Zevachim 73

Sugya Map

• Issue: The principle of davar sheb'minyan (a "counted item") and its implications for bitul b'rov (nullification in a majority), particularly concerning consecrated animals. The Gemara explores whether items prohibited by rabbinic or Torah law, if they are typically counted, can ever be nullified within a larger group of permitted items.
• Nafka Mina(s):
  • How to treat mixtures of issur (prohibited) and heter (permitted) items, especially when the issur has a distinct identity or is typically counted.
  • The b'di'avad (post-facto) validity of sacrifices performed from such mixtures, and the rationale behind prohibitions even when a bitul mechanism seems available.
  • The conceptual status of ba'alei chayim (living creatures) as intrinsically significant, influencing their nullification.
• Primary Sources:
  • Mishna Zevachim 73a (implied by the Gemara's initial statement)
  • Baraita (Tosefta Terumot 5:11), Zevachim 73a
  • Mishna Kinnim 22b, Zevachim 73a
  • Rashi, Steinsaltz (commentary on Zevachim 73a)

Text Snapshot

The Gemara on Zevachim 73a opens with a foundational principle:

כל דבר שיש בו מנין, ואפילו בדרבנן, לא בטיל, וכל שכן בדאורייתא, כגון פסולי קרבן דמתניתין. Any item that is counted, even if it is prohibited by rabbinic law, e.g., teruma of fruit, cannot be nullified, and all the more so items prohibited by Torah law, such as animals that are disqualified for the altar, as in the mishna. Zevachim 73a:1:1

This immediately frames the discussion around davar sheb'minyan and its non-nullification. The phrase "כל דבר שיש בו מנין" is central, requiring a precise definition of what constitutes a "counted item." The Gemara then cites a lengthy baraita from Tosefta Terumot 5:11, detailing a dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda regarding the opinions of Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua concerning litra katzu'ot (a litra of dried figs) that fell onto the openings of various vessels. The nuance of "על פי עיגול" (on the opening of a circular vessel) is crucial, implying a visible, defined location.

Later, Rava introduces a gezeirah (rabbinic decree) regarding sacrificial animals:

אמר רבא: השתא דאמרו רבנן אין מקריבין, אי הקריב – לא קיבל. Rava says: Now that the Sages have said that we do not sacrifice any of them, if we did sacrifice one of them, the offering does not effect acceptance for the owner. Zevachim 73a:17:1

This statement is challenged by Rav Huna bar Yehuda from Mishna Kinnim 22b, which describes a b'di'avad validation of intermingled bird offerings, provided they were sacrificed correctly. The Gemara resolves this by invoking a machloket Tanna'im regarding whether "living creatures are permanently rejected" (muchanim).

Readings

Rashi's Definition of Davar Sheb'minyan

Rashi, in his commentary on the opening statement of our sugya, provides a nuanced definition of "כל דבר שיש בו מנין":

כל דבר שיש בו מנין – כל שדרכו לימנות כלל, כגון ליטראות של קציעות, שרוב בני אדם אין מוכרין במנין אלא דורסין אותו בעיגול ומוכר כל העיגול יחד, הואיל ופעמים שמונין הליטראות לבד למוכרם במנין. Rashi on Zevachim 73a s.v. "כל דבר שיש בו מנין"

Rashi clarifies that davar sheb'minyan refers to "anything whose general way is to be counted" (כל שדרכו לימנות כלל). This is a critical distinction. It does not require the item always to be sold by count. Even if the typical mode of sale is by weight or as a unit (like the circular fig cakes), if there are instances where individual units (ליטראות) are counted for sale, then the item falls under this category. This broadens the scope of davar sheb'minyan beyond items like coins or eggs, encompassing commodities that retain a distinct identity. The chiddush here is that the criterion is not exclusive counting, but rather the potential or occasional practice of counting, implying an inherent significance to each unit.

Rashi further explains the initial statement:

ואפילו בדרבנן – במידי דאיסוריה מדרבנן כגון תרומת קציעות, לא בטיל, הואיל ודרכו לימנות כלל. כ"ש בדאורייתא כגון פסולי קרבן דמתניתין. Rashi on Zevachim 73a s.v. "ואפילו בדרבנן"

This reinforces that the principle of davar sheb'minyan is so robust that it applies even to rabbinic prohibitions, kal v'chomer (all the more so) to Torah prohibitions. The katzu'ot in the baraita are teruma, which is rabbinically prohibited for non-priests when untithed, underscoring the severity. The chiddush is highlighting the strength of the davar sheb'minyan principle, transcending the origin of the prohibition.

Ritva's Analysis of Rava's Gezeirah

The Ritva, in his commentary on our sugya, delves into Rava's gezeirah against sacrificing the animals even after moving them. Rava states that the decree is "lest one may, in another circumstance, allow them to be sacrificed even when they are taken from a fixed location" (Zevachim 73a:16:1). The Ritva illuminates the nature of this decree:

ומה שאמר רבא גזרה שמא יקריב ממקום קבוע, פירוש: גזרה אטו קבוע, דכיון דאיכא דמיון איכא למיחש שמא יקלו בזה מפני שהתירו להקריב מזה וסוף סוף איסורו קבוע, הלכך גזרו שלא להקריב בין מזה בין מזה. Ritva on Zevachim 73a s.v. "גזרה שמא יקריב ממקום קבוע"

The Ritva explains that Rava's decree is an "אטו" (lest) decree, prohibiting the permitted (sacrificing from a moved mixture) due to concern for the prohibited (sacrificing from a fixed mixture). The chiddush here is that the Sages feared a slippery slope: if they permitted sacrificing from a moved mixture (where kol d'parish could theoretically apply), people might mistakenly apply the same logic to a fixed mixture (where kol d'kavu'a k'mechtza al mechtza dami applies, meaning it remains a doubt). This reveals a meta-halachic principle: the Sages sometimes prohibit a seemingly permissible action to safeguard a more fundamental prohibition, especially when there's a risk of confusion due to similar circumstances (דמיון).

Friction

The Clash with Kinnim 22b

The most potent kushya in our sugya is Rav Huna bar Yehuda's objection to Rava's definitive ruling: "Now that the Sages have said that we do not sacrifice any of them, if we did sacrifice one of them, the offering does not effect acceptance for the owner" (Zevachim 73a:17:1). This statement implies that an offering prohibited from being sacrificed from a mixture is pasul (disqualified) b'di'avad (after the fact).

Rav Huna bar Yehuda challenges this from Mishna Kinnim 22b, which deals with bird offerings (kinim) – a chatat (sin-offering) intermingled with an olah (burnt-offering). The Mishna states that if a priest did not consult (i.e., acted b'di'avad) and sacrificed them, performing all rites above the red line (as for an olah) or below the red line (as for a chatat), "half are fit, and half are unfit" (Kinnim 22b:6:1). This implies that despite the initial prohibition due to the mixture, b'di'avad, the correctly performed sacrifices are valid and effect acceptance. This directly contradicts Rava's assertion that "לא קיבל" (it does not effect acceptance).

Resolution: Muchanim vs. Einan Muchanim

The Gemara resolves this powerful contradiction by positing a machloket Tanna'im:

אלא, הא כמאן דאמר בעלי חיים מוכנין הן, והא כמאן דאמר בעלי חיים אינן מוכנין. Zevachim 73a:19:1 Rather, this statement of Rava is in accordance with the opinion of the one who says that living creatures that become disqualified are permanently rejected from being sacrificed on the altar, and that ruling of the mishna in Kinnim is in accordance with the opinion of the one who says that living creatures are not permanently rejected from the altar.

The terutz clarifies that Rava's position, that the sacrifice "does not effect acceptance," aligns with the view that ba'alei chayim (living creatures) that become disqualified are considered muchanim – permanently rejected from the altar. Once rejected, they cannot become valid, even b'di'avad. The disqualification is fundamental and irreversible. The Kinnim Mishna, by contrast, aligns with the view that ba'alei chayim einan muchanim – living creatures are not permanently rejected. Their disqualification is not absolute; if the sacrificial rite is performed correctly, the animal can still achieve its purpose b'di'avad, as the animal itself is not inherently flawed but merely became problematic due to the mixture. This machloket hinges on the nature of the animal's sacred status and the impact of a temporary disqualification.

The Gemara then adds a clarifying nuance:

אלא יש שחוטין שמוכנין הן לכל הדעות. Zevachim 73a:20:1 But there is the case of slaughtered offerings that are rejected from the altar, concerning which everyone agrees that these are rejected.

This final clause indicates that while there's a dispute regarding living animals becoming muchanim, once an animal is slaughtered and then disqualified (e.g., its blood mixed with other blood, or it was intended for the wrong purpose), it is universally agreed to be muchan and cannot be redeemed or accepted. This emphasizes that the machloket about muchanim is specific to living animals, highlighting the unique sanctity and potential for rectification that some maintain for a living kodesh animal.

Intertext

Shulchan Aruch Yoreh De'ah 100:1 - Bitul B'rov and Davar Sheb'minyan

The principle of davar sheb'minyan is a cornerstone of halacha l'ma'aseh, particularly in Kashrut. The Shulchan Aruch directly codifies it in Yoreh De'ah Siman 100 regarding mixtures of prohibited and permitted foods:

כל דבר שבמנין, אפילו אחד באלף לא בטיל. וכן דבר חשוב שקבוע עליו שם, ואפילו אינו במנין, כגון חתיכה הראויה להתכבד. ודברים אלו אין בטלים, אלא צריך שידע איזה מהם הוא האסור ויטלנו. Shulchan Aruch Yoreh De'ah 100:1

This passage from the Shulchan Aruch echoes the Gemara's teaching precisely. It states that "any item that is counted, even one in a thousand, is not nullified." It then adds "and similarly, an important item that has a name fixed upon it, even if it is not counted, such as a piece (of meat) fit to be served (to guests)." This expands the concept beyond mere counting to include items of inherent significance, similar to Rav Ashi's statement about ba'alei chayim being chashuvim (Zevachim 73a:9:1). The nafka mina is clear: if such an item is mixed, the entire mixture remains prohibited unless the forbidden item can be identified and removed. This demonstrates the enduring and practical application of the sugya's core principle.

Mishna Temurah 2:1 and 5:1 - Muchanim for Consecrated Animals

The concept of muchanim (permanently rejected) for consecrated animals is explored extensively in Masechet Temurah. For example, Mishna Temurah 2:1 discusses various animals that cannot be used as temurah (a substitute for a consecrated animal) and, if consecrated, are muchanim:

אין מביאים תמורה מן הזכרים, ומן הטמאים, ומן הנקובים, ומן החולין, ומן הפסולים, ומן בעלי מומין... ואם הקדישן, הרי אלו קדש... ומוכנין. Mishna Temurah 2:1

This Mishna lists categories of animals that are inherently disqualified from the altar (e.g., males for certain offerings, blemished animals, etc.). If one attempts to consecrate them, they do acquire a sacred status (קדש), but they are simultaneously muchanim – permanently rejected from being sacrificed. This provides a broader context for the machloket Tanna'im in our sugya about muchanim for living animals. It shows that the Sages grappled with the precise point at which an animal's disqualification becomes absolute and irreversible, reflecting different philosophical approaches to the sanctity of kodesh and its potential for rehabilitation.

Psak/Practice

The principles elucidated in this sugya have profound implications for halacha l'ma'aseh, particularly in areas of Kashrut and sacrificial law.

Davar Sheb'minyan in Kashrut

The ruling that "כל דבר שיש בו מנין לא בטיל" (Zevachim 73a:1:1) is a fundamental principle in Kashrut. As seen in the Shulchan Aruch Yoreh De'ah 100:1, if a prohibited item that is typically counted (e.g., a specific food item, a complete matzah in a stack, a whole fish) falls into a majority of permitted items, it is not nullified. This means the entire mixture remains prohibited unless the forbidden item can be identified and removed. This differs from other mixtures where bitul b'rov (nullification in a majority) or bitul b'shishim (nullification in sixty) might apply. The rationale, as implied by the Gemara's discussion of katzu'ot and ba'alei chayim, is the item's inherent significance or distinct identity, which prevents it from being subsumed into the whole.

Gezeirot and Safeguarding Halacha

Rava's gezeirah (decree) against sacrificing even moved animals (Zevachim 73a:16:1) highlights a crucial meta-halachic heuristic: the Sages' proactive role in safeguarding Halacha. Even when a technical pathway to permit an action exists (kol d'parish on moved items), they may issue a decree to prevent errors or misunderstandings in similar, but prohibited, circumstances (gezeirah atu k'vua). This demonstrates a principle of lo plug (not distinguishing), where a prohibition is extended to avoid confusion, even at the cost of restricting a technically permissible action. This approach prioritizes the integrity of the halachic system and the prevention of transgression over maximizing leniency.

B'di'avad Validation and Muchanim

The machloket Tanna'im regarding whether ba'alei chayim muchanim hem (living creatures are permanently rejected) or einan muchanim (are not permanently rejected) (Zevachim 73a:19:1) has less direct practical application today due to the absence of the Temple. However, it informs the understanding of b'di'avad (post-facto) validation in other halachic contexts. It teaches that the potential for b'di'avad validation depends on the nature of the initial disqualification: if the item is truly "rejected" and inherently flawed from its sacred purpose, b'di'avad cannot rectify it. If the disqualification is merely circumstantial, b'di'avad may succeed if the core action was performed correctly.

Takeaway

This sugya masterfully unpacks the robust principle of davar sheb'minyan, demonstrating its application across rabbinic and Torah prohibitions, and revealing the Sages' nuanced approach to safeguarding Halacha through decrees and the profound implications of an item's inherent significance or "rejection" from its sacred purpose.