Zevachim 74

Sugya Map

• Issue: The permissibility of mixtures involving prohibited items, particularly concerning the principle of safek safekah (double uncertainty) and the status of items deemed lo b'minyan (not nullified by quantity).
• Nafka Mina(s):
  • Determining the halachic status of a mixture when a prohibited item is lost or removed.
  • Applying the stringent rules of avodah zarah (idol worship) versus other prohibitions.
  • The significance of "sealed" containers (kankanim) in mixtures.
  • The extent to which items are considered permanently disqualified (kavu'ah) once removed from their intended use.
• Primary Sources:
  • Zevachim 74a-b
  • Tosefta, Terumot 5:10
  • (Implied) Mishna, Zevachim 77b
  • (Implied) Avodah Zarah 49b

Text Snapshot

And we learned in a mishna (77b) that in a case where sacrificial portions from unblemished burnt offerings became mixed with sacrificial portions from blemished burnt offerings, which are disqualified, Rabbi Eliezer says: If the head of one of them was sacrificed on the altar before they knew of the blemish, all the heads should be sacrificed, as it is assumed that the head of the disqualified animal was the one already sacrificed on the altar. This indicates that even with regard to slaughtered animals, if they were rejected from the altar due to being in a mixture, they are not permanently rejected, but are fit after the fact.

The Gemara explains that this mishna affords no proof, as Rabbi Eliezer states his ruling in accordance with the opinion of Ḥanan the Egyptian, who maintains that even slaughtered animals are not permanently rejected. As it is taught in a baraita that Ḥanan the Egyptian says, with regard to the two goats of Yom Kippur, the one sacrificed to God and the scapegoat designated to be sent to Azazel: Even if the blood of the sacrificed goat is already in the cup where it was collected and the scapegoat dies, the sacrificed goat is still a fit offering, and the priest brings another goat and joins it to this slaughtered goat to serve as the scapegoat. By contrast, the other tanna’im, who maintain that slaughtered animals are rejected, hold that once they have become rejected due to being in a mixture they are no longer fit for sacrifice, as stated by Rava.

Rav Naḥman says that Rava bar Avuh says that Rav says: With regard to a ring used in idol worship, from which it is prohibited to derive benefit and which is not nullified even in a ratio of one in one hundred, that was intermingled with one hundred permitted rings, and subsequently one of them fell into the Great Sea [ Yam HaGadol ], they are all permitted. The reason is that we say: That ring that fell into the Great Sea is the prohibited ring.

Rava raised an objection to Rav Naḥman from the mishna: With regard to all the offerings that were intermingled with animals from which deriving benefit is prohibited, even if the ratio is one in ten thousand, they all must die. According to the opinion of Rav, that we say the one that was lost is the prohibited item, why must they all die? Let us say, with regard to the first animal that died, that the prohibited animal died, and the rest should be permitted.

Rav Naḥman said to Rava: Rav states his ruling in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, as we learned in the mishna that Rabbi Eliezer says: If the head of one of them is sacrificed on the altar before the priests knew of the blemish, all the heads should be sacrificed, as it is assumed that the head of the disqualified animal was the one already sacrificed on the altar.

Rava asked Rav Naḥman: But doesn’t Rabbi Elazar say: Rabbi Eliezer permitted the sacrifice of all the heads only if they were sacrificed two by two, as at least one of them is certainly permitted; but he did not permit them to be sacrificed one by one, in case the priest sacrifices the prohibited head by itself? How, then, can Rav Naḥman permit the rings without qualification? Rav Naḥman said to Rava: I too am saying that Rav permits the rings only if they are sold two at a time, in which case one of them is certainly not from idol worship.

• Dikduk/Leshon Nuance:
  • The repeated use of "as it is assumed" (chazakah) and "we say" (amar nan) highlights the reliance on probabilistic reasoning and logical inference in determining the status of mixtures.
  • The contrast between kavu'ah (permanently disqualified/fixed) and lo b'minyan (not nullified by quantity) is central to the discussion.
  • The distinction between safek (uncertainty) and safek safekah (double uncertainty) is crucial for understanding the severity of prohibitions, especially avodah zarah.
  • The phrase "lo b'minyan" appears to be an interpretative overlay by the Gemara, as the mishna itself doesn't use this exact terminology, but the concept is clearly embedded in the reasoning regarding the non-nullification of avodah zarah items.

Readings

The core of our sugya revolves around the intricate rules governing mixtures of prohibited and permitted items, a topic that touches upon fundamental principles of halakha. The Gemara here grapples with how to apply these rules, especially when the prohibited item is lost or its identity is doubly uncertain.

1. Rabbi Eliezer and Ḥanan HaMitzri: The Non-Permanent Rejection

The initial discussion in Zevachim 74a attempts to derive a principle from a mishna (77b) concerning sacrificial portions of blemished burnt offerings mixed with unblemished ones. Rabbi Eliezer permits sacrificing the remaining heads if one had already been sacrificed, assuming the one already offered was the blemished one. The Gemara clarifies that this is not a general rule about all disqualified sacrifices but specifically follows Ḥanan HaMitzri. Ḥanan HaMitzri, in the context of the Yom Kippur goats, states that even if the blood of the sacrificed goat is already in the cup, and the scapegoat dies, the sacrificed goat remains fit, and a replacement can be brought. This implies that a ritual action, once performed, might retain its validity or that the removed/disqualified item is not definitively removed from the equation in a way that invalidates everything.

Tosafot on Zevachim 74a:1:1 offers a crucial insight here: "ותנן ר"א אומר כו' - לא שייך למימר אדפריך מר' אליעזר לסייעיה מדרבנן דאמרו אפילו קרבו כולן חוץ מאחד מהן יצאו לבית השריפה וגבי כוסות ישפך לאמה דלמא דרבנן לאו משום דחייה פסלי אלא מטעם אחרינא" (And we learned Rabbi Eliezer says, etc. – It is not appropriate to say that we would refute from Rabbi Eliezer to support him from the Rabbanan who said, "even if all were sacrificed except one, they are disqualified [lit. go to the place of burning]", and regarding the cups, "its blood is poured out." Perhaps the Rabbanan do not disqualify it because of rejection [from sacrifice], but for another reason.)

Tosafot is pointing out that the Gemara’s attempt to learn a general principle from Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling on sacrifices is problematic. The Rabbanan’s ruling regarding the Yom Kippur goats (that if one is disqualified, its blood is poured out, and the other is disqualified) might be based on a different reason than mere rejection due to mixture. They might be disqualified due to a fundamental flaw in the process or the identity of the offering, rather than simply being "rejected" from the altar and thus potentially salvageable later. This distinction is vital: is the disqualification absolute, or is it a temporary removal from the altar with potential for later use?

Steinsaltz on Zevachim 74a:1 elaborates on this point: "ו מכל מקום תנן [שנינו במשנה] שבמקרה שנתערב איבר של בהמה בעלת מום באיברי עולה העומדים להקרבה, כגון ראש בראשים, ולכתחילה אסור להקריב אף לא אחד מהם, ר' אליעזר אומר: אם כבר קרב הראש של אחד מהן — יקרבו כל שאר ה ראשים. שכן יש לתלות ולומר שאותו הראש שקרב הוא ראשו של בעל המום. הרי איפוא, שגם איברים של שחוטים, שנדחים לגמרי, אם נדחו מהקרבה מחמת איסור שנתערב בהם — אין הם נדחים לגמרי, וכשרים בדיעבד!" (In any case, we learned in the Mishna that in a situation where a limb of a blemished animal became mixed with limbs of an unblemished burnt offering that were about to be sacrificed, such as a head with heads, le'chatchila it is forbidden to sacrifice even one of them. Rabbi Eliezer says: If the head of one of them has already been sacrificed—all the remaining heads should be sacrificed. For we can assume that the head that was sacrificed was the head of the blemished animal. Behold, therefore, that even limbs of slaughtered animals, which are completely rejected, if they were rejected from sacrifice due to a prohibition that became mixed with them—they are not completely rejected, and are permissible b'dieved!)

Steinsaltz emphasizes the b'dieved (after the fact) permissibility. Rabbi Eliezer’s leniency stems from the assumption that the already sacrificed item was the problematic one. This implies that the act of sacrifice, even on a potentially disqualified item, might render it "fixed" in some way, or at least not permanently disqualified. This is contrasted with other prohibitions where the item might be irrevocably kavu'ah (fixed/permanently disqualified).

2. Rav Naḥman and Rav: The Lost Ring and the Principle of "The Prohibited One Fell"

Rav Naḥman, citing Rav, introduces a case of a ring used in idol worship (avodah zarah) intermingled with permitted rings. If one ring falls into the Great Sea, all the rings are permitted because we assume the lost ring was the prohibited one. This is a direct application of the principle: "That which fell is the prohibited one." This implicitly assumes that the prohibited ring is not nullified even in a 1:100 ratio, and crucially, that the loss of the prohibited item resolves the safek (uncertainty).

Steinsaltz on Zevachim 74a:10 explains the application of this principle: "ו מכל מקום תנן [שנינו במשנה] שבמקרה שנתערב איבר של בהמה בעלת מום באיברי עולה העומדים להקרבה, כגון ראש בראשים, ולכתחילה אסור להקריב אף לא אחד מהם, ר' אליעזר אומר: אם כבר קרב הראש של אחד מהן — יקרבו כל שאר ה ראשים. שכן יש לתלות ולומר שאותו הראש שקרב הוא ראשו של בעל המום. הרי איפוא, שגם איברים של שחוטים, שנדחים לגמרי, אם נדחו מהקרבה מחמת איסור שנתערב בהם — אין הם נדחים לגמרי, וכשרים בדיעבד!" (And in any case, we learned in the Mishna that in a situation where a limb of a blemished animal became mixed with limbs of an unblemished burnt offering that were about to be sacrificed, such as a head with heads, le'chatchila it is forbidden to sacrifice even one of them. Rabbi Eliezer says: If the head of one of them has already been sacrificed—all the remaining heads should be sacrificed. For we can assume that the head that was sacrificed was the head of the blemished animal. Behold, therefore, that even limbs of slaughtered animals, which are completely rejected, if they were rejected from sacrifice due to a prohibition that became mixed with them—they are not completely rejected, and are permissible b'dieved!)

Steinsaltz's commentary here links Rav’s ruling to the earlier discussion on sacrifices. Rav’s leniency with the rings relies on the assumption that the lost ring was the prohibited one. This is the opposite of the Mishna's implied concern when Rava objects.

3. Rava's Objection: The Strictness of Avodah Zarah

Rava objects to Rav Naḥman's ruling by citing the mishna regarding offerings intermingled with items prohibited for avodah zarah. Even a 1:10,000 ratio requires all the items to be destroyed (metu). Rava argues: if Rav's logic ("the prohibited one fell") were universally applicable, then when one ring fell into the sea, the prohibited ring would be the one lost, and the rest should be permitted. The fact that the offerings must be destroyed indicates a more stringent rule for avodah zarah.

This objection highlights a critical distinction. The Gemara explains that Rav’s ruling is based on Rabbi Eliezer's opinion, which, as we saw, is seen as lenient regarding potential future use even after initial disqualification. Rava, by referencing the avodah zarah mishna, emphasizes that avodah zarah prohibitions are inherently more severe. The phrase "they all must die" (kolam metey - Zevachim 73b) signifies a permanent and absolute disqualification, not subject to the "what fell was the prohibited one" logic.

4. Rabbi Eliezer's Nuance: Two by Two vs. One by One

Rav Naḥman's defense of Rav’s position brings back Rabbi Eliezer, but with a crucial nuance introduced by Rabbi Elazar. Rabbi Eliezer permitted sacrificing the heads two by two, not one by one. This means that when offering two heads, one is definitely permitted, resolving the safek. If sacrificed one by one, there's a risk the prohibited head is sacrificed alone, creating a safek that cannot be resolved by the "lost item" logic. Rav Naḥman applies this to the rings: they are permitted only if sold two at a time, thus ensuring one is definitely permissible.

This demonstrates that even within a lenient opinion like Rabbi Eliezer's, there are layers of stringency. The act of selling two rings together creates a situation where the safek is immediately resolved for the pair being sold, allowing them to be used or sold. The lost ring principle is a post-hoc justification for the entire remaining mixture, but the activity of dealing with the mixture must itself be halachically sound.

5. The Baraita on Safek Safekah and Avodah Zarah

The Gemara then introduces a baraita concerning avodah zarah: "An uncertainty of idol worship is prohibited, but its compound uncertainty is permitted." This baraita illustrates with a cup of avodah zarah falling into a storeroom of cups (all prohibited), then one from that group falling into 10,000 others, and then one from that group falling into another 10,000 – these last are permitted. This directly contradicts Shmuel's assertion that avodah zarah prohibitions, even compounded, are always prohibited.

Steinsaltz on Zevachim 74a:10 clarifies the apparent contradiction: "מיתיבי [מקשים] על שמואל ממה ששנינו בברייתא, ספק עבודה זרה — אסורה, וספק ספיקה — מותרת. כיצד? כוס של עבודה זרה שנפל לאוצר (מחסן) מלא כוסות — כולן אסורין, פירש אחד מהן מהכוסות המעורבים הללו ונפל ל בין ריבוא (עשרת אלפים) כוסות אחרים, ומ אותו ריבוא פרש כוס אחד ונפל ל תוך ריבוא כוסות אחרים — מותרין. משמע שרק ספק אסור, אך ספק ספיקא מותר!" (They raised an objection to Shmuel from what we learned in a baraita: An uncertainty of idol worship is prohibited, and a double uncertainty is permitted. How so? A cup of idol worship that fell into a storeroom full of cups—all are prohibited. If one of them separated from these mixed cups and fell among ten thousand other cups, and from that ten thousand one cup separated and fell into ten thousand other cups—they are permitted. This implies that only a single uncertainty is prohibited, but a double uncertainty is permitted!)

This baraita is the crux of the debate. It posits a clear distinction between safek and safek safekah for avodah zarah, directly challenging Shmuel's stringent stance. This implies that the non-nullification principle (lo b'minyan) might have limits when compounded.

6. The Tanna’im of Safek Safekah: Rabbi Yehuda vs. Rabbi Shimon

The Gemara resolves the conflict with Shmuel by attributing the baraita to a dispute between tanna’im: Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon, as found in Tosefta Terumot. Rabbi Yehuda holds that certain items, like pomegranates from Badan (rimonai Badan), prohibit mixtures b'khol shehu (in any amount), and this stringency extends even to safek safekah. Rabbi Shimon, however, permits safek safekah in such cases.

Rashi on Zevachim 74a:11:1 explains the significance of rimonai Badan: "ה"ג תנאי היא דתניא ר' יהודה אומר רמוני בדן כו' - רמוני בדן אחד מששה דברים שאינן בטילים הן הלכך אוסרים בכל שהוא אם של ערלה או של תרומה הן כולן אסורין ואפילו אחרונים" (It is a dispute between tanna’im that it is taught: Rabbi Yehuda says, pomegranates from Badan, etc. – Pomegranates from Badan are among the six things that are not nullified; therefore, they prohibit in any amount. If they are of orlah or terumah, they are all prohibited, even the last ones.)

Rashi emphasizes that rimonai Badan are in a special category of non-nullifiable items. Rabbi Yehuda extends his stringent view on these items to safek safekah mixtures.

Steinsaltz on Zevachim 74a:11 further clarifies: "ומשיבים: הלכה זו תנאי [ מחלוקת תנאים] היא. דתניא [ששנויה ברייתא ], ר' יהודה אומר: רימוני באדן, שהם חשובים במיוחד, אם היו אסורים, הריהם אוסרין את תערובתם אפילו בכל שהוא. כיצד? נפל אחד מהן אפילו לתוך ריבוא רימונים של היתר, ומ אותו ריבוא פרש רימון אחד ונפל לריבוא רימונים אחרים — כולם אסורין, אף שהוא ספק ספיקא." (And they answer: This ruling is a dispute between tanna’im. For it is taught: Rabbi Yehuda says: Pomegranates from Badan, which are especially valuable, if they were forbidden, they prohibit their mixture even in the slightest amount. How so? If one of them fell even into ten thousand permitted pomegranates, and from that ten thousand one pomegranate separated and fell into another ten thousand pomegranates—all are prohibited, even though it is a double uncertainty.)

Steinsaltz on Zevachim 74a:12 contrasts this with Rabbi Shimon: "ר' שמעון בן יהודה אומר משום (בשם) ר' שמעון: אם נפל אחד מן הרימונים האסורים לריבוא — כולם אסורין, שאינם בטלים ברוב. אבל אם נפל אחד מ ה ריבוא ל תוך שלשה, ומ ה שלשה הללו חזר ונפל רימון אחד למקום אחר — מותר, משום ספק ספיקא." (Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: If one of the forbidden pomegranates fell into ten thousand—all are prohibited, as they are not nullified by the majority. But if one fell from the ten thousand into three, and from these three one pomegranate fell again to another place—it is permitted, because of double uncertainty.)

The Gemara then attempts to reconcile Shmuel with these tanna’im. It suggests Shmuel might follow Rabbi Yehuda regarding avodah zarah specifically, or perhaps Rabbi Shimon with an added stringency for avodah zarah that isn't explicitly stated in the baraita. Ultimately, it concludes that the baraita permitting safek safekah for avodah zarah represents a distinct opinion, not directly aligning with either Rabbi Yehuda or Rabbi Shimon as presented. Shmuel, however, is portrayed as holding the stringent view that safek safekah for avodah zarah remains prohibited.

7. Reish Lakish and Terumah Mixtures: Sealed Barrels and the "Noticeable Fall"

Reish Lakish addresses mixtures of terumah produce. He states that a sealed barrel of terumah mixed with non-terumah barrels is not nullified because sealed barrels are significant (kankanim gedolim). If one barrel falls into the Dead Sea, the rest are permitted by the logic "that barrel that fell is the prohibited one." This seems to mirror the avodah zarah ring case.

The Gemara then discusses the necessity of both Rav Naḥman's ruling (on rings) and Reish Lakish's ruling (on terumah barrels). If only Rav Naḥman's ruling were known, one might think the leniency applies only to avodah zarah because it has "no permitting factors" (ein lah matirin), unlike terumah which can be eaten by priests. Conversely, if only Reish Lakish's ruling were known, one might think the leniency is specific to barrels because their "falling is noticeable" (nefiliyo nikhra), unlike a ring whose loss is subtle. The kankanim gedolim principle is key here – sealed containers are treated as distinct entities, not easily nullified.

8. Rabba and Rav Yosef on Reish Lakish: Barrels vs. Figs

A further refinement emerges with Rabba and Rav Yosef discussing Reish Lakish's position. Rabba suggests Reish Lakish only permits this leniency for barrels because their loss is noticeable. For a fig, where the loss is not easily discerned, the rest remain prohibited. Rav Yosef, however, extends Reish Lakish's leniency even to figs, suggesting that just as the initial mixing rendered the entire group problematic, so too the "emergence" (yetsi'ah) of one item (even if it falls) permits the rest.

9. Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Oshaya: Handling Terumah Mixtures

Rabbi Elazar offers a practical approach to a barrel of terumah wine mixed with non-sacred wine. Since sealed barrels are not nullified, one must open one barrel (yiftach echad me'hen), take out the amount that would be nullified in a mixture (one-hundredth), give it to a priest, and then the rest can be drunk. This implies that after opening, the mixture becomes subject to standard nullification rules. Rav Dimi’s clarification suggests this is a b'dieved (after the fact) ruling. Rabbi Oshaya presents a more complex scenario with 150 barrels, 100 opened. He permits taking the terumah portion from the opened barrels and drinking the rest, but the remaining 50 sealed barrels are still prohibited until opened, as we don't assume the prohibited barrel is among the majority of opened ones. This highlights the continued significance of sealed containers.

10. The Mishna on Tereifa and Other Prohibitions: Identifying the Unknown

The final section of the Gemara shifts to a mishna listing various prohibited animals: bestiality, idol worship, payment for a prostitute/dog, mixed species, and tereifa. The Gemara questions how a tereifa animal, which is often identifiable by its condition, could be unknown and cause a mixture prohibition. The answers provided highlight the difficulty in identifying the prohibited item in specific scenarios: * School of Rabbi Yannai: A thorn-pierced animal (not tereifa) mixed with a wolf-clawed animal (tereifa). The visible signs are similar enough to cause uncertainty. * Reish Lakish: A healthy animal mixed with a "fallen" animal (nefel), which might be a tereifa even without visible signs. This requires further examination, and Reish Lakish holds it still requires a waiting period and post-slaughter inspection to definitively rule out tereifa. * Rabbi Yirmeya: A healthy animal mixed with the offspring of a tereifa. This is in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer, who disqualifies the offspring of a tereifa.

The Gemara then explains why these Sages propose different interpretations: they disagree on the distinguishability of the signs (thorn vs. wolf claw), the criteria for deeming a fallen animal a tereifa, and the applicability of Rabbi Eliezer's opinion regarding the offspring of a tereifa. The key takeaway is that the prohibition arises when the prohibited item is unknowable in the mixture, even if the category of prohibition is known.

Readings

1. Rabbi Eliezer and Ḥanan HaMitzri: The Non-Permanent Rejection

The Gemara begins by examining the mishna on Zevachim 77b, which deals with the mixture of sacrificial portions from unblemished and blemished burnt offerings. Rabbi Eliezer's position is that if the head of one offering was already sacrificed, all the remaining heads should be sacrificed. The Gemara clarifies that this leniency is not a general principle but is attributed to Ḥanan HaMitzri.

Tosafot on Zevachim 74a:1:1 states: "ותנן ר"א אומר כו' - לא שייך למימר אדפריך מר' אליעזר לסייעיה מדרבנן דאמרי אפילו קרבו כולן חוץ מאחד מהן יצאו לבית השריפה וגבי כוסות ישפך לאמה דלמא דרבנן לאו משום דחייה פסלי אלא מטעם אחרינא." (And we learned Rabbi Eliezer says, etc. – It is not appropriate to say that we would refute from Rabbi Eliezer to support him from the Rabbanan who said, "even if all were sacrificed except one, they are disqualified [lit. go to the place of burning]", and regarding the cups, "its blood is poured out." Perhaps the Rabbanan do not disqualify it because of rejection [from sacrifice], but for another reason.)

Tosafot questions the Gemara's attempt to learn a general rule from Rabbi Eliezer's opinion by linking it to the Rabbanan's ruling concerning the Yom Kippur goats. Tosafot argues that the Rabbanan's disqualification of the Yom Kippur goats might stem from a reason other than mere "rejection" (d'ḥiyyah). This suggests that the nature of disqualification matters; some disqualifications are absolute, while others might be conditional or temporary, allowing for later redemption or use. This distinction is crucial for understanding the downstream discussions on safek and safek safekah.

Steinsaltz on Zevachim 74a:1 elaborates on Rabbi Eliezer's ruling: "ו מכל מקום תנן [שנינו במשנה] שבמקרה שנתערב איבר של בהמה בעלת מום באיברי עולה העומדים להקרבה, כגון ראש בראשים, ולכתחילה אסור להקריב אף לא אחד מהם, ר' אליעזר אומר: אם כבר קרב הראש של אחד מהן — יקרבו כל שאר ה ראשים. שכן יש לתלות ולומר שאותו הראש שקרב הוא ראשו של בעל המום. הרי איפוא, שגם איברים של שחוטים, שנדחים לגמרי, אם נדחו מהקרבה מחמת איסור שנתערב בהם — אין הם נדחים לגמרי, וכשרים בדיעבד!" (In any case, we learned in the Mishna that in a situation where a limb of a blemished animal became mixed with limbs of an unblemished burnt offering that were about to be sacrificed, such as a head with heads, le'chatchila it is forbidden to sacrifice even one of them. Rabbi Eliezer says: If the head of one of them has already been sacrificed—all the remaining heads should be sacrificed. For we can assume that the head that was sacrificed was the head of the blemished animal. Behold, therefore, that even limbs of slaughtered animals, which are completely rejected, if they were rejected from sacrifice due to a prohibition that became mixed with them—they are not completely rejected, and are permissible b'dieved!)

Steinsaltz highlights that Rabbi Eliezer's leniency is b'dieved (after the fact). The assumption is that the already sacrificed item was the blemished one. This implies that an act of sacrifice, even on a potentially disqualified item, doesn't render it permanently unfit. This contrasts with items that are kavu'ah (fixed/permanently disqualified) and cannot be used even b'dieved. The example of Ḥanan HaMitzri further solidifies this: even if the scapegoat is lost, the sacrificed goat remains viable for its purpose, demonstrating a principle of not irrevocably disqualifying an offering based on a subsequent event.

2. Rav Naḥman and Rav: The Lost Ring and the Principle of "The Prohibited One Fell"

Rav Naḥman, citing Rav, presents a critical case involving a ring used for idol worship (avodah zarah). Such rings are prohibited from benefit and are not nullified even in a 1:100 ratio. If one such ring is mixed with 100 permitted rings, and then one ring falls into the Great Sea, Rav rules that all the rings become permitted. The reasoning is: "That ring that fell is the prohibited ring."

This establishes the principle of lo b'minyan for avodah zarah (it's not nullified by quantity) and the application of the "lost item" logic in resolving uncertainty. The implication is that the prohibited item's loss resolves the safek. However, as we will see, this leniency is challenged. The fact that avodah zarah items are not nullified even in a 1:100 ratio underscores their severe prohibition.

3. Rava's Objection: The Stringency of Avodah Zarah

Rava challenges Rav Naḥman's ruling by invoking the mishna (Zevachim 73b) concerning offerings mixed with items prohibited for avodah zarah. The mishna states that even if the mixture is 1:10,000, all the items must be destroyed (metu). Rava’s objection is sharp: if Rav's logic ("the prohibited one fell") were applicable, then the lost ring should have resolved the safek, rendering the remaining rings permitted. The fact that the offerings are subject to destruction indicates that avodah zarah prohibitions operate under a far more stringent rule.

The Gemara's explanation that Rav's ruling aligns with Rabbi Eliezer, who is seen as lenient regarding the potential post-sacrifice use of items, highlights the contrast. Rava's counter-argument, based on the mishna demanding destruction, underscores the inherent severity and non-nullifiable nature of avodah zarah prohibitions, even when mixed with permitted items. The phrase "they all must die" signifies an absolute, irreversible disqualification that overrides probabilistic reasoning concerning lost items.

4. Rabbi Eliezer's Nuance: Two by Two vs. One by One

Rav Naḥman defends Rav's position by returning to Rabbi Eliezer, but with a critical clarification attributed to Rabbi Elazar. Rabbi Eliezer permitted the sacrifice of the heads two by two, not one by one. This means that when two heads are presented, at least one is guaranteed to be permitted, thus resolving the immediate uncertainty. However, sacrificing them one by one would allow the prohibited head to be offered alone, creating an unresolvable safek. Rav Naḥman applies this distinction to the rings: they are permitted only if sold two at a time, ensuring the immediate transaction involves a demonstrably permitted item.

This nuance is crucial. It shows that even within a lenient framework, the method of handling the mixture matters. The "lost item" logic is a retrospective justification. However, the immediate interaction with the mixture must adhere to halachic principles that resolve uncertainty where possible. Selling two rings at once achieves this immediate resolution, making the subsequent assumption about the lost ring a secondary layer of permissibility.

5. The Baraita on Safek Safekah and Avodah Zarah

The discussion takes a significant turn with the introduction of a baraita: "An uncertainty of idol worship is prohibited, but its compound uncertainty is permitted." This baraita provides a stark example: a cup of avodah zarah mixed into a large quantity, then one from that mixture into another large quantity, and so on. The final mixture is deemed permitted. This directly contradicts Shmuel's stringent assertion that avodah zarah prohibitions, even compounded, remain prohibited forever.

Steinsaltz on Zevachim 74a:10 articulates this conflict: "מיתיבי [מקשים] על שמואל ממה ששנינו בברייתא, ספק עבודה זרה — אסורה, וספק ספיקה — מותרת. כיצד? כוס של עבודה זרה שנפל לאוצר (מחסן) מלא כוסות — כולן אסורין, פירש אחד מהן מהכוסות המעורבים הללו ונפל ל בין ריבוא (עשרת אלפים) כוסות אחרים, ומ אותו ריבוא פרש כוס אחד ונפל ל תוך ריבוא כוסות אחרים — מותרין. משמע שרק ספק אסור, אך ספק ספיקא מותר!" (They raised an objection to Shmuel from what we learned in a baraita: An uncertainty of idol worship is prohibited, and a double uncertainty is permitted. How so? A cup of idol worship that fell into a storeroom full of cups—all are prohibited. If one of them separated from these mixed cups and fell among ten thousand other cups, and from that ten thousand one cup separated and fell into ten thousand other cups—they are permitted. This implies that only a single uncertainty is prohibited, but a double uncertainty is permitted!)

This baraita introduces the concept of safek safekah (double uncertainty) as a pathway to permissibility, even in the context of avodah zarah. This is a profound development, as avodah zarah is typically treated with extreme stringency. The baraita implies that the compounding of uncertainties can, under certain circumstances, lead to permissibility.

6. The Tanna’im of Safek Safekah: Rabbi Yehuda vs. Rabbi Shimon

The Gemara resolves the apparent contradiction between Shmuel and the baraita by attributing the latter to a dispute between tanna’im, specifically Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon, as recorded in Tosefta Terumot. Rabbi Yehuda considers certain items, like rimonai Badan, to be non-nullifiable (lo b'minyan) and thus prohibit mixtures b'khol shehu (in any amount). Crucially, Rabbi Yehuda extends this stringency to safek safekah, meaning even a double uncertainty remains prohibited.

Rashi on Zevachim 74a:11:1 explains the unique status of rimonai Badan: "ה"ג תנאי היא דתניא ר' יהודה אומר רמוני בדן כו' - רמוני בדן אחד מששה דברים שאינן בטילים הן הלכך אוסרים בכל שהוא אם של ערלה או של תרומה הן כולן אסורין ואפילו אחרונים." (It is a dispute between tanna’im that it is taught: Rabbi Yehuda says, pomegranates from Badan, etc. – Pomegranates from Badan are among the six things that are not nullified; therefore, they prohibit in any amount. If they are of orlah or terumah, they are all prohibited, even the last ones.)

Rashi's commentary highlights that rimonai Badan are in a class of items that resist nullification by quantity. Rabbi Yehuda's adherence to this principle means that even if the prohibited item is only a tiny fraction of a mixture, and that fraction is further diluted through multiple stages of uncertainty, the prohibition persists.

Steinsaltz on Zevachim 74a:11 elaborates on Rabbi Yehuda's stringent position: "ומשיבים: הלכה זו תנאי [ מחלוקת תנאים] היא. דתניא [ששנויה ברייתא ], ר' יהודה אומר: רימוני באדן, שהם חשובים במיוחד, אם היו אסורים, הריהם אוסרין את תערובתם אפילו בכל שהוא. כיצד? נפל אחד מהן אפילו לתוך ריבוא רימונים של היתר, ומ אותו ריבוא פרש רימון אחד ונפל לריבוא רימונים אחרים — כולם אסורין, אף שהוא ספק ספיקא." (And they answer: This ruling is a dispute between tanna’im. For it is taught: Rabbi Yehuda says: Pomegranates from Badan, which are especially valuable, if they were forbidden, they prohibit their mixture even in the slightest amount. How so? If one of them fell even into ten thousand permitted pomegranates, and from that ten thousand one pomegranate separated and fell into another ten thousand pomegranates—all are prohibited, even though it is a double uncertainty.)

Steinsaltz on Zevachim 74a:12 contrasts this with Rabbi Shimon's view: "ר' שמעון בן יהודה אומר משום (בשם) ר' שמעון: אם נפל אחד מן הרימונים האסורים לריבוא — כולם אסורין, שאינם בטלים ברוב. אבל אם נפל אחד מ ה ריבוא ל תוך שלשה, ומ ה שלשה הללו חזר ונפל רימון אחד למקום אחר — מותר, משום ספק ספיקא." (Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: If one of the forbidden pomegranates fell into ten thousand—all are prohibited, as they are not nullified by the majority. But if one fell from the ten thousand into three, and from these three one pomegranate fell again to another place—it is permitted, because of double uncertainty.)

Rabbi Shimon, conversely, permits safek safekah in such cases, particularly when the mixture reaches a sufficient majority of permitted items. The Gemara then attempts to align Shmuel with these opinions, suggesting he might follow Rabbi Yehuda's stringency regarding avodah zarah specifically, or perhaps Rabbi Shimon with an added layer of severity for avodah zarah. The conclusion is that the baraita permitting safek safekah for avodah zarah represents a distinct position, while Shmuel remains staunchly stringent.

7. Reish Lakish and Terumah Mixtures: Sealed Barrels and the "Noticeable Fall"

Reish Lakish introduces the concept of sealed barrels (kankanim gedolim) in the context of terumah mixtures. He argues that a sealed barrel of terumah mixed with permitted barrels is not nullified because the barrel itself is a significant entity. If one such barrel falls into the sea, the remaining barrels are permitted under the principle "that barrel that fell is the prohibited one." This mirrors the logic applied to the avodah zarah ring.

The Gemara explains the necessity of presenting both Rav Naḥman's ruling on rings and Reish Lakish's ruling on terumah barrels. If only Rav Naḥman's ruling were known, one might assume the leniency applies only to avodah zarah because it lacks "permitting factors" (ein lah matirin), unlike terumah which can be consumed by priests. Conversely, if only Reish Lakish's ruling were known, one might assume the leniency is specific to barrels because their "falling is noticeable" (nefiliyo nikhra), a condition not met by a lost ring. The concept of kankanim gedolim is key; sealed containers maintain their individual significance and resist nullification.

8. Rabba and Rav Yosef on Reish Lakish: Barrels vs. Figs

The discussion regarding Reish Lakish's position is further refined by Rabba and Rav Yosef. Rabba suggests Reish Lakish’s leniency is confined to barrels, where the loss is noticeable. For a fig, where the loss is subtle, the rest remain prohibited. Rav Yosef, however, extends Reish Lakish’s leniency even to figs, arguing that just as the initial mixture rendered the entire group problematic, so too the "emergence" (yetsi'ah) of one item (even if it falls) from the mixture permits the remainder.

This debate highlights the differing views on what constitutes a "noticeable" event that resolves uncertainty. Rabba prioritizes the objective recognizability of the event, while Rav Yosef focuses on the functional equivalence of the event within the mixture's dynamics.

9. Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Oshaya: Handling Terumah Mixtures

Rabbi Elazar offers a practical method for dealing with a mixture of terumah wine in sealed barrels. Since the sealed barrels resist nullification, one must open one barrel (yiftach echad me'hen), extract the terumah portion (one-hundredth), give it to a priest, and then the rest of the wine in that barrel can be drunk. This implies that once opened, the mixture becomes subject to standard nullification rules. Rav Dimi clarifies that this might be a b'dieved ruling. Rabbi Oshaya presents a more complex scenario with 150 barrels, 100 of which were opened. He permits the consumption of wine from the opened barrels after separating the terumah. However, the remaining 50 sealed barrels remain prohibited until opened, as we do not assume the prohibited barrel is among the majority of opened ones.

This demonstrates the principle that the act of opening a container fundamentally alters its halachic status regarding mixtures, allowing for nullification by majority. The continued prohibition of the un-opened barrels underscores the enduring significance of sealed containers.

10. The Mishna on Tereifa and Other Prohibitions: Identifying the Unknown

The Gemara concludes by analyzing a mishna listing various prohibitions that render an animal unfit for sacrifice. The central question is how an animal that is intrinsically identifiable as prohibited (like a tereifa) could become part of an unknown mixture. The proposed solutions highlight scenarios where the prohibited item becomes indistinguishable: * School of Rabbi Yannai: A thorn-pierced animal (known to be permitted) mixed with a wolf-clawed animal (known to be tereifa). The visible signs are similar enough (pierced skin) to create uncertainty. * Reish Lakish: A healthy animal mixed with a "fallen" animal (nefel). A fallen animal is potentially a tereifa even without visible injury. Reish Lakish maintains that such an animal requires a waiting period and post-slaughter inspection to be definitively cleared, thus remaining a safek tereifa in the mixture. * Rabbi Yirmeya: A healthy animal mixed with the offspring of a tereifa. This is based on Rabbi Eliezer's opinion that the offspring of a tereifa is also prohibited.

The Gemara then explains the interrelationship between these interpretations: they disagree on the discernibility of signs (thorn vs. wolf claw), the criteria for disqualifying a fallen animal, and the applicability of Rabbi Eliezer's stringent view. The underlying theme is that when the prohibited item is rendered unknowable within a mixture, even if the category of prohibition is recognized, the mixture becomes problematic.

Friction

The Stringency of Avodah Zarah vs. The Logic of Lost Items

The most significant friction point in this sugya arises from the apparent contradiction between the stringent rules governing avodah zarah and the seemingly straightforward logic of "the prohibited item fell into the sea, therefore the rest are permitted."

The Kushya: Rava’s objection to Rav Naḥman’s ruling regarding the avodah zarah ring is the quintessential expression of this friction. Rava points to the mishna in Zevachim (73b) which states that offerings mixed with avodah zarah items, even in a 1:10,000 ratio, must all be destroyed (kolam metey). Rava asks, if Rav's logic ("that ring that fell is the prohibited ring") were applicable, then the lost ring would resolve the safek, and the remaining rings should be permitted. Why, then, does the mishna mandate destruction for avodah zarah mixtures? This implies that the principle of assuming the lost item is the prohibited one does not apply to avodah zarah, or at least not in a way that permits the remaining mixture.

The Terutz: Rav Naḥman's response, drawing from Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion (as clarified by Rabbi Elazar), offers a nuanced terutz. He states that Rav's ruling (and implicitly, Rabbi Eliezer's) permits the rings only if they are sold two at a time. This means that the immediate transaction itself must be halachically sound. When two rings are sold, at least one is certainly permitted, thus resolving the immediate safek of the transaction. The "lost item" logic then becomes a secondary justification for the permissibility of the remaining mixture after one has been lost.

However, this terutz does not fully resolve the tension with the avodah zarah mishna's demand for absolute destruction. The Gemara's subsequent discussion of the baraita on safek safekah for avodah zarah (which some tanna'im permit, while Shmuel remains stringent) suggests that the severity of avodah zarah might override even compounding uncertainties, or at least that there is a significant dispute on this matter.

A deeper layer of terutz lies in the very nature of avodah zarah. Unlike other prohibitions where the item might be merely forbidden for consumption or use, avodah zarah involves a fundamental spiritual contamination. The prohibition is not just about the object itself but about its association with idolatry, which permeates it entirely. This intrinsic severity might explain why probabilistic resolutions, like the "lost item" logic, are insufficient to permit the remaining mixture. The destruction mandated by the mishna might be a reflection of this absolute nature, a way to eradicate any trace of the idolatrous contamination.

Furthermore, the distinction between safek and safek safekah plays a crucial role. The mishna concerning offerings and avodah zarah is dealing with a single safek – is this particular offering mixed with avodah zarah? The assumption that the lost item is the prohibited one resolves this single safek. However, the Gemara's exploration of safek safekah suggests that even when dealing with multiple layers of uncertainty, the inherent severity of avodah zarah might still lead to prohibition, as argued by Shmuel, or at least represent a significant halachic debate.

Therefore, the friction is resolved not by a single, simple answer, but by understanding that:

1. Avodah zarah carries a unique and severe level of prohibition.
2. The application of probabilistic logic like "the lost item is the prohibited one" is nuanced and depends on the specific halachic context and the nature of the prohibition.
3. The immediate handling of the mixture (selling two at a time) must itself be halachically sound.
4. There is a fundamental dispute among tanna'im and amoraim regarding the extent to which safek safekah can permit avodah zarah mixtures, with Shmuel representing the most stringent view.

The Significance of Kankanim Gedolim and "Noticeable Falls"

Another area of subtle friction lies in the application of the "lost item" principle to different types of containers and items, particularly the distinction between sealed barrels (kankanim gedolim) and individual items like rings or figs.

The Kushya: The Gemara questions why Reish Lakish’s ruling regarding the terumah barrel falling into the sea necessitates a separate mention from Rav Naḥman's ruling on the avodah zarah ring. If the logic is the same ("the prohibited one fell"), why the need for two separate cases? This implies there might be a difference in the underlying principles or their applicability. The Gemara itself raises this: if only Rav Naḥman's ruling were known, one might think the leniency applies only to avodah zarah due to its lack of "permitting factors." Conversely, if only Reish Lakish's ruling were known, one might think the leniency is specific to barrels because their "falling is noticeable."

The Terutz: The terutz lies in the concept of kankanim gedolim and the "noticeable fall." * Sealed Barrels: Reish Lakish's ruling emphasizes that sealed barrels are treated as significant entities (kankanim gedolim) and are not nullified by quantity in the same way individual items might be. Their individual integrity is maintained. Therefore, when one barrel is lost, the assumption that it was the prohibited one is a more direct resolution of the safek for the remaining distinct entities. The "falling is noticeable" aspect emphasizes that the removal of a whole barrel is a significant event, readily apparent, thus reinforcing the idea that the specific prohibited barrel was removed. * Rings vs. Figs vs. Barrels: The Gemara's rationale for presenting both rulings is to show that the leniency is not uniform. For avodah zarah rings, the prohibition is inherently severe, and the "lost item" logic might be applied cautiously (as seen with the "two at a time" rule). For terumah in sealed barrels, the leniency stems from the kankanim gedolim principle and the noticeable nature of a barrel's disappearance. Rabba's distinction between barrels and figs further refines this: the "noticeable fall" is key for barrels, whereas a fig's disappearance might be lost in the shuffle. Rav Yosef’s counter-argument, focusing on the functional "emergence," suggests a different perspective on how uncertainty is resolved.

In essence, the friction is resolved by recognizing that the application of the "lost item" principle is not a universal formula but is modulated by:

1. The inherent severity of the prohibition (avodah zarah vs. terumah).
2. The nature of the container or item (sealed barrel vs. individual ring/fig).
3. The discernibility of the event (a barrel falling vs. a ring disappearing).

The necessity of both rulings, as explained by the Gemara, is precisely to delineate these boundaries and prevent over-application or under-application of the leniency.

Intertext

1. Mishna, Avodah Zarah 6:1 (and Gemara 49b)

The sugya repeatedly references the prohibition of deriving benefit from items used in idol worship. The core principle is established in Mishna Avodah Zarah 6:1: "ואלו דברים שאסורין ואין בהם אסור הנאה, כגון חלב ודם וגיד הנשה ושור הנסקל... וכל דבר שיש בו משום עבודה זרה, אסור ואין בו אסור הנאה." (And these are things that are prohibited and have no prohibition of benefit, such as forbidden fats, blood, the sciatic nerve, the ox stoned to death... and anything that involves idol worship is prohibited and has no prohibition of benefit.) The Gemara clarifies that while prohibited for consumption, items used in idol worship (like the ring in our sugya) are prohibited from all benefit. This stringent prohibition is what underpins Rava's objection. The Gemara in Avodah Zarah 49b discusses the non-nullification of avodah zarah items. This directly informs the discussion here about the 1:100 or 1:10,000 ratios and the demand for destruction.

2. Tosefta, Terumot 5:10

The dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon regarding safek safekah and non-nullifiable items is explicitly drawn from Tosefta Terumot 5:10. This Tosefta states: "ספק תרומה אסור, ספק ספיקא מותר. כיצד? כוס של תרומה שנפל לתוך אוצר של כוסות, כולן אסורים. פרש אחד מהן לריבוא, ומריבוא לריבוא, מותרין. רבי יהודה אומר: אסור. רבי שמעון בן יהודה אומר משום רבי שמעון: מותר." (An uncertainty of terumah is forbidden, a double uncertainty is permitted. How so? A cup of terumah that fell into a storeroom of cups, all are forbidden. If one of them separated to ten thousand, and from ten thousand to ten thousand, they are permitted. Rabbi Yehuda says: Forbidden. Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: Permitted.) The Gemara in Zevachim cites this Tosefta, applying its principles to avodah zarah. The debate here hinges on whether the stringency of avodah zarah aligns with Rabbi Yehuda's view (always prohibited) or if safek safekah can indeed permit it, aligning with Rabbi Shimon's view (or the baraita's independent ruling). This cross-reference is fundamental to resolving the safek safekah aspect of the sugya.

3. Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 110:1 (and commentaries)

The Shulchan Aruch, in Yoreh De'ah 110:1, addresses the laws of basar b'chalav (meat and milk) mixtures. While not directly about avodah zarah or terumah, the underlying principles of nullification and safek are relevant. For instance, regarding a mixture of meat and milk, the principle of nullification by majority is applied. However, if the prohibited item is intrinsically significant or non-nullifiable (like avodah zarah items are discussed to be), the rules change. The commentaries (e.g., Siftei Kohen, Baeir Hetev) often discuss the extent to which safek and safek safekah apply to various prohibitions, referencing the debates seen in the Talmud. The concept of kankanim gedolim (significant containers) also finds echoes in later halachic discussions concerning mixtures in vessels. The debate on whether safek safekah permits avodah zarah would represent an extreme stringency if the ruling leaned towards Rabbi Yehuda's view even for avodah zarah.

Psak/Practice

The practical implications of this sugya are profound, particularly concerning the handling of mixtures involving items of severe prohibition, most notably avodah zarah.

1. Stringency of Avodah Zarah: The overarching principle established is the extreme stringency of avodah zarah. While other prohibitions might be resolved through probabilistic reasoning like "the lost item is the prohibited one," or nullified by majority, avodah zarah is treated with a much higher degree of caution. This is reflected in Rava's objection and Shmuel's assertion that safek safekah for avodah zarah remains prohibited.
2. The "Two at a Time" Rule: Rav Naḥman's application of Rabbi Eliezer's ruling means that when dealing with items like avodah zarah rings that are not nullifiable by quantity, the immediate halachic act must itself resolve the safek. Selling or using them "two at a time" ensures that one of the pair is certainly permitted, thus creating a halachically sound transaction even before considering the loss of an item. This is a crucial heuristic for le'chatchila (ab initio) practice.
3. Significance of Containers (Kankanim Gedolim): The distinction between sealed barrels (kankanim gedolim) and individual items highlights the importance of the container's integrity. This principle allows for leniency in terumah mixtures when a whole sealed barrel is lost, based on the assumption that the prohibited barrel was the one lost. However, this leniency is tied to the "noticeable fall" and the inherent significance of the container.
4. Disputed Ground of Safek Safekah: The sugya leaves open a significant area of dispute regarding safek safekah and avodah zarah. While a baraita suggests it can be permitted, Shmuel's stringent view, aligning with Rabbi Yehuda's general principle of prohibiting compounded uncertainties for non-nullifiable items, often prevails in practice when extreme caution is warranted. Therefore, in cases of doubt involving avodah zarah, the default approach would lean towards prohibition unless a clear resolution of the uncertainty exists.
5. The "Lost Item" Heuristic: This heuristic is a tool for resolving a safek when an item is lost. It is applied differently based on the prohibition's severity and the nature of the item. For avodah zarah, its application is restricted, especially concerning single uncertainties or when the immediate act of dealing with the mixture is not itself halachically sound.

In meta-psak terms, the sugya teaches a hierarchy of stringency. Avodah zarah sits at the apex, demanding the highest level of caution, often overriding probabilistic resolutions. Terumah, while serious, allows for more nuanced application of principles like nullification and the "lost item" rule, particularly when dealing with significant containers. The Gemara’s detailed analysis serves as a framework for navigating these complex mixtures, emphasizing the need for precise identification of the prohibition, the nature of the item, and the method of resolution.

Takeaway

The severity of a prohibition dictates the acceptable methods of resolving uncertainty; avodah zarah's intrinsic contamination often resists probabilistic leniencies that might apply elsewhere. Ultimately, navigating mixtures demands a meticulous assessment of the prohibition's nature and the certainty of its removal or nullification.