Zevachim 86

Sugya Map

The Gemara on Zevachim 86a navigates a complex interplay of scriptural mandates and rabbinic interpretations concerning the kedushah and disposition of eivarim (limbs, specifically bones and tendons) of korbanot, particularly the Olah (burnt offering). The sugya primarily grapples with two seemingly contradictory verses and their reconciliation, then delves into the nuances of me'ilah (misuse of consecrated property) and the temporal limits of hakatarah (burning on the altar).

• Issue 1: What ascends to the Altar?

  • Nafka Mina: Whether bones and tendons, generally not considered "flesh," are part of the olah that must be burned on the mizbeach. This impacts the priest's duties and the kedushah status of these components.
  • Primary Sources:
    • "והקטיר הכהן את הכל המזבחה" (Vayikra 1:9) - Implies everything ascends.
    • "והקרבת את עולותיך הבשר והדם" (Devarim 12:27) - Implies only flesh and blood ascend.
    • Mishna (Zevachim 86a, later in the daf) - States that bones and tendons, if attached, ascend; if separated, they do not.

• Issue 2: Parush bones/tendons of an Olah – Me'ilah status and disposition.

  • Nafka Mina: If bones and tendons separate from the flesh of an olah, when, if ever, do they lose their kedushah such that they are no longer subject to me'ilah and may be used for mundane purposes? This has direct implications for their handling by priests and hedyot.
  • Primary Sources:
    • Leviticus 7:8 ("עור העולה אשר הקריב הכהן לו יהיה") and 7:7 ("הכהן המכפר הוא יהיה לו") – The basis for Rabba's gezeirah shavah.
    • Baraita (Zevachim 86a) – States that olah bones are always subject to me'ilah, seemingly contradicting Rabba.
    • Rabbi Elazar's opinion (Zevachim 86a) – Offers an alternative view on me'ilah for parush bones, distinguishing between before and after zrikah.

• Issue 3: Limbs dislodged from the Altar – Timing of return and me'ilah.

  • Nafka Mina: What is the latest point in the night that limbs of a fit olah that have fallen off the mizbeach must be returned? This establishes the active period for hakatarah and the cessation of me'ilah liability.
  • Primary Sources:
    • Mishna (Zevachim 86a) – Distinguishes between limbs dislodged before and after midnight.
    • "הוא העולה על מוקדה על המזבח כל הלילה עד הבקר" (Vayikra 6:2) – Source for burning kol halailah.
    • "והסיר הכהן את הדשן" (Vayikra 6:3) – Source for removing ashes.
    • Mishna (Yoma 20a) – Details varying times for dishaun (removal of ashes) on different days.

Text Snapshot

The sugya opens by presenting the fundamental scriptural tension:

גמ' יכול יחלוץ גידין ועצמות ויקטיר בשר על המזבח? תלמוד לומר: "והקטיר הכהן את הכל המזבחה". הא כיצד? אם מחוברין - יעלו. ואם פירשו, אפילו הן בראש המזבח - ירדו. Zevachim 86a

This passage introduces the chakira: could one infer that the priest must first remove tendons and bones and only then offer the flesh on the altar? The verse "And the priest shall make the whole smoke on the altar" (Leviticus 1:9) seems to contradict this, suggesting everything is burned. The Gemara's immediate resolution, following R. Yehuda HaNasi, is a critical distinction: if they are m'chubarim (attached), they ascend; if parshu (separated), even if on the altar, they descend.

Dikduk/Leshon Nuance:

• יכול יחלוץ: The term "יכול" here, as Rashi notes, implies a mitzvah or an obligation that one might have thought existed. It's not merely a possibility but a potential halachic imperative derived from "הבשר והדם" (Rashi, Zevachim 86a:1:1 s.v. gamra yachol yachlotz). The verb "יחלוץ" (to remove/extract) is precise, indicating a proactive separation by the priest.
• את הכל המזבחה: The phrase "את הכל" (the whole/everything) is inclusive, directly countering the restrictive "הבשר והדם." This lexical contrast drives the initial derasha.
• הא כיצד?: This rhetorical question signals the need for a harmonizing principle, which the Gemara provides with the m'chubar/parush distinction.

Later, the sugya addresses the me'ilah status of parush bones:

אמר רבא: הכי קאמר: לא שנו אלא שפירשו לאחר זריקה. אבל פירשו לפני זריקה, אתיא זריקה ושריתינהו. ואפילו עושה מהן קתות של סכינים. Zevachim 86a

Rabba introduces the crucial distinction of before or after zrikah (sprinkling of the blood). He argues that if bones separated before the blood was sprinkled, the zrikah then permits them for hedyot use, even to the extent of making knife handles. This is a significant chiddush, implying a complete removal of kedushah from these parush bones.

Dikduk/Leshon Nuance:

• אתיא זריקה ושריתינהו: "אתיא" (comes) and "שריתינהו" (permits them) anthropomorphize the zrikah, highlighting its transformative power. It's not just a passive event but an active agent in altering the halachic status of the bones (Rashi, Zevachim 86a:11:1 s.v. aval pirshu lifnei zrikah). This phrasing emphasizes that zrikah is what removes the kedushah from these specific items, rather than merely initiating the kedushah for the main offering.

Readings

The sugya's intricate discussion on the kedushah of eivarim, particularly bones and tendons, and the impact of zrikah and physical separation, has elicited varied and profound analyses from Rishonim and Acharonim. We will explore Rashi, Rambam, Tosafot, and the Rashba to appreciate the depth of their contributions.

Rashi: The Transformative Power of Zrikah and the Nature of Me'ilah

Rashi, as always, provides the foundational understanding, clarifying the Gemara's flow and the underlying svarot. His commentary is particularly illuminating in two areas: the reconciliation of the two verses regarding what ascends to the altar, and the machloket between Rabba and R. Elazar concerning the me'ilah status of olah bones.

1. Reconciling "את הכל" and "הבשר והדם": Rashi explains that the initial chakira ("יכול יחלוץ גידין ועצמות") is based on the verse "הבשר והדם" (Devarim 12:27), which seems to limit the offering to flesh and blood. The Gemara's terutz that "והקטיר הכהן את הכל המזבחה" (Vayikra 1:9) includes bones and tendons, but only if they are m'chubarim (attached), is crucial. This means that m'chubarim bones are considered an integral part of "הכל" and are therefore b'nei mizbeach (fit for the altar). However, once parshu (separated), they lose this status and are pasul (disqualified) from ascending, even if they were already on the altar. This distinction is key: physical attachment confers a certain kedushah or status that separation removes. Rashi implicitly highlights that kedushat eivarim (holiness of limbs) is contingent on their connection to the main basar component for hakatarah.

2. Rabba vs. R. Elazar and the Role of Zrikah: This is where Rashi's precision shines.

   • Rabba's View (as explained by Rashi): Rabba argues that if bones separated before zrikah, then at the time the flesh itself became permitted for the altar (via zrikah), these bones were not attached, and therefore "לאו בני מזבח הוו" (they were not fit for the altar). Consequently, "אתאי זריקה ושריתינהו להדיוט" (the sprinkling came and permitted them for ordinary use) (Rashi, Zevachim 86a:11:1 s.v. aval pirshu lifnei zrikah). Rashi here emphasizes the contingency of the bones' kedushah on their state at the time of zrikah. If already separated, the zrikah of the blood, which transforms the status of the olah, simultaneously removes any residual kedushah from these parush bones, effectively making them chullin (mundane) and available for hedyot benefit. This is a powerful chiddush – zrikah, which usually sanctifies or permits for the altar, here desanctifies or permits for hedyot by virtue of the bones' pre-existing separation.
   • R. Elazar's View (as explained by Rashi): R. Elazar offers a divergent perspective.
     • If bones parshu lifnei zrikah (separated before sprinkling), R. Elazar holds "מועלין בהן לעולם" (one is always liable for me'ilah from them) (Rashi, Zevachim 86a:12:2 s.v. pirshu lifnei zrikah mo'alin bahen l'olam). Rashi explains that since they separated, they were never destined for hakatarah ("לאו בני הקטרה נינהו"). Therefore, zrikah has no effect on them, and they remain in their original state of kedushat guf as hekdesh (consecrated property), hence subject to me'ilah. This implies that the initial kedushah of the korban itself, before zrikah, is a robust kedushat guf that is not easily removed from its components unless explicitly permitted.
     • If bones parshu l'achar zrikah (separated after sprinkling), R. Elazar states "לא נהנין" (one may not benefit from them l'chatchila) but "לא מועלין" (one is not liable for me'ilah) (Rashi, Zevachim 86a:12:3 s.v. pirshu l'achar zrikah lo nehnen). Rashi clarifies that the prohibition of hana'ah (benefit) is m'drabbanan (rabbinic). The reason one is not liable for me'ilah is mid'oraita (Torah law) because, according to R. Elazar (who aligns with R. Yishmael via the gezeirah shavah from asham), zrikah does permit them. This is a subtle yet crucial point: zrikah does remove the me'ilah status, but a rabbinic decree maintains a prohibition on hana'ah due to some other concern, perhaps a gezeirah against treating hekdesh too lightly or to prevent confusion. This shows a distinction between kedushat me'ilah and general kedushat hana'ah.

Rashi's commentary meticulously lays out the different svarot and their implications, providing the groundwork for deeper analysis by subsequent commentators.

Rambam: The Halachic Codification of Kedushah and Me'ilah

Rambam, in his Mishneh Torah, crystallizes the halachah derived from these discussions. His approach often reveals his understanding of the underlying principles governing kedushah and the cessation of me'ilah.

1. M'chubar vs. Parush: Rambam, following the Gemara's initial conclusion, codifies the rule that bones, tendons, horns, and hooves of an olah ascend if m'chubarim to the flesh, but if they parshu, they descend, even if already on the altar (Rambam, Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 6:5). He clearly aligns with the tanna R. Yehuda HaNasi. This demonstrates that for the olah, the kedushah of these accessory parts is dependent on their physical integration with the primary offering at the time of hakatarah. This isn't merely about convenience but a fundamental aspect of their halachic identity as b'nei mizbeach.

2. The Status of Parush Bones and Me'ilah: Rambam's psak on the me'ilah status of parush olah bones is critical. He explicitly rules in accordance with Rabba:

   • If bones parshu lifnei zrikah (separated before sprinkling), they are permitted for hedyot use, and one is not liable for me'ilah from them. He even explicitly states they can be used for knife handles (Rambam, Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 7:16; Hilchot Me'ilah 1:12). This psak directly adopts Rabba's interpretation of the gezeirah shavah from asham and the reinterpretation of the baraita. Rambam's reasoning is that the zrikah of the blood, which validates the olah and dedicates its flesh to the altar, simultaneously removes the kedushah from any parts that are not designated for the altar and have already separated. They are, in essence, 'released' from kedushah because they were not 'caught' by the zrikah as b'nei mizbeach.
   • If bones parshu l'achar zrikah (separated after sprinkling), they remain subject to me'ilah (Rambam, Hilchot Me'ilah 1:12). This means that once the zrikah has taken place, and the bones were still attached, they acquired a certain kedushah that is not removed by subsequent separation from the flesh. They become b'nei mizbeach via their attachment at the time of zrikah, and this status persists. This is in contrast to Rabba's initial statement about parshu l'achar zrikah in the Gemara's reinterpreted baraita where it states "מועלין בהן לעולם" (always liable for misuse) but not Rabba's svara that zrikah permits them. Rambam's formulation implies that once deemed b'nei mizbeach through zrikah and prior attachment, their kedushah is enduring.

Rambam's clear psak against R. Elazar highlights the significant chiddush of Rabba: that zrikah can, in specific circumstances, remove kedushah from certain components of the korban when they are not destined for the altar. For Rambam, the moment of zrikah is pivotal, determining the ultimate kedushah status of all parts of the korban based on their state (attached/separated) at that precise time.

Tosafot: Deeper Inquiries into Kedushah and Me'ilah

Tosafot, with their characteristic dialectical approach, often probe the underlying assumptions and potential inconsistencies in the Gemara's arguments. Their analysis of this sugya raises several profound questions regarding the nature of kedushah and the mechanism of its removal.

1. The Gezeirah Shavah and Kedushat Guf: Tosafot (Zevachim 86a s.v. just as) delve into Rabba's gezeirah shavah "לו יהיה" from asham to olah. The Gemara states that "לו יהיה" in the context of olah hide is muchrach (superfluous) and thus available for the gezeirah shavah. However, Tosafot question how this gezeirah shavah can apply to bones that are hekdesh. The bones of an asham are permitted to the priests (and thus to hedyot use) after zrikah because the asham itself is designated for consumption by priests. The hide of an olah is also permitted to priests after zrikah. But the olah's bones are not for consumption, nor are they for the altar if separated. How does the gezeirah shavah transfer the permission from asham bones (which are basar for kohanim) to olah bones (which are not)?

   • Tosafot seem to imply a chakira: Does zrikah for an olah remove kedushat guf from the parush bones, or does it merely prevent kedushah from attaching to them? If it removes kedushah, what kind of kedushah was it? Was it kedushat damim (holiness of monetary value) or kedushat guf (holiness of the object itself)? The asham gezeirah shavah is about hana'ah for kohanim, which is distinct from me'ilah. Tosafot are wrestling with the conceptual jump Rabba makes. They might suggest that the gezeirah shavah specifically teaches that olah bones, if parush, are to be treated like the asham's non-altar parts, which are permitted to priests. This isn't about kedushah being removed, but rather about never acquiring the kedushah that would subject them to me'ilah if they were already separated. This aligns with the idea that zrikah permits them because they were never b'nei mizbeach.

2. The Reinterpretation of the Baraita ("אימא הכי"): Tosafot also implicitly question the Gemara's dochek (forced interpretation) of the baraita to align with Rabba. The original baraita states that olah bones are always subject to me'ilah. The Gemara reinterprets this to mean: if parshu lifnei zrikah and then zrikah occurred, no me'ilah; but if parshu l'achar zrikah, then me'ilah l'olam.

   • Tosafot might point out the difficulty in this reinterpretation. If the original baraita meant "always me'ilah," why would it distinguish olah from chatat/asham bones? The distinction implies something unique about olah bones. The Gemara's terutz ("אימא הכי") effectively reverses the meaning of "לעולם" from "always me'ilah" to "always me'ilah if separated after sprinkling." This requires a significant textual emendation. Tosafot would likely consider if there's a way to understand the original baraita without such a dochek, perhaps by arguing that olah bones retain a more stringent kedushah than chatat/asham bones, even if separated, due to the olah's complete dedication to Hashem. This leads to a deeper chakira about the intrinsic kedushah of an olah's parts compared to kodshei kodashim whose meat is eaten.

Tosafot's critical lens forces a deeper understanding of the svarot behind the Gemara's conclusions, pushing us to ask why these halachot are so, rather than simply accepting them.

Rashba: The Nuance of Kedushah Status Post-Zrikah

The Rashba, known for his incisive logical analyses, often clarifies the precise status of objects and actions within the halachic framework. His insights into our sugya would likely focus on the stages of kedushah and the effects of zrikah.

1. The Svara Behind R. Elazar's View: The Rashba would likely explore the svara that underpins R. Elazar's position, especially that parush bones before zrikah are always subject to me'ilah. For the Rashba, this would stem from a robust understanding of kedushat guf. Once an animal is designated as an olah, all its parts, including bones, acquire kedushat guf. If these bones parshu before zrikah, they were never "captured" by the zrikah to be designated for the altar. Crucially, R. Elazar does not accept that zrikah has the power to desanctify these bones for hedyot use. They remain hekdesh in their original form, maintaining their kedushat guf, and thus me'ilah applies l'olam. The gezeirah shavah from asham does not apply here because asham bones are released due to the nature of the korban (eaten by priests), not because zrikah itself removes kedushah from a non-altar, non-eatable part.

2. The M'drabbanan Prohibition of Hana'ah: The Rashba would also meticulously analyze R. Elazar's distinction for bones parshu l'achar zrikah: mid'oraita no me'ilah, but m'drabbanan no hana'ah. What is the nature of this rabbinic prohibition?

   • The Rashba might suggest that even though the kedushat me'ilah is removed mid'oraita (by the gezeirah shavah), the Sages saw a need to preserve a sense of reverence for items that were once b'nei mizbeach or closely associated with hekdesh. This could be a gezeirah to prevent people from becoming lax with hekdesh, or to maintain a clear distinction between kodshim and chullin. It indicates that kedushah can sometimes be removed at a Torah level, but a rabbinic layer of kedushah or prohibition might persist for prudential reasons. This is a common theme in halacha, where chumrot (stringencies) or gezeirot are instituted to safeguard Torah law or maintain proper conduct.

The Rashba's approach, therefore, helps us appreciate the different layers and types of kedushah – the initial kedushat guf, the transformative effect of zrikah, the mid'oraita status post-zrikah, and the additional m'drabbanan safeguards. He highlights that kedushah is not a monolithic concept but a multifaceted status with varying degrees and implications.

Friction

The sugya presents several points of contention and deep logical challenges. We will focus on two major areas of friction: the explicit contradiction between Rabba's view and the initial reading of the baraita, and the underlying chakira regarding the nature of kedushah on olah bones and the mechanism of its removal.

Friction 1: The Baraita's Contradiction to Rabba

The Kushya: The Gemara explicitly notes a contradiction between Rabba's assertion and a baraita. Rabba states that if olah bones parshu lifnei zrikah (separated before sprinkling), "אתיא זריקה ושריתינהו להדיוט" (the sprinkling comes and permits them for ordinary use). This means they are not subject to me'ilah. However, the baraita teaches: "ושל עולה - מועלין בהן לעולם" (But concerning the bones of a burnt offering, one who benefits from them is always liable for misuse of consecrated property) (Zevachim 86a). This phrase "לעולם" (always) directly contradicts Rabba's position, as it implies that even parush lifnei zrikah bones would be subject to me'ilah.

The chakira here is profound. If olah bones, by their nature, are always subject to me'ilah, it suggests a robust, inherent kedushah that is not easily removed by separation or the completion of the korban process (like zrikah). This contrasts sharply with Rabba's view, which posits a conditional kedushah for these bones, dependent on their attachment at the time of zrikah. The baraita, in its unadorned form, seems to treat olah bones as permanently sacred until completely consumed, regardless of their physical state relative to the flesh.

Potential Terutzim:

1. The Gemara's Reinterpretation ("אימא הכי"): The primary terutz offered by the Gemara is to reinterpret the baraita. Instead of reading "ושל עולה - מועלין בהן לעולם" as "olah bones are always subject to me'ilah," the Gemara suggests: "אימא הכי: ושל עולה, אם פירשו לפני זריקה ונזרק הדם — אין מועלין בהן. אם פירשו לאחר זריקה — מועלין בהן לעולם" (Say this: And concerning the bones of a burnt offering, if they separated before the sprinkling of its blood and its blood was then sprinkled, then one who benefits from them is not liable for misuse. If they separated after the sprinkling of its blood, one who benefits from them is always liable for misuse of consecrated property) (Zevachim 86a).

   • Analysis: This terutz is a prime example of a dochek (forced interpretation) to reconcile conflicting sources. It essentially reverses the meaning of "לעולם" from an unconditional "always liable" to a conditional "always liable if separated after sprinkling." The Gemara structurally changes the baraita's statement, shifting the "לעולם" to only apply to the latter case. This implies that the Gemara is so committed to Rabba's svara (derived from the gezeirah shavah) that it is willing to perform significant textual surgery on a baraita. The underlying assumption is that Rabba's teaching is authoritative, and the baraita must be made to fit. This reveals a methodological preference in the Gemara: sometimes, a derasha or gezeirah shavah from a leading amora can supersede the plain reading of a baraita. The svara supporting this is that once the bones were attached at zrikah, they acquired a kedushah that is not then removed by subsequent separation, hence me'ilah l'olam applies to them.

2. R. Elazar's Independent Position (as an alternative, not a terutz): The Gemara then introduces R. Elazar's opinion, which fundamentally disagrees with Rabba, rather than attempting to reconcile with him. R. Elazar's view (as explained by Rashi) holds that parush lifnei zrikah bones are subject to me'ilah l'olam. This effectively aligns with the original, plain reading of the baraita.

   • Analysis: If we take R. Elazar's view, the kushya against Rabba simply stands, and the Gemara presents two opposing tannaim (Rabba and R. Elazar) with different svarot. R. Elazar's svara is that the initial kedushat guf of the olah is so strong that mere separation of bones, even before zrikah, does not remove their kedushah, nor does zrikah apply to desanctify them if they were never b'nei mizbeach. For R. Elazar, zrikah is about permitting the main parts (flesh for altar, hide for priests), not desanctifying peripheral parts. This terutz resolves the kushya by accepting the contradiction and presenting it as a machloket amora'im, rather than forcing a textual reinterpretation. The Gemara, by explicitly stating "ופליגא דרבי אלעזר" (And Rabba disagrees with Rabbi Elazar), indicates that Rabba's psak is the one being followed, making R. Elazar's view a rejected alternative.

Friction 2: The Nature of Kedushah on Olah Bones and its Removal

The Kushya: The core chakira underlying Rabba's chiddush is: What is the nature of the kedushah that olah bones possess, and how can it be removed, especially by zrikah, an act usually associated with sanctification or permission for specific hekdesh uses? The olah is entirely for the altar ("כליל לאשים"), implying a profound, comprehensive kedushah on all its components. If bones are hekdesh, how can zrikah, which dedicates the olah to the altar, simultaneously desanctify its separated bones for hedyot use? This seems counter-intuitive. Is it kedushat guf or kedushat damim? If kedushat guf, how can it be removed for hedyot without explicit pidyon (redemption)?

Potential Terutzim:

1. Rabba's Gezeirah Shavah: Zrikah as a 'Release' Mechanism: Rabba's terutz hinges on the gezeirah shavah from "לו יהיה" (Leviticus 7:8) regarding the hide of an olah and "הוא יהיה לו" (Leviticus 7:7) regarding an asham. Just as asham bones (which are not for the altar) are permitted to the priests after zrikah, so too olah bones (which are not for the altar if separated) are permitted.

   • Analysis: This gezeirah shavah teaches that for those parts of a korban that are not destined for the altar (e.g., asham meat/bones for priests, olah hide for priests), zrikah acts as a mechanism to release them from kedushat me'ilah and permit them for hedyot (or kohanim) use. The svara is that zrikah serves as the definitive act that finalizes the halachic status of all parts of the korban. For the main body of the olah, it consecrates it to the altar. For the parush bones that were never destined for the altar (because they separated before the zrikah), the zrikah acts to declare them chullin, as they are not b'nei mizbeach and not b'nei kohanim. This isn't necessarily desanctification in the sense of removing kedushat guf that was already fully active for hakatarah; rather, it's a declaration that these specific detached components never fully acquired the kedushah that would subject them to me'ilah for altar purposes. The original kedushat guf of the animal is superseded or clarified by the zrikah.

2. R. Elazar's Robust Kedushat Guf: Zrikah is Not a Desanctifier: R. Elazar implicitly (and as explained by Rashi) holds that the kedushat guf of olah bones is more robust.

   • Analysis: For R. Elazar, if bones parshu lifnei zrikah, they were still hekdesh by virtue of being part of the consecrated animal. Zrikah permits the hide to priests and sanctifies the flesh for the altar, but it does not have the power to desanctify other parts that are not included in those specific permissions. Therefore, parush bones, not being designated for either the altar or priests' consumption, remain in their original state of kedushat guf and are subject to me'ilah. This svara maintains a higher level of kedushah for olah parts, reflecting the olah's designation as "כליל לאשים." The gezeirah shavah is either rejected or interpreted differently, perhaps that "לו יהיה" only applies to the hide and not to bones, or that the asham analogy is imperfect due to the distinct purpose of the korbanot. The me'ilah on olah bones is viewed as a persistent kedushah that is only removed through complete consumption on the altar.

The tension between these two approaches highlights a fundamental chakira in halacha: what is the scope of zrikah's transformative power? Is it limited to its explicit functions (atonement, permitting for altar/priests), or does it also encompass a broader "reset" or clarification of the kedushah status of all korban components? Rabba leans towards the latter, seeing zrikah as a comprehensive halachic event that defines the status of all parts. R. Elazar, on the other hand, views zrikah as more specific, with kedushat guf persisting in other parts unless explicitly removed by a different halachic mechanism.

Intertext

The sugya on Zevachim 86a, with its discussions on kedushah, me'ilah, and the transformative power of zrikah, resonates deeply across various domains of Jewish law and thought.

1. The Nature of Kedushat Guf and Kedushat Damim: The debate between Rabba and R. Elazar regarding olah bones touches upon the fundamental distinction between kedushat guf (holiness of the object itself) and kedushat damim (holiness of monetary value). When an animal is consecrated as an olah, it acquires kedushat guf. The question is: how indelible is this kedushah for parts not explicitly designated for the altar?

   • Context: This distinction is pivotal in Masechet Me'ilah (e.g., Me'ilah 10b, where the Gemara discusses kedushat guf of kodshei kodashim and kedushat damim of kodshim kalim). An object with kedushat guf cannot be redeemed; its kedushah is intrinsic to its physical being. An object with kedushat damim can be redeemed, and its monetary value becomes hekdesh.
   • Connection: Rabba's view that zrikah "permits" parush lifnei zrikah bones for hedyot suggests that the kedushah on these bones was either a weaker form of kedushat guf or perhaps akin to kedushat damim that is nullified by zrikah. R. Elazar, however, by asserting me'ilah l'olam for parush lifnei zrikah bones, implies a very strong, persistent kedushat guf that zrikah does not remove for parts not explicitly designated for altar or priestly consumption. This chakira reflects a broader tension in halacha regarding the resilience and transferability of kedushah.

2. The Role of Zrikah in Kaparah and Permitting Hana'ah:

   • Context: The act of zrikah (sprinkling the blood) is central to the kaparah (atonement) process of korbanot (Zevachim 36a, 104b). It is also the point at which certain parts of the korban become permitted for specific uses (e.g., olah hide for kohanim, chatat meat for kohanim).
   • Connection: Our sugya presents a unique chiddush with Rabba's view: zrikah not only facilitates kaparah and permits hekdesh for kohanim or the mizbeach, but it can also actively desanctify (or prevent the full onset of kedushah that leads to me'ilah) certain parush parts for hedyot use. This expands our understanding of zrikah's multifaceted power. It's not merely a ritualistic action but a halachic watershed moment that redefines the status of all components of the korban. This conceptualization of zrikah as a 'clearing house' for kedushah status is a significant insight that can be applied to other areas where zrikah is performed.

3. The Gezeirah Shavah "לו יהיה" and its Limitations:

   • Context: The Gemara uses a gezeirah shavah (verbal analogy) derived from the repetition of "לו יהיה" regarding an olah's hide (Leviticus 7:8) and an asham (Leviticus 7:7) to permit olah bones. The rules of gezeirah shavah are discussed extensively in Pesachim 66a and Zevachim 49b, emphasizing that the phrase must be muchrach (superfluous) in both contexts and that only a talmid chacham can derive them.
   • Connection: The kushya raised by Tosafot (and implicitly by R. Elazar) regarding the gezeirah shavah highlights its inherent limitations. While gezeirah shavah is a valid middah she'haTorah nidreshet ba, its application can be debated. Can it transfer permission for hana'ah from asham bones (which are basar for kohanim) to olah bones (which are not)? This forces a deeper look at the svara behind the gezeirah shavah: is it establishing a general principle that zrikah permits all non-altar parts, or is it more specific to the nature of the korban? This pushes us to consider when gezeirah shavah can truly bridge disparate halachot and when the inherent differences between cases (e.g., olah vs. asham) might limit its scope.

4. Midnight as a Halachic Divisor:

   • Context: The latter part of our sugya discusses the Mishna's ruling that eivarim dislodged from the altar before midnight are returned, while those dislodged after midnight are not. This concept of midnight as a halachic cutoff is prevalent in halacha. For instance, the Korban Pesach must be eaten by chatzi halailah (Pesachim 120a), and Kriat Shema has a zman until chatzi halailah (Berachot 1a).
   • Connection: The Gemara here (Zevachim 86a) presents a machloket between Rav and R. Yochanan regarding the svara behind this midnight cutoff for hakatarah and dishaun. Rav derives it from a derasha of "כל הלילה" vs. "והסיר," implying a mid'oraita division. R. Yochanan argues that dishaun can occur earlier due to tzorech (need), suggesting the midnight rule is a l'chatchila ideal or specific to certain contexts, not a strict mid'oraita division of the night. This debate reflects a broader chakira: when is a zman (fixed time) a strict mid'oraita deadline, and when is it a l'chatchila ideal that can be adjusted for tzorech? The Yoma Mishna (20a) demonstrating flexibility for dishaun further solidifies R. Yochanan's point, illustrating that halacha often balances ideal timing with practical necessities, especially in the Temple service.

5. The Concept of Pigul and Notar:

   • Context: While not directly mentioned in our sugya, the laws of pigul (sacrificial offering invalidated by improper intention) and notar (leftover sacrificial food) (e.g., Zevachim 28a, 48a) are critically dependent on the zman (time) of hakatarah and consumption.
   • Connection: The debate regarding the zman of hakatarah for dislodged eivarim (before/after midnight) has implications for how we understand the completion of the korban process. If hakatarah is considered complete after midnight, then any eivarim remaining might be subject to notar if they were intended for consumption (though olah is entirely burned). More broadly, the precise timing of zrikah and hakatarah is crucial for preventing pigul and notar. The Gemara's analysis of eivarim needing to be returned before midnight underscores the ongoing kedushah and obligation of hakatarah within a specific time frame, connecting directly to the meticulous time-bound nature of korbanot to avoid severe halachic transgressions.

These intertextual connections demonstrate that the discussions in Zevachim 86a are not isolated but are integral to a vast and interconnected tapestry of halacha and aggadah, shedding light on fundamental principles of kedushah, ritual, and divine service.

Psak/Practice

The intricate discussions in Zevachim 86a regarding the kedushah and disposition of olah bones, and the timing of hakatarah, find their resolution and application in practical halacha and inform meta-psak heuristics.

Disposition of Olah Bones and Me'ilah:

The primary machloket between Rabba and R. Elazar concerning the me'ilah status of parush olah bones is settled by the poskim in favor of Rabba.

• Rambam's Psak: As noted in the "Readings" section, the Rambam explicitly rules in accordance with Rabba. He states that if the bones of an olah separated before zrikah, they are permitted for ordinary use, and one is not liable for me'ilah from them. He even specifies that one may use them to make knife handles (Rambam, Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 7:16; Hilchot Me'ilah 1:12). If they separated after zrikah, they remain subject to me'ilah (Rambam, Hilchot Me'ilah 1:12).
• Shulchan Aruch: While the laws of korbanot are not directly applicable today due to the absence of the Temple, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 500:1) briefly mentions the laws of me'ilah in a general context, but for specific korban details, one must consult the Rishonim. However, the psak of Rambam is authoritative in this area.
• Implication: This ruling establishes that zrikah is a powerful, comprehensive act that defines the kedushah status of all korban components. It can not only apply kedushah to the altar-bound parts but also remove kedushah (or prevent its full onset for me'ilah) from non-altar parts that were already separated. The moment of zrikah serves as a critical halachic pivot point.

Timing of Hakatarah and Dishaun:

The debate between Rav and R. Yochanan regarding the midnight cutoff for returning dislodged eivarim and the timing of dishaun (ash removal) also has halachic implications.

• Rambam's Psak: Rambam, following R. Yochanan, rules that the mitzvah of burning the eivarim extends "כל הלילה עד הבקר" (all night until morning), but the dishaun (removal of ashes) can begin earlier, even from the beginning of the night, if there is a tzorech (need) (Rambam, Hilchot Temidin U'Musafin 3:13-14). He cites the Mishna in Yoma (20a) as evidence for this flexibility, where dishaun was performed at various times (rooster's crow, midnight on Yom Kippur, end of the first watch on Festivals) based on the specific needs of the Temple service.
• Meta-Psak Heuristics: This reveals a crucial meta-psak principle: while the Torah may set an ideal or l'chatchila (ideally) time for a mitzvah, practical necessities (tzorech) can sometimes allow for flexibility, particularly when the mitzvah itself is not strictly time-bound to a specific hour, but rather to a broader period (e.g., "כל הלילה"). Rav's derasha implying a strict midnight division is rejected in favor of R. Yochanan's more nuanced approach, which accommodates the realities of Temple operations. This principle of tzorech overriding strict timing is seen in many areas of halacha.

In sum, the sugya provides a deep dive into the nuanced nature of kedushah and its removal, emphasizing the transformative power of zrikah. It also illustrates how halachic rulings, even for Temple rituals, often incorporate pragmatic considerations, balancing ideal performance with operational needs.

Takeaway

This sugya masterfully demonstrates the multifaceted nature of kedushah, revealing that its application and removal are not monolithic but contingent on the specific object's state and the transformative power of zrikah. Furthermore, it exemplifies how halacha often balances strict textual derivation with practical necessities, particularly in the context of Temple service.