Mishnah Keritot 6:2-3

Sugya Map

This sugya in Mishnah Keritot presents a multifaceted analysis of kedushah (sanctity), kippur (atonement), and the fate of consecrated items when their underlying premise is nullified or resolved. The Mishnah meticulously compares the asham talui (provisional guilt offering) to other categories, revealing intricate distinctions in halakhic status and disposal.

• Core Issue: The fundamental difference in halakha between hekdesh b'ta'ut (mistaken consecration) and a valid hekdesh that subsequently becomes pasul (disqualified), particularly when the original justification for the consecration or ritual act is later disproven or resolved.
• Nafka Mina(s):
  • Disposal Mechanism: Whether the item reverts to chulin (non-sacred) and grazes, or retains a form of kedushah requiring specific disposal (e.g., sale for eimei hanesakim, burial, burning).
  • Point of Irreversibility: At what stage of the ritual process does an act become irreversible in its halakhic effect, even if its initial premise was flawed?
  • Nature of Kippur: The distinction between kippur based on vadai (certainty) and kippur based on safek (uncertainty), and how each impacts the kedushah of the offering.
  • Subjectivity vs. Objectivity in Halakha: The role of "לב נוקפו" (a pricking heart) in establishing a valid chiyuv (obligation) and kedushah, versus reliance on objective facts or testimony.
  • Communal Atonement: The unique nature of eglah arufah as a ritual of kippur for communal safek, and its completion mid'eved.
• Primary Sources:
  • Mishnah Keritot 6:2-3
  • Babylonian Talmud Keritot 24b
  • Tosefta Keritot 3:3 (ed. Zuckermandel, p. 566)
  • Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Pesulei HaMukdashin 18:13-14
  • Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Me'ilah 8:8-9
  • Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Niskei Mamon 10:2
  • Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Rotze'ach U'Shmirat Nefesh 9:10
  • Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Parah Adumah 15:10

Text Snapshot

The Mishnah (Keritot 6:2-3) opens our inquiry with the asham talui, the provisional guilt offering:

"המביא אשם תלוי, ונודע לו שלא חטא, אם עד שלא נשחט – יצא וירעה בעדר, דברי רבי מאיר. וחכמים אומרים: ירעה עד שיפול בו מום, ויימכר, ודמיו לנדבה. רבי אליעזר אומר: יקרב, אם אינו בא על זה, בא על אחר. נודע לו משנשחט – הדם יישפך, והבשר ייצא לבית השריפה. נזרק הדם והבשר קיים – ייאכל. רבי יוסי אומר: אף הדם שבכוס – ייזרק, והבשר ייאכל." (Mishnah Keritot 6:2)

The nuance in R. Meir's "יצא וירעה בעדר" (it shall emerge and graze with the flock) suggests it was chulin (non-sacred) from the outset, implying a hekdesh b'ta'ut. The Rabbanan's "ירעה עד שיפול בו מום, ויימכר, ודמיו לנדבה" (it shall graze until it becomes blemished; and then it shall be sold, and the money received for it shall be allocated for communal gift offerings) signals a valid kedushah that has become pasul, transforming into damei nedavah. R. Eliezer's radical "יקרב, אם אינו בא על זה, בא על אחר" (it shall be sacrificed, as if it does not come to atone for this sin, it comes to atone for another sin) asserts the offering's inherent kippur capacity, even for a safek d'safek. The progression through shechitah (slaughter), shefichat hadam (blood pouring), and zrikat hadam (blood sprinkling) reveals escalating stages of ritual commitment, with R. Yosei extending achilah (eating) even if the blood was in the cup when the truth was discovered, provided it's subsequently sprinkled.

The Mishnah then contrasts this with the asham vadai:

"אשם ודאי אינו כן: אם עד שלא נשחט, יצא וירעה בעדר. משנשחט – הרי זה ייקבר. נזרק הדם – הבשר יצא לבית השריפה." (Mishnah Keritot 6:2)

Here, the absence of dispute over "יצא וירעה" pre-slaughter signifies universal agreement that asham vadai is hekdesh b'ta'ut if the sin is disproven. The dinim shift from kevurah (burial) after slaughter to sereifah (burning) after sprinkling, highlighting a critical distinction between chulin ba'azarah (non-sacred items in the Temple courtyard) and pesulei mukdashim (disqualified consecrated items).

Further comparisons clarify different halakhic categories:

"שור הניסקל אינו כן: אם עד שלא ניסקל, יצא וירעה בעדר. משניסקל – מותר בהנייה. עגלה ערופה אינה כן: אם עד שלא נערפה, תצא ותרעה בעדר. משנערפה – תיקבר במקומה, שעל ספק באת מתחילתה, כיפרה ספיקה והלכה לה." (Mishnah Keritot 6:2-3)

The shor haniskal (stoned ox) demonstrates that a din nefashot (capital law) fulfilled mid'eved renders the ox mutar b'hana'ah. The eglah arufah (broken-necked heifer) is unique; its arifa (neck-breaking) explicitly fulfills its kippur for safek, solidifying its ritual efficacy mid'eved ("כיפרה ספיקה והלכה לה"). These cases delineate how different forms of kedushah, issur, and kippur interact with the resolution of underlying uncertainty.

Readings

Rambam: The Systematic Framework of Kedushah and Stages of Kippur

Rambam, in his Perush haMishnayot on our sugya, offers a terse, almost dismissive, remark: "הכל מבואר ואין צריך פירוש" (Keritot 6:2:1). This apparent simplicity, however, often masks a deep, self-evident shiṭṭah that he later elaborates in Mishneh Torah. His codification reveals a highly structured understanding of kedushah and its interaction with the resolution of underlying facts.

Rambam aligns his psak with the Rabbanan's view regarding the asham talui. He rules that if the uncertainty is resolved before slaughter, the asham talui "ירעה עד שיפול בו מום ויימכר ודמיו לנדבה" (Hilkhot Pesulei HaMukdashin 18:13). This is a pivotal point: for Rambam, the asham talui, brought due to safek, establishes a legitimate, albeit conditional, kedushah. This kedushah is not retroactively nullified as hekdesh b'ta'ut if the safek is resolved pre-slaughter. The "לב נוקפו" – the internal, Torah-mandated response to uncertainty – is sufficient to create a valid act of consecration. When the safek is resolved, the animal is no longer fit for its original purpose, rendering it pasul, but not chulin. Its residual kedushah is thus converted into damei nedavah (money for communal gift offerings).

This stands in stark contrast to the asham vadai. Rambam rules that if the certainty of sin is nullified before slaughter, the animal "יצא וירעה בעדר" (Hilkhot Pesulei HaMukdashin 18:13). This is a classic case of hekdesh b'ta'ut. The asham vadai is predicated on an objective chiyuv. If that chiyuv never existed, the consecration was based on a false premise and is null ab initio. Thus, the animal reverts to chulin. The chiddush from Rambam is this clear demarcation: asham vadai relies on an objective truth, while asham talui relies on the subjective reality of safek as a valid halakhic trigger.

Rambam further details the dinim for asham vadai based on the stage of avodah. If the safek is resolved after slaughter, it is buried ("משנשחט הרי זה ייקבר" Hilkhot Pesulei HaMukdashin 18:13). If resolved after the blood is sprinkled, the meat is burned ("נזרק הדם הבשר יצא לבית השריפה" Hilkhot Pesulei HaMukdashin 18:13). This precise staging, mirroring the Mishnah, reveals Rambam's understanding of the escalating kedushah and the point of no return for an offering. Kevurah is the din for chulin ba'azarah, while sereifah is for pesulei mukdashim. Although Rambam states for asham vadai that it is "חולין מעיקרו" (Hilkhot Pesulei HaMukdashin 18:13), the post-slaughter kevurah is a gezeirat haketuvim to prevent me'ilah from its dust (Hilkhot Me'ilah 8:8). The sereifah after zrikat hadam, however, is for an item that appears to be a pasul offering, demonstrating that even a ritual act performed on an hekdesh b'ta'ut can alter its subsequent din of disposal, aligning it with pesulei mukdashim.

For the non-korban examples, Rambam maintains consistency. For shor haniskal, he rules: "אם נודע שזיכו את בעליו קודם סקילה יצא וירעה בעדר. ואם נודע אחר שנסקל מותר בהנאה" (Hilkhot Niskei Mamon 10:2). This illustrates that the din skilah (stoning) is a din nefashot that, once performed, removes the issur hana'ah (prohibition of benefit), regardless of the ox's objective guilt. The ritual act itself fulfills the din.

Similarly, for eglah arufah, Rambam codifies the Mishnah's explicit reasoning: "הרי זו תיקבר במקומה מפני שעל ספק באת מתחילתה וכיפרה ספיקה והלכה לה" (Hilkhot Rotze'ach U'Shmirat Nefesh 9:10). This is a unique instance where a ritual performed on safek is explicitly stated to achieve kippur and fulfill its purpose mid'eved. The eglah arufah atones not for a specific sin, but for a communal lack of responsibility leading to safek of a murderer. Once arifa is performed, the communal kippur is achieved, irrespective of a later discovery. This reinforces the principle that safek can be a valid basis for a din that, once completed, is irreversible in its efficacy.

Rambam's chiddush lies in his systematic delineation of these categories, emphasizing how the nature of the chiyuv (objective vs. subjective) and the stage of ritual performance dictate the halakhic fate of the item.

Yachin: The "לב נוקפו" and the Subjective Foundation of Kedushah

The Yachin commentary, particularly on Keritot 6:11:1, offers a profound chiddush that unlocks the Rabbanan's distinction regarding asham talui versus asham vadai when the underlying premise is nullified before slaughter. Yachin notes: "ולא פליגי רבנן כלעיל, דהתם מדלבו נוקפו מספק גמר ומקדיש. אבל הכא עיקר סמיכתו על העדים, או על מחשבתו שסבור שוודאי חטא, ומדנודע השתא שטעה לגמרי, בטעות הקדישו." (Yachin, Keritot 6:11:1).

Yachin posits that the chiddush is in the source of the kedushah. For an asham vadai, the consecration is "עיקר סמיכתו על העדים, או על מחשבתו שסבור שוודאי חטא" (its main reliance is on witnesses, or on his thought that he certainly sinned). This is an objective basis. If this basis proves false ("מדנודע השתא שטעה לגמרי" – now it became completely known that he erred), then the hekdesh was "בטעות הקדישו" (he consecrated it in error) – a classic hekdesh b'ta'ut, hence it's chulin.

Conversely, the asham talui's motivation stems from "מדלבו נוקפו מספק" (because his heart pricks him due to uncertainty). This "לב נוקפו" is not merely a psychological state; it is a subjective, internal chiyuv that the Torah itself mandates. The safek itself is the "truth" that drives the hekdesh. Therefore, even if the external safek is later resolved, the hekdesh was validly made based on this internal, Torah-mandated state of uncertainty. It is not hekdesh b'ta'ut, but rather a hekdesh that has become pasul for its original purpose. This explains the Rabbanan's ruling that it retains residual kedushah and its value goes to damei nedavah.

This chiddush from Yachin has deep implications for the philosophy of kedushah. It suggests that kedushah can be generated not only by objective fact but also by a subjective, Torah-mandated response to uncertainty. The validity of hekdesh is dependent on the type of chiyuv – whether externally verifiable or internally generated by the Torah's command to address safek.

Yachin further addresses the kushya regarding asham vadai where zrikat hadam leads to sereifah even though it's hekdesh b'ta'ut (Keritot 6:13:1). He explains that after zrikat hadam, it "מחזי כזבח פסול" (looks like a disqualified offering). The sereifah in beit hadeshen (place of ashes) prevents me'ilah or improper benefit because "ובדילי אינשי משם ואין לחוש שמא יהנה מעפרן" (people distance themselves from there, and there is no concern that one might benefit from its dust). The chiddush here is that halakha sometimes prioritizes mar'it ayin (appearance) and the pragmatic prevention of transgression over a strict ontological classification of the object. The ritual act itself, even if technically void ab initio, creates a new halakhic reality for the item's disposal.

In sum, Yachin, through his focus on "לב נוקפו," reveals that halakha acknowledges the power of subjective obligation to establish objective kedushah. This nuanced understanding allows for a deeper appreciation of the Mishnah's distinctions and the philosophical underpinnings of korbanot and ritual efficacy.

Friction

The Asham Vadai Paradox: Burial vs. Burning After Hekdesh B'Ta'ut

One of the most acute kushyot in our sugya, prominently highlighted by Yachin (Keritot 6:13:1) and alluded to by Mishnat Eretz Yisrael (Keritot 6:2:1-3), concerns the divergent dinim for an asham vadai when the certainty of sin is nullified mid'eved. The Mishnah states: "אשם ודאי אינו כן... משנשחט – הרי זה ייקבר. נזרק הדם – הבשר יצא לבית השריפה." (Keritot 6:2). The apparent contradiction is stark: if the asham vadai is discovered to be hekdesh b'ta'ut (mistaken consecration) – a consensus view when the premise is false, as Yachin affirms for asham vadai that "דמדהקדיש בטעות הו"ל חולין בעזרה" (Yachin, Keritot 6:12:1) – then its status is chulin ba'azarah (non-sacred items in the Temple courtyard). The established halakha for chulin ba'azarah is kevurah (burial), as explicitly stated in Temurah 28a, to prevent me'ilah from their dust. Yachin articulates the problem forcefully: "ואת"ל כיון שהפרישו לוודאי ונודע לו שלא חטא הקדש בטעות היא דאינו קדוש [כנזיר רפ"ה] והו"ל חולין בעזרה שדינן בקבורה [כשלהי תמורה] וכל הנקברים לא ישרפו כמבואר שם." (Yachin, Keritot 6:13:1). If it's hekdesh b'ta'ut from the outset, it's chulin ba'azarah and should consistently be buried. Why, then, does the act of zrikat hadam (sprinkling the blood) abruptly shift its din to sereifah (burning), a din typically reserved for pesulei mukdashim (disqualified consecrated items) that once possessed genuine kedushah? This appears to blur the fundamental distinction between items that never had kedushah and those that lost it.

Terutz: The Pragmatics of Ritual and Public Perception

Yachin's terutz offers a sophisticated resolution, positing that the shift from kevurah to sereifah is not due to the asham vadai somehow acquiring kedushah mid'eved. Rather, it is a gezeirah (rabbinic decree or scriptural directive) rooted in a confluence of pragmatic and preventative halakhic concerns, namely mar'it ayin (appearance) and the prevention of me'ilah.

Yachin argues that once the blood of the slaughtered animal is sprinkled, even if the consecration was fundamentally flawed, the item "מחזי כזבח פסול" (looks like a disqualified offering). To the public eye, witnessing the zrikat hadam, the animal has undergone a significant, irreversible stage of Temple service. It now appears to be a pasul offering that once held sanctity. To bury it, as one would ordinary chulin ba'azarah, might create confusion or diminish the reverence for the sacrificial service, blurring the lines between truly non-sacred items and those that have touched the realm of kedushah. The sereifah, typically associated with pesulei mukdashim, brings its disposal into conformity with this perceived status.

Furthermore, Yachin elaborates on the prevention of benefit. While chulin ba'azarah are buried to prevent me'ilah from their dust, pesulei mukdashim are burned in beit hadeshen (the specific place for ashes of offerings). He explains that beit hadeshen is inherently associated with kedushah and issur. Even if, technically, one might not incur me'ilah by benefiting from the ashes of a pasul offering (since its mitzva of sereifah has been performed), there remains an issur (prohibition) against such benefit. Crucially, "ובדילי אינשי משם ואין לחוש שמא יהנה מעפרן" (and people distance themselves from there, and there is no concern that one might benefit from its dust). The sereifah in beit hadeshen thus serves the same function as kevurah for chulin ba'azarah – preventing benefit – but achieves it through a different, contextually appropriate mechanism. The zrikat hadam, by elevating the item's perceived status, makes sereifah the more suitable, and equally effective, method of preventing benefit, rather than kevurah.

This terutz reveals a sophisticated halakhic heuristic: halakha is not purely an exercise in ontological classification. It dynamically incorporates public perception and pragmatic considerations to prevent transgression. The ritual act of zrikat hadam, even when performed on an item that was hekdesh b'ta'ut, has sufficient halakhic weight to alter the item's subsequent disposal, aligning it with the dinim of items that did possess true kedushah but became pasul. The act itself, regardless of underlying nullity, creates a new halakhic reality for the item's ultimate disposition.

The Rabbanan's Asham Talui: Not Hekdesh B'Ta'ut?

A second point of friction concerns the Rabbanan's position on asham talui. While they concur with R. Meir that an asham vadai reverts to chulin if the sin is disproven before slaughter, they fundamentally diverge on asham talui: "וחכמים אומרים: ירעה עד שיפול בו מום, ויימכר, ודמיו לנדבה." (Keritot 6:2). The kushya is patent: if the individual did not sin, then the basis for the asham talui is gone. Why, then, for the Rabbanan, is it not considered hekdesh b'ta'ut, thereby reverting to chulin like R. Meir's view on asham talui or the unanimous view on asham vadai? The objective fact of "שלא חטא" (that he did not sin) seems to apply equally to both.

Terutz: The Validity of Subjective Obligation and "לב נוקפו"

The terutz for this friction lies in the unique nature of the chiyuv for an asham talui, as eloquently articulated by Yachin and implied by Rishonim like Rashi (e.g., Zevachim 2a s.v. אשם תלוי). The asham talui is not brought because of a certain sin, but because of a certainty of uncertainty ("ודאי ספק"). The Torah explicitly mandates an asham talui for this specific state of safek. As Yachin states, "מדלבו נוקפו מספק גמר ומקדיש" (Yachot, Keritot 6:11:1). The "לב נוקפו" – the pricking of the heart due to uncertainty – is not merely a psychological condition; it is the very cause for the chiyuv, a divinely instituted obligation to address the safek.

Therefore, when one consecrates an asham talui, the hekdesh is entirely valid; it is not mistaken. The safek itself is the legitimate basis for the kedushah. When the safek is subsequently resolved and it is known that no sin occurred, the animal is no longer suitable for that specific asham talui. It becomes pasul for its original purpose, but it never loses its kedushah entirely. Its initial consecration was perfectly valid according to the Torah's command to respond to safek. Hence, for the Rabbanan, it is not chulin (as R. Meir maintains) but rather retains a residual kedushah that directs its monetary value to eimei hanesakim, a standard din for pesulei mukdashim that cannot be offered. This distinction between asham vadai (based on objective fact) and asham talui (based on subjective, Torah-mandated safek) is fundamental, highlighting that halakha can grant objective validity to subjective experiences, particularly when explicitly addressed by Torah law.

Intertext

Nezirut B'Safek: The Enduring Power of a Vow

A compelling parallel to the asham talui's unique kedushah arising from a subjective safek can be found in the laws of nezirut (Nazirite vow). The Gemara in Nazir 29b discusses a scenario where an individual vows to be a Nazir due to safek – for instance, "הריני נזיר אם עשיתי" (I am a Nazir if I did X), or "הריני נזיר אם לא עשיתי" (I am a Nazir if I did not do X). If the safek is later resolved and it becomes clear that the condition for nezirut was objectively not met, the individual is nonetheless considered a Nazir and must complete the term of nezirut. This is known as "נזיר ספק" or "נזיר על מנת" (a Nazir based on a condition).

The chiddush here is that a vow, even if made under a condition that later proves to be objectively false, can be binding. The nedar (vow) itself establishes a new halakhic reality. Just as the asham talui creates a valid kedushah from "לב נוקפו מספק" (the pricking of the heart due to uncertainty), so too a nedar made contingent on a safek takes effect, even if the safek is resolved mid'eved. The act of nedar, like the act of hekdesh for asham talui, is a performative utterance that generates halakhic facts irrespective of the objective truth of the underlying premise. The vow itself is the "truth" that obligates. This demonstrates a broader principle in halakha where subjective commitment or safek-based action, when legitimately undertaken, can have enduring objective consequences. The subjective intention, once articulated in a halakhically valid framework, creates an objective obligation.

Eglah Arufah and Parah Adumah: Rituals for Ambiguity and Supra-Rational Decrees

The Mishnah itself draws a direct comparison to eglah arufah (Keritot 6:3), explicitly stating: "שעל ספק באת מתחילתה, כיפרה ספיקה והלכה לה" (since it came due to uncertainty from the outset, it atoned for its uncertainty and is gone). This is a unique category, as the eglah arufah is not a korban in the traditional sense, but a ritual of purification and atonement for a communal safek regarding an unknown murderer. Once the arifa (breaking the neck) is performed, the kippur is complete, even if the murderer is subsequently found. As Mishnat Eretz Yisrael observes, this implies that the Mishnah's explanation is "חלקי בלבד" (only partial) (Mishnat Eretz Yisrael, Keritot 6:2:4), as the community's responsibility for security might persist. Nevertheless, the ritual's efficacy for the safek is undeniable. This is a powerful illustration of a ritual act's efficacy not being dependent on the ultimate resolution of an underlying factual ambiguity, but rather on its performance for that ambiguity.

A close relative in this regard is the Parah Adumah (Red Heifer). While not explicitly a safek-based ritual, its ashes are used for purification from tum'at met (impurity of a corpse), a state that often involves elements of safek (e.g., safek tum'ah in certain contexts). More pointedly, the Parah Adumah itself is unique in that it metaher tmei'im u'metaameh tehorim (purifies the impure but renders the pure impure) (Mishnah Parah 7:6). This paradoxical nature underscores its supra-rational, chok (decree) status, where the ritual's efficacy and effects transcend straightforward logical categories. Like the eglah arufah, the Parah Adumah operates on a plane where ritual performance, rather than perfect objective knowledge, is the key to achieving its designated kippur or purification. Rambam, in Hilkhot Parah Adumah 15:10, emphasizes its chok status, stating that one cannot fully comprehend its reasons, linking it to the idea of chokim that defy human rationale. This reinforces the idea that certain rituals, particularly those dealing with ambiguity or meta-physical states, derive their power from divine decree and performance, rather than strict logical congruence with an underlying factual reality.

These intertexts collectively illustrate that halakha possesses a robust framework for dealing with safek and ambiguity, where specific acts (vows, consecrations, rituals) can generate halakhic validity or effect kippur and purification, even when the initial factual premise is later disproven or clarified. The emphasis shifts from objective truth to the divinely mandated or humanly undertaken action in response to safek.

Psak/Practice

Meta-Halakhic Heuristics: The Weight of Subjectivity and Ritual Efficacy

While the direct psak implications of asham talui and Temple offerings are regrettably not immediately relevant in our current state of churban (destruction of the Temple), the meta-halakhic heuristics derived from this sugya are profoundly insightful for understanding the nature of halakha.

The core distinction between asham vadai and asham talui — where one is hekdesh b'ta'ut and the other retains kedushah even after the safek is resolved — illuminates the power of subjective obligation. The Rabbanan's view, codified by Rambam (Hilkhot Pesulei HaMukdashin 18:13), teaches that when the Torah itself mandates a response to safek (e.g., "לב נוקפו"), that subjective doubt becomes an objective, halakhically valid basis for action. This implies that halakha is not solely concerned with empirical, objective truth but also with the internal, human experience of chiyuv and the sincere attempt to fulfill divine will. This principle resonates beyond korbanot, informing areas like nedarim (vows) and shevu'ot (oaths), where individual kavanah (intention) and subjective understanding are often paramount, overriding a purely objective interpretation of the words (e.g., Nedarim 2a).

Similarly, the eglah arufah demonstrates that communal atonement can be achieved through a ritual act performed for safek, solidifying the efficacy of ma'aseh mitzvah (performance of a commandment) even in ambiguous circumstances. This underscores that ritual performance itself, when divinely mandated, possesses inherent power to effect kippur or change status, independent of a clean, objective factual predicate.

Furthermore, the discussion of kevurah vs. sereifah for asham vadai highlights that halakha dynamically integrates pragmatic concerns like mar'it ayin (appearance) and the prevention of me'ilah into its final psak. This illustrates a sophisticated halakhic system that balances strict ontological classification with practical considerations for maintaining the sanctity of the Mikdash and preventing transgression. These heuristics remind us that halakha is a dynamic, multi-layered system that engages with objective fact, subjective experience, ritual performance, and societal perception to establish its norms, offering a robust framework for navigating the complexities of human experience in light of divine law.

Takeaway

The sugya reveals halakha's nuanced approach to kedushah and kippur, demonstrating that subjective safek, when divinely mandated, can establish an objective and enduring halakhic reality, and that ritual performance can transform an item's status beyond its initial designation.

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Footnotes

1. Mishnah Keritot 6:2.
2. Mishnah Keritot 6:2.
3. Mishnah Keritot 6:2.
4. Mishnah Keritot 6:2.
5. Mishnah Keritot 6:2-3.
6. Rambam, Perush haMishnayot, Keritot 6:2:1.
7. Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Pesulei HaMukdashin 18:13.
8. Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Pesulei HaMukdashin 18:13.
9. Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Pesulei HaMukdashin 18:13.
10. Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Pesulei HaMukdashin 18:13.
11. Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Me'ilah 8:8.
12. Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Niskei Mamon 10:2.
13. Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Rotze'ach U'Shmirat Nefesh 9:10.
14. Yachin, Keritot 6:11:1 s.v. יצא וירעה בעדר.
15. Mishnah Keritot 6:2.
16. Yachin, Keritot 6:13:1 s.v. הבשר יצא לבית השרפה.
17. Yachin, Keritot 6:13:1 s.v. הבשר יצא לבית השרפה.
18. Mishnah Keritot 6:2.
19. Yachin, Keritot 6:12:1 s.v. משנשחט הרי זה יקבר.
20. Mishnah Keritot 6:2.
21. Babylonian Talmud Temurah 28a.
22. Yachin, Keritot 6:13:1 s.v. הבשר יצא לבית השרפה.
23. Yachin, Keritot 6:13:1 s.v. הבשר יצא לבית השרפה.
24. Yachin, Keritot 6:13:1 s.v. הבשר יצא לבית השרפה.
25. Mishnah Keritot 6:2.
26. Yachin, Keritot 6:11:1 s.v. יצא וירעה בעדר.
27. Mishnah Keritot 6:2.
28. Babylonian Talmud Nazir 29b.
29. Mishnah Keritot 6:3.
30. Mishnat Eretz Yisrael, Keritot 6:2:4 s.v. עגלה ערופה אינה כן.
31. Mishnah Parah 7:6.
32. Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Parah Adumah 15:10.
33. Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Pesulei HaMukdashin 18:13.
34. Babylonian Talmud Nedarim 2a.