Daf Yomi · Expert – Beit Midrash Analysis · On-Ramp

Zevachim 77

On-RampExpert – Beit Midrash AnalysisNovember 30, 2025

Sugya Map

The sugya on Zevachim 77a primarily grapples with the intricate halachic status of disqualified sacrificial items when intermingled with valid ones, particularly concerning their eligibility to be placed on the Mizbeach "לשם עצים" (for the sake of wood).

  • Core Issue: May disqualified items, or portions of them, be placed on the Mizbeach if they are designated "לשם עצים" and not as an offering?
  • Nafka Mina(s):
    • The practical disposition of eivarim (limbs) of a chatat mixed with olah, or eivarim of ba'alei mumim (blemished animals) mixed with unblemished olah.
    • The interpretive methodology concerning ribui u'miyut (inclusion and exclusion) derived from specific terms in pesukim, such as "אותם" and "בהם/בם."
    • The scope of kedusha – does the kevesh (ramp) of the Mizbeach carry the same halachic weight as the Mizbeach itself?
  • Primary Sources:
    • Vayikra 2:11-12: "כי כל שאור וכל דבש לא תקטירו ממנו אשה לה' קרבן בכורים תקריבו אותם לה' ואל המזבח לא יעלו לריח ניחוח."
    • Vayikra 22:25: "כי משחתם בהם מום בם לא ירצו לכם."
    • Tosefta 8:15 (cited in Gemara Zevachim 77a).

Text Snapshot

The crux of our sugya begins with the Mishna's dispute and the subsequent Gemara's analysis:

MISHNA: "איברי חטאת שנתערבו באיברי עולה רבי אליעזר אומר יעלו ויעלו לשם עצים. וחכמים אומרים ירקב ויוצא לבית השריפה." (Zevachim 77a)

  • Dikduk/Leshon Nuance: R' Eliezer's unique phrase "ויעלו לשם עצים" (and they shall go up for the sake of wood) posits a specific mechanism for placing otherwise disqualified items on the Mizbeach. This is not an offering, but a functional use of the Mizbeach space. The Rabbis, by contrast, insist on "ירקב ויוצא" (it shall decay and be taken out), highlighting a strict separation from the sanctity of the Mizbeach.

GEMARA: "מאי טעמא דרבי אליעזר? דכתיב: 'קרבן בכורים תקריבו אותם לה' ואל המזבח לא יעלו לריח ניחוח.' לריח ניחוח הוא דלא יעלו, הא לשם עצים יעלו." (Zevachim 77a)

  • Dikduk/Leshon Nuance: The Gemara derives R' Eliezer's position from the drasha "לריח ניחוח הוא דלא יעלו, הא לשם עצים יעלו" – only as an offering are shaor v'dvash prohibited, but for fuel, they are permitted. This kal v'chomer (or rather, mi'yut) forms the bedrock of R' Eliezer's approach.

GEMARA (Rabbanans' drasha): "ורבנן? ממעט רחמנא 'אותם'. אותם הוא דלריח ניחוח לא יעלו אבל לשם עצים יעלו, מידי אחריני לא." (Zevachim 77a)

  • Dikduk/Leshon Nuance: The Rabbis seize upon the word "אותם" (them) as an exclusionary term (miyut), limiting the allowance of "לשם עצים" only to shaor v'dvash. Other disqualified items, by extension, are not permitted even for wood.

GEMARA (R' Eliezer's drasha on "אותם"): "ורבי אליעזר 'אותם' מאי עביד ליה? אותם הוא דרבאי לך כבש כמזבח, אבל מידי אחריני לא." (Zevachim 77a)

  • Dikduk/Leshon Nuance: R' Eliezer interprets "אותם" as an inclusionary term (ribui) but for a chumra – to equate the kevesh (ramp) with the Mizbeach itself specifically for shaor v'dvash. This means even bringing shaor v'dvash onto the ramp is prohibited, implying a stricter kedusha for these items.

GEMARA (R' Eliezer's drasha on "בהם/בם"): "רבי אליעזר, מה לי שניא בהמה ששימשו בה בני אדם ובהמה שנשכבה? אטו בעל מום לאו מום הוא? אמר רב הונא: במום שעל קרן העין, כרבי עקיבא דאמר עלו לא ירדו... אלא טעמא דרבי אליעזר, ממעט רחמנא 'מום בם'. מום בם הוא דלא ירצו, הא בדרך תערובת ירצו." (Zevachim 77a)

  • Dikduk/Leshon Nuance: R' Eliezer applies a similar miyut to Vayikra 22:25. The phrase "מום בם" (a blemish in them) implies that only if the blemish is clearly identifiable are they rejected. If they are in a mixture ("בדרך תערובת"), they are accepted. This allows him to distinguish between ba'alei mumim (which he permits in a mixture) and nivlat pe'ulim (animals used for bestiality, which he forbids).

Readings

Rashi on Zevachim 77a s.v. "ורבי אליעזר - להכי כתיב אותם"

Rashi clarifies R' Eliezer's seemingly counterintuitive interpretation of "אותם." For R' Eliezer, the word "אותם" (Vayikra 2:12) serves not to exclude other items from being placed "לשם עצים," but rather to include the ramp (kevesh) of the Mizbeach in the prohibition of bringing shaor v'dvash "לריח ניחוח." Chiddush: Rashi highlights that R' Eliezer sees "אותם" as a ribui for a chumra specific to shaor v'dvash. "אין לי אלא מזבח, כבש מניין? תלמוד לומר אל המזבח." (Zevachim 77a s.v. "ורבי אליעזר"). This means the verse's "אל המזבח" (to the altar) is extended to include the kevesh, making the kevesh equivalent to the Mizbeach for shaor v'dvash. For R' Eliezer, this stricture on shaor v'dvash does not imply a blanket prohibition on other items "לשם עצים."

Tosafot on Zevachim 77a s.v. "ורבי אליעזר אותם הוא דרבאי לך כבש כמזבח"

Tosafot raise a penetrating question on R' Eliezer's drasha. They ask how R' Eliezer can be consistent: "וא"ת מה סברא היא זו לר' אליעזר דאותם לא קאי אכולהו ולריח ניחוח דבתריה קאי אכולהו אפי' אשיריים." If "אותם" is a miyut that limits the chumra of "כבש כמזבח" only to shaor v'dvash, why doesn't it also limit the kula of "לשם עצים" only to shaor v'dvash? In short, if "אותם" is a miyut, it should be consistent in its application. Chiddush: Tosafot's terutz is that R' Eliezer finds no logical reason (lo mistaber leih ta'ama) to be more stringent with shirayim (other disqualified items) than with shaor v'dvash. The drasha of kevesh k'mizbe'ach is itself a chumra (stricture). R' Eliezer applies this chumra only to shaor v'dvash because they are inherently "חמיר" (strict/severe). However, for other disqualified items, since they are not as "חמיר" as shaor v'dvash, R' Eliezer does not extend the chumra of kevesh k'mizbe'ach to them. This allows the general kula of "לשם עצים" (derived from the broader implication of Vayikra 2:12) to apply to all other disqualified items.

Steinsaltz on Zevachim 77a s.v. "ושואלים: ור' אליעזר כיצד הוא דורש את המיעוט הזה?"

Steinsaltz articulates the Gemara's explanation of R' Eliezer's reading of "אותם" with characteristic clarity. He explains that R' Eliezer interprets "אותם" as an inclusion (רבאי) for shaor v'dvash specifically regarding the prohibition of bringing them onto the kevesh as if it were the Mizbeach itself. Chiddush: Steinsaltz emphasizes that this specific chumra (כבש כמזבח) applies only to shaor v'dvash. For any "מידי אחריני" (other items), their ascent to the kevesh is not considered equivalent to ascending the Mizbeach. This allows R' Eliezer to maintain his broader position that other disqualified items may be placed "לשם עצים" directly on the Mizbeach, as the kevesh stricture does not apply to them. The word "אותם" thus carves out a unique, stringent rule for shaor v'dvash without affecting the general rule for other items.

Friction

The Strongest Kushya

The most acute kushya arises from the tension in R' Eliezer's interpretive method, keenly identified by Tosafot (Zevachim 77a s.v. "ורבי אליעזר אותם הוא דרבאי לך כבש כמזבח"). The Gemara presents R' Eliezer's drasha of "אותם" as a ribui for a chumra: "אותם הוא דרבאי לך כבש כמזבח, אבל מידי אחריני לא" (Zevachim 77a). This means the prohibition of bringing shaor v'dvash to the Mizbeach applies even to the kevesh, but this stricture does not extend to other disqualified items. However, the Rabbanans interpret "אותם" as a miyut for a kula: "אותם הוא דלריח ניחוח לא יעלו אבל לשם עצים יעלו, מידי אחריני לא" (Zevachim 77a). They claim only shaor v'dvash may be placed "לשם עצים," excluding other items.

The kushya for R' Eliezer is this: If "אותם" is a miyut that limits the chumra of "כבש כמזבח" only to shaor v'dvash (as R' Eliezer implies by "אבל מידי אחריני לא"), why doesn't "אותם" also limit the kula of "לשם עצים" only to shaor v'dvash? Why does "אותם" serve as an exclusionary term for the chumra of kevesh k'mizbe'ach, but not for the kula of "לשם עצים"? It seems inconsistent to derive a chumra for shaor v'dvash alone from "אותם," while simultaneously allowing a kula (לשם עצים) for all other items, when "אותם" could logically restrict that kula too. The word "אותם" should either be an absolute exclusionary term for both chumra and kula, or neither.

The Best Terutz (from Tosafot)

Tosafot provide the most satisfying terutz by delving into R' Eliezer's underlying rationale: "ויש לומר משום דלא מסתבר ליה טעמא לר' אליעזר להחמיר בשיריים טפי משאור ודבש ודרשא דכבש כמזבח חומרא היא ולא קאי אלא אשאור ודבש דחמיר" (Tosafot Zevachim 77a s.v. "ורבי אליעזר אותם הוא דרבאי לך").

R' Eliezer does not find it logically compelling (lo mistaber leih ta'ama) to be more stringent with other disqualified items (shirayim) than with shaor v'dvash (leaven and honey). The drasha of "כבש כמזבח" is inherently a chumra. R' Eliezer believes that this specific chumra applies only to shaor v'dvash because they possess a unique degree of severity (d'chameir). Their prohibition is tied to "ריח ניחוח" (pleasing aroma), implying a fundamental unsuitability as an offering.

For other disqualified items (like chatat limbs or ba'alei mumim), while they cannot be offered as sacrifices, they don't carry the same inherent "חומרא" as shaor v'dvash. Therefore, the chumra of "כבש כמזבח" (equating ramp to altar) derived from "אותם" does not extend to them. Since that specific chumra doesn't apply, the general kula derived from the broader reading of Vayikra 2:12 ("לריח ניחוח הוא דלא יעלו, הא לשם עצים יעלו") does apply to these items.

In essence, R' Eliezer uses "אותם" to carve out a specific, heightened severity for shaor v'dvash regarding the kevesh. This doesn't contradict his broader view that other disqualified items can be used "לשם עצים," as they are not subject to that same heightened severity. The chumra of "כבש כמזבח" is unique to "אותם" due to their inherent nature, while the kula of "לשם עצים" is a more general principle derived from the pasuk's phrasing, applicable where no specific chumra overrides it.

Intertext

Menachot 57b: The Scope of "כבש כמזבח"

The sugya's discussion of "כבש כמזבח" (the ramp is like the altar) resonates deeply with a parallel sugya in Menachot 57b. There, the Gemara debates whether one is liable for bringing shaor v'dvash onto the kevesh (ramp) as one would be for bringing them onto the Mizbeach itself. Rabbi Elazar (cited by Tosafot Zevachim 77a s.v. "ורבנן תרתי שמעת מינה") holds that one who brings any of these onto the kevesh is exempt (patur), implying the kevesh is not fully equivalent to the Mizbeach. Rabbi Yochanan, however, holds one is liable (mechayav), implying it is equivalent.

This directly connects to our sugya. R' Eliezer's drasha of "אותם הוא דרבאי לך כבש כמזבח" (Zevachim 77a) aligns with the view that the kevesh can be considered like the Mizbeach for specific items, like shaor v'dvash. The Rabbanans in Zevachim 77a, who derive two halachot from "אותם" – both the kula of "לשם עצים" for shaor v'dvash and the chumra of "כבש כמזבח" for shaor v'dvash – are taking a nuanced position that for shaor v'dvash, the kevesh is like the Mizbeach. This is a critical point for understanding how drashot can delineate the sanctity of different parts of the Temple.

The interplay between these sugyot demonstrates that the interpretive methods of ribui u'miyut are not confined to a single context but are crucial tools for defining the scope and application of kedusha throughout Kodshim. The very meaning of what constitutes "bringing to the altar" (אל המזבח) is contingent on these linguistic nuances.

Psak/Practice

The halacha does not follow Rabbi Eliezer's opinion that disqualified items may be placed on the Mizbeach "לשם עצים." The Mishna in Zevachim 77a presents the Rabbanans' view: "ירקב ויוצא לבית השריפה" (it shall decay and be taken out to the place of burning). This is the accepted halacha.

This ruling establishes a fundamental principle in Kodshim: items that have become disqualified from being an offering may not actively be used on the Mizbeach in any capacity, even for a non-sacrificial purpose like fuel. The sanctity of the Mizbeach is paramount, and it may not be used for anything other than its designated purpose of offering korbanot. To permit disqualified items "לשם עצים" would blur the lines between sacred and profane, potentially leading to chillul kodashim (desecration of sacred items).

This principle is reflected in the Shulchan Aruch, which consistently rules that disqualified sacrifices are to be removed and burned in the appropriate beit haserifot or left to decay, never to be actively brought onto the Mizbeach (e.g., Rambam, Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashin 18:1). The Gemara's extensive debate on ribui u'miyut (inclusion/exclusion) highlights the meticulous nature required in halachic interpretation, particularly in Kodshim, where the consequences of error are severe. The psak here leans towards the stricter interpretation to safeguard the integrity of the Mizbeach and its service.

Takeaway

The sugya masterfully unpacks the Tannaitic interpretive methods (drashot) of ribui u'miyut to define the precise boundaries of kedusha on the Mizbeach, demonstrating the profound implications of single words like "אותם" and "בהם" for Temple service. The ultimate psak underscores the Rabbanans' unwavering commitment to strictly separating disqualified items from the Mizbeach, preserving its sanctity against any appearance of impropriety.