Zevachim 79

Sugya Map

• Core Issue: Reconciling seemingly contradictory views attributed to Rabbi Yehuda regarding bitul (nullification) of substances in mixtures, particularly min b'mino (same type) and min b'she'eino mino (different type), and the role of rov (majority), ta'am (taste), and mareh (appearance).
• Nafka Mina(s):
  • The halacha for mei chatas (purification water) mixed with mikvah water: Is it nullified by rov?
  • The halacha for white wine mixed with water: Is it nullified by rov, or does its appearance (or lack thereof) lead to a different rule?
  • The halacha for tumah (impurity) of zav's bodily fluids (blood, spittle, urine) when mixed with their pure counterparts or with water: When does bitul occur, if at all?
  • General principles governing bitul in issurim (prohibitions) and tumah.
• Primary Sources:
  • Gemara Zevachim 79a: Initial discussion reconciling R. Yehuda's views on mei chatas and white wine.
  • Baraita (R. Yehuda in R. Gamliel's name): "אין דם מבטל דם, אין רוק מבטל רוק, ואין מי רגלים מבטלין מי רגלים" (Blood does not nullify blood, spittle does not nullify spittle, and urine does not nullify urine). Zevachim 79a.
  • Rava's tirutz regarding the bucket with mei chatas. Zevachim 79a.
  • Rava's summary of bitul principles: ta'am, rov, mareh. Zevachim 79a.
  • Baraita (Tosefta Teharot 5:3): Zav's urine in an earthenware flask – bitul with water vs. bitul with pure urine. Zevachim 79a.
  • Baraita (Tosefta Teharot 4:11): Niddah's spittle in flax – R. Yehuda's stringency. Zevachim 79a.
  • Mishna Zevachim 79a: Mixtures of sacrificial bloods (R. Eliezer vs. Rabbanan).

Text Snapshot

The Gemara on Zevachim 79a opens with an attempt to harmonize two statements concerning bitul attributed to Rabbi Yehuda:

הא דמי חטאת ברוב מים בטלי דידיה היא. הא דיין לבן ברוב מים לא בטלי דרביה היא. דתניא רבי יהודה אומר משום רבן גמליאל: אין דם מבטל דם, אין רוק מבטל רוק, ואין מי רגלים מבטלין מי רגלים. (Zevachim 79a)

Translation & Nuance: "This statement, that mei chatas are nullified in a majority of water, is his, i.e., Rabbi Yehuda's [own opinion]. That statement, [regarding] white wine that is not nullified in a majority of water, is his teacher's ruling, i.e., Rabban Gamliel's. As it is taught in a Baraita: Rabbi Yehuda says in the name of Rabban Gamliel: Blood does not nullify blood, spittle does not nullify spittle, and urine does not nullify urine."

• Dikduk/Leshon: The use of "הא...דידיה" and "הא...דרביה" is a classic Gemara construction to resolve contradictions by attributing opinions to different sources or contexts. "דידיה" (lit. "of him") refers to Rabbi Yehuda's personal view, while "דרביה" (lit. "of his teacher") refers to Rabban Gamliel's opinion, transmitted by R. Yehuda.
• The phrase "יין לבן ברוב מים לא בטלי" (white wine is not nullified in a majority of water) implicitly references a prior discussion, likely from Zevachim 78b, where the concept of "רואין אותו כאילו הוא יין אדום" (we view it as if it were red wine) is introduced. This "viewing" implies that even if the white wine's appearance is not discernible, we treat it as if it were (like red wine, whose appearance would be distinct), thus preventing bitul b'rov in min b'she'eino mino.
• The Baraita quoted by R. Yehuda in R. Gamliel's name explicitly states the principle of min b'mino lo batel (a substance of its own type is not nullified) for tumah contexts, directly contrasting with the leniency of mei chatas being nullified by rov. This sets the stage for the Gemara's deep dive into bitul rules.

Readings

The Gemara's initial tirutz attempts to resolve a contradiction within Rabbi Yehuda's attributed statements regarding bitul. On one hand, mei chatas (purification water) is nullified by a rov (majority) of mikvah water (R. Yehuda's own view). On the other hand, white wine is not nullified by a rov of water, as it is "viewed as if it were red wine" (R. Yehuda in R. Gamliel's name). The Gemara attributes the leniency regarding mei chatas to R. Yehuda himself, and the stringency regarding white wine to his Rebbe, Rabban Gamliel, who is generally stringent in min b'mino scenarios. This distinction is bolstered by the Baraita where R. Yehuda quotes R. Gamliel as saying, "Blood does not nullify blood, spittle does not nullify spittle, and urine does not nullify urine."

Rashi's Interpretation (Zevachim 79a s.v. הא דרביה)

Rashi clarifies the Gemara's initial resolution by delineating the differing stringencies of Rabban Gamliel, and how R. Yehuda's own opinion fits into a broader framework of bitul.

Rashi explains:

הא דרביה – הא דתנן לעיל רואין אותו כאילו הוא יין אדום דרביה הוא דמחמיר בביטול כי היכי דמחמיר במין ומינו ואמר לא בטיל כלל ומין בשאינו מינו נמי דאית ליה דבטל וקיימא ליה כל זמן שמראה המועט ניכר ברוב לא בטיל מחמיר נמי ואמר דהיכא דמראיהן שוין כגון יין לבן במים דרואין אותו כאילו אדום ולא סגיא ליה ברובא. (Rashi Zevachim 79a s.v. הא דרביה)

Translation: "That of his Rebbe – That which we learned above, 'we view it as if it is red wine,' is his Rebbe's [opinion], for he is stringent in nullification, just as he is stringent in min b'mino and says it is not nullified at all. And even in min b'she'eino mino (a type mixed with a non-type), where he holds it is nullified, it stands for him that as long as the appearance of the minority is discernible in the majority, it is not nullified. He is also stringent and says that where their appearances are similar, like white wine in water, we view it as if it is red, and majority is not enough."

Rashi's Chiddush: Rashi's chiddush here is to present Rabban Gamliel as having a consistently stringent approach to bitul, encompassing both min b'mino and specific min b'she'eino mino cases. For min b'mino, R. Gamliel holds lo batel klal (not nullified at all), as seen from the Baraita ("Blood does not nullify blood..."). For min b'she'eino mino, Rashi explains that while bitul is generally possible, R. Gamliel's stringency extends to cases where the mareh (appearance) should be discernible but isn't due to the nature of the mixture (e.g., white wine in water). In such instances, the principle of "רואין אותו כאילו הוא יין אדום" (we view it as if it were red wine) applies. This means we assume a discernible appearance (like red wine would have), thereby preventing bitul b'rov. This is a crucial distinction: it's not that white wine is red wine, but that we treat it as such for bitul purposes due to R. Gamliel's stringency. This implies that for R. Gamliel, even in min b'she'eino mino, bitul is not merely about actual discernible appearance or taste, but also about a hypothetical, more stringent standard. This hypothetical standard, "we view it as if," functions as a gezeirah (rabbinic decree) or a fundamental principle preventing bitul where the minority could have been discernible if its nature were different.

Rashi also briefly clarifies the specific contexts of Rabban Gamliel's stricture:

אין דם מבטל דם – אצל זריקה ואצל כיסוי. אין רוק – הטהור מבטל רוק הזב. אין מי רגלים – טהורים מבטלים מי רגלים של זב ומטמא ואע"פ שרבות הטהורות על הטמאות בכלי. (Rashi Zevachim 79a s.v. אין דם מבטל דם, אין רוק, אין מי רגלים)

Translation: "Blood does not nullify blood – for sprinkling [of offerings] and for covering [of blood]. // Spittle does not nullify – pure spittle does not nullify the zav's spittle. // Urine does not nullify – pure urine does not nullify zav's urine and makes one tamei, even though the pure are greater than the impure in the vessel."

These Rashi snippets elucidate that R. Gamliel's min b'mino lo batel applies even when the pure substance is in the majority, and in specific halachic contexts of kodshim (sacrifices) and tumah. This provides the backdrop for understanding the Baraita about the zav's flask later in the sugya.

Tosafot's Interpretation (Zevachim 79a s.v. הא דרביה)

Tosafot launches a powerful critique of Rashi's interpretation, finding several difficulties with it, and proposes an alternative girsa (textual reading) and understanding.

Tosafot states:

הא דרביה – הא דתנן לעיל רואין אותן כאילו הן יין אדום דרביה הוא דמחמיר בבטול כי היכי דמחמיר במין במינו כך פירש בקונטרס וקשה לפירושו חדא דמה ענין האי רואין דמי רגלים ליין וחלב דלעיל שאינו מינו לא שייך בהו השקה אבל מי רגלים לדברי רש"י שהם מים גמורים וסלקא להו השקה אם כן מאי רואין שייך בהו וכי משום דנשתנו קצת לא יהא שם מים עליהם ולא תועיל להם השקה דלא דמו למי צבע שבטל מהם תורת מים בפרק קמא דמכות (דף ג:) ועוד בלאו סוגיא דלעיל תקשי ליה רישא לסיפא ועוד מאי קא משני הא דידיה הא דרביה אכתי הך דמי חטאת קשיא רישא לסיפא לסברת הש"ס דאמר דתנא דהנך מי רגלים רואין כאילו הן מים סובר נמי ביין וחלב רואין כאילו הן יין אדום ועל זה פריך אמאי מכשרינן במי חטאת על ידי רוב מי מקוה דבמיעוט מי חטאת נמי הוה לן למימר רואין כאילו הן יין אדום ע"ז לא תירץ כלום דאכתי מי רגלים למי חטאת קשו אהדדי: (Tosafot Zevachim 79a s.v. הא דרביה)

Translation (first part): "That of his Rebbe – That which we learned above, 'we view them as if they are red wine,' is his Rebbe's [opinion], for he is stringent in nullification, just as he is stringent in min b'mino. So explained in the Kuntres (Rashi). And it is difficult according to his explanation. First, what connection does this 'we view' of urine have to wine and milk discussed earlier, which is min b'she'eino mino? The concept of hashka'ah (immersion) is not relevant to them. But urine, according to Rashi, which is pure water, hashka'ah applies to them. If so, what 'we view' is relevant to them? Is it because they changed slightly, they lose the status of water and hashka'ah is ineffective, like colored water which loses the status of water in the first chapter of Makkot (3b)? Furthermore, even without the previous sugya, the reisha (first part) would contradict the seifa (last part). Furthermore, what is the answer 'this is his own, this is his Rebbe's'? Still, this [case] of mei chatas is difficult, the reisha contradicts the seifa, according to the Gemara's reasoning, which says that the Tanna who holds 'we view these urines as if they are water' also holds that in wine and milk 'we view them as if they are red wine'. And on this it asks, why do we permit mei chatas with a majority of mikvah water? For even with a minority of mei chatas, we should say 'we view it as if it is red wine'. On this, he (Rashi) did not answer anything, for still urine and mei chatas contradict each other."

Tosafot's Critique of Rashi:

1. Incoherence of "רואין" in urine: Tosafot questions Rashi's application of "רואין" to urine. If urine, in Rashi's view, is "pure water" (mayim gemurim), then hashka'ah (immersion) should purify it directly. Why would "we view it" as something else (like wine, as implied in the broader context of ro'in) and thus prevent bitul b'rov? This implies a loss of "water status" for zav's urine, which Tosafot finds problematic, distinguishing it from mei tziv'a (colored water) in Makkot 3b.
2. Internal Contradiction within Rashi's framework: Tosafot argues that even with Rashi's distinction, the reisha (mei chatas - nullified by rov) and seifa (urine - not nullified by rov, due to "ro'in") still contradict each other if both are considered R. Yehuda's views or if the "ro'in" principle is applied broadly. The Gemara's tirutz ("this is his own, this is his Rebbe's") only addressed the white wine case, not the urine case which also seems to imply a "ro'in" principle. If the Tanna who holds zav's urine is "viewed as water" (a different girsa Tosafot discusses later) or "viewed as wine" also holds the white wine "viewed as red wine," then why is mei chatas different? Why don't we apply "רואין אותו כאילו הוא יין אדום" to mei chatas to prevent its nullification by rov? Rashi offers no answer to this, leaving a significant gap.

Tosafot then proposes a fundamental girsa change and an alternative interpretation:

הג"ה ונראה דגרסינן מי רגלים רואין אותן כאילו הן יין וכי האי גוונא תניא בתוספתא דמסכת טהרות בפרק שמתחיל דם טמא מי רגלים שנתערבו ביין רואין אותן כאילו הן מים נתערבו במים רואין אותן כאילו הן יין במים אם בטל מראיהן טהורים ואם לאו טמאים והאי ורמינהו דהכא אמתניתין קאי דקאמר רבי יהודה אין דם מבטל דם והכי פירושו דלי שהוא מלא רוקין והטבילו כאילו לא טבל מלא מי רגלים רואין אותן כאילו הן יין ולא בטלי ברובא מלא מי חטאת עד שירבו המים על מי חטאת שישפוך רובו ולכשיתמלא טהור דלא מהניא להו השקה לטהרם כמו שפירש בקונטרס ואי נמי חומרא בעלמא משום דאין זריעה להקדש כדאמרי' בפרק כל שעה (פסחים דף לד:) וכ"ש למי חטאת דאפילו בגדי אוכלי תרומה מדרס לחטאת (חגיגה דף כ.) אבל היכא דרבו בטלי מהם תורת מי חטאת ונעשו מי מקוה מאן שמעת ליה דאית ליה רואין במין שאינו מינו השוין בחזותא רבי יהודה דקתני בההיא דיין לבן רואין אותו כאילו הוא יין אדום והכי מי רגלים נמי הוי מין בשאינו מינו כדמוכח בסמוך גבי חרסן של זב וגבי שוין בחזותא וקתני דסגי להו ברובא במי חטאת אלמא דמין במינו בטל לרבי יהודה ומשני הא דידיה הא דרביה מתניתין דרביה דמין במינו לא בטל וברייתא דידיה ומברייתא דלעיל רואין אותן כאילו הן יין אדום אם דיהה מראהו כשר לא הוה מצי לאקשויי אמתניתין אלמאדמין במינו בטל לרבי יהודה דהתם מין בשאינו מינו הוא אע"ג דחשיבי ליה קצת מין במינו לומר דבטל ברוב אי לאו טעמא דרואין כמו מין במינו מ"מ מין במינו גמור לא הוי... (Tosafot Zevachim 79a s.v. הא דרביה)

Translation (second part, Tosafot's own view): "And it seems that we should read: 'Urine, we view it as if it is wine.' And a similar teaching is found in Tosefta Maseches Teharot, chapter starting 'Dam Tamei': 'Urine that was mixed with wine, we view it as if it is water. Mixed with water, we view it as if it is wine.' In water, if its appearance is nullified, it is pure; if not, it is impure. And this 'and we raise a contradiction' here refers to the Mishna, which states R. Yehuda says 'blood does not nullify blood.' And this is its explanation: A bucket that is full of spittle, and one immersed it, it is as if it was not immersed. Full of urine, we view it as if it is wine and it is not nullified by a majority. Full of mei chatas, until the water is greater than the mei chatas, so that he pours out most of it, and when it is filled, it is pure, for hashka'ah is not effective to purify them, as Rashi explained in the Kuntres. And even if it is a stringency only because there is no 'zeriah' (sowing/planting) for hekdesh as we say in Perek Kol Sha'ah (Pesachim 34b), and certainly for mei chatas that even clothes of ochlei terumah are midras (pressure impurity) for chatas (Chagigah 20a). But where the majority is present, the status of mei chatas is nullified from them and they become mikvah water. Who did you hear who says 'we view' in min b'she'eino mino where appearances are similar? R. Yehuda, as it is taught in that [baraita] of white wine, 'we view it as if it is red wine.' And similarly, urine is also min b'she'eino mino, as proven nearby regarding the zav's flask, and regarding similar appearances. And it teaches that a majority is sufficient for mei chatas. Therefore, min b'mino is nullified according to R. Yehuda. And he answers: 'This is his own, this is his Rebbe's.' The Mishna is his Rebbe's, that min b'mino is not nullified. And the Baraita is his own. And from the Baraita above, 'we view them as if they are red wine,' if its appearance was nullified, it is kosher. It would not be possible to contradict from the Mishna. Therefore, min b'mino is nullified according to R. Yehuda. For there it is min b'she'eino mino, even though it is considered somewhat min b'mino to say that it is nullified by a majority, were it not for the reason of 'we view' like min b'mino, nevertheless, it is not pure min b'mino..."

Tosafot's Chiddush: Tosafot's chiddush is multifaceted:

1. Textual Emendation (Girsa): Tosafot suggests a girsa change to "מי רגלים רואין אותן כאילו הן יין" (urine, we view it as if it is wine), citing the Tosefta. This is critical, as it redefines how urine is treated in mixtures. Instead of Rashi's "pure water," it's "viewed as wine" when mixed with water, making it a min b'she'eino mino situation where "appearance" (even hypothetical) matters for bitul.
2. Redefining the Contradiction: Tosafot reinterprets the Gemara's kushya of "V'Raminhu" (and we raise a contradiction) as referring to the Mishna (which states R. Yehuda holds min b'mino lo batel for blood/spittle/urine) from the Baraita (white wine/urine cases where bitul is more complex due to "ro'in").
3. Coherent R. Yehuda: Tosafot endeavors to construct a consistent R. Yehuda. He argues that the white wine/urine cases, where "ro'in" applies, are min b'she'eino mino where appearances are similar but not identical, justifying the "ro'in" principle to prevent bitul. However, mei chatas is different. While mei chatas is also distinct from mikvah water, it's considered min b'mino in a certain sense that allows bitul b'rov without the "ro'in" stringency. This leads Tosafot to conclude that according to R. Yehuda, min b'mino can be nullified by rov (referring to mei chatas in mikvah), and the "this is his own, this is his Rebbe's" applies to a deeper distinction where R. Gamliel truly holds min b'mino lo batel klal, whereas R. Yehuda allows bitul b'rov in some min b'mino contexts (like mei chatas). The Tosefta's "urine as wine" makes urine a min b'she'eino mino (or a hybrid) where "ro'in" acts as a stringency.
4. Stringency of Mei Chatas: Tosafot notes that mei chatas is highly stringent (אין זריעה להקדש, בגדי אוכלי תרומה מדרס לחטאת - no "sowing" for consecrated items, clothes of terumah eaters are midras for chatas), yet it is nullified by a rov. This highlights the unique nature of mei chatas in bitul contexts, where despite its sanctity/impurity, the rov principle still applies to its tumah status once its identity as mei chatas is lost. This is a crucial distinction between bitul of tumah and bitul of issur.

In essence, Rashi presents R. Gamliel as broadly stringent, extending "ro'in" to min b'she'eino mino cases with similar appearances. Tosafot, by contrast, challenges this broad application of "ro'in" for R. Gamliel and, through a girsa emendation, refines the understanding of urine as min b'she'eino mino. This allows Tosafot to construct a more internally consistent R. Yehuda, where min b'mino can be nullified by rov in certain cases (like mei chatas), while "ro'in" applies to min b'she'eino mino with similar appearances (like white wine and urine as wine). The "this is his own, this is his Rebbe's" then becomes a distinction between R. Yehuda's more nuanced approach to bitul b'rov even in some min b'mino (or close to it) scenarios, and R. Gamliel's absolute min b'mino lo batel stance.

Friction

The most potent friction in this sugya arises from the Gemara's initial attempt to reconcile Rabbi Yehuda's views, and more acutely, from Tosafot's critique of Rashi's explanation of that reconciliation. The core kushya can be framed as: How can Rabbi Yehuda consistently hold that mei chatas (purification water) is nullified by a rov of mikvah water, while simultaneously maintaining (or transmitting for his Rebbe) that white wine is not nullified by a rov of water, due to the principle of "רואין אותו כאילו הוא יין אדום" (we view it as if it were red wine), and that min b'mino (same type) is generally lo batel (not nullified)?

The Strongest Kushya: The Inconsistency of "רואין" and "מין במינו"

The Gemara's initial tirutz states: "הא דמי חטאת ברוב מים בטלי דידיה היא. הא דיין לבן ברוב מים לא בטלי דרביה היא" (Zevachim 79a). Rashi explains that Rabban Gamliel (R. Yehuda's Rebbe) is stringent: for min b'mino he holds lo batel klal, and for min b'she'eino mino with similar appearance (like white wine in water), he applies "רואין אותו כאילו הוא יין אדום" to prevent bitul b'rov. This "ro'in" principle effectively treats a min b'she'eino mino as if it were min b'mino or at least, prevents its bitul by rov due to a discernible appearance.

The kushya emerges when we consider the zav's urine. The Baraita quoted by R. Yehuda in R. Gamliel's name states: "אין דם מבטל דם, אין רוק מבטל רוק, ואין מי רגלים מבטלין מי רגלים" (Blood does not nullify blood, spittle does not nullify spittle, and urine does not nullify urine). Rashi explains that this applies even when pure urine is in the majority. This is a clear min b'mino lo batel rule.

However, the Gemara (and a Tosefta, as cited by Tosafot) also discusses urine in other contexts where "רואין" applies. If urine is "pure water" (Rashi's implied understanding), why would "רואין" apply to it, preventing hashka'ah (immersion) from purifying it? Why would it lose its status as water? And if zav's urine is so potent that it's min b'mino lo batel even with a majority of pure urine, how can mei chatas, also a highly potent tuma liquid, be nullified by a rov of mikvah water, even according to R. Yehuda himself?

Tosafot encapsulates this friction:

אכתי הך דמי חטאת קשיא רישא לסיפא לסברת הש"ס דאמר דתנא דהנך מי רגלים רואין כאילו הן מים סובר נמי ביין וחלב רואין כאילו הן יין אדום ועל זה פריך אמאי מכשרינן במי חטאת על ידי רוב מי מקוה דבמיעוט מי חטאת נמי הוה לן למימר רואין כאילו הן יין אדום ע"ז לא תירץ כלום דאכתי מי רגלים למי חטאת קשו אהדדי. (Tosafot Zevachim 79a s.v. הא דרביה)

Translation: "Still, this [case] of mei chatas is difficult, the reisha contradicts the seifa, according to the Gemara's reasoning, which says that the Tanna who holds 'we view these urines as if they are water' also holds that in wine and milk 'we view them as if they are red wine'. And on this it asks, why do we permit mei chatas with a majority of mikvah water? For even with a minority of mei chatas, we should say 'we view it as if it is red wine'. On this, he (Rashi) did not answer anything, for still urine and mei chatas contradict each other."

The kushya is essentially: If R. Yehuda (or R. Gamliel, whose principle R. Yehuda transmits) employs "רואין" to prevent bitul b'rov for white wine (a min b'she'eino mino with similar appearance), and min b'mino is generally lo batel (as per the blood/spittle/urine Baraita), then why is mei chatas (which, despite being water, has a unique tumah status and could be seen as "similar" to mikvah water, or even min b'mino in a certain sense) nullified by a rov? Why isn't "רואין" applied to mei chatas as well, treating it as if it were a distinct, discernible entity that cannot be nullified? The disparate treatment of these liquids under bitul principles, particularly the selective application of "רואין" or min b'mino lo batel, creates a significant tension.

Best Terutz (or two): Reconciling the Principals

The Gemara itself, and subsequently Tosafot, offer profound terutzim by re-evaluating the underlying principles and categories of bitul.

Terutz 1: Rava's Distinction (A Different Type of Bitul for Mei Chatas)

Before Tosafot's critique of Rashi, Rava offers an alternative terutz for the mei chatas case:

אמר רבא: במתניתין בדלי טהור מבפנים וטמא מבחוץ, דמדאורייתא סגי ליה במשהו. וגזרו ביה רבנן, דילמא חייס עילויה ולא מבטיל ליה. השתא מיהא כיון דאיכא רובא לא צריך. (Zevachim 79a)

Translation: "Rava says: In the Mishna, we are dealing with a bucket whose internal surface is ritually pure, and only its external surface is impure. That by Torah law it suffices for the water of the ritual bath to enter the bucket in any amount to purify its external surface. And it is the Sages who decreed with regard to this case that the internal surface must be purified as well, lest the owner wish to spare the water of purification and not nullify it from its sanctity. But once there is a majority of water in the bucket from the ritual bath, he does not need to enable any more water to enter the vessel, as by Torah law it is already pure."

Explanation: Rava's terutz effectively removes the mei chatas case from the general rules of bitul b'rov vs. min b'mino lo batel vs. ro'in. He argues that the bitul of mei chatas is not a true bitul in the conventional sense of one substance being absorbed into another until its identity is lost. Rather, it's a matter of hashka'ah (immersion) in a mikvah. The mei chatas in the bucket is tamei. When mikvah water enters, mid'Oraita, even a tiny amount would purify the external surface of the bucket. The Chachamim (Sages) decreed a more extensive immersion to purify the internal surface as well, lest one try to conserve the precious mei chatas. However, once a rov of mikvah water has entered, this gezeirah (rabbinic decree) ceases to apply, and the bucket, along with its contents, is considered pure. The chiddush of Rava's terutz is that the bitul of mei chatas is not a phenomenon of quantitative nullification, but rather a halachic consequence of a mikvah purification process and the limits of a rabbinic decree. This means the mei chatas case is fundamentally different from white wine, blood, spittle, or urine in terms of bitul mechanics. It doesn't rely on ta'am, mareh, or even rov in the sense of one substance disappearing into another; it's about the mikvah's purifying power and the scope of a rabbinic decree. This resolves the contradiction by showing that the mei chatas case operates on a different legal plane.

Terutz 2: Tosafot's Reconstruction (Categorical Distinction)

Tosafot, after dismantling Rashi's approach, offers its own intricate solution by proposing a girsa change and a more precise categorization of bitul principles.

Tosafot's girsa: "מי רגלים רואין אותן כאילו הן יין" (urine, we view it as if it is wine) (Tosafot Zevachim 79a s.v. הא דרביה).

Explanation: This girsa is crucial. If zav's urine is "viewed as wine" when mixed with water, it transforms the scenario from a problematic min b'mino (urine with pure urine, or urine with water where urine is 'pure water') to a min b'she'eino mino (urine as wine, mixed with water). In this min b'she'eino mino context, the principle of "רואין" (viewing it as if it were a different color/type) can be consistently applied to prevent bitul b'rov for R. Yehuda (or R. Gamliel). The underlying logic is that if it were wine, its appearance would be discernible, thus preventing bitul.

With this, Tosafot can make the following distinctions:

1. Pure Min b'Mino (R. Gamliel): Blood with blood, spittle with spittle, urine with urine (when not "viewed as wine"). Here, R. Gamliel (transmitted by R. Yehuda) holds lo batel klal. This is the absolute stringency where the identity of the minority is never lost within the majority of its own kind.
2. Min b'She'eino Mino with Similar Appearance (R. Yehuda/R. Gamliel): White wine in water, and urine (viewed as wine) in water. Here, the "רואין" principle applies. It's not min b'mino, but their appearances are so similar that the minority might go unnoticed. To ensure stringency (perhaps a gezeirah or a philosophical extension of bitul), we "view" it as if it were a distinct color (red wine) that would be discernible, thus preventing bitul b'rov. This means bitul is not merely about actual disappearance, but about potential disappearance if it were not for this "viewing." This aligns with Rava's summary that mareh (appearance) matters.
3. Mei Chatas (R. Yehuda's Own View): Here, bitul b'rov does apply. Tosafot suggests that mei chatas in mikvah water is conceptually min b'mino enough that R. Yehuda allows bitul b'rov, but not so similar that the "רואין" principle (for min b'she'eino mino with similar appearances) would be invoked. The Gemara's initial tirutz ("this is his own, this is his Rebbe's") now clarifies that R. Gamliel holds an absolute min b'mino lo batel (category 1), while R. Yehuda, in his own view, allows bitul b'rov for mei chatas (a specific min b'mino context, or at least a mixture where its identity is lost to the mikvah). The "רואין" cases (category 2) are distinct, applying to min b'she'eino mino with deceptive appearances.

Tosafot's Chiddush in Reconciliation: Tosafot's chiddush is a more nuanced categorical analysis of bitul. It differentiates between:

• Absolute min b'mino lo batel (R. Gamliel).
• Min b'she'eino mino where mareh is critical, leading to "רואין" (R. Yehuda/R. Gamliel).
• Specific min b'mino contexts (like mei chatas) where R. Yehuda does allow bitul b'rov.

This creates a consistent framework for R. Yehuda's views, where the "this is his own, this is his Rebbe's" distinction is about the rigor of min b'mino (R. Gamliel being absolutely stringent, R. Yehuda having a more nuanced approach where some min b'mino can be nullified) and the "רואין" principle is reserved for min b'she'eino mino with similar visual properties. The key is that mei chatas is not subject to the "רואין" stringency, allowing its bitul b'rov.

Both Rava and Tosafot provide compelling terutzim by re-categorizing the mei chatas case, either by distinguishing its bitul mechanism (Rava - hashka'ah and gezeirah) or by refining the definitions and applications of min b'mino and "רואין" (Tosafot - categorical distinction).

Intertext

The sugya's deep dive into bitul principles, particularly the interplay of min b'mino, min b'she'eino mino, rov, ta'am, and mareh, resonates broadly across Shas. Two significant intertextual parallels stand out: the discussion of bitul b'rov for issurim in Masechet Pesachim, and the philosophical underpinnings of bitul in the context of tumah vs. issur.

1. Pesachim 34b: The Stringency of Bitul for Hekdesh

The Gemara in Pesachim 34b, in the context of chametz mixed with other substances, delves into the stringencies of bitul for hekdesh (consecrated items) and issurei hana'ah (prohibitions of benefit). The principle of "אין זריעה להקדש" (there is no 'sowing' for consecrated items) is mentioned, implying a heightened sensitivity to bitul in hekdesh contexts.

Tosafot on our sugya in Zevachim 79a explicitly references this:

ואי נמי חומרא בעלמא משום דאין זריעה להקדש כדאמרי' בפרק כל שעה (פסחים דף לד:) וכ"ש למי חטאת דאפילו בגדי אוכלי תרומה מדרס לחטאת (חגיגה דף כ.) (Tosafot Zevachim 79a s.v. הא דרביה)

Translation: "And even if it is a stringency only because there is no 'sowing' for hekdesh as we say in Perek Kol Sha'ah (Pesachim 34b), and certainly for mei chatas that even clothes of ochlei terumah are midras (pressure impurity) for chatas (Chagigah 20a)."

Connection: The phrase "אין זריעה להקדש" in Pesachim 34b (and elsewhere, e.g., Kiddushin 5b, Temurah 34a) means that hekdesh cannot be 'planted' or 'sown' into a larger quantity to be nullified. This is often understood as a principle that consecrated items do not undergo bitul b'rov. Even if a small amount of hekdesh gets mixed with a much larger amount of chulin (non-sacred items), the hekdesh status is not lost. This implies a fundamental difference in the nature of bitul when dealing with sacred objects or prohibitions of benefit.

Our sugya discusses mei chatas, which, though not hekdesh in the typical sense, is a highly sacred and potent ritual liquid. Tosafot notes the paradox: despite its extreme stringency (as evidenced by its ability to impart midras impurity even to garments of terumah eaters, Hagigah 20a), mei chatas is nullified by a rov of mikvah water according to R. Yehuda. This contrasts with the "אין זריעה להקדש" principle that applies to other issurim and hekdesh.

This intertextual comparison highlights a crucial tension:

• For issurei hana'ah or hekdesh, the identity of the forbidden/sacred item is often preserved even in a rov, negating bitul.
• For tumah (like mei chatas), bitul b'rov can apply, suggesting that the tumah status, while potent, can be overcome by a quantitative majority of a purifying agent.

The nafka mina is profound: bitul is not a monolithic concept. Its application and limits are highly dependent on the halachic domain (e.g., issur, tumah, kedusha), the nature of the substances (e.g., min b'mino vs. min b'she'eino mino), and the specific rabbinic decrees or stringencies that may apply. The leniency for mei chatas in our sugya, even with Rava's terutz, stands out against the backdrop of stringent bitul rules for hekdesh.

2. Makkot 3b: Mei Tziv'a and the Definition of "Water" for Tumah

Another critical cross-reference, also cited by Tosafot, is the discussion in Makkot 3b regarding mei tziv'a (colored water).

Tosafot asks:

וכי משום דנשתנו קצת לא יהא שם מים עליהם ולא תועיל להם השקה דלא דמו למי צבע שבטל מהם תורת מים בפרק קמא דמכות (דף ג:) (Tosafot Zevachim 79a s.v. הא דרביה)

Translation: "Is it because they changed slightly that they lose the status of water and hashka'ah is ineffective, that they are not like colored water which loses the status of water in the first chapter of Makkot (3b)?"

Connection: Makkot 3b discusses whether water that has been colored (e.g., with dye) retains its status as "water" for various halachic purposes, particularly for tumah and taharah. The Gemara there concludes that if the water is so changed in appearance that it no longer looks like water, it loses its "water status" and cannot, for example, be used to complete a mikvah or to purify certain tamei items. This is because the Torah's definition of "water" for purification requires it to be recognizably water.

Our sugya deals with zav's urine mixed with pure urine or water. Rashi, in his explanation, implies that zav's urine is still "pure water" (mayim gemurim). Tosafot challenges this: if it's "pure water," why would it not be nullified by a rov of water, or why would "רואין" apply to it? If it's not considered "pure water" due to its impurity or other properties, then it should be analogous to mei tziv'a that has lost its water status. However, Tosafot argues that urine, even zav's urine, does not undergo such a radical change to lose the name of "water" entirely, unlike mei tziv'a.

This intertext highlights the fine line in halacha regarding the definition of a substance, especially water, when its properties are altered.

• Mei tziv'a clearly loses its "water status" if its appearance is sufficiently altered.
• Zav's urine, according to Tosafot, retains its "water status" for some purposes, yet for bitul purposes in our sugya, it is treated with the stringency of "רואין אותן כאילו הן יין" (Tosafot's girsa). This means that while it retains the name of water, its halachic identity in mixtures is complicated by its tumah status and its visual similarity to water.

The tension lies in how far a substance can deviate from its original form or state (e.g., water becoming tamei urine, or water being colored) before it loses its fundamental halachic identity and thus its applicability to certain halachot like bitul or hashka'ah. The sugya on Zevachim 79a, with the aid of Makkot 3b, forces us to consider the nuanced interplay between chemical/physical properties, tumah status, and halachic definitions when determining bitul.

Psak/Practice

The sugya on Zevachim 79a, particularly the discussion of bitul rules for different types of mixtures, lays foundational principles that find extensive application in halacha l'ma'aseh, especially in kashrut, tumah v'taharah, and other areas involving mixtures.

1. General Principles of Bitul:

Rava's summary on 79a provides the classical framework for bitul:

אמר רבא: אמרו חכמים טעם, ואמרו חכמים רוב, ואמרו חכמים מראה. סוג במינו – טעם. סוג בשאינו מינו – רוב. היכא דאיכא מראה – מראה. (Zevachim 79a)

Translation: "Rava says, in summary of these halakhot: The Sages said that the status of an item in a mixture is determined by the taste, and the Sages said that a prohibited item is nullified by the majority, and the Sages also said that the status of an item in a mixture is determined by the appearance. With regard to a type of food mixed with food not of its own type, the nullification is determined by the taste. In the case of a type of food mixed with food of its own type, the nullification is determined by the majority. In a case where there is a possibility to determine the status of an item based on appearance, the nullification is by appearance."

This Rava is often cited as the bedrock for bitul in kashrut.

• Min b'mino (same type): Bitul b'rov (nullified by a majority). E.g., a drop of forbidden milk in a larger quantity of permitted milk.
• Min b'she'eino mino (different type): Bitul b'ta'am (nullified if its taste is imperceptible). E.g., a drop of forbidden milk in coffee. This is a more stringent rule, requiring 60:1 ratio for bitul l'chatchila (ideally) as a safeguard, but b'dieved (post-facto) bitul follows ta'am.
• Mareh (appearance): If the prohibited item's appearance is discernible, it's not nullified, regardless of rov or ta'am. This is particularly relevant for mixtures where the forbidden item retains a distinct color or form.

The psak follows these general rules as codified by the Rambam (Ma'achalot Assurot 15:1-3) and Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 98-101), with additional stringencies and details for specific cases (e.g., davar sheb'minyan - counted items, davar she'yesh lo matirin - items that will eventually become permitted).

2. Tumah and Taharah (Mei Chatas, Zav's Fluids):

The sugya's discussion of mei chatas and zav's fluids primarily concerns tumah v'taharah.

• Mei Chatas: Rava's terutz that the bitul of mei chatas in mikvah water is due to the cessation of a rabbinic decree once a rov is present, rather than a straightforward bitul b'rov of the mei chatas itself, highlights a specific halachic mechanism for purification. This implies that the mei chatas itself isn't "gone" in the physical sense, but its tumah status (or the vessel's tumah status related to it) is removed by the mikvah. This is distinct from kashrut bitul.
• Zav's Fluids (Min b'Mino lo Batel): The principle of "אין דם מבטל דם, אין רוק מבטל רוק, ואין מי רגלים מבטלין מי רגלים" (Zevachim 79a) as R. Gamliel's stringent view for min b'mino in tumah contexts is a significant psak. This means that if a zav's impure bodily fluid mixes with a majority of its pure counterpart, the impurity is not nullified. This stringency for tumah applies even b'rov (majority), underscoring the severe nature of tumah that originates from a tamei person. This is codified in Rambam Hilchot Metamei Mishkav u'Moshav (6:10) and Shulchan Aruch Yoreh De'ah (200:2).

3. Meta-Psak Heuristics:

The sugya demonstrates several meta-psak heuristics:

• Contextual Bitul: The rules of bitul are not universal. They vary significantly between issurim (prohibitions), tumah (impurity), and hekdesh (sanctity). This teaches poskim to always identify the halachic domain before applying a bitul rule.
• Rabbinic Decrees vs. Torah Law: Rava's explanation for mei chatas illustrates how rabbinic decrees (gezeirot) operate. They often create stringencies beyond mid'Oraita requirements, but these decrees might have limits (e.g., they cease to apply once a rov is present, as the initial concern is mitigated). This teaches that a psak must discern between mid'Oraita and mid'Rabbanan elements.
• Textual Precision and Girsa: Tosafot's extensive discussion and proposed girsa change highlight the paramount importance of precise textual transmission and interpretation in halachic reasoning. A subtle difference in wording can lead to entirely different halachic conclusions.

In practice, this sugya reinforces the complexity of bitul. While kashrut generally operates with rov for min b'mino and ta'am for min b'she'eino mino, tumah often introduces additional stringencies, such as min b'mino lo batel, or specific purification mechanisms (like mikvah for mei chatas). The principle of mareh (appearance) is a universal override.

Takeaway

This sugya illuminates that bitul is not a singular phenomenon, but a complex interplay of quantity, discernibility, and halachic domain, with distinct rules for issurim versus tumah, and unique considerations for rabbinic decrees. The tension between rov and mareh forces a rigorous categorization of mixtures to determine their halachic status.