Mishnah Keritot 3:1-2

Sugya Map

• Issue: Liability for a chatas (sin offering) when witnesses testify to a transgression, but the accused denies it.
• Nafka Mina: Under what conditions is one obligated to bring a chatas, an asham talui (provisional guilt offering), or nothing, based on the nature and conflict of testimony.
• Primary Sources: Mishnah Keritot 3:1-2; Vayikra 4:23; Rambam, Mishnah Commentary, Keritot 3:1; Rashash, Keritot 3:1; Mishnat Eretz Yisrael (ME"Y), Keritot 3:1.

Text Snapshot

"שנים אומרין אכל והוא אומר לא אכלתי רבי מאיר מחייב. אמר רבי מאיר ומה אם למיתה חמורה הביאוהו לא יביאוהו לקורבן הקל. אמרו לו מה אם ירצה לומר מזיד הייתי פטור" (Keritot 3:1).

• Dikduk/Leshon Nuance: The Rabbanan's response, "מה אם ירצה לומר מזיד הייתי פטור" ("what if he wishes to say, 'I did so intentionally,' in which case he would be exempt"), is the classic formulation of a mi'go (lit. "since he could have said..."), a presumptive argument for credibility.

Readings

• Rambam (Mishnah Commentary, Keritot 3:1): Explains the Rabbanan's exemption by citing "או הודע אליו חטאתו" (Vayikra 4:23), positing that chatas liability requires the individual's self-awareness of the sin, not merely external notification. Thus, if he denies it, he's exempt.
• Rashash (Keritot 3:1): Questions Rambam's use of "או הודע." He notes the Gemara (Keritot 11b) applies this verse to one who is uncertain ("איני יודע"), not one who denies. For denial, the Gemara's primary rationale for the Rabbanan is indeed the mi'go – "אדם נאמן על עצמו" (a person is believed concerning himself) because he could claim mezid (intentionality) and avoid the chatas anyway.

Friction

• Kushya: The Rashash's challenge to the Rambam is precise: How can the Rambam ground the Rabbanan's exemption in "או הודע" when the Gemara offers a different, context-specific reason (the mi'go) for a denying party, reserving "או הודע" for cases of uncertainty?
• Terutz: ME"Y (Keritot 3:1:8-31) suggests the Rabbanan's mi'go points to a deeper re'ayoni principle. A korban chatas isn't merely a judicial penalty but a means of atonement requiring the sinner's ratzon (will/desire for expiation). If one denies the sin, he inherently lacks this ratzon, rendering the korban ineffective. The mi'go argument is thus the halachic articulation of this underlying spiritual prerequisite for chatas.

Intertext

Mishnah Arachin 5:6 states, "חייבי חטאות ואשמות אין ממשכנין אותן... כופין אותו עד שיאמר 'רוצה אני'." This highlights the ratzon requirement for certain korbanot and even gittin, reinforcing the notion that atonement (or divorce) cannot be entirely forced upon an unwilling individual (ME"Y Keritot 3:1:32-47).

Psak/Practice

The halacha follows the Rabbanan: one who denies having sinned unwittingly, even when confronted by two witnesses, is exempt from a chatas. This is because he could claim he acted intentionally ("מזיד הייתי"), which would exempt him from a chatas (though incur karet). This mi'go makes him credible. "אין הלכה כר' מאיר" (Rambam, Mishnah Commentary, Keritot 3:1).

Takeaway

The chatas is unique in demanding the sinner's subjective acceptance and ratzon for atonement, demonstrating that divine decrees are not mere legalities but require internal spiritual engagement.