Mishnah Chullin 10:3-4

Sugya Map

This sugya in Mishnah Chullin 10:3-4 delves into the intricate laws of matanot kehunah (the foreleg, jaw, and maw given to the priests) and their applicability across various scenarios, primarily focusing on the interplay between kedusha (sanctity), mum (blemish), and pidyon (redemption). The core issues revolve around delineating which animals are subject to these gifts and the precise conditions under which the obligation arises or is suspended.

Issue 1: Applicability of Matanot Kehunah to Kodashim

The Mishnah begins by stating that matanot apply b'Eretz v'chutz la'aretz, b'zman haMikdash v'lo b'zman haMikdash, but crucially, b'chulin v'lo b'kodashim. This last exclusion is presented with a kal v'chomer (a fortiori argument) that is then refuted by a pasuk. The kal v'chomer posits: if chulin (non-sacred animals), which are p'turim from chezeh v'shok (breast and thigh, given from korban shlamim), are chayavim in matanot, then kodashim (sacrificial animals), which are chayavim in chezeh v'shok, should certainly be chayavim in matanot. The Torah's prita (specification) in Vayikra 7:34, "וְנָתַתִּי אֹתָם לְאַהֲרֹן הַכֹּהֵן וּלְבָנָיו לְחָק עוֹלָם מֵאֵת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל," is understood to limit the kohen's share from kodashim exclusively to what is explicitly stated, i.e., chezeh v'shok, thereby excluding matanot.

Issue 2: The Dinim of Kodashim with Mumim

The Mishnah then meticulously distinguishes between two categories of kodashim that develop mumim and are subsequently redeemed:

1. Mum Kodesh (מום קדש): Animals in which a permanent blemish (mum kava) preceded their consecration. These animals never fully acquire inherent sanctity (kedushat haguf); rather, only their value (kedushat damim) is consecrated.
2. Kodesh Mum (קדש מום): Animals whose consecration preceded their blemish, or had a temporary blemish (mum ara'i) prior to consecration which later became permanent. These animals initially acquire kedushat haguf.

The nafka mina between these two categories is profound, affecting a host of dinim: chiyuv bechor, chiyuv matanot, yotzin l'chulin l'gizah v'avodah (returning to non-sacred status for shearing and labor), the status of their validin v'chalavan (offspring and milk), liability for shechitat chutz (slaughtering outside the Temple courtyard), rendering temurah (substitute) sacred, and their post-mortem disposition (pidyon for dogs vs. burial). The mum kodesh category largely reverts to a chulin status post-redemption, while kodesh mum retains many aspects of its kedusha.

Issue 3: The Ta'aruvet Bechor (Mixture of Firstborn) and Ownership Scenarios

The Mishnah presents complex cases concerning a bechor (firstborn animal, which is inherently a kodesh) that became blemished and was redeemed, then intermingled with 100 chulin animals.

• If 100 people slaughter one each, all are exempt from matanot.
• If one person slaughters all 100, one animal is exempt for him. This highlights the tension between chovat gavra (an obligation on the person) and chovat cheftza (an obligation on the object) regarding matanot, and the implications of safek (doubt) in matanot kehunah. Further scenarios explore:
• Slaughtering for a kohen or nochri (gentile) – exemption.
• An Yisrael partnering with a kohen or nochri – requiring rishum (marking).
• Selling an animal "except for the matanot" – exemption for the buyer.
• Buying "innards" with matanot included (maw) – giving matanot without deduction vs. with deduction, depending on the mode of sale.
• A ger (convert) and his cow – chiyuv based on the time of shechita relative to conversion.

Issue 4: Defining the Shiurim of Matanot

The Mishnah concludes by defining the anatomical boundaries of the zero'a (foreleg) and lechi (jaw), connecting the zero'a to the zero'a of the nazir (Numbers 6:19). A machloket between the Tanna Kamma and Rabbi Yehuda regarding the shok (thigh) of shalmim is also presented, drawing a parallel to the matanot.

Primary Sources:

• Mishnah Chullin 10:3-4 (our base text)
• Vayikra 7:34: The source for chezeh v'shok from shalmim, used to prat the kal v'chomer.
• Bamidbar 6:19: The source for zero'a of nazir, used for comparison.
• Gemara Chullin 134a-137b: Extensive discussion elaborating on these Mishnayot.
• Gemara Bechorot 15a: The foundational source for the dinim of mum kodesh vs. kodesh mum.
• Gemara Ketubot 106a: The machloket Admon v'Chachamim regarding safek in mammon, relevant to the ta'aruvet bechor.

Text Snapshot

Here are the exact lines from Mishnah Chullin 10:3-4, with notes on dikduk and leshon:

Mishnah Chullin 10:3

"מַתְּנוֹת כְּהֻנָּה נוֹהֲגוֹת בָּאָרֶץ וּבְחוּץ לָאָרֶץ, בִּפְנֵי הַבַּיִת וְשֶׁלֹּא בִּפְנֵי הַבַּיִת, בְּחֻלִּין וְלֹא בַּקֳּדָשִׁים. וְלֹא בַּקֳּדָשִׁים, אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ לוֹמַר. וַהֲלֹא דִּין הוּא, וּמָה אִם חֻלִּין שֶׁאֵינָן חַיָּבִין בַּחֲזֶה וָשׁוֹק חַיָּבִין בַּמַּתְּנוֹת, קֳדָשִׁים שֶׁחַיָּבִין בַּחֲזֶה וָשׁוֹק אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁחַיָּבִין בַּמַּתְּנוֹת? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: "כִּי אֶת חֲזֵה הַתְּנוּפָה וְאֵת שׁוֹק הַתְּרוּמָה לָקַחְתִּי מֵאֵת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל מִזִּבְחֵי שַׁלְמֵיהֶם וָאֶתֵּן אֹתָם לְאַהֲרֹן הַכֹּהֵן וּלְבָנָיו לְחָק עוֹלָם מֵאֵת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל". אֵין לוֹ לַכֹּהֵן אֶלָּא מָה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר בּוֹ.

כָּל קֳדָשִׁים שֶׁקְּדָמָן מוּם לְהַקְדֵּשָׁן, וְנִפְדּוּ, חַיָּבִין בַּבְּכוֹר וּבַמַּתְּנוֹת, וְיוֹצְאִין לְחֻלִּין לְגִזָּה וְלַעֲבוֹדָה, וּוְלָדוֹתֵיהֶן וַחֲלָבָן מֻתָּרִין לְאַחַר פִּדְיוֹנָן. וְהַשּׁוֹחֵט אוֹתָן בַּחוּץ פָּטוּר, וְאֵין עוֹשִׂין תְּמוּרָה. וְאִם מֵתוּ, יִפָּדוּ. חוּץ מִן הַבְּכוֹר וּמַעֲשֵׂר בְּהֵמָה.

כָּל קֳדָשִׁים שֶׁקְּדָמָן הֶקְדֵּשׁ לְמוּמָן, אוֹ שֶׁהָיָה לָהֶן מוּם עוֹבֵר וְנִתְפָּרֵךְ, וְנִפְדּוּ, פְּטוּרִין מִן הַבְּכוֹר וּמִן הַמַּתְּנוֹת, וְאֵין יוֹצְאִין לְחֻלִּין לְגִזָּה וְלַעֲבוֹדָה, וּוְלָדוֹתֵיהֶן וַחֲלָבָן אֲסוּרִין לְאַחַר פִּדְיוֹנָן. וְהַשּׁוֹחֵט אוֹתָן בַּחוּץ חַיָּב, וְעוֹשִׂין תְּמוּרָה. וְאִם מֵתוּ, יִקָּבְרוּ.

בְּכוֹר שֶׁנִּתְעָרֵב בְּמֵאָה, בִּזְמַן שֶׁמֵּאָה שׁוֹחֲטִין אֶת כֻּלָּן, כֻּלָּן פְּטוּרִין. אֶחָד שָׁחַט אֶת כֻּלָּן, אֶחָד פָּטוּר לוֹ.

הַשּׁוֹחֵט לַכֹּהֵן וְלַנָּכְרִי פָּטוּר מִן הַמַּתְּנוֹת. וְהַנִּכְנָס לִשְׁתוּפוּת עִם כֹּהֵן וְעִם נָכְרִי צָרִיךְ לִרְשׁוֹם. וְאִם אָמַר: חוּץ מִן הַמַּתְּנוֹת, פָּטוּר מִן הַמַּתְּנוֹת. אָמַר לוֹ: מְכוֹר לִי כְּרֵס פָּרָה, וְהָיוּ בָּהּ מַתְּנוֹת, נוֹתֵן לַכֹּהֵן וְאֵינוֹ מְנַכֶּה לוֹ מִן הַדָּמִים. לָקַח מִן הַטַּבָּח בְּמִשְׁקָל, נוֹתֵן לַכֹּהֵן וּמְנַכֶּה לוֹ מִן הַדָּמִים.

גֵּר שֶׁנִּתְגַּיֵּר וְהָיְתָה לוֹ פָרָה, נִשְׁחֲטָה קֹדֶם שֶׁנִּתְגַּיֵּר, פָּטוּר. לְאַחַר שֶׁנִּתְגַּיֵּר, חַיָּב. סָפֵק, פָּטוּר, שֶׁהַמּוֹצִיא מֵחֲבֵרוֹ עָלָיו הָרְאָיָה." [Mishnah Chullin 10:3]

Dikduk/Leshon Nuance:

• "וְלֹא בַּקֳּדָשִׁים, אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ לוֹמַר. וַהֲלֹא דִּין הוּא": This is a classic leshon indicating that the stated exclusion (of kodashim) appears superfluous, as it could be derived via kal v'chomer. The Mishnah itself then provides the prita d'katuv that refutes this kal v'chomer. This highlights the principle that ein somchin al kal v'chomer l'hafidlo b'makom she'yachol ha'katuv l'frut.
• "כָּל קֳדָשִׁים שֶׁקְּדָמָן מוּם לְהַקְדֵּשָׁן" vs. "כָּל קֳדָשִׁים שֶׁקְּדָמָן הֶקְדֵּשׁ לְמוּמָן": The precise phrasing "קדמן מום" (blemish preceded) vs. "קדמן הקדש" (consecration preceded) is critical. It signifies the fundamental distinction between kedushat damim (value sanctity) and kedushat haguf (inherent sanctity), with all subsequent dinim flowing from this temporal priority.
• "וְיוֹצְאִין לְחֻלִּין לְגִזָּה וְלַעֲבוֹדָה": The specific phrasing "יוצאין לחולין" (they emerge to non-sacred status) implies a return to a full chulin state in many regards, but the specification "לגיזה ולעבודה" (for shearing and labor) suggests that even in mum kodesh, it's not an absolute chulin status in all respects, as these are specific prohibitions of kedusha. However, in the context of mum kodesh, it implies a complete permission for these activities.
• "בְּכוֹר שֶׁנִּתְעָרֵב בְּמֵאָה": The use of nit'arev (intermingled) implies an unintentional mixture, leading to safek.
• "צָרִיךְ לִרְשׁוֹם": The need to "mark" in a partnership implies a physical distinction to avoid safek or machloket with the kohen, as the kohen's share is exempt.
• "וְאֵינוֹ מְנַכֶּה לוֹ מִן הַדָּמִים" vs. "וּמְנַכֶּה לוֹ מִן הַדָּמִים": This distinction hinges on whether the sale was for a specific item (where the matanot were a hefker component the seller didn't own) or by weight (where the weight includes the matanot, which the seller implicitly sold but didn't own).

Mishnah Chullin 10:4

"אֵיזוֹ הִיא הַזְּרוֹעַ? מִפֶּרֶק הַזְּרוֹעַ עַד הַכַּף הַגָּדוֹל שֶׁבָּהּ. וְהִיא הַזְּרוֹעַ הָאֲמוּרָה בַּנָּזִיר: "וְלָקַח הַכֹּהֵן אֶת הַזְּרֹעַ בְּשֵׁלָה מִן הָאַיִל". וְכֵן בַּיָּרֵךְ: מִפֶּרֶק הַיָּרֵךְ עַד הַכַּף הַגָּדוֹל שֶׁבָּהּ. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: הַיָּרֵךְ מִפֶּרֶק הַיָּרֵךְ עַד הָאַרְכֻּבָּה. אֵיזוֹ הִיא הַלְּחִי? מִפֶּרֶק הַלְּחִי עַד טַבַּעַת הַגָּדוֹל שֶׁבַּקָּנֶה." [Mishnah Chullin 10:4]

Dikduk/Leshon Nuance:

• "מִפֶּרֶק הַזְּרוֹעַ עַד הַכַּף הַגָּדוֹל שֶׁבָּהּ": This anatomical description for the zero'a (foreleg) is precise, defining it from the joint of the lower knee (pereq hazero'a) to the rounded protrusion (kaf hagadol) of the humerus.
• "וְהִיא הַזְּרוֹעַ הָאֲמוּרָה בַּנָּזִיר": This explicit equation of the shiur (measure) for matanot with that of the nazir's zero'a is crucial, indicating a unified anatomical understanding across different halachot.
• "וְכֵן בַּיָּרֵךְ": The Tanna Kamma applies the same shiur principle to the yarech (thigh) of shalmim, drawing an analogy.
• "רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: הַיָּרֵךְ מִפֶּרֶק הַיָּרֵךְ עַד הָאַרְכֻּבָּה": Rabbi Yehuda offers a different definition for the yarech, extending it from the lower knee joint to the upper knee joint (arkuva). This machloket is specific to the yarech of shalmim, but it informs our understanding of anatomical definitions in halacha.
• "מִפֶּרֶק הַלְּחִי עַד טַבַּעַת הַגָּדוֹל שֶׁבַּקָּנֶה": The lechi (jaw) is defined from the lower jaw joint to the upper ring of the windpipe. The precision here is paramount for practical halacha.

Readings

The Mishnah's succinct presentation of matanot kehunah necessitates extensive elucidation from the Rishonim and Acharonim, particularly concerning the dinim of kodashim with mumim, the safek bechor case, and the nature of the obligation. We will examine the insights of Rambam, Tosafot Yom Tov, Rashash, and Tosafot Rabbi Akiva Eiger.

Rambam on Mishnah Chullin 10:3:1

Rambam, in his Perush haMishnayot on Chullin 10:3:1, addresses the complex scenario of the bechor (firstborn) intermingled with 100 other animals. The Mishnah states: "בכור שנתערב במאה בזמן שמאה שוחטין את כו': הבכור הזה הוא שהגיע ליד הכהן מפני שהבכור הוא של כהן כמו שנתבאר בהקדמת הסדר הזה ונפל בו מום ברשות הכהן ומכרו לישראל שאין הבכור זה חייב מתנות כל עיקר אח"כ נתערב אצל ישראל עם אחרים והרי דינו כפי מה שזכר." Rambam's chiddush here is foundational for understanding the sugya. He posits that the bechor in question must have already entered the domain of a kohen. A bechor, by Torah law, is designated for the kohen. However, it cannot be slaughtered and eaten by the kohen unless it develops a mum (blemish). Once blemished, it can be redeemed by the kohen or sold to an Israelite. The critical point for Rambam is that even if a bechor is sold to an Israelite after developing a mum, it never becomes obligated in matanot kehunah. Why? Because its initial status as kodesh (even kedushat haguf of a bechor) exempts it from matanot by virtue of the drasha "אין לו לכהן אלא מה שנאמר בו" (Leviticus 7:34, as explained for kodashim generally). Even after pidyon, the matanot chiyuv does not kick in, as the animal's sacred origin prevents it from ever being considered chulin regarding matanot. Thus, when this bechor (which is p'tur from matanot) gets mixed with 100 other chulin animals (which are chayav in matanot), the safek arises.

Rambam further clarifies the Mishnah's statement: "ומה שאמר פטור מן המתנות רוצה לומר הטבח לפי שהעיקר בידינו הדין עם הטבח והוא הנקבע במתנות ואפילו היה כהן מוציאים אותם מידו ונותנין אותם לזולתו." Here, Rambam makes a crucial point: the petur from matanot applies to the tabach (slaughterer). This is based on the Gemara's principle (Chullin 134a) that "הדין עם הטבח" – the legal obligation for matanot falls squarely on the tabach. Even if the tabach is a kohen, if he slaughters an Israelite's animal, he is obligated to give the matanot to another kohen. This emphasis on the tabach's chiyuv is central to understanding the safek bechor case. If the bechor is p'tur and the chulin are chayav, and the tabach is the one obligated, the safek about which animal is which directly impacts the tabach's liability.

Tosafot Yom Tov on Mishnah Chullin 10:3:1

Tosafot Yom Tov (TYT) builds upon Rambam's explanation of the bechor case. Regarding the phrase "בזמן שמאה שוחטים כולן פטורים," TYT states: "על כרחך כשכולן בעלי מומין איירי דאין שוחטין בכור אא"כ נפל בו מום [ועוד דבמכרו במומו מוקמינן לה כדפירש הר"ב] ומדנתערב ואין מכירין בו. א"כ ג"כ האחרים בעלי מומין הם. תוספות." TYT argues that for the bechor to be slaughtered, it must have a mum. If this bechor with a mum is mixed into a group of 100 animals, and we don't know which one it is, it logically follows that all the other 100 animals must also be ba'alei mumim (blemished). Why? Because if the other animals were t'mimim (unblemished), they would be prohibited from slaughter outside the Temple for a yisrael. While this seems obvious, TYT's point is that the safek isn't just about identifying the bechor, but about the halachic status of all animals in the ta'aruvet. All are assumed to be chulin ba'alei mumim that can be slaughtered, except for the one bechor ba'al mum which is p'tur from matanot. This clarifies the okimta of the sugya as dealing with animals that are all otherwise permissible for slaughter.

On the issue of "הדין עם הטבח," TYT further elaborates based on the Gemara (Chullin 134a): "וליתני הכהן והנכרי פטורין אמר רבא זאת אומרת הדין עם הטבח. כלומר דיכול הכהן לתבוע מתנותיו מהטבח. וילפינן בגמ'. מדכתיב מאת זובחי הזבח. דאפילו טבח כהן במשמע פירש כששחט בהמת ישראל. ודייק מדכתיב מאת יתירא דהמ"ל מאת העם זובחי הזבח." TYT explains Rava's derasha from "מאת זובחי הזבח" (from those who slaughter the sacrifice - Leviticus 7:34, though the Gemara applies it to matanot via hekesh). The word "מאת" is seen as superfluous if it only refers to the owner. Its inclusion implies that the obligation falls on the shochet (the slaughterer), even if the shochet is a kohen slaughtering an Israelite's animal. This establishes the tabach as the primary obligee, meaning the kohen can directly claim matanot from him. TYT then quotes the Beit Yosef (YD 61) in the name of Rashba, clarifying that while the tabach cannot refuse the kohen's claim, if he already gave the matanot to the owner or someone else, he is p'tur from kefel (double payment) since "מזיק מתנות כהונה פטור" (one who damages matanot kehunah is exempt). This distinction is vital: the tabach is the primary address for the chiyuv, but the matanot themselves do not carry the same dinim as regular mammon regarding damages or theft.

Rashash on Mishnah Chullin 10:3:1

Rashash offers a profound connection for the ta'aruvet bechor case. Regarding the Mishnah's ruling in the ta'aruvet where 100 people slaughter: "בזמן שמאה שוחטין כו'. ואם לקח אחד מהמאה נראה דתליא בפלוגתת אדמון וחכמים בפ' בתרא דכתובות גבי מי שאבדה דרך שדהו. ועי' בשו"ע ח"מ סי' קי"ט ס"ה ובאחרונים שם." Rashash draws a parallel between our Mishnah's safek bechor and the machloket Admon v'Chachamim in Ketubot 106a. The Gemara there discusses a lost path (דרך שדהו) that was used by many. If one person claims it, he is given it. If two claim it, they divide it. If three, they also divide. The machloket arises when many claim. Admon says each can take a path, but Chachamim disagree. The underlying principle is how safek in mammon (property rights) is resolved when multiple individuals have an uncertain claim. In our sugya, when 100 people slaughter the 100 animals, each can claim "perhaps the animal I slaughtered was the bechor (which is exempt from matanot)." This is a form of te'enat shema ani (the claim "maybe it's me"). Rashash suggests that the Mishnah's ruling that "כולן פטורין" (all are exempt) when 100 people slaughter aligns with the approach that allows each individual to benefit from the safek if he can make a plausible claim that his specific action (slaughtering) was related to the exempt item. This implies that the safek in matanot can lead to a petur for all involved, due to the inability to definitively assign the chiyuv.

Rashash further addresses a potential kushya regarding matanot and kedusha. On the Rambam's comment regarding the bechor not being subject to matanot even after redemption, Rashash cites a Rashi (Chullin 134a, s.v. חלה) which states that matanot do not have kedusha. He notes that the Taz (YD 61:21) found this difficult. Rashash offers a terutz: "ולע"ד נ"פ הטעם משום דאיתקש לצבי ואיל בפ' ראה. וכמו שפרש"י בר"פ גבי פהמ"ק שנפדו. והוא מהגמרא דבכורות (ט"ו)." Rashash explains that the exemption of kodashim from matanot (even after redemption) is not merely because kedusha "precludes" matanot, but rather because matanot are fundamentally associated with chulin that are likened to tzvi v'ayil (deer and hart) in Parashat Re'eh (Devarim 12:22-23). These are non-sacred animals permissible for consumption, from which matanot are given. Kodashim, even after pidyon, retain a vestige of their sacred origin that distances them from this tzvi v'ayil category, thus exempting them from matanot. This explanation provides a deeper conceptual understanding for the Mishnah's initial exclusion of kodashim from matanot.

Tosafot Rabbi Akiva Eiger on Mishnah Chullin 10:3:1

Tosafot Rabbi Akiva Eiger (TRAE) raises a sharp kushya on Rambam's explanation of the bechor case. Rambam stated that the bechor "נפל בו מום ברשות הכהן ומכרו לישראל." TRAE asks: "[אות נג] הרע"ב ד"ה בכור. ונפל בו מום ביד כהן. וקשה לי אמאי לא מוקי בפשיטות יותר שירש הבכור מאבי אמו כהן (קושית רבינו על ומכרו לישראל. דבמום צריך בודאי לאוקמי כמ"ש תי"ט בשם תוס')." TRAE questions why Rambam chooses such a specific and arguably circuitous okimta (scenario) – that the kohen received the bechor, it developed a mum in his possession, and then he sold it to an Israelite. TRAE suggests a simpler okimta: the Israelite inherited the bechor from his maternal grandfather who was a kohen. In such a case, the bechor would already be in the Yisrael's possession due to inheritance, and it would still be p'tur from matanot due to its kedusha and its ultimate destination for a kohen. This simpler scenario would avoid the need for the kohen to first acquire the bechor and then sell it to an Israelite.

While TRAE's question is valid from a minimalist okimta perspective, Rambam's choice likely emphasizes the kohen's proprietary rights over the bechor and its eventual disposition. The bechor is fundamentally a kohen's due, and Rambam's okimta highlights this ownership transfer, whether direct or indirect. Furthermore, the Tosafot Yom Tov (cited by TRAE) emphasizes that for the bechor to be slaughtered, it must have a mum, and Rambam's scenario explicitly includes this critical detail. Perhaps Rambam's okimta is not just about ownership but about establishing the halachic chain of events that permits the slaughter and gives rise to the safek regarding matanot. The bechor must be a kohen's and must have a mum to be relevant to the sugya, and Rambam's scenario clearly covers these prerequisites.

Friction

The Mishnah presents several points of conceptual and practical tension that require deep lomdus. We will analyze two significant kushyot and their terutzim.

Kushya 1: The Bechor in the Ta'aruvet – The Nature of Safek in Matanot

The Mishnah states: "בכור שנתערב במאה, בזמן שמאה שוחטין את כולן, כולן פטורין. אחד שחט את כולן, אחד פטור לו." This presents a substantial kushya on multiple fronts:

The Kushya: Why the Distinction between One vs. Many Slaughterers, and Why any Exemption?

1. Nature of Matanot Obligation: If matanot kehunah are a chovat gavra (personal obligation) on the shochet (as implied by "הדין עם הטבח" from the Gemara, Chullin 134a), then every act of shechita on a chulin animal should independently trigger the chiyuv. The fact that one animal out of 101 (100 chulin + 1 bechor) is exempt does not negate the chiyuv for the other 100 chulin animals. Why would the safek of a bechor (which is p'tur from matanot) exempt any chulin animal that is chayav?
2. The "One vs. Many" Paradox: The most striking distinction is between 100 individuals slaughtering and one individual slaughtering.
   • If 100 individuals slaughter: "כולן פטורין" (all are exempt). This means 100 matanot that should have been given are now withheld. How can a single safek bechor (one p'tur item) nullify the obligation on 100 chayav items?
   • If one individual slaughters: "אחד פטור לו" (one is exempt for him). This means only one set of matanot is exempt, and the other 99 are still obligatory. Why the difference? What halachic principle changes based on the number of slaughterers?
3. Conflict with Safek D'Oraita L'Chumra: Matanot kehunah are a Torah-level obligation (Devarim 18:3). Generally, if there's a safek regarding a d'oraita chiyuv, we rule l'chumra (stringently). Here, we have 100 chayav animals and 1 p'tur animal. In any given instance of slaughter, there's a safek whether it's the chayav or p'tur. Why wouldn't we resolve this l'chumra, requiring matanot for all 100 chulin animals (even if eventually one set of matanot would be "lost" to the kohen if it turned out to be the bechor)?

Terutzim:

Terutz 1: Rambam & Tosafot Yom Tov – The Kohen's Claim and the Safek of Identification

As explained by Rambam, the bechor in question already belongs to a kohen (or was destined for him) and was sold to an Israelite after developing a mum. Thus, it is fundamentally p'tur from matanot. The safek is not about whether matanot apply to chulin (they do) or to bechor (they don't), but about identification. The kohen is the claimant for the matanot.

• 100 Slaughterers, All Exempt: When 100 people slaughter, each person slaughters one animal. Each shochet can argue, "Perhaps the animal I slaughtered was the bechor." Since the kohen cannot definitively point to any specific shochet and say "you slaughtered a chulin animal and owe me matanot," his claim is unproven against any individual. The principle of "המוציא מחברו עליו הראיה" (the burden of proof is on the claimant) applies. The kohen cannot claim matanot from any of the slaughterers because each has a legitimate safek to present. Therefore, all are exempt. This aligns with Rashash's reference to Admon v'Chachamim regarding safek in mammon where each party has a plausible claim.
• One Slaughterer, One Exempt: When one person slaughters all 100 animals, he cannot use the same argument for all of them. He knows he slaughtered at least 99 chulin animals (if one was the bechor). He can only claim safek for one of his actions. He can say, "I am obligated to give 99 sets of matanot, but one of these animals was the bechor, so one set of matanot is exempt." Since he performed 100 acts of shechita, and 100 sets of matanot are due, but one is p'tur, he is obligated to give 99 sets. The Mishnah phrases it as "אחד פטור לו" to indicate that one chiyuv is removed from his overall obligation. The safek here is not about if he's obligated, but about the exact quantity of his obligation.

Terutz 2: The Kohen's Ownership and the Safek of Kedusha (Alternative Nuance)

Another approach, less prominent but conceptually interesting, posits that the bechor in the ta'aruvet isn't just p'tur but retains a degree of kedusha that prevents the matanot from ever applying.

• The Problem with Safek D'Oraita L'Chumra: The sugya must be understood in a way that avoids a direct violation of safek d'oraita l'chumra. If matanot were a chovat gavra on every shechita of a chulin animal, then each shochet in the "100 slaughterers" case would ideally need to give matanot, and the kohen would somehow return one set if the bechor was later identified (an impractical scenario).
• Focus on the Cheftza (object): Perhaps the matanot have a stronger chovat cheftza aspect than initially appears, meaning the matanot intrinsically belong to the kohen from a specific animal. The safek is not merely about the shochet's liability, but about which cheftza (animal) is the source of the matanot. In the case of 100 slaughterers, the kohen cannot claim any specific matanot because he cannot identify their source. In the case of one slaughterer, the shochet knows he slaughtered a total quantity of chayav animals (99) and a total quantity of p'tur animals (1). He owes the kohen the sum total of matanot from his chulin acts, which is 99. This perspective still hinges on the idea that the kohen cannot claim what is not definitively his.

Kushya 2: The Kohen Slaughtering for an Yisrael – The Gezeirah of Chazal

The Mishnah states: "השוחט לכהן ולנכרי פטור מן המתנות." The Gemara (Chullin 134a) asks: why state "השוחט לכהן" (one who slaughters for a kohen)? It should have simply said "כהן פטור" (a kohen is exempt), implying the kohen is generally exempt from matanot from his own animal, as the verse "מאת בני ישראל" (from the children of Israel) excludes kohanim. The Mishnah's phrasing implies a shochet who is not the owner, leading to a deeper kushya.

The Kushya: Is a Kohen Ever Obligated in Matanot from His Own Animal?

1. Mishnah's Implication: The lashon "השוחט לכהן" implies that if a kohen slaughters his own animal, he would be obligated. Otherwise, the phrase "לכהן" is redundant; if the kohen's animal is exempt, it doesn't matter who slaughters it for him. But this contradicts the explicit exclusion of kohanim from the chiyuv of matanot (derived from "מאת בני ישראל").
2. The Gemara's Resolution and Subsequent Tension: The Gemara, as explained by Tosafot Yom Tov, resolves the initial kushya by stating that "הדין עם הטבח" (the din is with the slaughterer), meaning the kohen can demand the matanot from the tabach, even if the tabach is himself a kohen who slaughters an Israelite's animal. This clarifies the tabach's chiyuv. However, it does not directly address the kushya of whether a kohen is ever obligated in matanot from his own animal. If "השוחט לכהן" means an Israelite slaughtering a kohen's animal, then that Israelite is exempt. This makes sense. But what if a kohen slaughters his own animal? Is he exempt? The Mishnah doesn't explicitly state "a kohen is exempt from his own animal."

Terutzim:

Terutz 1: The Gezeirah D'Rabbanan (Tosafot Yom Tov)

Tosafot Yom Tov (on M. 10:3:3) provides a critical terutz by introducing a gezeirah d'rabbanan (rabbinic decree). He explains that while mid'oraita (by Torah law) a kohen is exempt from matanot from his own animal (based on "מאת בני ישראל"), Chazal instituted a decree:

• "ומה שכתב הר"ב ואפילו כהן כו' אם הוא טבח כו' דמדרבנן גזרו כשהוא טבח ליתן מתנות כהונה אפילו הבהמה שלו שלא ירגילו טבחי ישראל לשתף כהנים עמהם ליפטר מן המתנות."
  • The Gezeirah: If a kohen acts as a professional tabach (slaughterer) for Yisraelim, Chazal decreed that he is obligated to give matanot even from his own animals.
  • The Reason: This decree prevents professional Israelite tabachim from regularly partnering with kohanim (e.g., by having the kohen buy a share of the animal, or even just having the kohen slaughter it) to avoid the matanot obligation. If the kohen were always exempt, it would create a loophole.
• Limits of the Gezeirah: This gezeirah is not absolute. TYT continues: "ועד ג' שבתות דאיכא למימר לדידיה שחיט לא גזרו רבנן ואוקמוהו על דין תורה. ומכאן ואילך גזרו. וכי קבע אמסחתא. מיד מוכח דלאו דידיה שחיט ולכך גזרו לאלתר."
  • The gezeirah applies only when the kohen is clearly acting as a professional tabach. If he slaughters his own animal only occasionally (e.g., up to two or three times for Shabbatot), it's assumed he's slaughtering for his own consumption, and Chazal did not extend the decree. In such cases, he remains p'tur mid'oraita.
  • However, if he "קבע אמסחתא" (establishes a regular slaughtering post/schedule), it's immediately evident that he's a professional tabach, and the gezeirah applies immediately, obligating him even on his own animal. This terutz elegantly resolves the kushya. The Mishnah's phrasing "השוחט לכהן" (referring to an Israelite slaughtering for a kohen) explicitly states an exemption. This is because the animal belongs to the kohen, and mid'oraita, kohanim are exempt. The kushya about a kohen slaughtering his own animal is addressed by the rabbinic decree, which specifies the conditions under which a kohen would be obligated, despite the Torah's general exemption. The Mishnah simply presents the straightforward d'oraita rule where the kohen is the owner.

Terutz 2: The Tabach's Role and Sheliach (Agent) (Implicit in Gemara)

The Gemara's statement "הדין עם הטבח" fundamentally shifts the locus of the chiyuv. The Mishnah's phrase "השוחט לכהן" means an Israelite shochet who is acting as an agent for a kohen owner. In such a case, the sheliach (agent) is exempt because the primary beneficiary/owner of the animal (the kohen) is p'tur. The chiyuv on the tabach from "מאת זובחי הזבח" applies when he is slaughtering for an Yisrael owner, where the matanot are indeed due. But if the kohen is the owner, and the matanot are not due from his animal, then the sheliach is also p'tur. This terutz relies on a clear distinction between the tabach who slaughters for an Israelite (where he is the primary obligee) and a tabach who slaughters for a kohen (where the object itself is exempt). The gezeirah d'rabbanan of TYT then deals with the edge case of a kohen acting as a professional tabach for Yisraelim, thereby completing the picture.

Intertext

The sugya of matanot kehunah in Chullin 10:3-4 is rich with intertextual connections, drawing upon various strata of Jewish law, from Tanakh to Gemara to Poskim. These connections illuminate the underlying principles and broader implications of the Mishnah's rulings.

1. Vayikra 7:34 – The Prat of the Kal V'Chomer

The Mishnah explicitly cites Vayikra 7:34: "כִּי אֶת חֲזֵה הַתְּנוּפָה וְאֵת שׁוֹק הַתְּרוּמָה לָקַחְתִּי מֵאֵת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל מִזִּבְחֵי שַׁלְמֵיהֶם וָאֶתֵּן אֹתָם לְאַהֲרֹן הַכֹּהֵן וּלְבָנָיו לְחָק עוֹלָם מֵאֵת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל". This verse is used to refute the kal v'chomer that would otherwise obligate kodashim in matanot kehunah. The principle derived is "אֵין לוֹ לַכֹּהֵן אֶלָּא מָה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר בּוֹ" – the kohen is entitled only to what is explicitly stated in the Torah concerning kodashim.

• Connection: This principle is fundamental to derasha and the limits of logical inference in halacha. While kal v'chomer is a valid hermeneutic tool, it can be overridden by a prat (specific verse) that limits its scope. In this case, the Torah specifically enumerates chezeh v'shok from shalmim as the kohen's share from kodashim. By not mentioning zero'a, lechi, v'keiva (foreleg, jaw, and maw), the Torah implicitly excludes them. This demonstrates the precision of Divine legislation, where even a seemingly logical extension is curtailed by explicit textual boundaries. The verse's emphasis "מֵאֵת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל" further underscores that these specific matanot from kodashim are given by Israelites to kohanim, but only the specified ones.

2. Bamidbar 6:19 – The Zero'a of the Nazir

The Mishnah defines the zero'a for matanot kehunah and explicitly states: "וְהִיא הַזְּרוֹעַ הָאֲמוּרָה בַּנָּזִיר: 'וְלָקַח הַכֹּהֵן אֶת הַזְּרֹעַ בְּשֵׁלָה מִן הָאַיִל'" (Numbers 6:19). This verse describes the kohen's portion from the eil ha'miluim (ram of dedication) offered by a nazir at the completion of his nezirut.

• Connection: This hekesh (juxtaposition/comparison) between the zero'a of matanot and the zero'a of the nazir is crucial for establishing a standardized anatomical definition across different halachic contexts. It implies that when the Torah uses the term "zero'a" in such contexts, it refers to a specific, identifiable anatomical part. The machloket of Rabbi Yehuda regarding the yarech (thigh) of shalmim further highlights the importance of precise definitions, even if there's an internal debate among Chazal. This hekesh teaches us that shiurim and anatomical designations are not arbitrary but often consistent across mitzvot, reflecting a unified halachic system.

3. Gemara Bechorot 15a – Mum Kodesh vs. Kodesh Mum

The detailed distinction in our Mishnah between "כל קדשים שקדמן מום להקדשן" and "כל קדשים שקדמן הקדש למומן" is profoundly rooted in Gemara Bechorot 15a. This gemara is the primary source that establishes the different dinim for animals that acquire kedushat damim (value sanctity) versus kedushat haguf (inherent sanctity).

• Connection: The gemara explains that if a permanent blemish (mum kava) precedes consecration, the animal never truly becomes kodesh haguf. Its inherent flaw prevents it from ever being fit for the altar. Therefore, only its value is consecrated, making it essentially a chulin item whose monetary worth is dedicated. Consequently, upon redemption, it largely reverts to chulin status with regards to matanot, bechor, gizah v'avodah, etc. In contrast, if consecration precedes the blemish (or a temporary blemish becomes permanent after consecration), the animal was initially fit for the altar and thus acquired kedushat haguf. Even after redemption, it retains a residual sanctity that affects its dinim, such as exemption from matanot, prohibition of gizah v'avodah, and shechitat chutz. This sugya in Bechorot provides the deep conceptual framework for the seemingly disparate dinim listed in our Mishnah, demonstrating how the precise sequence of events (blemish before or after consecration) fundamentally alters an animal's halachic identity and fate.

4. Gemara Chullin 134a – "הדין עם הטבח"

The Mishnah's discussion of "השוחט לכהן ולנכרי פטור מן המתנות" and the bechor ta'aruvet leads directly to the Gemara in Chullin 134a, which states "הדין עם הטבח" – the legal claim for matanot lies with the tabach (slaughterer). This is derived from the superfluous word "מאת" in "מאת זובחי הזבח."

• Connection: This derasha is pivotal. It shifts the primary obligation from the owner of the animal to the person performing the shechita. This has significant practical nafka minot. For example, if an Israelite hires a professional tabach to slaughter his animal, the tabach is the one who owes the matanot to the kohen. If the tabach fails to give them, the kohen pursues the tabach, not necessarily the owner. This principle also underlies the resolution of the bechor ta'aruvet case, where the safek impacts the tabach's chiyuv. The gemara also clarifies that even a kohen tabach is obligated when slaughtering an Israelite's animal, further emphasizing that the shechita act, not just ownership, triggers the chiyuv. This highlights the chovat gavra aspect of matanot as distinct from the chovat cheftza of the animal itself.

5. Shulchan Aruch Choshen Mishpat 119:5 and Gemara Ketubot 106a – Safek in Mammon

Rashash, as noted earlier, links the ta'aruvet bechor case (100 slaughterers, all exempt) to the machloket Admon v'Chachamim in Ketubot 106a concerning a lost path (דרך שדהו). This machloket is codified in Shulchan Aruch Choshen Mishpat 119:5.

• Connection: The machloket Admon v'Chachamim deals with a safek in mammon where multiple parties have an uncertain claim to a single item or right. Admon rules that each claimant can assert "maybe it's mine," leading to a division or shared access. Chachamim are more restrictive. In our sugya, when 100 people slaughter, each can claim "maybe the one I slaughtered was the bechor (which is p'tur from matanot)." This "shema ani" argument is a form of safek in mammon (as matanot are essentially a monetary right of the kohen). The Mishnah's ruling of "כולן פטורין" when 100 slaughterers are involved can be seen as aligning with a lenient approach to safek in mammon when the claimant (the kohen) cannot definitively identify the obligor. This demonstrates how principles from dinei mammonot (monetary law) intersect with halachot pertaining to kohanim and kedusha, especially when an item that is usually mammon (meat) has a designated sacred component.

Psak/Practice

The intricate sugya of matanot kehunah in Chullin 10:3-4, particularly concerning kodashim and safek scenarios, has significant implications for halacha l'ma'aseh, codified primarily in Rambam's Mishneh Torah and the Shulchan Aruch.

1. The Distinction of Mum Kodesh vs. Kodesh Mum

The Mishnah's detailed delineation between "קדמן מום להקדשן" (blemish preceded consecration) and "קדמן הקדש למומן" (consecration preceded blemish) forms the bedrock of halacha regarding blemished sacred animals.

• Rambam: This distinction is foundational in Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot (Ch. 3 and 4) and Hilchot Bechorot (Ch. 1-2). For instance, an animal with mum kodesh (blemish before consecration) is considered kodesh damim (sanctity of value). Upon redemption, it completely reverts to chulin status, hence it is "חייבין בבכור ובמתנות, ויוצאין לחולין לגיזה ולעבודה." This means its offspring are chayav as bechorim, matanot are given from it, and it can be sheared and worked.
• Shulchan Aruch: While the Shulchan Aruch does not deal with korbanot directly, the dinim of bechor (which is a kodesh) follow this principle. Yoreh De'ah 315 discusses bechorim. If a bechor is born with a mum (analogous to mum kodesh for other kodashim), it is p'tur from the general kedusha dinim and can be eaten by a kohen (or sold to an Israelite) without pidyon, and it is chayav in matanot (if slaughtered by an Israelite, as it's now considered chulin vis-à-vis matanot). However, if the bechor develops a mum after birth (analogous to kodesh mum), it retains a stronger kedusha that exempts it from matanot. This is critical for understanding the status of bechorim in practice.

2. The Principle of "הדין עם הטבח"

The Gemara's ruling that "הדין עם הטבח" (the din is with the slaughterer) is a cornerstone of matanot kehunah halacha l'ma'aseh.

• Shulchan Aruch Yoreh De'ah 61:1: "השוחט בהמה בין שלו בין של אחרים חייב במתנות." This clearly states that the shochet is obligated, regardless of ownership. The kohen claims the matanot from the shochet. If the shochet is a kohen, he is generally exempt from matanot from his own animal because of "מאת בני ישראל" (YD 61:3). However, if a kohen slaughters an Israelite's animal, he is obligated to give the matanot to another kohen (YD 61:3, based on the Gemara's derasha from "מאת זובחי הזבח").
• Practical Implications: This means that slaughterhouses and professional tabachim are primarily responsible for separating and giving matanot. The owner of the animal typically relies on the tabach to fulfill this mitzva. If the tabach fails, the kohen's claim is against the tabach.

3. The Ta'aruvet Bechor

The Mishnah's ruling regarding a bechor intermingled with 100 chulin animals also finds its way into halacha.

• Shulchan Aruch Yoreh De'ah 315:30: "בכור שנתערב במאה, ומאה שוחטין אותן, כולן פטורין מן המתנות. ואם אחד שחט אותן, אחד פטור לו." This is a direct codification of our Mishnah.
• Meta-Psak Heuristics: This rule exemplifies the application of safek in mammon to mitzva obligations. When the kohen's claim for matanot is uncertain due to an inability to identify the chayav item among many, and each individual shochet can claim "shema ani" (perhaps mine was the exempt bechor), the kohen cannot enforce his claim. This is a practical recognition of the limits of legal enforceability in cases of genuine safek. However, when one person slaughters all, the aggregate chiyuv is clear, and the safek only reduces the total by one unit. This indicates a nuanced approach to safek based on the structure of the chiyuv and the clarity of the obligor.

4. Partnership and Sales

The Mishnah's rules regarding an Israelite partnering with a kohen or nochri, or selling an animal "except for the matanot", are also codified.

• Shulchan Aruch Yoreh De'ah 61:2: "השותף עם כהן או עם נכרי בבהמה צריך לסמן חלקו, ואם לא סימן פטור מן המתנות." This means the Israelite partner must mark his share to show it is chayav in matanot; otherwise, the safek of ownership with the kohen or nochri (who are exempt from matanot from their share) leads to petur. This underscores the importance of clear demarcation in halacha to avoid safekot.
• Shulchan Aruch Yoreh De'ah 61:5: The rules regarding selling "innards" or by weight, and whether to deduct the value of matanot, are also present. If sold as a general item, the matanot are considered hefker (ownerless) by the seller and belong to the kohen without deduction. If sold by weight, the matanot were implicitly part of the weight sold, so their value is deducted from the payment. This demonstrates the sensitivity of halacha to commercial conventions and the intent of the parties in a transaction.

These psakim collectively illustrate how the Mishnah's initial principles are applied in diverse real-world scenarios, revealing the depth and practicality of the halachic system.

Takeaway

This sugya masterfully navigates the intricate relationship between sacred status, physical blemishes, and human actions, demonstrating how the precise sequence of events and the identity of the actor fundamentally redefine halachic obligations. It highlights the tension between chovat gavra and chovat cheftza in mitzva performance and the nuanced application of safek principles in dinei mammonot and d'oraita chiyuvim.