenced to be stoned) render a mixture assur b'chol shehu, why is this necessary?

"Why is this mishna necessary? We already learn this halakha on another occasion, in a mishna (Temura 28a): With regard to all animals whose sacrifice on the altar is prohibited, if they are intermingled with animals whose sacrifice is permitted they render the entire mixture prohibited in any amount, regardless of the ratio of permitted to prohibited animals. The mishna adds that these are the animals whose sacrifice is prohibited: An animal that actively copulated with a person, and an animal that was the object of bestiality." The kushya is: Mishnah Temura 28a already teaches the principle of bitul b'chol shehu for items prohibited from the altar. If so, what chiddush does our Mishnah in Zevachim add, particularly when it comes to items that are assur b'hana'ah? It seems superfluous.

Terutz 1 (Rav Ashi's Initial Reconciliation)

Rav Ashi, in the Gemara Zevachim 71b, provides the classic terutz, arguing for the dual necessity of both mishnayot:

"Rav Ashi says: I said this halakha in the presence of Rav Shimi, and he explained to me that both mishnayot are necessary, as each teaches a novelty not included in the other. Rav Ashi clarifies: As, if this halakha was learned only from there, the mishna in Temura, I would say that this statement, that prohibited animals render a mixture prohibited in any ratio, applies only to prohibiting the animals from being sacrificed to the Most High; but with regard to prohibiting the animals even to an ordinary person [hedyot], e.g., that if they became intermingled with an ox that is to be stoned they all must die without the possibility of redemption, one might say that they are not all rendered prohibited in benefit, as the prohibited animal is nullified in a majority. Therefore, the mishna here teaches that even with regard to deriving benefit, all the animals in the mixture are prohibited. And if this halakha was learned only from here, I would say that it is only these categories that are mentioned in this mishna, i.e., sin offerings that were condemned to die or an ox that was sentenced to be stoned, that render a mixture prohibited in any ratio. The halakha is stringent with regard to them, as they are items from which deriving benefit is prohibited. But with regard to these categories mentioned in the mishna in Temura, e.g., an animal that copulated with a person, which are not items from which deriving benefit is prohibited, one might say that they are not disqualified from being sacrificed, and they are nullified in a majority. Therefore, both mishnayot are necessary."

Rav Ashi's terutz is a prime example of lomdus in identifying the chiddush of each Mishnah. He posits two distinct categories of issurim that are batel b'chol shehu:

1. Issurei Hana'ah (Prohibitions of Benefit): These are items like chatat shemita and shor haniskal (after verdict), which are inherently forbidden for any personal use. Our Mishnah in Zevachim teaches that these assurim contaminate a mixture b'chol shehu not only l'Gavoah but also l'hedyot (for ordinary benefit). This is a chiddush because one might have thought that issur hana'ah only applies to the issur item itself, and in a mixture with mutar items, the issur would be batel b'rov for hedyot use.
2. Issurei Mizbe'ach (Prohibitions of Altar Sacrifice): These are items like rove'a v'nirba, which are disqualified from the altar but are mutar l'hedyot (as Rashi and Tosafot explain). The Mishnah in Temura teaches that these assurim contaminate a mixture b'chol shehu specifically l'Gavoah. This is a chiddush because one might have thought that since they are mutar l'hedyot, their psul l'Gavoah would be batel b'rov when mixed with kodshim.

Thus, each Mishnah teaches a stringent halacha that one could not derive from the other. Without Zevachim, we might think bitul b'chol shehu for hedyot is limited. Without Temura, we might think bitul b'chol shehu for Gavoah is limited to issurei hana'ah.

Terutz 2 (Gemara's Refinement and Further Challenge)

The Gemara immediately challenges Rav Ashi's explanation:

"The Gemara questions this explanation: This justifies the mishna here, but concerning the halakha stated in Temura, why did that mishna teach the halakha with regard to those animals that are not items from which deriving benefit is prohibited, such as an animal that copulated with a person; the tanna already taught this halakha in the mishna here. The Gemara answers: Does the mishna here teach by what ratio they render the mixture prohibited? The important measure: In any amount, is taught there, in Temura, not in the mishna here, and that is the novelty of the mishna in Temura. The Gemara challenges: But if so, let the tanna teach that mishna in Temura, and then he would not require this mishna here. Why teach the second clause of the mishna here? The Gemara explains: It was necessary for the tanna to mention the remedy, i.e., that the animals that are intermingled shall graze until they become unfit for sacrifice and then they shall be sold; and from the money received in the sale, the owner shall bring another offering of the monetary value of the highest-quality animal among them as the same type of offering that the sacrificial animal was. This halakha is not stated in the mishna in Temura."

This refined terutz clarifies the precise chiddush of each Mishnah even further. The Gemara first asks: If Zevachim teaches about issurei hana'ah and Temura about issurei mizbe'ach, why does Temura bother listing rove'a v'nirba which is mutar l'hedyot? This is because the chiddush of Temura is not merely the existence of the issur, but the measure of its bitul – that it is b'chol shehu even for issurei mizbe'ach. Then, the Gemara asks: If Temura teaches the bitul b'chol shehu principle for all types of psulim (categorized by Rav Ashi), why do we need Zevachim at all? The answer is that Zevachim is needed to teach the takanah of "ירעו עד שיסתאבו ונמכרים ויביא בדמי היפה שבהן" (they shall graze until they become unfit and are sold, and he shall bring from the money of the most valuable among them). This practical remedy for psulei kodshim is unique to our Mishnah and not found in Temura.

This two-stage Gemara analysis demonstrates an extreme rigor in identifying redundancy and novelty. It's not enough to show that each Mishnah introduces a type of issur or psul. Rather, each Mishnah must teach a specific halachic detail (the measure of bitul, or the practical takanah) that cannot be derived from elsewhere.

Kushya 2: The Tereifa's Treatment in the Mishnah

The Mishnah lists tereifa (an animal with a fatal wound) among the items that, when intermingled with kodshim, necessitate the takanah of "ירעו עד שיסתאבו" (they shall graze until they become unfit). However, as Rashi 71b:1:1 explicitly states, a tereifa is mutar l'hedyot ("ולהדיוט מותרת בהנאה להשליכה לכלבים"). If it's mutar l'hedyot, why can't it be immediately sold and used for ordinary benefit (e.g., fed to dogs) rather than having to graze until it develops a blemish? This seems like an overly stringent takanah for an item that is not assur b'hana'ah.

Terutz 1 (Based on Rashi's Underlying Assumption)

Rashi's comment (71b:1:1) that tereifa is mutar l'hedyot for throwing to dogs suggests that the psul is only l'Gavoah. Thus, when a tereifa is mixed with kodshim, the entire mixture becomes psul l'Gavoah (by bitul b'chol shehu as discussed in Temura and Rav Ashi's second category). The takanah of yer'u ad sheyista'avu applies to all psulei kodshim that cannot be brought on the altar. While the tereifa itself could be given to dogs, the kodshim it is mixed with cannot be. Since the mixture is indistinguishable, and the kodshim cannot be given to dogs (as they are kedusha), the takanah of grazing until a mum develops becomes the only viable option to preserve the sanctity of the kodshim and allow for their eventual redemption and replacement. This terutz views the takanah as being driven by the status of the kodshim in the mixture, not necessarily the tereifa itself.

Terutz 2 (Tosafot 71b:1:1 – The Ambiguity of Tereifa)

Tosafot (71b:1:1) raises this kushya directly and provides a multi-faceted terutz:

"ובטריפה - בגמ' דייק האי טריפה היכי דמי אי ידע לה ליזיל ולישקלה ומפרש רבי ירמיה כגון שנתערבה בוולד טריפה ורבי אליעזר היא ורבי ינאי מפרש כגון דאיתערבה נקובת הקוץ בדרוסת הזאב וריש לקיש מפרש כגון דאיערב בנפולה והקשה ה"ר אפרים כיון דלא ידיעה מה מועלת כאן רעייה דלמיכלה א"א משום ספק טריפה ולעובדי כוכבים ולכלבים אי איפשר דאין פודין את הקדשים להאכילן לכלבים ומחיים נמי לא איפשר ליהנות דפסולי המוקדשים אסורים בגיזה ועבודה מיהו למ"ד דאיערב בדרוסה יש לה בדיקה לאחר שחיטה אם האדימה בשר כנגד בני מעיים או כנגד הסימנים דאפי' ודאי דרוסה יש לה בדיקה ולמ"ד דאיערב בנפולה נפולה יש לה בדיקה אבל למ"ד בוולד טריפה קשה ושמא קסבר פודין את הקדשים להאכילן לכלבים כאיכא דאמרי בפרק שני דבכורות (דף טו:) אי נמי כדאמרינן (פסחים דף.) אין פודין את הקדשים להאכילן לכלבים הני מילי היכא דלא חזו אלא לכלבים כגון קדשים שמתו או נטרפו אבל הני אסורים מחמת טריפות חולין שנתערבו בהן אבל קדשים גופייהו אם היה מכירן דחזו לדידיה שרי להאכילן לעובדי כוכבים ולכלבים ומיתרצא בהכי פירכא אחריתי שהיה מקשה ה"ר אפרים בבכורות פ' כל פסולי המוקדשין (בכורות דף לב:) בכור מתיר ר"ע אפי' לעובד כוכבים ולקמן בפ' טבול יום (זבחים דף קג:) אמר ר"ע מדבריהם למדנו שהמפשיט את הבכור ונמצא טריפה שיאותו הכהנים בעורו משמע דווקא בעורו אבל בבשרו לא דאסור להאכילו לכלבים ולעובדי כוכבים ולפי מה שפירשתי ניחא דמידי דלא חזי לישראל אסור להאכילו לכלב ולעובדי כוכבים אבל מידי דחזי לישראל כיון שנפדו שרי ליתן לכלב והיינו טעמא דדרשינן ואכלת ולא לכלביך כלומר דבר שאין עומד אלא לכלביך אבל היכא דחזי לדידיה אישתרו לגמרי דאיתקש לצבי ואיל וא"ת בפרק הפרה (ב"ק דף נג:) דפטרינן שור פסולי המוקדשים שנפל לבור משום דכתיב והמת יהיה לו מי שהמת שלו הרי המת שלו כדתנן (לקמן זבחים דף קג:) דיאותו הכהנים בעורו ומשום עור לחודיה איצטריך שור ולא אדם דהוה מחייבנא באדם דחשיב המת שלו משום עור דשרי בהנאה מדאורייתא ולא אסור אלא משום גזירה שמא יעשה עורות אביו ואמו שטיחין (חולין דף קכב.) וי"ל דסוגיא דב"ק (דף נג:) אתיא כמסקנא דפרק טבול יום (לקמן זבחים ד' קד.) דפסקי' כרבנן בשר בקבורה ועור בשריפה:"

Tosafot first notes that the Gemara itself questions "אי ידע לה ליזיל ולישקלה" (if he knows it, let him go and take it), implying that if one knew which animal was the tereifa, one could separate it. The Gemara therefore offers various explanations for what kind of tereifa is meant, e.g., v'yeled tereifa (offspring of a tereifa mother), nikvat hakoitz b'derusat haze'ev (a punctured windpipe mixed with a wolf-mauled animal), or n'fula (a fallen animal). These scenarios create a safek (doubt) or an inherent psul that is not immediately obvious. The core of Tosafot's kushya (from HaRav Ephraim) is: if the mixture contains a safek tereifa, one cannot eat it (due to safek issur). But why can't one redeem the kodshim to feed them to dogs or sell to goyim? Because "אין פודין את הקדשים להאכילן לכלבים" (we do not redeem sacred offerings to feed them to dogs). This prohibition prevents immediate disposal. Tosafot then offers a resolution: Perhaps some Amoraim (cited in Bechorot 15b) do hold that kodshim can be redeemed to be fed to dogs if they are psulim. Alternatively, even if we say ein podin, that only applies "היכא דלא חזו אלא לכלבים" (where they are only fit for dogs), like kodshim shemeitu (sacred animals that died) or nitarfu (became tereifa themselves). However, here, the kodshim themselves are kasher, but are assur due to admixture with chullin tereifos. In such a case, if one could identify the kodshim, they would be fit for a Yisrael. Since they are not fit for a Yisrael now (due to the mixture), once they are redeemed (by developing a mum and being sold), they can be given to goyim or dogs. This is based on the principle that "מידי דחזי לישראל כיון שנפדו שרי ליתן לכלב" (something fit for a Jew, once redeemed, is permitted to give to a dog). This terutz from Tosafot is exceptionally intricate. It hinges on:

1. The specific type of tereifa involved (often a safek or one that requires post-slaughter inspection), making immediate identification and separation impossible.
2. The halacha regarding pidyon kodshim for dogs/gentiles, distinguishing between kodshim that are inherently psul (which cannot be redeemed for dogs) and kodshim that are kasher but become unusable due to a mixture with chullin psulim (which can be redeemed for dogs/gentiles after the takanah).

This kushya and Tosafot's terutz highlight the deep practical considerations behind halachic rules. The takanah of yer'u ad sheyista'avu is not a mere arbitrary delay but a necessary procedure given the complex interplay of issurim, safek, and the specific rules of kedusha and pidyon.

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Intertext

The sugya in Zevachim 71a-b is deeply interconnected with several other fundamental texts across Shas, illuminating the broader halachic landscape of issur and bitul.

1. Mishnah Temura 28a

This Mishnah is the primary parallel cited by the Gemara to challenge our Mishnah. It states:

"כל הנאסרים על גבי המזבח אם נתערבו במי שהם מותרין על גבי המזבח, אוסרין בכל שהוא. ואלו הן הנאסרים: הרובע והנרבע..." (All animals that are prohibited on the altar, if they are intermingled with animals that are permitted on the altar, they render the entire mixture prohibited in any amount. These are the prohibited ones: the animal that copulated with a person, and the animal that was the object of bestiality...)

Connection to Zevachim 71a-b

This Mishnah is the cornerstone of Rav Ashi's first category: issurei mizbe'ach (like rove'a v'nirba) that are mutar l'hedyot but are batel b'chol shehu for the altar. The Gemara's initial kushya is that if Temura teaches bitul b'chol shehu for psulim l'Gavoah, why does Zevachim bother with similar cases? Rav Ashi's genius is in identifying the precise chiddush of Temura as limited to Gavoah and then showing Zevachim's novelty for hedyot. The very existence of this parallel Mishnah forces a rigorous analysis of the scope and application of bitul b'chol shehu for different types of issurim. Without Temura 28a, Rav Ashi's entire framework for reconciling the mishnayot would be unnecessary, but also the nuanced understanding of bitul in kodshim would be incomplete.

2. Mishnah Avoda Zara 74a

Towards the end of the sugya on Zevachim 71b, the Gemara again challenges the necessity of our Mishnah, citing another parallel:

"The halakha of the mishna that items from which deriving benefit is prohibited render a mixture prohibited in any amount even to an ordinary person, as stated with regard to the sin offerings that were condemned to die and an ox that was sentenced to be stoned, is also taught in a mishna (Avoda Zara 74a): And these following items are themselves forbidden, and any amount of them renders other items with which they become mixed forbidden: Wine used for a libation that became mixed with kosher wine, and objects of idol worship that were intermingled with permitted items."

Connection to Zevachim 71a-b

This Mishnah in Avoda Zara directly addresses Rav Ashi's first category: issurei hana'ah (like yayin nesekh and avoda zara objects) that are batel b'chol shehu even for hedyot. The Gemara in Zevachim asks: if Avoda Zara already teaches that issurei hana'ah are batel b'chol shehu for hedyot, what's the chiddush of Zevachim? The Gemara's terutz is that Zevachim is needed to teach the specific takanah of yer'u ad sheyista'avu. This highlights that even within the category of issurei hana'ah that are batel b'chol shehu for hedyot, there are distinct halachic implications depending on whether the mixture involves chullin (as in Avoda Zara) or kodshim (as in Zevachim), necessitating unique remedies for the latter. The Avoda Zara Mishnah serves to show that the principle of bitul b'chol shehu for issurei hana'ah is broad, but Zevachim adds the specific kodshim-related procedure.

3. Bava Kamma 40b – Shor Hanogeah vs. Rove'a/Nirba

Tosafot on Zevachim 71a:1:2 alludes to a Gemara in Bava Kamma 40b (or 40a, depending on edition) that discusses the distinctions between an ox that gores (shor hanogeah) and an ox that copulates (rove'a v'nirba). The Gemara there states:

"שיש בנוגח שאין ברובע ויש ברובע שאין בנוגח" (There are things in a gorer that are not in a copulator, and there are things in a copulator that are not in a gorer.)

Connection to Zevachim 71a-b

This statement underscores the idea that different psulim, even if they involve animals, are not necessarily analogous in their halachic implications. The shor haniskal (which comes from shor hanogeah if it killed a person) and rove'a v'nirba are distinct categories. The psul of shor haniskal (after a verdict) is issur hana'ah and issur mizbe'ach. The psul of rove'a v'nirba is issur mizbe'ach but mutar l'hedyot. This distinction is precisely what Rav Ashi leverages to justify the separate chiddushim of Zevachim and Temura. The Bava Kamma sugya provides a broader halachic context for this categorical differentiation, demonstrating that the Torah itself treats these animals with distinct legal frameworks, which then extends to their korban status and bitul rules.

4. Bechorot 15b / 32b – Redemption of Psulei Kodshim

Tosafot on Zevachim 71b:1:1, in its discussion of the tereifa and the takanah of yer'u ad sheyista'avu, refers to a debate in Bechorot regarding "אין פודין את הקדשים להאכילן לכלבים" (we do not redeem sacred offerings to feed them to dogs). For example, Bechorot 15b discusses whether bechorot (firstborn animals) that are psulim can be redeemed for this purpose. Bechorot 32b similarly discusses the disposal of psulei kodshim.

Connection to Zevachim 71a-b

The rule of "אין פודין את הקדשים להאכילן לכלבים" is critical for understanding why the takanah of yer'u ad sheyista'avu is necessary for kodshim mixed with tereifa. If a tereifa is mutar l'hedyot, why not simply sell the mixture and feed the tereifa part to dogs and use the kodshim proceeds for a new korban? The halacha in Bechorot explains that kodshim, even if psulim, retain a certain sanctity that prevents them from being redeemed for such ignoble uses. This directly impacts the Mishnah's prescribed remedy, necessitating the prolonged grazing until a mum develops, allowing for a more dignified (and halachically permissible) redemption through sale to a Yisrael (who would then use the money for a korban). Tosafot's resolution, distinguishing between kodshim inherently psul and kodshim rendered unusable by mixture, further refines this understanding, showing how the principles of kedusha and pidyon interact with the rules of bitul and ta'aroves.

5. Kiddushin 57b – Rove'a/Nirba Prohibited L'Hedyot?

Tosafot on Zevachim 71a:1:2 also references Kiddushin 57b, where there's a discussion that might imply rove'a v'nirba are assurim l'hedyot.

"וכן נמי משמע בפרק האיש מקדש (קדושין דף נז:) דפריך והרי רובע ונרבע בעדים דאסירי מחיים להדיוט" (And similarly, it seems in Perek Ha'ish Mekadesh (Kiddushin 57b) that it asks: But rove'a v'nirba with witnesses, are they not forbidden l'hedyot while alive?)

Connection to Zevachim 71a-b

This reference from Kiddushin presents a potential challenge to the core premise of Rav Ashi's terutz – that rove'a v'nirba are mutar l'hedyot. If Kiddushin implies they are assur l'hedyot, then they would fall into Rav Ashi's first category (issurei hana'ah) and the distinction between Zevachim and Temura would crumble. Tosafot on Zevachim 71a:1:2 acknowledges this difficulty but sets it aside, stating "ושמא איכא שום דרש" (perhaps there is some drasha / interpretation) that differentiates it. This highlights the fluidity and occasional tension between sugyot and the interpretive efforts required to maintain a consistent halachic system. The very fact that Tosafot notes this kushya indicates its potential to disrupt the established framework of the Zevachim sugya, emphasizing the precise nature of the definitions of issur hana'ah versus issur mizbe'ach.

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Psak/Practice

The sugya in Zevachim 71a-b, while dealing with korbanot and specific animal psulim that are less common today, establishes foundational halachic principles that permeate various areas of halacha l'maaseh (practical halacha) and meta-psak heuristics.

Meta-Psak Heuristics

1. Hierarchy and Scope of Issurim: The most profound heuristic is the meticulous categorization of prohibitions: issur hana'ah (prohibition of benefit) vs. issur mizbe'ach (prohibition of altar use). This distinction, championed by Rav Ashi, is fundamental. An item can be disqualified for sacred use but perfectly permissible for mundane benefit, and vice versa. This framework guides psak in myriad contexts where an item's status is ambiguous, forcing the posek to ask: what precisely is the scope of this issur? Is it absolute or limited?
2. Rules of Bitul (Nullification): The sugya clarifies that bitul is not a monolithic concept. Some issurim are batel b'rov (nullified by a majority), while others are batel b'chol shehu (nullified by any amount). This distinction is driven by the nature of the issur itself (e.g., issurei hana'ah often nullify b'chol shehu, especially if they are chashuv or d'Oraita). This principle is crucial in kashrut (e.g., basar b'chalav, treifos, stam yeinam) where the ratio of mixture determines the halacha.
3. Unique Takanot for Kedusha: The takanah of yer'u ad sheyista'avu highlights that sacred items, even when disqualified, cannot be treated as ordinary chullin. They retain a residual sanctity that requires a specific, often prolonged, process for their eventual desanctification and redemption. This reflects a broader halachic principle that kedusha is not easily removed and requires specific halachic mechanisms, often involving delays or special procedures, before an item can revert to chullin status. This teaches a posek to always consider the kedusha status of an item and its unique handling requirements.
4. The "Why is This Mishna Necessary?" Paradigm: The Gemara's rigorous questioning of seemingly redundant mishnayot ("מאי שנא הכא ומאי שנא התם" - what is different here and what is different there?) is a classic lomdus approach. It teaches that every halachic text, especially a Mishnah, is presumed to have a unique chiddush. A posek employing this heuristic will always search for the specific nuance or novel teaching in any halachic source, rather than assuming redundancy or generality.

Psak/Practice

1. Kashrut and Bitul: The principles of bitul b'chol shehu for certain issurei hana'ah find direct application in kashrut. For instance, stam yeinam (wine handled by a non-Jew, making it forbidden for benefit) or actual yayin nesekh (libation wine) are assur b'hana'ah and nullify b'chol shehu in a mixture with kosher wine, just as avoda zara objects nullify b'chol shehu in Avoda Zara 74a. The sugya's rigorous distinctions provide the theoretical underpinning for these practical halachot. Similarly, while a tereifa is generally batel b'rov in chullin mixtures for eating, the sugya reminds us of the complexity when kedusha is involved or if the tereifa itself is issur hana'ah (e.g., a neveila of certain categories).
2. Psulei Kodshim Today: While korbanot are not offered today, the halachot pertaining to psulei kodshim remain relevant for bechorot (firstborn animals) and ma'aser beheima (animal tithe) in specific contexts. If a bechor develops a mum (blemish), it becomes psul l'Gavoah and must be given to a kohen to be eaten. If it is mixed with other animals, the principles from our sugya regarding ta'aroves and bitul would be consulted. The takanah of yer'u ad sheyista'avu is the prescribed procedure for such psulei kodshim that cannot be used. They are left to graze until they acquire a permanent mum, then slaughtered and eaten by kohanim (or sold if they are not bechorot but other psulei kodshim from the Mishnah that do not have kedushat haguf). The sugya thus provides the blueprint for handling sacred items that have become disqualified but cannot be immediately disposed of.

The principles elucidated in Zevachim 71a-b, therefore, are not confined to the esoteric world of the Beit Hamikdash but offer fundamental insights into the structure of halacha, guiding both abstract lomdus and concrete psak in diverse areas of Jewish law.

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Takeaway

The sugya meticulously distinguishes between various categories of issurim and psulim, demonstrating that bitul is not a monolithic concept but rather nuanced based on the nature of the prohibition (e.g., issur hana'ah vs. issur mizbe'ach) and the specific item involved. This complexity necessitates multiple mishnayot to teach seemingly overlapping halachot and underscores the systematic rigor underlying the apparent diversity of halachic rules.