Mishnah Bekhorot 4:6-7

Sugya Map

The Mishnah in Bekhorot 4:6-7 grapples with several distinct, yet interconnected, halakhic domains, primarily concerning Bekhorot (firstborn animals) and the ethical conduct of communal functionaries. Our primary focus, as highlighted by the provided commentaries, will be on the permissibility of taking wages for the performance of mitzvot or rabbinic services.

• Issue 1: Management and Disposition of a Firstborn Animal.

  • Sub-issues:
    • The minimum duration an Israelite must tend a bekhor before giving it to a Kohen.
    • The timeline for consuming a bekhor (within its first year).
    • The process for inspecting a bekhor for blemishes, especially post-slaughter.
    • The liability of a non-expert who erroneously permits a bekhor.
    • The exemption of an expert for the court (מומחה לבית דין) from liability for erroneous rulings.
  • Nafka Mina(s): Determines when a Kohen can demand a bekhor; implications for the validity of meat consumption; financial liability of halakhic authorities.
  • Primary Sources: Mishnah Bekhorot 4:6-7; Devarim 15:20 ("You shall eat it before the Lord your God year by year"); Tosefta Bekhorot 3:15.

• Issue 2: Taking Wages for Davar Mitzvah (Mitzvah-Related Services).

  • Sub-issues:
    • The general prohibition against taking wages for judging, testifying, examining bekhorot, or performing mei chatat rituals.
    • The consequence of violating this prohibition (invalidity of rulings, testimonies, rituals).
    • Permitted exceptions: sechar b'tela (compensation for lost work), compensation for a Kohen losing teruma, transportation for an elder.
    • The definition and calculation of sechar b'tela.
  • Nafka Mina(s): The validity of Rabbinic court decisions, gittin, kashrut certifications, and communal halakhic services. The financial model for religious functionaries.
  • Primary Sources: Mishnah Bekhorot 4:6-7; Devarim 4:5, 16:19 ("You shall not take a bribe"); Avot 4:5; Gemara Sanhedrin 6b; Tosefta Bekhorot 3:15.

• Issue 3: Credibility of Suspect Individuals (חשוד).

  • Sub-issues:
    • The extent to which one may transact with individuals suspected of violating specific mitzvot (e.g., bekhorot, Shevi'it, ma'aser, teruma, tahorot).
    • The "domino effect" of suspicion: being suspect in one area affecting credibility in others.
    • The principle that a suspect cannot judge or testify in matters related to their suspicion.
  • Nafka Mina(s): Guidelines for commercial interactions within a religious community; criteria for appointing judges and accepting testimony.
  • Primary Sources: Mishnah Bekhorot 4:6-7; Tosefta Bekhorot 3:17-18.

Text Snapshot

Our focus lines from Mishnah Bekhorot 4:6-7 are particularly rich in their implications for rabbinic authority and communal life:

הַנּוֹטֵל שָׂכָר לִבְדֹּק בְּכוֹרוֹת, אֵין שׁוֹחֲטִין עַל פִּיו, אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן הָיָה מֻמְחֶה כְּאִילָא בְּיַבְנֶה, שֶׁהִתִּירוּ לוֹ חֲכָמִים בְּיַבְנֶה לִטֹּל ד' אִסָּר לִקְטַנָּה וְו' לִגְדוֹלָה, בֵּין תָּמִים בֵּין בַּעַל מוּם. הַנּוֹטֵל שְׂכָרוֹ לָדוּן, דִּינָיו בְּטֵלִים. לְהָעִיד, עֵדִיּוֹתָיו בְּטֵלִים. לְהַזּוֹת וּלְקַדֵּשׁ, מֵימָיו כְּמֵי מְעָרָה, וַאֲפָרוֹ כְּאֵפֶר מַקְלֶה. וְאִם הָיָה כֹהֵן וְטִמְּאָהוּ מִתְּרוּמָתוֹ, מַאֲכִילִין אוֹתוֹ וּמַשְׁקִין אוֹתוֹ וְסָכִין אוֹתוֹ מִשֶּׁלּוֹ. וְכֵן אִם הָיָה זָקֵן, מַרְכִּיבִין אוֹתוֹ עַל הַחֲמוֹר. וְנוֹתֵן לוֹ שְׂכָרוֹ כְּפוֹעֵל בָּטֵל.

The one who takes payment to be one who examines firstborn animals, one may not slaughter on the basis of his ruling, unless he was an expert like Ila in Yavne, whom the Sages in Yavne permitted to take a wage of four issar for issuing a ruling concerning a small animal and six issar for issuing a ruling concerning a large animal, whether it turned out that the firstborn was unblemished or whether it was blemished. The one who takes his wages to judge, his rulings are void. To testify, his testimonies are void. To sprinkle [the purification waters of the red heifer] and to sanctify [those waters], his water is like cave water, and his ashes are like mere burnt ashes. And if he was a priest, and [the owner] rendered him impure and prevented him from partaking of his teruma, [the owner] must provide him with food, drink, and oil for smearing on his body from his own [non-sacred property]. And likewise if he was an elderly person, [the owner] transports him on a donkey. And [in all these cases], he gives him his wages like a laborer. [Bekhorot 4:6]

Dikduk and Leshon Nuance

The Mishnah's use of plural forms is noteworthy: "דִּינָיו בְּטֵלִים" (his rulings are void, plural) and "עֵדִיּוֹתָיו בְּטֵלִים" (his testimonies are void, plural). This is highlighted by the Tosafot Yom Tov, who infers that this implies all of his rulings or testimonies are void, not just the specific one for which he took payment, unless it is known that he did not take payment for them. This suggests a broader disqualification based on a pattern of behavior rather than a singular act, touching upon the concept of chazakat kashrut (presumption of reliability) versus chazakat chashad (presumption of suspicion) [Tosafot Yom Tov, Bekhorot 4:6:2].

Furthermore, the phrase "וְנוֹתֵן לוֹ שְׂכָרוֹ כְּפוֹעֵל בָּטֵל" (and he gives him his wages like a laborer) is crucial. The term "פועל בטל" does not simply mean a "lazy laborer" or "unemployed laborer," but rather a laborer who is idle from his usual work due to performing a mitzvah or providing a service. The compensation is for the opportunity cost of his time, not a wage for the mitzvah itself. This nuanced understanding forms the basis for extensive halakhic discourse on permissible remuneration for mitzvah performance.

Readings

The Mishnah's unequivocal declaration that "The one who takes his wages to judge, his rulings are void. To testify, his testimonies are void" presents a profound challenge to any system where rabbinic functionaries receive remuneration. The Rishonim and Acharonim, particularly Rambam and Tosafot Yom Tov, engage in sophisticated analysis to reconcile this ideal with the practical necessities of communal life.

Rambam: Economic Nuance in Sechar B'tela

Chiddush: The Rambam introduces a novel economic and ethical dimension to the concept of sechar b'tela (compensation for lost work), arguing that it is not a flat rate based on lost income, but rather an amount adjusted by the difficulty of the work from which one is idled. A day of rest from arduous labor carries less compensatory value than a day off from light labor, as the rest itself is a benefit.

In his commentary on Mishnah Bekhorot 4:6, the Rambam meticulously explains the various provisions related to taking wages:

"הנוטל שכר לדון דיניו בטלים להעיד עדותיו כו': מי מערה אינן מותרים לקדוש אלא מן המים חיים לפיכך אמר מים האלו כאילו הם מי מערה ואותו האפר כאילו הוא אפר מקלה ר"ל אפר הכבשן לא אפר פרה: וענין הקדוש להשליך אפר הפרה לתוך המים וזהו שאין מותר לעשותו בשכר ואם עשה פסול להזות עליו ממי חטאת ואם נטל הדיין שכר משני בעלי הדין כאחד בפרסום נוטל כנגד מה שבטל ממלאכתו לא יותר ויהיה זה גלוי ומפורסם כגון שיהיה בעל אומנות ידים עושה כל היום ונוטל שני דרכמונים כסף בטל עמהם רביע היום נוטל משניהן חצי דרכמון רביע מזה ורביע מזה והרי זה מותר וכבר עשו כזה גדולי החכמים:"

"The one who takes wages to judge, his rulings are void; to testify, his testimonies, etc.: Cave water is not permitted for sanctification unless it is living water (mayim chayim). Therefore, [the Mishnah] said these waters are as if they are cave water, and that ash is as if it is kiln ash, meaning, furnace ash, not red heifer ash. The act of sanctification is to cast the ash of the heifer into the water, and this is what is not permitted to do for wages. If one did it, it is invalid for sprinkling the purification waters. If the judge took wages from both litigants equally and publicly, he takes only what he lost from his work, no more. And this must be open and public, for example, a craftsman who works all day and earns two drachmas of silver; if he is idle for a quarter of the day with them, he takes half a drachma from both of them – a quarter from this one and a quarter from that one. This is permitted, and great Sages have already done so." [Rambam, Mishnah Commentary, Bekhorot 4:6:1]

The Rambam first clarifies the technical invalidity of mei chatat performed for wages, emphasizing that the required elements (mayim chayim, efer parah adumah) are nullified. He then presents the conventional understanding of how sechar b'tela operates for a judge: it must be public, taken equally from both parties, and limited strictly to the amount lost from one's regular occupation. He provides a clear example of a craftsman.

However, the Rambam then delves deeper into the nature of sechar b'tela:

"ומה שאמר כפועל אמרו בטל באותה מלאכה ואני הנני מבאר המאמר הזה וענינו לפי ששמעתי בו דברים שאינן מתקבלין ולא עוד אלא שאין להן תכלית כוונה כל עיקר וזהו שלפעמים יהא אדם גבור ומהיר במלאכתו ומרויח בכל יום ממון הרבה אין אומרים יתן לו כנגד מה שבטל האיש הזה אלא אומדים אותה מלאכה על הרוב ורואין במה שאפשר שירויח האדם באותה מלאכה בכל יום וזהו ענין מאמרם כאותה מלאכה אבל אמרם הבטל של אותה מלאכה אומדים אותו כפי היגיעה שבמלאכה ההיא או המנוחה ההיא לפי שיש מן המלאכות שהן בעמל גדול כאומנות חרשי ברזל וחציבת צירי המתכות ולפיכך אם נמסר לאדם רשות לבחור לו לעשות המלאכה הזו המיגעת או שינוח כל היום בלי ספק יבחר לו המנוחה אע"פ שלא ירויח אלא מעט מזער יותר מהעבודה הקשה אע"פ שירויח בו השיעור הידוע אבל המלאכות הקלות שפועלים כבני הבטלנים כגון השולחני שמקבל מעות ומטבעות ונוטל שכר על כך והדומה לו זו אין הפרש גדול בין העוסק באותה המלאכה או הבטל ואם חרש הברזל דרך משל היה מרויח שני דרכמונים והשולחני שני דרכמונים והיה הדיין הזה אומן ברזל ובטלו ממלאכתו יום אחד בדינו והוראתו נותן לו חצי דרכמון לפי שאע"פ שבטל הרי זה נח מעמל גדול ואם היה שולחני נותן לו דרכמון וחצי דרך משל לפי שבטלו מדבר שלא היה בו עליו טורח והבן הענין הזה שהוא נפלא ואמתי:"

"And what [the Mishnah] said, 'like a laborer,' they said 'idle from that work.' And I will explain this statement and its meaning, because I have heard things about it that are unacceptable, and moreover, have no ultimate intention at all. This is that sometimes a person is strong and skilled in his work and earns a lot of money every day; we do not say that he should be given according to what this person lost. Rather, we estimate that work in general and see what a person can usually earn in that work every day – this is the meaning of their statement 'like that work.' But their statement 'the idle [part] of that work' is estimated according to the exertion involved in that work, or the rest from it. For there are some labors that involve great toil, like the craft of ironworkers and quarrying metal ores. Therefore, if a person were given the choice to perform this strenuous work or to rest all day, he would undoubtedly choose rest, even if he would earn only a minimal amount more than the hard work, even if he would earn a known amount from it. But for light labors where workers are like idle people, such as a money changer who receives money and coins and takes payment for it, and the like – there is not a great difference between one engaged in that work or one who is idle. So if, for example, an ironworker earned two drachmas, and a money changer earned two drachmas, and this judge was an ironworker and was idled from his work for one day due to his judgment and ruling, he is given half a drachma, because even though he was idle, he also rested from great toil. But if he was a money changer, he is given, for example, a drachma and a half, because he was idled from something that did not involve exertion for him. And understand this matter, for it is wonderful and true." [Rambam, Mishnah Commentary, Bekhorot 4:6:1]

Rambam's chiddush is profound. He rejects the notion that sechar b'tela is simply a direct compensation for the individual's actual lost earnings, particularly for a highly skilled or wealthy individual. Instead, it's based on the average earnings for that type of work. More radically, he introduces the concept that the nature of the work matters. A person idled from physically demanding labor (e.g., an ironworker) receives less compensation because the "idleness" also provides the benefit of rest from strenuous activity. Conversely, one idled from light, non-strenuous work (e.g., a money changer) receives more compensation, as there is less inherent benefit in the "rest." This perspective redefines "loss" to include not just monetary income but also the physical and mental exertion saved by not performing one's regular occupation. This is a subtle yet powerful insight into the economics of labor and leisure in halakhic thought.

Tosafot Yom Tov: Reconciling Idealism with Pragmatism

Chiddush: The Tosafot Yom Tov (TYT) primarily aims to reconcile the Mishnah's strict prohibition against taking wages for mitzvot with the widespread practice of communal leaders and scholars receiving support. He does this by drawing distinctions between different types of "wages" and "services," and by invoking the principle of Et la'asot la'Shem heferu Toratecha (a time to act for God, they violated Your Torah) as a meta-halakhic justification for communal support of Torah scholars.

The TYT begins by elaborating on the prohibition:

"הנוטל שכר לדון דיניו בטלים . פי' הר"ב דכתיב ראה למדתי וגו'. כאשר צוני ה' מה אני בחנם כו'. עיין במשנה ה' פ"ד דאבות שפירשתי זה בשם הר"ן. וכתבו התוס' וא"ת ושוחד לא תקח דכתב רחמנא למה לי. ולאו פירכא היא דתרי מילי נינהו. כדמוכח בר"פ בתרא דכתובו' דבתורת אגרא היינו שכר טרחו. ובתורת שוחד היינו להשתדל לדונו יפה ולהפך בזכותו. כדאמר התם. אפילו לזכות את הזכאי ולחייב את החייב."

"The one who takes wages to judge, his rulings are void. The Rav [Ovadia of Bartenura] explained this, for it is written, 'See, I have taught you...' [Devarim 4:5], implying 'as the Lord commanded me, what I received for free...' See in Mishnah 5, Perek 4 of Avot, where I explained this in the name of the Ran. And the Tosafot wrote, 'And if you ask, why did the Torah write "You shall not take a bribe" [Devarim 16:19]?' This is not a contradiction, for they are two different matters, as is evident in the last chapter of Ketubot: 'wages' refers to compensation for effort, while 'bribery' refers to striving to judge him well and to turn the case in his favor, as it says there, 'even to acquit the innocent and to convict the guilty.'" [Tosafot Yom Tov, Bekhorot 4:6:1]

TYT distinguishes between schar tracha (compensation for effort/lost time), which the Mishnah here prohibits, and shochad (bribery), which is prohibited by a separate Torah command and involves an intent to pervert justice, even if one judges justly.

He then addresses a contemporary halakhic debate regarding fees for gittin:

"ומ"ש הר"ב. וברבני אשכנז ראיתי שערוריה בדבר זה שלא יבוש הרב הנסמך ר"י ליטול י' זהובים כדי להיות חצי שעה על כתיבת ונתינת גט אחד כו' ומהר"ר משה איסרלש ז"ל בהגהותיו לש"ע א"ה סי' קנ"ד כתב עליו שאינו כלום. כי הוא מדמה דבר זה למה שאמרו הנוטל שכר לדון דיניו בטלים. ואינו ראיה כי סדור הגט אינו דין אלא לימוד בעלמא. וכן העדים הואיל ומתנין עמהם שאם יקלקלו הגט שישלמו אותו. מכח זה מותר להם לקבל שכר הרבה או מטעם דהעדים אסורים לישא הגרושה. ע"כ."

"And what the Rav [R' Ovadia] wrote: 'And among the Rabbis of Ashkenaz I saw a scandal in this matter, that the ordained Rabbi R.Y. is not ashamed to take ten gold coins to be present for half an hour for the writing and giving of one get...' And R. Moshe Isserles (Rema), may he rest in peace, in his glosses to Shulchan Aruch Even HaEzer Siman 154, wrote about him that it is nothing. For he compares this matter to what they said, 'The one who takes wages to judge, his rulings are void.' But this is not a proof, for the arrangement of a get is not a judgment, but merely a craft/learning. And similarly, regarding the witnesses, since they stipulate with them that if they invalidate the get, they will pay for it – by virtue of this, they are permitted to receive much wages, or because the witnesses are forbidden to marry the divorcée, etc." [Tosafot Yom Tov, Bekhorot 4:6:1]

TYT sides with the Rema, arguing that writing a get is a melakha (craft/skill), not a din (judgment), and thus permissible to charge for. Witnesses for a get are also justified in taking fees due to potential liability or personal restrictions.

He then introduces a critical distinction from the Rashba, which he extends to judges:

"ואני אומר עוד דעל העדים מעיקרא לאו קושיא. כי הא דכתב ב"י ח"מ ס"ס כ"ח בשם תשובה להרשב"א שלא אמרו הנוטל שכר להעיד עדותו בטלה אלא בעדים שנעשו עדים כבר שהם מצווים להעיד. ולא רצו להעיד עד שנטלו שכר. ודומיא דנוטל שכרו לדון שמצוה על ב"ד לדון בין איש לרעהו. אבל מי שאינו מחויב להעיד ונוטל שכר לילך ולהיות עד אינו בדין זה לפי דעתו. ע"כ. והשתא דאתית להכי אף בדיין יש לומר כן שלא אמרו אלא בבאו לפניו לדין. אבל כשקובעין אותו להיות קבוע לדון. זה אינו בכלל המצוה. שכשאינו קבוע. היום יבואו לפניו ולמחר לפני אחר. ולפיכך כשנקבע רשאי להתנות בתחלת קביעתו ליטול שכר על כך ועל כך. ובזה יוכל להתנות גם כן על החליצה שאף מהרמא"י הנ"ל החמיר לאסור בחליצה. כמ"ש בר"ס קס"ט."

"And I say further, regarding the witnesses, it is not a difficulty from the outset. For the Beit Yosef, Choshen Mishpat siman 28, wrote in the name of a Responsum of the Rashba that they only said, 'The one who takes wages to testify, his testimony is void,' concerning witnesses who have already become witnesses and are commanded to testify, but refused to testify until they received wages. This is similar to one who takes wages to judge, where the Beit Din is commanded to judge between one person and another. But one who is not obligated to testify and takes wages to go and be a witness is not included in this law, according to his opinion, etc. And now that you have come to this, it can also be said regarding a judge: they only said [the prohibition] when people came before him for judgment. But when he is appointed to be a permanent judge, this is not part of the mitzvah [that he is commanded to do without pay]. For when he is not permanent, today they come before him, and tomorrow before another. Therefore, when he is appointed, he is permitted to stipulate at the beginning of his appointment to take wages for this and that. And in this way, he can also stipulate for Chalitzah, even though the Rema mentioned above was strict to prohibit it for Chalitzah, as he wrote in Siman 169." [Tosafot Yom Tov, Bekhorot 4:6:1]

This is a crucial chiddush: the Rashba distinguishes between a person already obligated to perform a mitzvah (e.g., a witness who saw an event, or a judge whose court is open) and one who is hired to create a situation or appointed to a role. A witness who saw an event must testify; if he demands wages, his testimony is void. But someone who is asked to be present to witness a future event is not yet obligated and can charge. TYT extends this to judges: a judge who is appointed to a permanent position, rather than simply having a case brought before him, can stipulate for a salary because he is undertaking a role, not merely fulfilling an immediate obligation. This provides a halakhic basis for salaried Rabbinic positions.

Finally, TYT invokes a broader principle to justify communal support for scholars:

"ומסיק עוד דקיי"ל כל מקום שההלכה רופפת בידך הלך אחר המנהג. וראינו כל חכמי ישראל קודם זמן רבינו [ר"ל הרמב"ם שכתב בפירוש המשנה פ"ד ממסכת אבות שלא ליטול שום דבר כלל] ואחריו נוהגים ליטול שכרן מן הצבור. וגם כי נודה שהלכה כדברי רבינו בפירוש המשנה אפשר שהסכימו כן כל חכמי הדורות משום עת לעשות לה' הפרו תורתך. שאילו לא היתה פרנסת הלומדים ומלמדים מצוייה לא היו יכולים לטרוח בתורה כראוי והיתה התורה משתכחת ח"ו ובהיותה מצויה יוכלו לעסוק ויגדיל תורה ויאדיר ע"כ:"

"And he concludes further that we hold, 'Wherever the Halakha is weak in your hand, follow the custom.' And we have seen all the Sages of Israel before the time of our Rabbi [meaning the Rambam, who wrote in his commentary on Mishnah Avot 4:5 not to take anything at all] and after him, customarily taking their wages from the public. And even if we concede that the Halakha is according to our Rabbi in his Mishnah commentary, it is possible that all the Sages of the generations agreed to this because of 'A time to act for God, they violated Your Torah.' For if the livelihood of those who learn and teach were not available, they would not be able to toil in Torah properly, and the Torah would be forgotten, God forbid. And when it is available, they will be able to engage in it and magnify Torah and glorify it, etc." [Tosafot Yom Tov, Bekhorot 4:6:1]

This is the ultimate meta-halakhic justification. Even if the strict letter of the law aligns with Rambam's stringent view (in Avot, not Bekhorot) against any remuneration, the overriding need to preserve Torah study and transmission justifies the communal practice of supporting scholars. This principle, Et la'asot la'Shem heferu Toratecha, allows for a temporary deviation from a specific halakha for the sake of a greater divine purpose.

Friction

The Strongest Kushya

The most significant kushya arising from our Mishnah is the apparent contradiction between its explicit prohibition of taking wages for judging or testifying, with the severe consequence of rendering "his rulings void" and "his testimonies void," and the historical and ongoing reality of rabbinic courts, communal leaders, and even individual dayanim and rabbonim receiving salaries or fees for their services. If the Mishnah's statement is taken literally and universally, it would invalidate a vast swathe of Jewish legal history and contemporary practice, including gittin, kashrut certifications, and countless court judgments. How can such a fundamental principle, with such drastic ramifications, be so widely disregarded, or, conversely, how can we understand the Mishnah such that it accommodates this practice? The plural form "דיניו בטלים" (his rulings are void) and "עדותיו בטלים" (his testimonies are void), as noted by Tosafot Yom Tov [Bekhorot 4:6:2], exacerbates the problem, implying a broad disqualification based on a pattern of receiving payment, not just the particular case.

This kushya is deeply felt, as it touches upon the very legitimacy of institutionalized Jewish law and its practitioners. It forces us to confront the tension between the ideal of Torah lishmah (Torah for its own sake) and the practical exigencies of maintaining a functioning legal and spiritual infrastructure.

The Best Terutz (or two)

The Rishonim and Acharonim offer multi-layered terutzim to address this fundamental kushya, primarily by refining the definitions of "wages" and "services," and by invoking meta-halakhic principles.

Terutz 1: Distinguishing Sechar Mitzvah from Sechar B'tela and Sechar Hachana

The primary terutz, articulated by the Rambam and further developed by the Tosafot Yom Tov (drawing on the Rashba), distinguishes between prohibited "wages for the mitzvah itself" (sechar mitzvah) and permissible "compensation for lost work/time" (sechar b'tela), or even "compensation for preparation/appointment" (sechar hachana).

• Rambam's Elaboration on Sechar B'tela: As discussed in "Readings," the Rambam states that a judge may take sechar b'tela, provided it is public, equal from both parties, and only covers the lost time from his regular occupation. He even introduces the nuance that the value of this lost time is adjusted by the difficulty of the original work, acknowledging the inherent benefit of rest from strenuous labor [Rambam, Mishnah Commentary, Bekhorot 4:6:1]. This implies that the prohibition in the Mishnah refers to taking actual sechar mitzvah, i.e., payment for the act of judging itself, as opposed to compensation for the economic detriment caused by performing the mitzvah. The underlying principle is that Torah is not a commodity to be bought or sold.

• Tosafot Yom Tov's (Rashba's) Distinction for Witnesses and Judges: The Tosafot Yom Tov, citing the Rashba, offers a critical distinction for witnesses: the prohibition applies only to witnesses who are already obligated to testify (e.g., they witnessed an event) but refuse to do so without payment. However, one who is hired to become a witness (i.e., to be present at a future event to observe it) is not yet obligated and can legitimately charge for their time. The TYT extends this logic to judges:

  "ואני אומר עוד דעל העדים מעיקרא לאו קושיא. כי הא דכתב ב"י ח"מ ס"ס כ"ח בשם תשובה להרשב"א שלא אמרו הנוטל שכר להעיד עדותו בטלה אלא בעדים שנעשו עדים כבר שהם מצווים להעיד. ולא רצו להעיד עד שנטלו שכר... והשתא דאתית להכי אף בדיין יש לומר כן שלא אמרו אלא בבאו לפניו לדין. אבל כשקובעין אותו להיות קבוע לדון. זה אינו בכלל המצוה. שכשאינו קבוע. היום יבואו לפניו ולמחר לפני אחר. ולפיכך כשנקבע רשאי להתנות בתחלת קביעתו ליטול שכר על כך ועל כך."

  "And I say further, regarding the witnesses, it is not a difficulty from the outset... And now that you have come to this, it can also be said regarding a judge: they only said [the prohibition] when people came before him for judgment. But when he is appointed to be a permanent judge, this is not part of the mitzvah. For when he is not permanent, today they come before him, and tomorrow before another. Therefore, when he is appointed, he is permitted to stipulate at the beginning of his appointment to take wages for this and that." [Tosafot Yom Tov, Bekhorot 4:6:1]

  This distinction is pivotal. A judge who is appointed to a permanent position (e.g., a Dayan on a Beit Din) is not merely performing an ad hoc mitzvah of judging for a specific litigant. Rather, he is undertaking a communal role, an office, which may involve preparing to judge, being available to judge, and dedicating his life to the study necessary for this role. For such an appointment, he can stipulate a salary, as this is sechar hachana (payment for preparation/appointment) or sechar battala in a broader sense, not sechar mitzvah. This reconciles the Mishnah with the reality of institutionalized rabbinic courts.

Terutz 2: Et la'asot la'Shem Heferu Toratecha (A Time to Act for God, They Violated Your Torah)

The second powerful terutz, also articulated by the Tosafot Yom Tov (citing the Kessef Mishneh on Hilchot Talmud Torah), is a meta-halakhic justification based on communal necessity. Even if one were to concede that the strict interpretation of the Mishnah (or Rambam's stringent view in Avot 4:5) prohibits all forms of remuneration for Torah-related activities, the overarching principle of ensuring the continuity and flourishing of Torah study and teaching permits a deviation.

"ומסיק עוד דקיי"ל כל מקום שההלכה רופפת בידך הלך אחר המנהג. וראינו כל חכמי ישראל קודם זמן רבינו [ר"ל הרמב"ם שכתב בפירוש המשנה פ"ד ממסכת אבות שלא ליטול שום דבר כלל] ואחריו נוהגים ליטול שכרן מן הצבור. וגם כי נודה שהלכה כדברי רבינו בפירוש המשנה אפשר שהסכימו כן כל חכמי הדורות משום עת לעשות לה' הפרו תורתך. שאילו לא היתה פרנסת הלומדים ומלמדים מצוייה לא היו יכולים לטרוח בתורה כראוי והיתה התורה משתכחת ח"ו ובהיותה מצויה יוכלו לעסוק ויגדיל תורה ויאדיר ע"כ:"

"And he concludes further that we hold, 'Wherever the Halakha is weak in your hand, follow the custom.' And we have seen all the Sages of Israel before the time of our Rabbi... and after him, customarily taking their wages from the public. And even if we concede that the Halakha is according to our Rabbi... it is possible that all the Sages of the generations agreed to this because of 'A time to act for God, they violated Your Torah.' For if the livelihood of those who learn and teach were not available, they would not be able to toil in Torah properly, and the Torah would be forgotten, God forbid. And when it is available, they will be able to engage in it and magnify Torah and glorify it." [Tosafot Yom Tov, Bekhorot 4:6:1]

This terutz acknowledges the ideal but prioritizes the survival of Torah. In a world where scholars cannot sustain themselves without financial support, the absolute prohibition on wages, if strictly enforced, would lead to the neglect and eventual forgetting of Torah. Therefore, the Sages collectively sanctioned communal support as a necessary measure to "magnify Torah and glorify it." This argument provides a powerful and pragmatic justification for the contemporary reality of salaried rabbinical positions, framing it not as a violation, but as a proactive measure to uphold a greater mitzvah.

These two terutzim, one drawing careful distinctions within the existing halakhic framework and the other invoking a higher, meta-halakhic principle, collectively provide a robust response to the profound kushya posed by the Mishnah.

Intertext

The Mishnah's discussion on taking wages for mitzvot resonates with several foundational texts in Jewish thought, highlighting the tension between the ideal of Torah lishmah and the practicalities of human existence.

1. Devarim 16:19 — "לא תקח שחד" (You Shall Not Take a Bribe)

"לֹא תַטֶּה מִשְׁפָּט לֹא תַכִּיר פָּנִים וְלֹא תִקַּח שֹׁחַד כִּי הַשֹּׁחַד יְעַוֵּר עֵינֵי חֲכָמִים וִיסַלֵּף דִּבְרֵי צַדִּיקִֽים׃"

"You shall not pervert justice; you shall not recognize faces; and you shall not take a bribe, for a bribe blinds the eyes of the wise and distorts the words of the righteous." [Devarim 16:19]

This verse from Devarim is a cornerstone of judicial ethics, explicitly prohibiting shochad (bribery). While our Mishnah speaks of "wages" (sachar), the commentaries are careful to distinguish between schar tracha (compensation for effort/lost time) and shochad. The Tosafot Yom Tov, quoting the Tosafot, clarifies this distinction:

"וכתבו התוס' וא"ת ושוחד לא תקח דכתב רחמנא למה לי. ולאו פירכא היא דתרי מילי נינהו. כדמוכח בר"פ בתרא דכתובו' דבתורת אגרא היינו שכר טרחו. ובתורת שוחד היינו להשתדל לדונו יפה ולהפך בזכותו. כדאמר התם. אפילו לזכות את הזכאי ולחייב את החייב."

"And the Tosafot wrote, 'And if you ask, why did the Torah write "You shall not take a bribe" [Devarim 16:19]?' This is not a contradiction, for they are two different matters, as is evident in the last chapter of Ketubot: 'wages' refers to compensation for effort, while 'bribery' refers to striving to judge him well and to turn the case in his favor, as it says there, 'even to acquit the innocent and to convict the guilty.'" [Tosafot Yom Tov, Bekhorot 4:6:1]

The prohibition of shochad is absolute, even if the judge intends to rule justly, because the act of taking a bribe inherently corrupts perception and potentially distorts judgment. The Mishnah's discussion of sachar for judging/testifying, by contrast, refers to remuneration for the time and effort involved in the performance of the mitzvah, distinct from an intent to pervert justice. The fact that the Mishnah invalidates the dinim and eduyot for taking sachar (even without an intent to pervert justice) underscores the profound value placed on the disinterested performance of these mitzvot. It reinforces the idea that justice and testimony must be beyond any suspicion of personal gain, even if that gain is merely compensation for time.

2. Mishnah Avot 4:5 — "לא תעשם עטרה להתגדל בהם ולא קורדום לחפור בהם" (Do Not Make Them a Crown to Magnify Yourself With, Nor a Spade to Dig With)

"רַבִּי צָדוֹק אוֹמֵר, לֹא תַעֲשֵׂם עֲטָרָה לְהִתְגַּדֵּל בָּהֶם, וְלֹא קֻרְדּוֹם לַחְפֹּר בָּהֶם. וְכֵן הוּא אוֹמֵר, כָּל הַנֶּהֱנֶה מִדִּבְרֵי תוֹרָה, נוֹטֵל חַיָּיו מִן הָעוֹלָם. הָא לָמַדְתָּ, כָּל הַנֶּהֱנֶה מִדִּבְרֵי תוֹרָה, נוֹטֵל חַיָּיו מִן הָעוֹלָם:"

"Rabbi Tzadok says: Do not make them a crown to magnify yourself with, nor a spade to dig with. And so it states: 'Whoever derives benefit from the words of Torah takes his life from the world.' You have learned this: Whoever derives benefit from the words of Torah takes his life from the world." [Avot 4:5]

This well-known Mishnah in Avot articulates the philosophical ideal of Torah lishmah, that Torah should be studied and its mitzvot performed for their inherent value and for the sake of Heaven, not for personal gain, honor, or livelihood. The phrase "לא קורדום לחפור בהם" (nor a spade to dig with) directly addresses the use of Torah as a means of earning a living.

The Rambam, in his commentary to this Mishnah in Avot, takes a very stringent position, interpreting "כל הנהנה מדברי תורה" (whoever derives benefit from the words of Torah) literally to mean any material benefit, even sechar b'tela. He states that one should not take any payment for teaching Torah, judging, or performing mitzvot, and that one should pursue a secular profession to support oneself [Rambam, Mishnah Commentary, Avot 4:5:1]. This rigorous stance presents an even greater challenge to the communal practice of supporting scholars than our Mishnah in Bekhorot.

However, the Tosafot Yom Tov, in his commentary on our Mishnah in Bekhorot, implicitly addresses this tension by referencing the Rambam's view in Avot and then immediately presenting the terutz of Et la'asot la'Shem Heferu Toratecha and the reliance on minhag (custom):

"וראינו כל חכמי ישראל קודם זמן רבינו [ר"ל הרמב"ם שכתב בפירוש המשנה פ"ד ממסכת אבות שלא ליטול שום דבר כלל] ואחריו נוהגים ליטול שכרן מן הצבור. וגם כי נודה שהלכה כדברי רבינו בפירוש המשנה אפשר שהסכימו כן כל חכמי הדורות משום עת לעשות לה' הפרו תורתך."

"And we have seen all the Sages of Israel before the time of our Rabbi [meaning the Rambam, who wrote in his commentary on Mishnah Avot 4:5 not to take anything at all] and after him, customarily taking their wages from the public... it is possible that all the Sages of the generations agreed to this because of 'A time to act for God, they violated Your Torah.'" [Tosafot Yom Tov, Bekhorot 4:6:1]

This shows a sophisticated interplay between the abstract ideal of Torah lishmah (as articulated in Avot) and the pragmatic necessities addressed in Bekhorot. While the ideal remains, Halakha must also ensure the practical continuity of Torah study and its application. The terutz of Et la'asot la'Shem functions as a bridge, allowing the community to support its scholars without fundamentally undermining the ethical principle against profiting from Torah.

These intertextual connections demonstrate that the discussion in Bekhorot is not isolated but part of a broader, ongoing halakhic and philosophical discourse within Judaism about the role of Torah and its practitioners in society.

Psak/Practice

The halakhic and meta-halakhic insights derived from Mishnah Bekhorot 4:6-7 and its commentaries have profoundly shaped the practice of Jewish law concerning rabbinic remuneration.

The initial, strict prohibition against taking wages for judging, testifying, or performing other mitzvot (like mei chatat or bekhor inspection) as stated in the Mishnah, remains the theoretical ideal. However, the practical application in Halakha is almost universally guided by the various terutzim developed by Rishonim and Acharonim.

1. Sechar B'tela (Compensation for Lost Work): The principle that one may receive compensation for the time lost from their regular employment while performing a mitzvah is widely accepted. This is not payment for the mitzvah itself (sechar mitzvah), but for the economic detriment incurred. The Rambam's nuanced approach to calculating sechar b'tela, factoring in the difficulty of the original work and the benefit of rest, is a sophisticated application of this principle [Rambam, Mishnah Commentary, Bekhorot 4:6:1]. This is the primary justification for Rabbanim, Dayanim, and Sofrim to receive fees when their services require them to cease their usual professional activities.

2. Sechar Hachana / Appointment to a Role: The Rashba's distinction, extended by the Tosafot Yom Tov, between an individual already obligated to perform a mitzvah and one who is appointed to a permanent role or hired to prepare for a mitzvah, is crucial. A Dayan who is appointed to a Beit Din, or a Rabbi hired by a community, is understood to be receiving a salary for undertaking an office and for the ongoing commitment of time, study, and availability, not for each individual act of judging or teaching. This provides the most direct halakhic basis for salaried rabbinical positions in modern communities [Tosafot Yom Tov, Bekhorot 4:6:1]. The Rema's ruling concerning fees for writing a get, classifying it as a melakha (craft/skill) rather than a din, further clarifies that many rabbinic services are legitimate sources of income [Rema, Even HaEzer 154:1; cited by Tosafot Yom Tov, Bekhorot 4:6:1].

3. Et la'asot la'Shem Heferu Toratecha (Meta-Halakhic Justification): The principle that communal necessity can justify a deviation from the strict letter of the law is a powerful meta-psak heuristic. The Tosafot Yom Tov, citing the Kessef Mishneh, explicitly states that the widespread custom of supporting Torah scholars, even if it appears to contradict the ideal of Torah lishmah, is justified to ensure the continued existence and flourishing of Torah study and teaching. This overarching principle allows for a pragmatic approach to ensure that those who dedicate their lives to Torah are able to do so without undue financial hardship, thereby "magnifying Torah and glorifying it" [Tosafot Yom Tov, Bekhorot 4:6:1].

In contemporary Halakha, these principles converge to legitimize the financial support of Rabbanim, Dayanim, Poskim, Kashrut supervisors, and Sofrim. Their remuneration is generally viewed not as a "wage for mitzvah," but as compensation for their time, expertise, professional commitment, and the maintenance of essential communal services. This sophisticated framework allows the Jewish community to uphold the ideal of Torah lishmah while simultaneously ensuring the practical continuity and accessibility of Halakha.

Takeaway

The Mishnah in Bekhorot, through its rigorous analysis and the nuanced interpretations of Rishonim and Acharonim, reveals the profound tension between the ideal of selfless Torah lishmah and the pragmatic necessity of supporting those who dedicate their lives to its study and application. The development of concepts like sechar b'tela and sechar hachana, alongside the meta-halakhic principle of Et la'asot la'Shem, demonstrates a sophisticated halakhic system that balances ethical purity with communal survival, ensuring the enduring vitality of Jewish law and learning.

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References:

• Bekhorot 4:6.
• Devarim 4:5.
• Devarim 15:20.
• Devarim 16:19.
• Avot 4:5.
• Rambam. Mishnah Commentary, Bekhorot 4:6:1.
• Tosafot Yom Tov. Bekhorot 4:6:1.
• Tosafot Yom Tov. Bekhorot 4:6:2.
• Rema. Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 154:1. (Referenced by Tosafot Yom Tov).
• Beit Yosef. Choshen Mishpat siman 28. (Referenced by Tosafot Yom Tov).
• Kessef Mishneh. Hilchot Talmud Torah 3. (Referenced by Tosafot Yom Tov).