Zevachim 87

Sugya Map

The sugya on Zevachim 87a grapples with fundamental principles of kedushah and hakravah (sacrificial service) on the mizbei'ach (altar), examining the temporal and spatial boundaries of sanctity.

• Issue 1: When are limbs considered "consumed" by the altar fire?
  • Nafka Mina: Whether dislodged limbs are returned to the altar.
  • Primary Sources: Rabba vs. Rav Ḥisda, Zevachim 87a line 1-3. Rav Yosef's objection and the halakha from Eretz Yisrael, Zevachim 87a line 4.
• Issue 2: Does Linah (being left overnight) disqualify items on the Altar?
  • Nafka Mina: Whether limbs left on the altar overnight, if subsequently removed, may be returned.
  • Primary Sources: Rava's dilemma to Rabba, Zevachim 87a line 6. Rabba vs. Rava, Zevachim 87a line 10.
• Issue 3: Do Keli Shareis (Service Vessels) Sanctify Pesulim (Disqualified Items) Le-Hakrava L'chatchila (for ab initio offering)?
  • Nafka Mina: Whether a disqualified item, once placed in a kli shareis, can be offered as if it were valid.
  • Primary Sources: Reish Lakish's dilemma to Rabbi Yoḥanan, Zevachim 87a line 12. Mishna Zevachim 84a.
• Issue 4: Is Avir HaMizbei'ach (the Altar's Airspace) Considered Part of the Altar?
  • Nafka Mina: Determines the status of items passing over or within the altar's airspace, particularly concerning yordei'ah lo ya'aleh (once descended, it shall not ascend) and linah.
  • Primary Sources: Gemara's dilemma, Zevachim 87a line 14. Rami bar Ḥama's dilemma, Zevachim 87a line 16. Rava bar Rav Ḥanan's objection, Zevachim 87a line 17. Rav Shimi bar Ashi's terutz, Zevachim 87a line 18.

Text Snapshot

The sugya opens with a sharp temporal dispute: "חצות שני עוכלתן. רב חסדא אומר: עמוד השחר עוכלתן" ("The second midnight renders them consumed. Rav Ḥisda says: Dawn renders them consumed.") This terse statement immediately sets the stage for a machloket regarding the precise moment limbs are considered fully consumed by the altar's fire, even if not entirely reduced to ash. The nuance of "עוכלתן" (renders them consumed) is key; it doesn't mean actual physical consumption, but a halakhic status of having fulfilled their purpose, such that they need not be returned if dislodged. Rashi explains this as "שרירי דידהו חצות שני של ליל המחרת" (Rashi, Zevachim 87a s.v. "חצות שני עוכלתן"), referring to the surviveurs (survivors) of the fire, implying a state of completion.

Another pivotal chakira (dilemma) addresses the spatial boundary of the altar's sanctity: "אויר המזבח כגוף המזבח דמי או לאו?" ("Is the airspace above the altar considered as the altar itself, or not?") This question, introduced at Zevachim 87a line 14, unpacks the nature of kedushah. Is sanctity a purely physical attribute, tied to the material structure, or does it extend into the surrounding spatial envelope? The implications are vast, affecting the laws of linah, temurah, and me'ilah.

Readings

Rashi on the Linah Dispute

Rashi, ever the p'shat master, clarifies the core disagreement between Rabba and Rava regarding linah al gabbei hamizbei'ach (being left overnight on the altar): "רבא אמר לא יעלו - דלינה מועלת והוו להו פסולין וכיון דירדו לא יעלו" (Rashi, Zevachim 87a s.v. "רבא אמר לא יעלו"). Rashi explains Rava's position: if limbs that were on the altar overnight subsequently descended, "they shall not ascend." This is because Rava holds that linah does disqualify items even when they are on the altar. Consequently, once they are disqualified and have descended, the rule of "יורד לא יעלה" (what has descended shall not ascend) applies.

Rashi's understanding highlights the fundamental chakira on Zevachim 87a line 6: "לינה מועלת בראש המזבח או אין מועלת בראש המזבח?" (Is linah effective on top of the altar or not?). Rabba argues linah is not effective on the altar, citing the parallel of the Shulchan (Table of Showbread) where bread left for "many days" is not disqualified (Menachot 100a). The altar, being a place of hakravah, might be seen as immune to linah for items actively being consumed. Rava, conversely, holds that linah is effective, equating the altar's top to the azara (courtyard) ground for this disqualification. Rashi's brief comment crystallizes Rava's reasoning: the linah disqualifies, and the descent seals their fate. This distinction is crucial for understanding the subsequent sugya concerning avir hamizbei'ach.

Tosafot on Kedushat Keli Shareis and Pesulim

Tosafot on Zevachim 87a (s.v. "הגה"ה כבש מנין") delves into a deeper layer of kedushah, specifically concerning keli shareis and their ability to sanctify pesulim. The Gemara asks for the source that the kevesh (ramp) sanctifies, citing "את המזבח" (Exodus 40:10). It then asks about keli shareis, citing "כל הנגע בהם יקדש" (Exodus 30:29). Reish Lakish's dilemma to Rabbi Yochanan is whether keli shareis sanctify pesulim le-hakriva l'chatchila.

Tosafot raises a kushya from Rabbi Yehuda, who states that the azara (Temple courtyard) sanctifies like the mizbei'ach. If so, why is an inclusion (the word "את") needed to teach that the kevesh sanctifies? Even if an item fell to the azara (which sanctifies), it would ascend. The kevesh is certainly no less holy. Tosafot's terutz is profound: "וי"ל דשמא הא דעזרה מקדשת כמזבח היינו כשירין להקטיר עליה אבל פסולין לא להכי איצטריך קרא" (Tosafot, Zevachim 87a s.v. "הגה"ה כבש מנין"). Perhaps the azara only sanctifies items that are k'sheirim (fit) to be offered. However, for pesulim, a specific pesukim (verse) is required to teach that the kevesh (and by extension keli shareis) can sanctify them.

This chiddush from Tosafot introduces a critical distinction in the nature of kedushah. Not all kedushah is created equal. The kedushah of the azara, while potent enough to prevent items from descending if they are fit, might not possess the transformative power to enable the hakravah of pesulim l'chatchila. The kedushah derived from "את המזבח" or "כל הנגע בהם יקדש" for keli shareis is of a higher, more encompassing order, capable of rendering even disqualified items kadosh to the extent that they can be offered. This reveals a hierarchical understanding of kedushah, where certain objects (like the altar itself, its ramp, and service vessels) possess a unique capacity to override or mitigate disqualifications, a power not necessarily shared by other areas of sanctity like the azara.

Friction

The most intricate friction point in the sugya revolves around the chakira: "אויר המזבח כגוף המזבח דמי או לאו?" (Is the airspace above the altar considered as the altar itself, or not?) (Zevachim 87a line 14). This question has significant nafka minot, particularly regarding the rule of yordei'ah lo ya'aleh (what has descended shall not ascend) and the efficacy of linah.

The Gemara initially attempts to resolve this from the mishnah that states, "Just as the altar sanctifies, so too the ramp sanctifies" (Zevachim 87a line 14). If avir hamizbei'ach is not like the mizbei'ach, then avir hakkevesh (ramp's airspace) also isn't like the kevesh. How then does one elevate limbs from the ramp to the altar, since they must pass through an airspace, which would constitute "descending" from the ramp? The Gemara terutz is that the priest drags the offering. But even dragging involves a small "space between the ramp and the altar." The Gemara responds that "a majority of the limb is on the ramp" (Zevachim 87a line 15), applying the principle of rov (majority) to maintain its status. This terutz would seem to imply that avir is not like the object, otherwise, no such rov rule would be needed; the avir itself would maintain the connection. Yet, the Gemara concludes this terutz as not definitively resolving the issue.

The strongest kushya to the idea that avir hamizbei'ach is like the mizbei'ach is raised by Rava bar Rav Ḥanan: "אלא אי אמרת אויר המזבח כגוף המזבח דמי, עולת העוף שפסלה במחשבה היכי משכחת לה?" (But if you say that the airspace above the altar is considered as the altar itself, how can you find a bird burnt offering that one disqualified by intention?) (Zevachim 87a line 17). A corban of a bird burnt offering is nimlak (pinched) in the avir hamizbei'ach. If the avir is like the mizbei'ach, then at the moment of melikah, the altar "accepts it." If the altar accepts it, it should never descend, even if one intended to burn it p’sula (disqualified) by linah (e.g., the next day). This is because items accepted by the altar are immune to linah once on the altar (according to Rabba), and once accepted, they "shall not descend," thus preventing the disqualification from taking effect. Therefore, Rava bar Rav Ḥanan argues, if avir hamizbei'ach is like the mizbei'ach, there should be no such thing as a bird burnt offering disqualified by machshavat pigul (intention to burn beyond its designated time) or linah.

The best terutz is provided by Rav Shimi bar Ashi: "היכי משכחת לה? כגון דאמר: הריני מולק לשם להוריד למחר ולהקטיר. וכיון דאמר להוריד למחר, דעתו להוריד, כיון דירד, לא יעלה" (How can you find it? For example, where he says: I am hereby pinching it with the intention of taking it down tomorrow and burning it. And since he says "to take down tomorrow," his intention is to take it down. Once it has descended, it shall not ascend) (Zevachim 87a line 18). Rav Shimi bar Ashi argues that even if avir hamizbei'ach is like mizbei'ach, one can still disqualify a bird offering by machshava if the intention includes removing it from the altar before burning. By intending to remove it, one creates a scenario where it will descend, and once it descends after being disqualified (e.g., by linah intention), it cannot be returned.

However, Rav Shimi bar Ashi's terutz faces a further kushya: This only works "לרבא דאמר לינה מועלת בראש המזבח" (according to Rava, who says that linah is effective on top of the altar) (Zevachim 87a line 19). If linah disqualifies on the altar, then the intention to remove it and burn it later, combined with linah, makes it pasul. But "לרבה דאמר לינה אין מועלת בראש המזבח" (according to Rabba, who says linah is not effective on top of the altar), even if one removes it, it's not pasul by linah and must be returned. So Rabba's view negates the disqualification.

Rav Shimi bar Ashi provides a terutz for Rabba as well: "אפילו לרבה, כגון דאמר: הריני מולק לשם להוריד קודם עמוד השחר ולהקטיר לאחר עמוד השחר" (Even according to Rabba, such as where he says: I am hereby pinching it with the intention of taking it down before dawn and burning it after dawn) (Zevachim 87a line 20). In this case, the intention is to remove it from the altar before dawn. Once it's off the altar, even Rabba agrees it can be disqualified by linah. This complex exchange ultimately solidifies the position that avir hamizbei'ach is considered as guf hamizbei'ach, allowing for the possibility of p'sul by machshava through intricate machshavot to remove it from the altar.

Intertext

The sugya's exploration of avir hamizbei'ach (the altar's airspace) and its kedushah finds fascinating parallels in other areas of halakha, particularly regarding the concept of avir as an extension of a physical domain.

One salient parallel is found in Hilchot Shabbat, concerning the definitions of reshuyot (domains). The avir (airspace) above a reshut hayachid (private domain) or reshut harabbim (public domain) is often considered an extension of that domain up to a certain height. For instance, in Shabbat 97a, the Gemara discusses whether carrying an object through the avir above a reshut harabbim constitutes a hotza'ah (carrying out) from a reshut hayachid. The chakira there, "אויר רשות הרבים כרשות הרבים דמי או לאו" (Is the airspace of a public domain considered like the public domain itself, or not?), directly mirrors our sugya's language and conceptual query regarding kedushah. Just as the reshuyot define spatial boundaries for melacha (prohibited labor), the mizbei'ach defines spatial boundaries for kedushah and hakravah. The very question of whether avir counts as guf (body) is a meta-halakhic principle applied across diverse legal contexts.

Another compelling intertextual connection can be drawn from Hilchot Tumah v'Taharah, specifically regarding kli cheres (earthenware vessels) and their tumah (impurity). A kli cheres becomes tamei (impure) through its avir (airspace/interior). The Mishnah in Keilim 2:1 states: "כלי חרס אינו מקבל טומאה אלא מאוירו" (An earthenware vessel only receives impurity through its airspace). This principle means that an external contact with the vessel's exterior does not impart tumah; rather, the tumah must enter its internal avir. Here, the avir is not merely an extension but the primary locus of interaction for tumah, demonstrating a unique legal personality of airspace. While in Zevachim 87a, avir hamizbei'ach is debated as being like the mizbei'ach, in the context of kli cheres, the avir is the vessel for the purpose of tumah. This showcases a spectrum of how avir is considered in halakha – from a debatable extension to the very essence of the object's legal identity. Both sugyot force us to ponder the philosophical relationship between physical form, spatial emptiness, and their halakhic ramifications.

Psak/Practice

While the sugya concerning the exact timing of "consumption" and the efficacy of linah on the altar is primarily theoretical in our post-Temple era, certain meta-halakhic principles derived here do land in psak heuristics.

The halakha regarding the timing of consumption, as established by the anonymous "שלחו משם" (they sent from there) (Zevachim 87a line 4), is "הלכה כרב יוסף" (the halakha is in accordance with Rav Yosef). Rav Yosef holds that "midnight, wherever the limbs are found, effects for them consumption." This means that the passing of midnight, regardless of whether the limbs are on or off the altar, grants them the status of "consumed" such that they need not be returned if subsequently dislodged. This establishes a clear temporal boundary for the mitzvah of hakrava for eivarim, emphasizing the finite nature of the zman hakravah.

More broadly, the extensive chakira regarding avir hamizbei'ach and the nature of kedushah provides a lens through which to understand the boundaries of kedushah in other contexts. The Gemara's ultimate inclination towards "אויר המזבח כגוף המזבח דמי" (airspace above the altar is considered as the altar itself) (Zevachim 87a line 21) informs how we perceive the sanctity of an object not just as its physical mass, but as an encompassing spiritual field. This meta-psak heuristic influences discussions in Hilchot Beit HaMikdash, where the kedushah of the Temple, its courtyards, and its vessels are often understood to extend beyond their immediate physical dimensions. It posits that kedushah is not merely surface-level but permeates and defines its surrounding space, albeit with varying degrees and conditions.

Takeaway

This sugya meticulously dissects the temporal and spatial dimensions of kedushah on the mizbei'ach, revealing that sanctity is not a monolithic concept but rather a dynamic force with intricate boundaries and multifaceted interactions. It underscores the profound halakhic import of even the seemingly intangible, like airspace or a specific moment in time, in defining sacrificial efficacy.

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Footnotes:

1. Zevachim 87a line 1.
2. Zevachim 87a line 1.
3. Rashi, Zevachim 87a s.v. "חצות שני עוכלתן".
4. Zevachim 87a line 14.
5. Rashi, Zevachim 87a s.v. "רבא אמר לא יעלו".
6. Zevachim 87a line 6.
7. Menachot 100a.
8. Zevachim 87a line 11.
9. Zevachim 87a line 12.
10. Tosafot, Zevachim 87a s.v. "הגה"ה כבש מנין".
11. Zevachim 87a line 14.
12. Zevachim 87a line 15.
13. Zevachim 87a line 17.
14. Zevachim 87a line 18.
15. Zevachim 87a line 19.
16. Zevachim 87a line 20.
17. Zevachim 87a line 21.
18. Shabbat 97a.
19. Keilim 2:1.
20. Zevachim 87a line 4.
21. Zevachim 87a line 4.
22. Zevachim 87a line 21.