Zevachim 98

Sugya Map

This sugya in Zevachim 98a-b embarks on an expansive exegetical journey through Vayikra 7:37-38, "This is the law of the burnt offering, of the meal offering, and of the sin offering, and of the guilt offering, and of the inauguration offering, and of the sacrifice of peace offerings. This is the law which the Lord commanded Moses in mount Sinai, in the day of His commanding the children of Israel, to offer their offerings unto the Lord, in the wilderness of Sinai." The Gemara derives numerous halakhot by juxtaposing specific korbanot mentioned in the verse with the general category.

• Issue: Elucidating various halakhot of korbanot through derashot from Vayikra 7:37-38, and a subsequent discussion on ḥatzitzah (interposition) in tevilah (immersion).
• Nafka Mina(s):
  • Sanctification by Absorption: What materials become kodesh upon contact with kodshim, and what is the mechanism? (e.g., chatat and mincha sanctify through absorption).
  • Fetal Sac/Placenta: Whether shilyah (placenta) and uvra (fetal sac) within a sacrificial animal possess sanctity.
  • Leftovers: The proper disposal of notar (leftover sacrificial meat) and the status of living animals designated as korbanot but not used.
  • Piggul: Which korbanot are susceptible to the disqualification of piggul (improper intent to eat beyond its time).
  • Source of Animals: Korbanot must generally come from non-sacred animals.
  • Time of Service: Avodah (Temple service) must be performed during the day.
  • Right Hand: Specific avodot must be performed with the priest's right hand.
  • Bones: The status of bones from kodshim.
  • Ḥatzitzah: The conditions under which a foreign substance on a person or object interposes between it and the mei mikvah, invalidating the tevilah.
• Primary Sources: Vayikra 7:37-38, Vayikra 6:11, Vayikra 14:16, Vayikra 16:11, Exodus 29:34. Mishna Zevachim 98b.

Text Snapshot

The Gemara meticulously analyzes the aforementioned verse: "חטאת — מה חטאת מקדשת בהבלעה, אף כל מקדשין בהבלעה. אשם — מה אשם אין שילייתו ומי שפיר שלו קדושין בו, אף כל אין שילייתו ומי שפיר שלו קדושין בו. אלמא קסבר: וולד בהמה קדשין הן כמות שהן, ויליף אפשר מאי אפשר. מלואים — מה מלואים מותריהן נשרפין, ואין בהן בהמה חיה, אף כל מותריהן נשרפין ואין בהן בהמה חיה. שלמים — מה שלמים מפיגילין ומתפגלין, אף כל מפיגילין ומתפגלין." (Zevachim 98a)

Dikduk/Leshon Nuance

The recurring phrase "מה X אף כל" (Just as X, so too all) is a classic hekeish (juxtaposition) structure, implying that a halakha stated for one korban applies to all others listed in the verse. The Gemara immediately delves into the svarot behind these derivations, such as the kushya regarding "מקודשת בהבלעה" (sanctified through absorption) for mincha vs. chatat, necessitating both sources due to their differing consistencies ("רכה היא נבלעת," "מטפטפא היא"). This showcases the Gemara's precision in distinguishing between guf ha'halakha and its underlying rationale. The phrase "אלמא קסבר" (evidently he holds) introduces an inferred Tannaitic position, revealing the Tanna's underlying assumptions (muskamot) about kedushat ha'valad.

Readings

Tosafot (Zevachim 98a s.v. איכא דנפקא ליה מהכא)

Tosafot addresses the initial phrase "איכא דנפקא ליה מהכא כו'" concerning the derivation that shelamei tzibur (communal peace offerings) are eaten only by male priests. The Gemara here presents two tannaim, each deriving this halakha from a different part of the verse. Tosafot points out that there exists a third Tanna in Perek Eizehu Mekoman (Zevachim 55a) who derives this halakha differently: "אלא היקישא למאי אתא מה חטאת לזכרי כהונה אף זבחי שלמי ציבור לזכרי כהונה." This Tanna uses a hekeish from chatat (sin offering) to shelamei tzibur.

Chiddush: Tosafot's chiddush lies in explaining why this third Tanna is not cited in our sugya. He states: "והא דלא מייתי לה הכא משום דסוגיא דשמעתא היא ולא משכח לה ברייתא בהדיא." Tosafot asserts that the sugya in Zevachim 55a is a sugya d'shmaata (a Gemara discussion/analysis) rather than a direct baraita (an explicit Tannaitic teaching). Our sugya prefers to cite explicit baraitot for its derashot. This highlights a methodological principle in the Gemara's presentation of sources: explicit Tannaitic traditions (baraitot) are preferred when introducing primary derivations, even if the Gemara elsewhere offers similar conclusions through its own analytical sugyot. It teaches us to discern the nature of the source being cited.

Rashi (Zevachim 98a s.v. מדרבה בר בר חנה נפקא כו' and כר"ש)

Rashi clarifies the Gemara's kushya and subsequent terutz regarding the derivation that avodah must be performed with the right hand. The baraita derives this from chatat. The Gemara questions this, asking why it isn't derived from Rabba bar bar Ḥana's principle: "כל מקום שנאמר אצבע או כהונה אינו אלא בימין" (Zevachim 98a).

Chiddush 1 (on the kushya): Rashi explains the premise of the kushya from Rabba bar bar Ḥana: "וקס"ד או אצבע או כהונה ואין לך בכל אלו שלא נאמר כהן בהקרבתן." The Gemara initially assumes that Rabba bar bar Ḥana's rule means either the mention of "finger" or the mention of "priesthood" is sufficient to imply "right hand." Since all korbanot mentioned in Vayikra 7:37-38 certainly involve kohanim, there would be no need for a specific derasha from chatat. Rashi's precision here illuminates the Gemara's initial, intuitive reading of the rule.

Chiddush 2 (on R' Shimon's terutz): The Gemara then offers R' Shimon's opinion as an alternative terutz: "סבר לה כרבי שמעון, דאמר: אצבע לא בעיא כהונה, כהונה בעיא אצבע" (Zevachim 98a). Rashi explains R' Shimon's nuanced position: "בפ"ב (שם) כהונה בעי אצבע ובחטאת תרוייהו כתיב ולקח הכהן מדם החטאת באצבעו." According to R' Shimon, if the Torah mentions "finger," it's inherently understood to be the right hand, even without mentioning "priesthood." However, if the Torah only mentions "priesthood" (i.e., the kohen performs an action) without specifying "finger," it does require an additional derasha (like from chatat) to establish that it must be done with the right hand. The example of chatat itself is instructive, as "ולקח הכהן מדם החטאת באצבעו" (Vayikra 16:18) includes both "priest" and "finger," making it a suitable source to derive the rule for cases where only "priest" is mentioned. Rashi's elucidation highlights R' Shimon's sophisticated hermeneutic, distinguishing between different linguistic cues to derive halakha.

Friction

The Strongest Kushya

The Gemara itself presents a formidable kushya against the baraita's derashot for "daytime" and "right hand" avodah. The baraita states: "חטאת — מה חטאת אינה באה אלא מחולין ובלילה ובימין, אף כל אינן באין אלא מחולין ובלילה ובימין" (Zevachim 98a). The Gemara challenges:

1. "בלילה" (should be "ביום"): "ביום מדרבה בר בר חנה נפקא?! מ"ביום צותו" נפקא!" (Why derive 'daytime' from chatat? It's derived from 'on the day of His commanding'!) (Zevachim 98a).
2. "בימין": "בימין מדרבה בר בר חנה נפקא?! דאמר רבה בר בר חנה אמר ריש לקיש: כל מקום שנאמר אצבע או כהונה אינו אלא בימין" (Why derive 'right hand' from chatat? It's derived from Rabba bar bar Ḥana's rule that 'wherever "finger" or "priesthood" is mentioned, it is only with the right hand'!) (Zevachim 98a).

These challenges are potent because they identify pre-existing, general principles that would render the baraita's specific derivations from chatat superfluous (mi-kol makom). If a broader rule already covers these cases, why does the Torah go out of its way to teach it through a specific korban? This strikes at the heart of derasha methodology.

The Best Terutz (or Two)

The Gemara offers two distinct terutzim to resolve these kushyot, demonstrating its multi-layered approach to halakhic reasoning:

1. "כדי נסבה" (It was cited for no reason): For the derivation of "daytime" avodah, the Gemara answers: "כדי נסבה" (Zevachim 98a). This means the baraita mentioned "daytime" alongside "from non-sacred animals" and "right hand" without intending to establish a novel derasha for "daytime." It was simply grouped for convenience or rhetorical flow, even though its source is actually "ביום צותו." This terutz acknowledges that not every element in a Tannaitic teaching necessarily carries a unique, independent derasha. Sometimes, principles are reiterated or clustered for didactic purposes. The same terutz is initially offered for the "right hand" derivation before a more profound explanation is given.

2. כרבי שמעון (According to Rabbi Shimon): For the "right hand" derivation, the Gemara offers a more substantive terutz: "ואיבעית אימא: סבר לה כרבי שמעון, דאמר: אצבע לא בעיא כהונה, כהונה בעיא אצבע" (Zevachim 98a). As elucidated by Rashi, Rabbi Shimon holds that Rabba bar bar Ḥana's rule is not a simple disjunction ("either/or"). Rather, if "finger" is mentioned, it's inherently right-handed; but if only "priesthood" is mentioned (i.e., a priest performs an action without explicit mention of a finger), then an additional derasha is required to teach that it must be with the right hand. Since many avodot involve kohanim but do not explicitly mention "finger," the baraita's derivation from chatat (where both "priest" and "finger" are mentioned, establishing the precedent) is indeed necessary to apply the "right hand" rule to those instances. This terutz elevates the discussion from a mere textual grouping (kedi nesiba) to a fundamental disagreement between tannaim about the interpretation of exegetical rules, thereby justifying the baraita's unique derivation.

Intertext

Tanakh

The entire sugya is an extended derasha on Vayikra 7:37-38, "זֹאת הַתּוֹרָה, לָעֹלָה לַמִּנְחָה וְלַחַטָּאת וְלָאָשָׁם וְלַמִּלּוּאִים וּלְזֶבַח הַשְּׁלָמִים. זֹאת הַתּוֹרָה אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה יְהוָה אֶת מֹשֶׁה בְּהַר סִינָי בְּיוֹם צַוֹּתוֹ אֶת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל לְהַקְרִיב אֶת קָרְבְּנֵיהֶם לַיהוָה בְּמִדְבַּר סִינָי." This verse serves as the hermeneutical fulcrum, where the specific mention of various korbanot allows for analogical extensions of halakhot from one to another. The derivation of sanctification by absorption for mincha references Vayikra 6:11, "כֹּל אֲשֶׁר יִגַּע בָּהֶם יִקְדָּשׁ" (Whatever shall touch them shall be sacred), providing the foundational principle for such sanctity. The source for Rabba bar bar Ḥana's rule regarding the right hand is Vayikra 14:16, "וְטָבַל הַכֹּהֵן אֶת אֶצְבָּעוֹ הַיְמָנִית בַּשָּׁמֶן אֲשֶׁר עַל כַּפּוֹ" (And the priest shall dip his right finger in the oil that is in his palm), explicitly linking "finger" with "right hand." This verse is crucial for understanding the kushya and terutz about performing avodah with the right hand.

Shulchan Aruch / Responsa

The latter part of our sugya (Zevachim 98b) delves into Rava's questions regarding ḥatzitzah (interposition) in tevilah. Rava's kushya about a person who is both a butcher and a fat-seller, with both blood and fat on their garment, directly addresses the core principle of ḥatzitzah: "האם הוא מקפיד על אחד ואינו מקפיד על שנים, או דילמא אינו מקפיד אפילו על שנים?" (Is he particular about one, but not about two, or perhaps he is not particular even about two?). This un-resolved kushya (teiku) is a classic example of the Gemara grappling with the psychological dimension of halakha.

This sugya is foundational for Hilchot Mikvaot, specifically Yoreh De'ah 198:1-2 in the Shulchan Aruch. The Shulchan Aruch, based on these and other sugyot, establishes that a substance only interposes if it is makpid alav (one is particular about it) and it covers rov gufo (most of one's body) or rov se'arotav (most of one's hair). The specific cases of blood and fat, and the status of a butcher/fat-seller, are direct applications of the svara that ani l'ba'al melachto (a substance common to one's profession) is not considered an interposition, as one is generally not makpid on it. The teiku of "butcher and fat-seller" suggests that in such a compounded scenario, the ruling might lean towards ḥatzitzah due to the cumulative effect, or perhaps remain lenient if the person is accustomed to both. Posekim often rule stringently on teiku in de'oraita matters, but the general principle of makpid remains.

Psak/Practice

The derashot from Vayikra 7:37-38 form the bedrock of many Hilchot Korbanot. The rules regarding sanctification by absorption, the disposal of notar, the susceptibility to piggul, and the requirement for avodah to be performed during the day and with the right hand, are all fundamental principles governing Temple service. These are not merely academic exercises but define the very validity of the korbanot. For example, performing an avodah with the left hand, where the right is required, would likely invalidate the offering.

The sugya on ḥatzitzah has direct and profound implications for daily halakha, particularly in Hilchot Niddah and other areas requiring tevilah. The principle of "האם הוא מקפיד על זה" (is he particular about this?) is a cornerstone of Hilchot Mikvaot (Yoreh De'ah 198). If a person is not particular about a stain or substance on their body, it generally does not interpose. This creates a subjective element in halakha, where personal habits and attitudes can influence the validity of a mitzvah. The teiku concerning the "butcher and fat-seller" highlights the complexity of applying this subjectivity, particularly when multiple, usually non-interposing substances are present. In practice, posekim tend to be stringent regarding ḥatzitzah for tevilah for niddah due to its severity, often advising removal of anything that might interpose, even if one is not typically makpid.

Takeaway

This sugya masterfully demonstrates the meticulousness of Torah derasha, where a single verse yields a panoply of halakhot, and the Gemara's rigorous internal critique ensures each derivation is robust. It underscores the interplay between specific scriptural allusions and broader halakhic principles, revealing the depth and multi-layered nature of Torah Sheba'al Peh.