Mishnah Keritot 5:6-7

Sugya Map

This sugya from Mishnah Keritot 5:6-7 is a dense tapestry, initially addressing the karet liability for consuming dam ha'nefesh (lifeblood) and then swiftly transitioning into the intricate laws of asham talui (provisional guilt offering), particularly in cases of safek me'ila (uncertain misuse of consecrated property) and the broader scope of safek chatat (uncertain sin offering). The core of the sugya revolves around:

Issue

The scope and application of the Asham Talui, specifically whether it applies to cases of safek me'ila (as per R' Akiva) or exclusively to safek chatat (as per the Rabbanan), and the permissibility of communal or conditional offerings (korbanot b'shutfut u'b'tnai) for resolving shared uncertainties.

Nafka Mina(s)

1. Scope of Asham Talui: When is one obligated to bring an asham talui? Does it extend beyond safek chatat to safek me'ila? This impacts liability in numerous scenarios involving consecrated property.
2. Resolution of Multiple Sfekot: How does one resolve a situation where multiple potential transgressions (e.g., cheilev, me'ila, notar) might have occurred, but only one asham talui can be brought?
3. Partnership in Korbanot: Can multiple individuals jointly bring a single korban chatat or asham, especially when the actual liable party is uncertain, and can such an offering be made conditionally (b'tnai)? This has implications for the very nature of personal atonement.

Primary Sources

• Mishnah Keritot 5:6-7
• Vayikra 5:15-19 (Source for Asham Me'ilot and Asham Talui)
• Vayikra 7:23-25 (Prohibition of Cheilev)
• Vayikra 19:6-7 (Prohibition of Notar)

Text Snapshot

The Mishnah opens with a seemingly disparate halakha concerning blood consumption, then pivots sharply to its central theme:

• "אכל כזית דם... חייב עליו. דם הטחול, דם הלב... פטור. רבי יהודה מחייב בדם תמצית." (Keritot 5:6)
  • This initial segment distinguishes between dam ha'nefesh (blood upon which the soul depends), which incurs karet, and other types of blood. R' Yehuda's dissent on dam tamtzit (exudate blood) is a classic machloket on the precise definition of dam ha'nefesh. While interesting, its connection to the subsequent sugya on asham talui is tangential, perhaps serving as an introductory example of liability.
• "רבי עקיבא מחייב אשם תלוי על ספק מעילה. וחכמים פוטרים." (Keritot 5:6)
  • This is the foundational machloket of the sugya. R' Akiva broadens the scope of asham talui to safek me'ila, while the Rabbanan restrict it to safek chatat. The dikduk of "על ספק מעילה" is crucial here, highlighting the direct application to misuse of consecrated property.
• "חתיכה של חולין וחתיכה של קודש, אכל אחת מהן ואינו יודע אי זו אכל, פטור. רבי עקיבא מחייב אשם תלוי." (Keritot 5:7)
  • This sets up the first of several complex scenarios of uncertainty. The Rabbanan's exemption here is consistent with their stance that asham talui doesn't apply to safek me'ila. R' Akiva's liability is equally consistent.
• "חתיכה של חלב וחתיכה של קודש, אכל אחת מהן ואינו יודע אי זו אכל, מביא אשם תלוי." (Keritot 5:7)
  • Here, surprisingly, there appears to be an anonymous Mishnah ruling for asham talui. This implies agreement between R' Akiva and the Rabbanan, a point of significant lomdus as explored below. The term "קודש" in this context, when juxtaposed with "חלב" (forbidden fat), is understood by commentators as consecrated meat that is permitted to eat (e.g., cheilev heter or basar kodesh), not forbidden consecrated fat.
• "רבי שמעון אומר שניהם מביאין חטאת ואשם. רבי יוסי אומר אין שנים מביאין חטאת ואשם." (Keritot 5:7, various scenarios)
  • This repeated machloket between R' Shimon and R' Yosei is central to the second part of the Mishnah. R' Shimon allows partners to bring a single korban (with a tnai or condition), while R' Yosei fundamentally rejects the concept of shared atonement offerings. The dikduk "שניהם מביאין אחד" (both bring one) vs. "אין שנים מביאין" (two do not bring) directly highlights this principled dispute regarding the individuality of the korban obligation.

Readings

The commentaries illuminate the subtle distinctions and underlying principles at play, particularly concerning the apparent agreement in the Mishnah's "חתיכה של חלב וחתיכה של קודש" case.

Rambam: One Asham Talui for Two Sfekot

The Rambam on Mishnah Keritot 5:6:1 offers a critical insight into the seemingly agreed-upon case of "חתיכה של חלב וחתיכה של קודש":

חתיכה של קדש וחתיכה של חלב אכל את אחת כו': לא אמר ר"ע כאן כלום לפי שדין זה השוו בו דעתו ודעת חכמים לפי שחכמים חייבו אשם תלוי מחמת החלב לבדו והוא מחייב בזה מחמת החלב ומחמת הקדש לפי שהאשם תלוי אחד והוא צריך על שתי הספקות בשותפות יחד ורבי יוסי הוא מאמר ת"ק שאין מביאין שנים חטאת בשותפות ואשם בשותפות וכן הלכה. (Rambam on Mishnah Keritot 5:6:1)

Translation: "A piece of consecrated [meat] and a piece of fat, he ate one of them etc. R' Akiva said nothing here, because in this law, his opinion and the opinion of the Sages are equal. For the Sages obligated an asham talui only on account of the fat alone, and he [R' Akiva] obligates here on account of the fat and on account of the consecrated [meat], because the asham talui is one, and he needs it for both uncertainties together. And R' Yosei's statement is the statement of the Tanna Kamma that two do not bring a chatat in partnership and an asham in partnership, and so is the halakha."

Chiddush: The Rambam explains that the agreement between R' Akiva and the Rabbanan in this specific scenario is not due to a convergence of their fundamental principles, but rather a practical outcome. The Rabbanan, who generally exempt asham talui for safek me'ila, would still obligate an asham talui due to the safek cheilev (uncertainty of eating forbidden fat), which is a safek chatat. R' Akiva, conversely, would obligate an asham talui for either the safek cheilev or the safek me'ila. Since one only brings a single asham talui to cover all relevant sfekot for which an asham talui is mandated, both parties arrive at the same conclusion: an asham talui is brought. The Rambam further notes that R' Yosei's position regarding the inability of two people to bring a single korban is the accepted halakha.

Mishnat Eretz Yisrael: Differentiating the Underlying Principles

The Mishnat Eretz Yisrael on Mishnah Keritot 5:6:1-2 further elaborates on this apparent agreement:

חתיכה שלחלב – חולין, וחתיכה שלקודש – המותרת לאכילה (שאינה חלב), אכל את אחד מהן ואין ידוע איזו מהן אכל – או שאכל חלב או שמעל, מביא אשם תלוי – אף על פי שמכל מקום חטא, הרי לשיטת חכמים אלו חטאים שונים. על ספק אכילת חלב צריך להביא אשם תלוי, ועל ספק מעילה פטור. לשיטת רבי עקיבא על ספק אכילת חלב יביא אשם תלוי, ועל ספק מעילה צריך להביא אשם תלוי, ומכיוון שחטא רק באחד החטאים יביא רק אשם תלוי אחד. אם כן זה מקרה שבו אין מחלוקת רבי עקיבא וחכמים. (Mishnat Eretz Yisrael on Mishnah Keritot 5:6:1-2)

Translation: "A piece of non-sacred fat and a piece of consecrated [meat] – permitted to eat (which is not fat) – he ate one of them and it is not known which he ate – either he ate fat or he misused, he brings an asham talui – even though in any case he sinned, these are different sins according to the Sages. For uncertainty of eating fat, one must bring an asham talui, and for uncertainty of misuse, one is exempt. According to R' Akiva, for uncertainty of eating fat, he brings an asham talui, and for uncertainty of misuse, he must bring an asham talui. And since he only sinned with one of the sins, he brings only one asham talui. Therefore, this is a case where there is no dispute between R' Akiva and the Sages."

Chiddush: This commentary explicitly clarifies the distinct reasoning for the "agreement." The Rabbanan's exemption for safek me'ila is clear, but safek cheilev unequivocally triggers an asham talui. R' Akiva, with his broader view, would obligate an asham talui for either safek cheilev or safek me'ila. Since the individual is only liable for one sin, and an asham talui covers such unknown transgressions, the practical outcome is identical despite the theoretical disagreement on the scope of the asham talui.

Yachin: Elucidating the Asham Talui Mechanism

The Yachin on Mishnah Keritot 5:32:1 further elaborates on this point:

מביא אשם תלוי אפילו למאי דקיי"ל דאין אשם תלוי במעילות, הכא חייב משום ספק חלב... ולר"ע דס"ל יש אשם תלוי במעילות, יוצא הכא באשם א' ממ"נ, אי משום ספק חלב או ספק קודש. (Yachin on Mishnah Keritot 5:32:1)

Translation: "He brings an asham talui – even according to what we hold that there is no asham talui for me'ilot, here he is liable because of the uncertainty of cheilev... And according to R' Akiva who holds there is asham talui for me'ilot, he fulfills his obligation here with one asham in any case, whether for safek cheilev or safek kodesh."

Chiddush: The Yachin reinforces the previous commentaries, emphasizing that even if the halakha generally follows the Rabbanan that asham talui does not apply to me'ila, in the cheilev/kodesh scenario, the safek cheilev alone is sufficient to obligate an asham talui. For R' Akiva, the single asham talui serves as a catch-all for either potential transgression.

Friction

The Conundrum of the Concurrence

Kushya: How can the Mishnah present a scenario ("חתיכה של חלב וחתיכה של קודש") where R' Akiva and the Rabbanan, who fundamentally disagree on the application of asham talui to me'ila in Mishnah 5:6, appear to concur without comment in Mishnah 5:7? The Rabbanan explicitly exempt asham talui for safek me'ila, while R' Akiva obligates it. If one piece is cheilev (forbidden fat, a chatat) and the other is kodesh (consecrated, potentially me'ila), and the individual ate one, there's a safek chatat and a safek me'ila. If the Rabbanan don't hold of asham talui for me'ila, why would they agree to bring one here?

Terutz: The solution, as clarified by the Rambam, Mishnat Eretz Yisrael, and Yachin, lies in the nature of the asham talui and the specific combination of sfekot. The asham talui is brought for a safek chatat (Vayikra 5:17-19). Eating cheilev is a definite chatat transgression. Therefore, in the case of "חתיכה של חלב וחתיכה של קודש," there is a clear safek chatat (did he eat the cheilev?). Since a safek chatat unequivocally warrants an asham talui according to all opinions, the Rabbanan would obligate it on this basis alone. R' Akiva, who applies asham talui to safek me'ila as well, would likewise obligate an asham talui. Crucially, one only brings one asham talui for all potential unknown transgressions that would individually trigger an asham talui. As the Rambam states, "האשם תלוי אחד והוא צריך על שתי הספקות בשותפות יחד" (the asham talui is one, and he needs it for both uncertainties together). Thus, the agreement is not on the principle of asham talui for me'ila, but on the practical outcome that an asham talui is brought because at least one of the sfekot (the cheilev) certainly triggers it. The asham talui becomes a general atonement for the safek of a chatat-level transgression, encompassing any other safek that might also apply if one holds of it.

The Problem of Shared Atonement

Kushya: R' Shimon and R' Yosei are locked in a fundamental dispute regarding the permissibility of two individuals bringing a single korban chatat or asham conditionally. What is the root of this disagreement? R' Shimon allows it ("שניהם מביאין אחד"), while R' Yosei staunchly rejects it ("אין שנים מביאין").

Terutz: The heart of this machloket likely lies in the understanding of the korban as a personal act of atonement. R' Yosei's position, "אין שנים מביאין," reflects a strict interpretation that a chatat or asham is inherently a singular, personal obligation. It is brought by one individual for their specific sin, or for their specific safek of sin. To introduce a partnership, particularly with a condition (tnai), undermines the clarity and personal nature required for such a profound act of atonement. The korban is not merely a monetary contribution; it is a physical manifestation of the sinner's return to God, and that connection must be unambiguous. The Gemara in Keritot 25a explicitly supports R' Yosei, stating: "תניא רבי יוסי אומר אין שנים מביאין חטאת אחת אלא שנים מביאין שתי חטאות" (R' Yosei says two do not bring one chatat, rather two bring two chatatot). This suggests that even if both are liable, they must each bring their own. R' Shimon, conversely, might view the korban as a means to achieve atonement for an actual sin that definitely occurred, even if the specific liable party is uncertain. As long as one of the partners is certainly liable, and the tnai clarifies for whom the korban is ultimately dedicated, R' Shimon might consider the korban valid. He perhaps focuses on the efficacy of the korban in achieving its purpose rather than the absolute singularity of the individual's offering. However, the halakha ultimately follows R' Yosei, emphasizing the personal and precise nature of atonement offerings.

Intertext

The Scriptural Basis of Asham Talui

The concept of the Asham Talui is rooted in Vayikra 5:17-19:

וְאִם נֶפֶשׁ תֶּחֱטָא וְעָשְׂתָה אַחַת מִכָּל מִצְוֺת ה' אֲשֶׁר לֹא תֵעָשֶׂינָה וְלֹא יָדַע וְאָשֵׁם וְנָשָׂא עֲוֺנוֹ: וְהֵבִיא אֵיל כֶּבֶשׂ תָּמִים מֵהָעֵדֶר בְּעֶרְכְּךָ כֶּסֶף שְׁקָלִים לְאָשָׁם אֶל הַכֹּהֵן וְכִפֶּר עָלָיו הַכֹּהֵן עַל שִׁגְגָתוֹ אֲשֶׁר שָׁגָה וְהוּא לֹא יָדַע וְנִסְלַח לוֹ: (Vayikra 5:17-18)

Translation: "If a soul sins and does any of the things which are forbidden by the commandments of Hashem, though he knew it not, yet he is guilty and shall bear his iniquity. And he shall bring a ram without blemish out of the flock, according to your valuation, silver shekels, for a guilt offering to the priest; and the priest shall make atonement for him concerning his error which he committed unknowingly, and it shall be forgiven him." This passage explicitly introduces the idea of bringing an offering for an unknown sin, providing the textual foundation for the asham talui. The Mishnah in Keritot builds upon this by delineating the precise scenarios and types of uncertainty that trigger this obligation, and the debates surrounding its scope, as seen in R' Akiva's position on safek me'ila.

The Individuality of Offerings in Halakha

The machloket between R' Shimon and R' Yosei regarding shared korbanot echoes broader principles in halakha concerning the personal nature of sacrificial atonement. While not a direct pasuk, the Gemara in Keritot 25a explicitly clarifies R' Yosei's view:

תניא רבי יוסי אומר אין שנים מביאין חטאת אחת אלא שנים מביאין שתי חטאות (Keritot 25a)

Translation: "It was taught: Rabbi Yosei says: Two people do not bring one chatat; rather, two people bring two chatatot." This statement directly supports R' Yosei's position in our Mishnah, establishing a fundamental principle that chatatot (and by extension ashamot, as they are also atonement offerings for specific transgressions) are individual obligations. This principle has ramifications beyond just korbanot, influencing the understanding of personal responsibility and atonement in Jewish thought. For instance, the Korban Pesach (Pesachim 96a) can be brought by a group, but that is a communal offering with a different nature and purpose than a chatat or asham, which are expiatory.

Psak/Practice

The halakha unequivocally follows the opinion of Rabbi Yosei regarding communal offerings and the Rabbanan regarding the scope of Asham Talui. The Rambam explicitly states concerning R' Yosei's view: "וכן הלכה" (and so is the halakha). This means that:

1. No Shared Korbanot for Atonement: Two or more individuals cannot bring a single korban chatat or asham in partnership, even if they stipulate conditions. Each individual who is liable for such an offering must bring their own. This reflects the deeply personal nature of atonement for specific transgressions.
2. Scope of Asham Talui: The halakha aligns with the Rabbanan that an asham talui is generally brought only for safek chatat (uncertainty regarding a transgression punishable by karet or chatat), not for safek me'ila (uncertain misuse of consecrated property). However, as seen in the "חתיכה של חלב וחתיכה של קודש" case, if a safek chatat (like safek cheilev) is present alongside a safek me'ila, an asham talui is still brought due to the safek chatat, and it covers all relevant sfekot.
3. Dam Ha'nefesh: The initial halakha regarding dam ha'nefesh remains fundamental: consuming dam ha'nefesh (lifeblood) incurs karet (or chatat for unintentional consumption), while other types of blood are permitted. This is codified in Shulchan Aruch Yoreh De'ah 68:1-2.

While korbanot are not currently offered, the principles derived from these discussions continue to inform our understanding of personal responsibility, the nature of sin and atonement, and the meticulousness required in halakhic observance.

Takeaway

The Mishnah in Keritot 5:6-7 masterfully navigates the complexities of uncertainty in halakha, highlighting the nuanced application of the Asham Talui and underscoring the distinctly personal nature of atonement offerings. It's a vivid demonstration of how even apparent agreements between Sages can mask profound underlying machlokot.