Mishnah Chullin 7:1-2

Hey there! Ready to dive into some really fascinating stuff? Today we're tackling a passage that, at first glance, seems to be about a simple dietary restriction, but quickly opens up into a rich exploration of halakhic origins and the very structure of Jewish law. What makes the prohibition of the gid hanasheh (sciatic nerve) so uniquely complex and universally applied?

Context

The prohibition of gid hanasheh stems from a singular, dramatic moment in Genesis (32:25-33), where our patriarch Jacob wrestles with a mysterious figure – traditionally understood as an angel or a heavenly emissary. During this intense nocturnal struggle, Jacob's "hip was dislocated from its socket" or, as some interpret, "the hollow of his thigh was strained." Following this pivotal encounter, the Torah states, "Therefore the children of Israel eat not the sciatic nerve that is upon the hollow of the thigh, unto this day."

This narrative, predating the formal revelation at Sinai and the comprehensive dietary laws of Kashrut, presents a fascinating theological and halakhic challenge. How does a prohibition originating from a specific historical event involving an individual patriarch transition into a universal, eternal commandment for all of Israel? This unique genesis sets the stage for the meticulous discussions in our Mishnah. The Sages grapple with whether this pre-Sinaitic origin implies a different scope or character for the gid hanasheh compared to other mitzvot given at Sinai. This tension culminates in the explicit debate at the end of our passage regarding its application to non-kosher animals and its true point of halakhic enactment, inviting us to consider the interplay between narrative and legislation in the Torah.

Text Snapshot

The Mishnah Chullin 7:1-2 lays out the law of the gid hanasheh:

The prohibition of eating the sciatic nerve applies both in Eretz Yisrael and outside of Eretz Yisrael, in the presence of, i.e., the time of, the Temple and not in the presence of the Temple, and with regard to non-sacred animals and with regard to sacrificial animals...

And it applies to a late-term animal fetus [shalil] in the womb. Rabbi Yehuda says: It does not apply to a fetus; and similarly, its fat is permitted.

The prohibition of eating the sciatic nerve applies to a kosher animal and does not apply to a non-kosher animal. Rabbi Yehuda says: It applies even to a non-kosher animal. Rabbi Yehuda said in explanation: Wasn’t the sciatic nerve forbidden for the children of Jacob... yet the meat of a non-kosher animal was still permitted to them?... The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yehuda: The prohibition was stated in Sinai, but it was written in its place...

Close Reading

Insight 1: Structure – The Universal Framework and its Granular Refinements

The Mishnah's opening lines of Chullin 7:1 present a masterclass in halakhic codification, establishing the universal and enduring nature of the gid hanasheh prohibition before meticulously detailing its nuances and exceptions. This systematic approach isn't merely a list of rules; it's a deliberate structural choice designed to convey the profound scope and unyielding applicability of this mitzvah. The very first clause, "The prohibition of eating the sciatic nerve applies both in Eretz Yisrael and outside of Eretz Yisrael, in the presence of, i.e., the time of, the Temple and not in the presence of the Temple, and with regard to non-sacred animals and with regard to sacrificial animals," (Mishnah Chullin 7:1) immediately sets a tone of unwavering universality. By stating its applicability across geographical boundaries (ארץ ובח"ל), temporal epochs (בפני הבית ושלא בפני הבית), and categories of animal sanctity (בחולין ובמוקדשין), the Mishnah preempts any potential arguments for limitation. It declares that this prohibition, rooted in Jacob's personal encounter, transcends specific contexts and remains perpetually binding.

This broad declaration is further expanded to encompass the biological spectrum: "And it applies to domesticated animals and to undomesticated animals, to the thigh of the right leg and to the thigh of the left leg." (Mishnah Chullin 7:1). The inclusion of both domesticated (בהמה) and undomesticated (חיה) animals underscores that the prohibition is tied to the anatomical feature itself, not to the animal's relationship with humanity or its ritual status. Similarly, specifying "right leg and left leg" eliminates any ambiguity regarding laterality, reinforcing that the physiological basis of the prohibition is symmetrical. This initial sweep establishes an almost axiomatic truth: wherever a gid hanasheh exists on a kosher animal, its consumption is forbidden.

However, this universal framework is immediately followed by crucial refinements and exceptions, demonstrating the Halakha's precision. The first notable exception is birds: "But it does not apply to a bird, due to the fact that the verse makes reference to the sciatic nerve as being 'upon the spoon of the thigh' (Genesis 32:33), and a bird has no spoon of the thigh." (Mishnah Chullin 7:1). This clause is pivotal, shifting from broad applicability to a specific anatomical distinction, grounding the prohibition not just in the presence of a nerve, but in a nerve located in a very particular anatomical configuration – the "spoon of the thigh" (כף הירך). This exegetical link back to the originating biblical verse highlights how scriptural language can define the boundaries of a seemingly universal law. Rambam, in his commentary, explains this further, noting that the "spoon of the thigh" refers to a "thigh spoon similar to a human's which is round" (כף ירך דומה לשל אדם שהוא עגול). Thus, the absence of this specific anatomical feature in birds exempts them, showcasing how the Mishnah builds its legal structure upon careful textual interpretation and biological observation.

The Mishnah then introduces a series of disputes, moving from the established rule to areas of disagreement among the Sages. The debate regarding the shalil (fetus) – "And the prohibition applies to a late-term animal fetus [shalil] in the womb. Rabbi Yehuda says: It does not apply to a fetus; and similarly, its fat is permitted." (Mishnah Chullin 7:1) – reveals how fundamental questions about an entity's halakhic status (is a fetus considered an independent animal or an extension of its mother?) directly impact the application of specific prohibitions. The structure here is to present the initial ruling (the Tanna Kamma), followed by a dissenting opinion (Rabbi Yehuda), setting up a classic pattern of halakhic discourse.

Following this, the Mishnah addresses practical issues of enforcement and credibility: "And butchers are not deemed credible to say that the sciatic nerve was removed; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: They are deemed credible about the sciatic nerve and about the forbidden fat." (Mishnah Chullin 7:1). This section shifts from defining the object of the prohibition to the agents involved in its practical implementation. It acknowledges the real-world challenge of ensuring compliance. The dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis regarding the credibility of butchers highlights the tension between ensuring absolute adherence to halakha and facilitating practical commerce and trust within the community.

The Mishnah continues with rules for removal, quantities for liability, and the complex issue of ta'am k'ikar (flavor as substance) when the nerve is cooked with other meat. Each of these sections systematically addresses a different aspect of the prohibition, moving from identification and removal to the consequences of consumption and the rules for mixed cooking. The progression from general principles to specific cases and then to complex scenarios like "a thigh that was cooked with the sciatic nerve in it" (Mishnah Chullin 7:2) demonstrates the comprehensive nature of the Mishnah's treatment. The analogy of "meat imparting flavor to a turnip" (Mishnah Chullin 7:2) is not merely illustrative; it provides a concrete, albeit abstract, method for halakhic measurement, turning a qualitative judgment into a quantifiable standard.

Finally, the Mishnah culminates in a profound theological and halakhic debate regarding the origin of the prohibition itself: "The prohibition of eating the sciatic nerve applies to a kosher animal and does not apply to a non-kosher animal. Rabbi Yehuda says: It applies even to a non-kosher animal... The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yehuda: The prohibition was stated in Sinai, but it was written in its place..." (Mishnah Chullin 7:2). This concluding dispute is structurally significant as it circles back to the very foundation of the mitzvah, bringing to the forefront the tension between a narrative origin (Jacob) and a legislative origin (Sinai), encapsulating a larger theme in Jewish law regarding the nature of mitzvot that predate the Sinai revelation. The Mishnah, therefore, structurally guides the learner from the broad principle, through specific applications and disputes, to the very theological bedrock upon which the entire edifice rests.

Insight 2: Key Term – "כף" (Kaf) and "שליל" (Shalil) as Definitive Boundaries

The Mishnah's discussion on gid hanasheh masterfully employs specific terminology to delineate the precise boundaries of the prohibition. Two such terms, "כף" (kaf) and "שליל" (shalil), serve as crucial anchors in defining what falls within and what falls outside the scope of this mitzvah, prompting deep anatomical and ontological inquiries.

The term "כף" (kaf), often translated as "spoon" or "hollow," appears in the Mishnah's explanation for why the prohibition does not apply to birds: "But it does not apply to a bird, due to the fact that the verse makes reference to the sciatic nerve as being 'upon the spoon of the thigh' (Genesis 32:33), and a bird has no spoon of the thigh." (Mishnah Chullin 7:1). This seemingly simple anatomical distinction carries profound halakhic weight. The Torah's specific phrasing, "על כף הירך" (upon the spoon of the thigh), is interpreted not merely as a general location, but as referring to a particular, identifiable anatomical structure.

Commentators elaborate on this. Rambam, in his commentary, clarifies "What it said, 'because it has no kaf,' means it has no kaf yerech (thigh spoon) similar to that of a human, which is round." (Rambam on Mishnah Chullin 7:1:1). This suggests that the "kaf" is a specific, rounded anatomical feature associated with the thigh bone, present in mammals but absent in birds. Tosafot Yom Tov further cites Rashi's description of "כף" as "the pulpa/flesh that wraps around the upper thigh bone in a circle." (Tosafot Yom Tov on Mishnah Chullin 7:1:6). This detailed anatomical definition is critical; it implies that the prohibition is not merely about any large nerve in the leg, but specifically the nerve found in this particular "rounded" configuration around the upper thigh bone. If an animal lacks this "kaf," then the gid hanasheh prohibition, by definition, does not apply to it.

The Tosafot Yom Tov then raises an intriguing hypothetical: "And if an bird is found that has a rounded kaf, its gid hanasheh is forbidden." (Tosafot Yom Tov on Mishnah Chullin 7:1:5). This thought experiment, attributed to Rabbi Yirmiya, asks whether we follow the specific species or the individual anatomical characteristic. While the gemara leaves this as a teiku (unresolved), it profoundly illustrates how the term "kaf" serves as a precise halakhic boundary. It's not just "no birds," but "no creatures lacking the specific anatomical 'kaf yerech' described." This level of detail demonstrates the Halakha's commitment to objective, verifiable criteria, even when those criteria are rooted in a biblical phrase. The kaf thus becomes a gatekeeper term, determining which entire classes of animals are subject to the prohibition and which are exempt.

The second crucial term is "שליל" (shalil), referring to an animal fetus. The Mishnah states, "And the prohibition applies to a late-term animal fetus [shalil] in the womb. Rabbi Yehuda says: It does not apply to a fetus; and similarly, its fat is permitted." (Mishnah Chullin 7:1). The dispute here is not merely about whether a fetus has a gid hanasheh (it clearly does, anatomically speaking), but about its halakhic status. Is a fetus considered an independent entity subject to its own set of prohibitions, or is it halakhically subsumed within its mother until birth?

Tosafot Yom Tov, explaining the positions of Rabbi Meir (the Tanna Kamma) and Rabbi Yehuda, links this directly to the fundamental halakhic principle of "ניתר בשחיטת אמו" (nitar b'shechitat imo) – "permitted by the slaughter of its mother." He explains: "Rabbi Meir is consistent with his view that [the fetus] is not permitted by the slaughter of its mother... therefore it is considered an animal unto itself, and its fat and gid are forbidden. And Rabbi Yehuda is consistent with his view that it is permitted by the slaughter of its mother... therefore its fat and gid are also permitted." (Tosafot Yom Tov on Mishnah Chullin 7:1:7).

This commentary reveals that "shalil" isn't just a biological term; it's a halakhic category that triggers a deeper debate about legal identity. If the fetus is nitar b'shechitat imo, it means that its life and, by extension, its dietary status are intrinsically linked to the mother's act of shechita. Rabbi Yehuda, holding this view, logically extends this leniency to the fetus's gid hanasheh and fat. Conversely, Rabbi Meir (or the Tanna Kamma), by prohibiting the gid and fat of the fetus, implicitly views the fetus as having a more independent halakhic status, or that the specific gid hanasheh prohibition operates independently of the general shechita permission. The term "shalil" thus becomes a battleground for a fundamental halakhic principle, determining not only the permissibility of a specific nerve but reflecting a broader understanding of life, autonomy, and the efficacy of ritual slaughter.

Insight 3: Tension – Sinai vs. Narrative Origin and the Scope of Mitzvot

Perhaps the most profound tension explored in this Mishnah, and indeed in much of Jewish law, centers on the origin and scope of mitzvot that predate the revelation at Sinai. The gid hanasheh prohibition, rooted in Jacob's wrestling match, is the quintessential example. The Mishnah explicitly brings this tension to the forefront in its concluding lines: "The prohibition of eating the sciatic nerve applies to a kosher animal and does not apply to a non-kosher animal. Rabbi Yehuda says: It applies even to a non-kosher animal. Rabbi Yehuda said in explanation: Wasn’t the sciatic nerve forbidden for the children of Jacob... yet the meat of a non-kosher animal was still permitted to them? Since the sciatic nerve of non-kosher animals became forbidden at that time, it remains forbidden now. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yehuda: The prohibition was stated in Sinai, but it was written in its place..." (Mishnah Chullin 7:2).

Rabbi Yehuda's argument is compelling and logical from a historical-narrative perspective. He posits that the prohibition, as described in Genesis, was already binding upon Jacob's children. At that time, the broader dietary laws of kashrut had not yet been fully revealed at Sinai. Therefore, if the gid hanasheh was forbidden to them, it must have been forbidden irrespective of the animal's kosher status. If it applied even to non-kosher animals then, why should it not apply now? His reasoning hinges on the idea that the Genesis narrative establishes the initial and broadest scope of the prohibition, which should remain consistent.

The Rabbis, in their response, introduce a fundamental halakhic principle that recontextualizes the entire prohibition: "The prohibition was stated in Sinai, but it was written in its place." This statement is a cornerstone for understanding the relationship between narrative and law in Judaism. It asserts that while the historical event (Jacob's wrestling) and the biblical recording of the prohibition (Genesis 32:33) occurred early, the legal force and full definition of the mitzvah were formally enacted and revealed at Sinai. The Genesis account, in this view, serves as an asmachta (a textual allusion or support) or a narrative origin point, but not the source of its halakhic binding power or its precise parameters for all generations.

This tension between "stated in Sinai" (נאמרה בסיני) and "written in its place" (נכתבה במקומה) highlights a critical distinction: the Rabbis distinguish between when a story is told and when a law becomes fully operative and defined. Many practices existed among the patriarchs, but their formal, universal, and legally binding nature for the nation of Israel is generally understood to stem from Sinai. For the gid hanasheh, this means that the specifics – such as its application only to kosher animals, its precise anatomical definition, and the quantity for liability – were codified at Sinai, even if the general concept was foreshadowed in Genesis. If a mitzvah originates at Sinai, then its scope is defined within the Sinai framework. This means it becomes subject to the overarching principles of kashrut, which dictate that only kosher animals are generally permissible for consumption. Therefore, if the prohibition of gid hanasheh is a Sinai mitzvah, it would naturally apply only to those animals that are otherwise permissible to eat, i.e., kosher animals. Rabbi Yehuda, by contrast, sees the Genesis narrative as setting an independent and broader scope, where the gid hanasheh is forbidden even in animals that one would not eat anyway.

This dispute is not merely an academic exercise; it touches upon the very nature of divine law. Does a mitzvah's "earliest mention" automatically define its broadest scope, or does its formal "enactment" (Sinai) redefine and refine its application within a comprehensive legal system? The Rabbis' position, which is the accepted halakha, emphasizes that Sinai is the ultimate source of detailed halakhic authority. The gid hanasheh thus becomes a fascinating case study in the interplay between history, narrative, and the intricate architecture of halakha, illustrating how seemingly straightforward biblical verses can conceal layers of legal and theological debate.

Two Angles

The Mishnah's discussion on the shalil (fetus) presents a classic halakhic dispute, illuminating differing approaches to the status of an unborn animal. The Tanna Kamma (represented by Rabbi Meir's view in some interpretations) states: "And the prohibition applies to a late-term animal fetus [shalil] in the womb." Rabbi Yehuda, however, counters: "It does not apply to a fetus; and similarly, its fat is permitted." (Mishnah Chullin 7:1). This seemingly straightforward disagreement about the gid hanasheh on a fetus opens up a more fundamental question about the halakhic autonomy of the fetus, particularly in relation to the mother's shechita (ritual slaughter). Examining the perspectives, or interpretations of them, by Rambam and Tosafot Yom Tov reveals distinct legal frameworks.

Rambam, in his commentary on this Mishnah, appears to align with the Tanna Kamma (or Rabbi Meir's position) by stating, concerning the fetus and the gid hanasheh, that "The Halakha is neither according to Rabbi Meir nor according to Rabbi Yehuda." (Rambam on Mishnah Chullin 7:1:1). This seemingly ambiguous ruling is understood by some later commentators, including the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 64:8), to mean that while the fat of the fetus is permitted (like Rabbi Yehuda says), its gid hanasheh is forbidden (like the Tanna Kamma). This interpretation suggests that Rambam views the fetus as sufficiently independent for its gid hanasheh to remain forbidden, even if its fat is permitted by the mother's slaughter. The gid hanasheh, in this view, retains its unique prohibitory status, perhaps because its prohibition is rooted in a specific anatomical feature and a distinct historical event that might operate independently of the general permissibility granted by shechita.

Tosafot Yom Tov, however, presents a more explicit and detailed argument, strongly supporting Rabbi Yehuda's position and, in doing so, critiques Rambam's apparent ruling. He explains the core of the dispute by linking it directly to the principle of "ניתר בשחיטת אמו" (nitar b'shechitat imo) – "permitted by the slaughter of its mother." Tosafot Yom Tov states that Rabbi Meir (the Tanna Kamma) holds that the fetus is not entirely permitted by the mother's slaughter, and thus its gid and chelev (forbidden fat) remain prohibited as if it were a separate animal. Rabbi Yehuda, conversely, asserts that the fetus is permitted by the mother's slaughter. Consequently, if the mother's shechita grants permissibility to the fetus's meat, then all its otherwise forbidden parts (like gid and chelev) should also become permitted, as they are subsumed under the general permission. Tosafot Yom Tov then explicitly concludes: "And the Halakha is established like Rabbi Yehuda regarding slaughter, that a shalil, even a nine-month-old one, is permitted by the slaughter of its mother... therefore its fat and gid are also permitted. And the words of Rambam are not clear as he rules here not like Rabbi Yehuda." (Tosafot Yom Tov on Mishnah Chullin 7:1:7). The contrast is stark: Rambam (as interpreted) appears to carve out an exception for the gid hanasheh of a fetus, keeping it forbidden even while its fat is permitted. Tosafot Yom Tov, championing Rabbi Yehuda, argues for a more holistic view of nitar b'shechitat imo, where the mother's slaughter fully legalizes the fetus, including its gid hanasheh. This debate thus highlights a fundamental tension between the distinct nature of specific prohibitions and the overarching power of general halakhic principles.

Practice Implication

The intricate discussions within Mishnah Chullin 7:1-2 regarding the gid hanasheh are far from abstract; they directly shape the daily practice of kashrut and the operations of the kosher meat industry. The most salient practical implication emerges from the meticulous process of nikkur (often translated as "de-veining" or "porging"), the ritual removal of forbidden fats and nerves, most notably the gid hanasheh. This Mishnah's detailed regulations and disputes underscore why nikkur is not merely a butchering technique but a highly specialized halakhic skill.

Consider the rules for removal: "One who removes the sciatic nerve must scrape away the flesh in the area surrounding the nerve to ensure that he will remove all of it. Rabbi Yehuda says: Scraping is not required; it is sufficient to excise it from the area above the rounded protrusion in order to thereby fulfill the mitzva of removal of the sciatic nerve." (Mishnah Chullin 7:2). Even with Rabbi Yehuda's more lenient opinion regarding scraping, the requirement to "remove all of it" (להסיר את כולה) or to excise it from a specific anatomical point ("above the rounded protrusion" – למעלה מן העיגול) demands profound anatomical knowledge and surgical precision. The gid hanasheh is deeply embedded within the thigh, necessitating careful dissection to extract completely, without leaving even a kezayit (olive-bulk) of the nerve attached to the meat.

Furthermore, the Mishnah's debate about the credibility of butchers – "And butchers are not deemed credible to say that the sciatic nerve was removed; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: They are deemed credible about the sciatic nerve and about the forbidden fat." (Mishnah Chullin 7:1) – directly informs the level of oversight required. While the Rabbis ultimately hold butchers to be credible, this credibility is predicated on the assumption of their training and adherence to halakhic standards. Historically and currently, this has led to the development of highly specialized menakrim (those who perform nikkur). In many communities, especially outside of Eretz Yisrael, the meticulousness required for nikkur is so demanding that the hindquarters of animals are often not processed for kosher consumption at all. Instead, they are sold to the non-kosher market, and only the forequarters, which do not contain the gid hanasheh, are processed as kosher meat. This decision, driven by the practical difficulty and cost associated with precise nikkur, is a direct outgrowth of the Mishnah's strictures.

Even when nikkur is performed, the rules of ta'am k'ikar (flavor as substance) or nullification are paramount. "In the case of a thigh that was cooked with the sciatic nerve in it, if there is enough of the sciatic nerve in it to impart its flavor to the thigh, the entire thigh is forbidden for consumption." (Mishnah Chullin 7:2). This means that if the nerve is not fully removed, and even a small piece remains and is cooked with the meat, it can render the entire dish forbidden if it imparts discernible flavor. This adds another layer of stringency: not only must the nerve be removed, but it must be removed so thoroughly that no part remains that could later affect the kosher status of a cooked dish. In contemporary kosher meat production, these laws translate into rigorous training programs for menakrim, stringent supervision (hashgacha) in processing plants, and often, the economic decision to forgo processing hindquarters. Consumers benefit from these practices, knowing that the kosher meat they purchase has undergone a meticulous process rooted in these ancient laws, ensuring that the gid hanasheh has been properly removed.

Chevruta Mini

Here are two questions to delve into with a study partner, exploring some of the tradeoffs inherent in this Mishnah:

1. The Rabbis famously countered Rabbi Yehuda's argument with the principle: "The prohibition was stated in Sinai, but it was written in its place." This distinction separates the narrative account of a mitzvah's origin from its formal halakhic enactment and definition. How does this concept – that a law's origin story is distinct from its halakhic enactment – influence our understanding of other mitzvot that seem to have pre-Sinai roots (like brit milah, korbanot, or shechita itself)? What are the practical and theological tradeoffs between understanding a mitzvah primarily through its earliest narrative mention versus understanding it as fully defined and operative only from Sinai? Consider how each approach might affect the scope of applicability, the rationale, or even the emotional connection one feels to a mitzvah.
2. The Mishnah grapples with the credibility of butchers concerning the removal of the gid hanasheh and forbidden fat, with Rabbi Meir demanding stricter oversight than the Rabbis. In contemporary terms, this touches upon the balance between rigorous halakhic enforcement and fostering communal trust in the kashrut system. What are the practical and ethical tradeoffs between strictly enforcing halakhic standards (e.g., demanding very specific training, mandatory third-party verification, or even disqualifying certain parts of the animal) and maintaining trust within a community, especially for common practices like purchasing kosher meat? How might an overly strict or overly lenient approach impact the accessibility and cost of kosher food, the livelihood of those in the industry, and the spiritual well-being of the observant community?

Takeaway + Citations

The prohibition of gid hanasheh is a complex and broadly applied mitzvah, uniquely rooted in Jacob's personal narrative but fully codified at Sinai, demanding meticulous anatomical precision and raising fundamental halakhic questions about the scope and origin of divine commandments.

Citations

• Mishnah Chullin 7:1: https://www.sefaria.org/Mishnah_Chullin.7.1?lang=bi
• Mishnah Chullin 7:2: https://www.sefaria.org/Mishnah_Chullin.7.2?lang=bi
• Rambam on Mishnah Chullin 7:1:1: https://www.sefaria.org/Rambam_on_Mishnah_Chullin.7.1.1?lang=bi
• Tosafot Yom Tov on Mishnah Chullin 7:1:5: https://www.sefaria.org/Tosafot_Yom_Tov_on_Mishnah_Chullin.7.1.5?lang=bi
• Tosafot Yom Tov on Mishnah Chullin 7:1:6: https://www.sefaria.org/Tosafot_Yom_Tov_on_Mishnah_Chullin.7.1.6?lang=bi
• Tosafot Yom Tov on Mishnah Chullin 7:1:7: https://www.sefaria.org/Tosafot_Yom_Tov_on_Mishnah_Chullin.7.1.7?lang=bi
• Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 64:8: https://www.sefaria.org/Shulchan_Arukh,_Yoreh_De'ah.64.8?lang=bi