Zevachim 84

Sugya Map

The sugya on Zevachim 84a delves into the intricate halachic principle of Alu Lo Yerdhu (אם עלו לא ירדו) – disqualified sacrificial items that, once placed on the altar, are not to be removed. The discussion unfolds across a Mishna and Gemara, highlighting a fundamental machloket between R' Yehuda and R' Shimon regarding the scope and underlying rationale of this principle.

Issue

The core issue is to define which specific disqualifications (פסולים) are encompassed by the rule that "if they ascended, they shall not descend." This necessitates a precise exegetical approach to the foundational pasuk in Vayikra 6:2, which itself contains terms subject to varying interpretations as mi'utim (exclusions) or ribuyim (inclusions).

Nafka Mina(s)

1. Practical Application: Determining the fate of a disqualified korban that has already reached the Mizbe'ach. Should it be left to burn, or removed?
2. Conceptual Distinction: Delineating between psulim that occur "in sanctity" (פסולן בקדושה) versus those that are "not in sanctity" (לא בקדושה), and the altar's power to "accept" the former.
3. Hermeneutic Principles: The Gemara's analysis exposes different methodologies of drasha (exegesis) and the interplay between textual derivations and underlying halachic principles.

Primary Sources

• Mishna, Zevachim 84a
• Gemara, Zevachim 84a
• Vayikra 6:2 — "זאת תורת העולה היא העולה על מוקדה על המזבח כל הלילה עד הבקר ואש המזבח תוקד בו."

Text Snapshot

The Mishna (Zevachim 84a) opens with a list of items that, if they ascended, shall not descend: blood, emurim, limbs of an Olah that were notar (left overnight), yotzei (exited the courtyard), tamei (impure), shechutei חוץ לזמנו or חוץ למקומו, or whose blood was sprinkled by psulei kehunah.

Rabbi Yehuda's View

"רבי יהודה אומר: שנשחטה בלילה, ושנשפך דמה, ושיצא דמה חוץ לקלעים: אם עלתה תרד." R' Yehuda explicitly excludes three categories from the Alu Lo Yerdhu rule: an animal slaughtered at night, whose blood was spilled, or whose blood exited the Temple courtyard. For these, even if they ascended, they shall descend.

Rabbi Shimon's View

"רבי שמעון אומר: לא תרד, מפני שפסולן בקדושה. שרבי שמעון אומר: כל שפסולו בקדושה – קדש מקדש, וכל שאין פסולו בקדושה – אין קדש מקדש." R' Shimon fundamentally disagrees, holding that for all the above cases (including those R' Yehuda excludes), if they ascended, they shall not descend. His overarching principle is that any psul that occurred "in sanctity" (בקדושה) – meaning during the actual sacrificial process within the Temple – is "accepted" by the kodesh (sanctuary). Conversely, psulim that did not occur "in sanctity" (e.g., inherent flaws like tereifa, yotzei dofen, rovia v'nirva) are not accepted, and thus descend even if they ascended.

Gemara's Derivations

The Gemara (Zevachim 84a) then delves into the drashot (exegetical derivations) underpinning these views from Vayikra 6:2: "זאת תורת העולה היא העולה."

• R' Yehuda's Derivation: "זאת, היא, וה"א דהעולה – הרי אלו שלשה מיעוטין: פרט לשנשחטה בלילה, ושנשפך דמה, ושיצא דמה חוץ לקלעים – שאם עלתה תרד." R' Yehuda identifies three terms of exclusion ("זאת," "היא," and the definite article "ה" of "העולה") from this pasuk, which specifically exclude the three cases he listed, causing them to descend.
• R' Shimon's Derivation: "מרבה תורת העולה – כל העולים למזבח אם עלו לא ירדו." R' Shimon, conversely, interprets "תורת העולה" as a ribui (inclusion) to teach that all items that ascend the altar, if disqualified, shall not descend (except for those inherent psulim which he later explicitly excludes via "זאת"). His argument: "ומה ראית לרבות את אלו ולמעט את אלו? אחר שריבה הכתוב ומיעט הכתוב – ארבה אני את שפסולן בקדושה, ואמעט את שאין פסולן בקדושה." He prioritizes psulim she'bikdusha for inclusion and psulim she'lo bikdusha for exclusion.

Readings

The Gemara's analysis of "זאת תורת העולה היא העולה" serves as a battleground for hermeneutic principles. Rashi and Tosafot illuminate the nuances of these drashot.

Rashi: The Mi'utim and Ribuyim as Anchors for Machloket

Rashi explains R' Yehuda's drasha on "זאת תורת העולה היא העולה" as deriving three mi'utim (exclusions): "זאת" (this), "היא" (it), and the "הא" (definite article) of "העולה" (the burnt offering). These three terms, Rashi clarifies, serve to exclude three specific psulim listed by R' Yehuda – shechutei layla, nishpach dama, and yatza dama l'chutz la'kela'im – such that if they ascend, they shall descend. Rashi's understanding here is that these mi'utim are meant to counter a potential sevara that any item touching the altar becomes kadosh and should not be removed. The pasuk then specifies which psulim are not subject to this general sevara (Rashi on Zevachim 84a:10:1 s.v. "גמ' זאת היא העולה").

For R' Shimon, Rashi implies a different approach. While the Gemara doesn't explicitly detail R' Shimon's drasha for the inclusions in the same way it does for R' Yehuda's exclusions, the principle "קדש מקדש" is paramount. R' Shimon sees "תורת העולה" as an expansive term (ribui) that includes most psulim occurring in sanctity. The "זאת" term then serves, for R' Shimon, to exclude those psulim that are not "in sanctity" (e.g., rovia v'nirva, tereifa), thereby leaving the psulim she'bikdusha under the umbrella of Alu Lo Yerdhu.

Tosafot: Unpacking the Drasha and Addressing Apparent Contradictions

Tosafot on Zevachim 84a:10:1 (s.v. "זאת היא העולה") raises a critical question on Rashi's interpretation of R' Yehuda's mi'utim. Tosafot argues that the first "העולה" in the pasuk ("זאת תורת העולה") refers to the Olah Rishona (the initial burnt offering, which is discussed extensively in the sugya of Tamid Nishchat in Pesachim 58b), and thus cannot be used as a mi'ut for psulim. Instead, Tosafot suggests that the three mi'utim are "זאת," "היא," and the definite article "ה" in "העולה" later in the pasuk ("היא העולה"). This refines the textual basis for R' Yehuda's exclusions.

Furthermore, Tosafot (Zevachim 84a:10:1 s.v. "ואם תאמר") posits a significant kushya against R' Yehuda: "הא ר' יהודה סבר לעיל בפ"ק (זבחים דף יד.) רצפה מקדשה במזבח א"כ כולן עלו והיכי משכחת לה פסול בפיגול ונותר וטמא." If R' Yehuda holds that the Temple courtyard floor (ritzpah) itself mekadeshet (sanctifies) items placed upon it, how can he maintain that piggul, notar, or tamei items that ascend the altar do not descend? These items are psulim that would seemingly be "accepted" by the kodesh according to the ritzpah mekadeshet principle. This highlights a tension between R' Yehuda's position here and his more general principle in Zevachim 14a. Tosafot resolves this by suggesting that R' Yehuda's ritzpah mekadeshet applies only when there is no hefsek (interruption) between the item and the floor. This implies that for certain psulim to remain pasul even after being in the courtyard, there must be some intervening factor preventing the kedusha of the ritzpah from taking effect.

Rashash: Deepening the Textual Analysis

The Rashash (Zevachim 84a:4 s.v. "תד"ה זאת") further analyzes Tosafot's point about the first "העולה" referring to Olah Rishona. He notes a parallel discussion in Niddah 40a, where a similar drasha from "העולה" is found. The Rashash acknowledges the tzarich iyun (needs clarification) as to how Tosafot's interpretation here fully aligns with the Niddah sugya. This demonstrates the meticulous cross-referencing and harmonization required in lomdus, ensuring consistency across different sugyot that employ similar textual derivations. He also points to his own comments in Menachot 26b, indicating the complexity of these textual interpretations.

The Rashash also references his comments later in Zevachim 87a (s.v. "כבש") concerning Tosafot's kushya on Ritzpah Mekadeshet (Rashash 84a:5). This suggests that the interplay between the Mizbe'ach's power to "accept" and the nuances of psulim is a recurring theme that requires careful attention throughout the masechet.

Friction

The most potent kushya in this sugya lies in reconciling R' Yehuda's specific exclusions with his broader halachic principles, particularly his stance on Ritzpah Mekadeshet.

The Strongest Kushya

The Gemara's initial question to R' Shimon ("ומה ראית לרבות את אלו ולמעט את אלו?") could equally be leveled at R' Yehuda. But the kushya articulated by Tosafot (Zevachim 84a:10:1 s.v. "ואם תאמר") is more piercing for R' Yehuda: How can R' Yehuda maintain that psulim like piggul, notar, or tamei do not descend if they ascended, when elsewhere (Zevachim 14a) he seemingly holds that the ritzpah (floor) of the Temple courtyard itself mekadeshet (sanctifies) items? If the courtyard floor has such sanctifying power, then surely the Mizbe'ach itself would. Why then would he need specific textual inclusions for these types of psulim? Moreover, if ritzpah mekadeshet is true, then all psulim she'bikdusha should, by definition, be mekudeshet and thus not descend, blurring the distinction between R' Yehuda's nuanced list and R' Shimon's broader "פסולן בקדושה – קדש מקדש." This seems to contradict R' Yehuda's drasha from "זאת, היא, וה"א דהעולה" which excludes specific items, implying that the Mizbe'ach does not automatically accept all psulim she'bikdusha.

The Best Terutz (or Two)

Tosafot (Zevachim 84a:10:1 s.v. "וי"ל") offers a resolution by positing that R' Yehuda's principle of ritzpah mekadeshet requires direct contact. Thus, if there is an hefsek (interruption) between the sacrificial item and the ritzpah ha'azara (courtyard floor), the kedusha of the floor would not take effect. This allows for items to remain pasul even after being in the courtyard, and therefore the Mizbe'ach's power to mekadesh them is not a given. The drashot (including R' Yehuda's mi'utim) are then necessary to delineate which items, despite being psulim and not having been sanctified by the ritzpah, are nevertheless accepted by the Mizbe'ach once they ascend. This resolves the apparent contradiction by adding a condition to ritzpah mekadeshet.

Alternatively, the Gemara's own terutz (Zevachim 84a) at the end of the baraita discussing R' Yehuda's various derivations (from notar, yotzei, tamei etc.) states: "תנא אסתמך אקרא: 'זאת תורת העולה' – רבה." The tanna (of the baraita presenting R' Yehuda's view) relied on the expansive term "זאת תורת העולה" as a ribui (inclusion) that teaches that many types of disqualified offerings may be left upon the altar. The detailed derivations cited in the baraita are merely asmachtot (supports) to clarify why R' Yehuda doesn't exclude these specific psulim with his "זאת, היא, וה"א דהעולה" mi'utim. This terutz suggests that R' Yehuda, too, acknowledges a broad inclusion from "תורת העולה," but uses his three mi'utim to carve out very specific exceptions. This harmonizes R' Yehuda's position more closely with R' Shimon's by recognizing a general expansive power of the pasuk, while still allowing for R' Yehuda's specific exclusions.

Intertext

The sugya's core principle of Alu Lo Yerdhu resonates across various areas of halacha, particularly concerning the sanctity of korbanot and the unique power of the Mizbe'ach.

The Power of the Mizbe'ach: "קדש מקדש"

The concept of "קדש מקדש" – that the sacred area (specifically the Mizbe'ach) has the power to validate or "accept" certain disqualified items – is central to R' Shimon's position (Zevachim 84a). This idea is not unique to Alu Lo Yerdhu. We find a similar notion in the context of chatat blood that mistakenly enters the Heichal: "דם חטאת שנכנס לפנים, אם פסול – פסול" (Zevachim 81b). However, the Mizbe'ach is understood to possess a unique, almost transformative, power for items placed upon it, far exceeding other kodesh areas. This is why the Mizbe'ach can "accept" even psulim she'bikdusha, whereas a pasul chatat blood in the Heichal remains pasul. The Mizbe'ach is the ultimate point of connection between the korban and its intended purpose, imbuing it with a finality of sanctity.

Piggul and the Intentionality of Kedusha

The Mishna lists shechutei חוץ לזמנו (slaughtered with intent to eat beyond its time, i.e., piggul) as an item that, if it ascended, shall not descend (Zevachim 84a). This is particularly striking given the severe nature of piggul, which incurs karet (Leviticus 7:18) and invalidates the entire offering. The fact that piggul items, once on the Mizbe'ach, remain there, underscores a profound truth: the Mizbe'ach can "accept" the physicality of the offering even when its spiritual efficacy has been severely compromised by improper intent. This highlights a distinction between the halachic status of the korban for atonement or consumption, and its physical status once it has entered the sacred domain of the altar. The Mizbe'ach acts as a final filter, retaining the physical offering even if its spiritual purpose was thwarted. This aligns with the broader principle that machshava (improper thought) does not mekadeshet the offering (Zevachim 28a), but the Mizbe'ach itself has a kedusha that can overcome certain psulim once the item is upon it.

Psak/Practice

The machloket of R' Yehuda and R' Shimon regarding Alu Lo Yerdhu fundamentally shapes our understanding of the Mizbe'ach's power and the nature of different psulim.

Halachic Landings

While the Gemara concludes that the tanna relied on "זאת תורת העולה" as a ribui for R' Yehuda, the specific exceptions R' Yehuda maintains (items slaughtered at night, spilled blood, blood outside the curtains) are significant. The halacha generally follows R' Shimon's broader principle of "פסולו בקדושה – קדש מקדש" for Alu Lo Yerdhu (Rambam, Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashin 18:13). However, R' Yehuda's specific exclusions are noted. The Rambam, for instance, rules that shechutei layla (slaughtered at night) do descend, aligning with R' Yehuda on this specific point (Rambam, Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashin 18:15). This indicates that while R' Shimon's principle provides the general framework, certain specific exclusions, particularly those derived from explicit mi'utim in the pasuk, can override it.

Meta-Psak Heuristics

The sugya provides a powerful heuristic for understanding the interaction between textual derivations and underlying halachic principles. R' Yehuda prioritizes explicit mi'utim from the pasuk to create specific exclusions, even when a general principle (like Alu Lo Yerdhu for psulim she'bikdusha) might suggest otherwise. R' Shimon, conversely, leans on the overarching principle of kedusha (פסולן בקדושה – קדש מקדש) as the primary differentiator, using "זאת" to exclude only those psulim that are inherently outside the realm of sanctuary-based disqualification. This tension highlights two approaches to psak: one that is highly sensitive to textual particularities, and another that seeks to apply broader conceptual principles. The Gemara's conclusion that R' Yehuda also relies on a ribui (albeit with specific mi'utim) suggests a synthesis, where textual expansion provides a general rule, and textual contraction specifies exceptions.

Takeaway

The debate between R' Yehuda and R' Shimon on Alu Lo Yerdhu reveals distinct understandings of the Mizbe'ach's sanctifying power and the role of textual exegesis in defining its limits. It underscores that even within the sacred space, not all disqualifications are treated equally, demanding a nuanced approach to kedusha and its boundaries.

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Footnotes

1. Zevachim 84a.
2. Mishna, Zevachim 84a.
3. Gemara, Zevachim 84a.
4. Vayikra 6:2.
5. Mishna, Zevachim 84a.
6. Mishna, Zevachim 84a.
7. Mishna, Zevachim 84a.
8. Gemara, Zevachim 84a.
9. Gemara, Zevachim 84a.
10. Rashi, Zevachim 84a:10:1 s.v. "גמ' זאת היא העולה."
11. Gemara, Zevachim 84a.
12. Tosafot, Zevachim 84a:10:1 s.v. "זאת היא העולה."
13. Pesachim 58b.
14. Tosafot, Zevachim 84a:10:1 s.v. "ואם תאמר."
15. Zevachim 14a.
16. Tosafot, Zevachim 84a:10:1 s.v. "וי"ל."
17. Gemara, Zevachim 84a.
18. Rashash, Zevachim 84a:4 s.v. "תד"ה זאת."
19. Niddah 40a.
20. Menachot 26b.
21. Rashash, Zevachim 84a:5 s.v. "בא"ד וא"ת הא ר"י סבר כו' רצפה כו'."
22. Zevachim 14a.
23. Tosafot, Zevachim 84a:10:1 s.v. "ואם תאמר."
24. Tosafot, Zevachim 84a:10:1 s.v. "וי"ל."
25. Gemara, Zevachim 84a.
26. Zevachim 81b.
27. Mishna, Zevachim 84a.
28. Leviticus 7:18.
29. Zevachim 28a.
30. Rambam, Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashin 18:13.
31. Rambam, Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashin 18:15.
32. Gemara, Zevachim 84a.